电商平台主导的E-闭环供应链定价、服务决策与回收模式

E-闭环供应链(E-CLSC)管理须有科学的定价与服务决策支撑。针对集中和分散回收模式,构建电商平台主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究E-CLSC定价与平台服务决策。通过对产品销售价格、平台服务水平等均衡策略分析,揭示回收主体投资有效性、回收转移价格等对E-CLSC均衡策略影响。研究表明:集中回收模式优于分散回收模式;在分散回收模式下,若回收主体投资有效性相同,制造商、平台均偏好制造商回收模式;平台回收与第三方回收模式相比,产品销售价格、平台服务水平相同,前者回收渠道效率较高;平台回收模式下,单位佣金与回收转移价格负相关,产品销售价格、平台服务水平、废旧产品回收率均与回收转移价格无关;若回收主体投资有效性差异程度较大,制造商回收模式并非总是最优的,回收主体投资有效性差异显著影响产品销售价格、回收渠道效率、平台服务水平和E-CLSC各成员利润。上述结论通过数值仿真进行了验证。     

在线短租平台的盈利模式及定价策略研究

线短租平台作为共享经济的重要平台之一,有着显著的特征:它只提供房间的信息展示等服务而不是提供产品,只决策交易佣金以及向谁收取佣金,而平台上交易的房间租赁服务的质量和价格均由房东来决策。文章考虑三种在线短租平台的盈利模式——向房东、向房客以及向双边用户都收取交易佣金,分别建立三阶段动态博弈模型,利用逆向归纳法分析了房东的房间服务质量和定价决策。通过均衡分析,得到以下结论:不管平台选择哪种盈利模式,当平台上已有的房东数量较少时,房东数量的增多反而不利于平台获利,而当已有房东数量超过规模临界值时,房东数量的增多会给平台带来更多的利益。有趣的是,如果平台想吸引更多的消费者,向房东收取交易佣金的盈利模式并不一定总是最优的。     

政府补贴和平台宣传投入下双渠道逆向供应链定价策略研究

整合线上和线下回收渠道,构建互联网回收平台和拆解商竞争回收、合作拆解的逆向供应链模型。通过设定互联网回收平台的宣传效应系数,探讨政府补贴拆解商和互联网回收平台进行宣传投入对逆向供应链定价决策和利润的影响。研究结果表明政府补贴和宣传投入相结合模式能够提高互联网回收平台和拆解商的经济收益,且优于只有政府补贴拆解商的情形。当宣传效应系数较小时,在合理的宣传投入范围内,二者的利润大于无宣传投入时的利润;当宣传效应系数较大时,互联网回收平台的利润始终随着宣传投入的增加而增大,而拆解商的利润随着宣传投入的增大呈现先增加后减少的变化趋势。     

基于电子商务B2B平台的个性化定制产品供应链治理结构重复博弈分析

个性化定制产品的供应链上下游企业合作面临着双边道德风险问题,电子商务B2B平台提供了该问题的一种有效治理模式,但是也存在着平台企业索要商业贿赂等自身治理问题。本文构建了电子商务平台的个性化定制产品的供应链治理重复博弈模型,分析了定制化产品的供应链双边道德风险治理结构,以及平台自身的激励问题。研究结果表明,第一,通过电商平台的信息检索服务,可以有效规避双边道德风险问题,达成帕雷托最优的供应链上下游合作。第二,为了加强电子商务平台的自身治理问题,需要采取“按效果收费”制度,完善用户反馈信息记录,尤其是加强行业自律,提高电子商务平台的社会公信力和市场声誉。     

考虑消费者转移的双渠道定价决策研究

产品的双渠道销售不仅给企业带来更多的利润收益,同时给企业在应对市场复杂需求方面带来冲突和挑战.以拥有双渠道销售的制造商为研究对象,基于消费者对制造商线下渠道和线上渠道存在的策略型行为,研究了渠道之间考虑存在消费者转移的双渠道产品定价及协调策略.首先,构建了"线下主导"和"线上主导"的Stackelberg分散决策博弈模型,得到分散决策模式下的双渠道最优定价均衡解,并分析了策略型消费者所占比例、线上消费者购买到产品概率、消费者转移概率对最优定价和总利润的影响.然后,构建了双渠道集中决策定价模式,通过分析得出存在唯一的双渠道最优定价策略,并给出其解析解表达式.最后,通过数值算例仿真分析进行验证.     

基于T-FAHP的线上购物顾客感知价值评价研究——以A购物平台为例

针对线上购物环境,明确基于平台-产品-顾客3类要素的顾客感知价值评价指标体系.使用三角模糊层次分析法(T-FAHP)构建评价模型,通过计算确定各指标权重值,对指标体系中的指标分五级变量赋予效用值,得到顾客感知价值评价分数.以A购物平台为例,验证评价模型的可行性.发现A平台主要优势在于产品价格以及降低了顾客对购物风险的感知.通过对指标元素分析解读,帮助线上购物企业制定竞争策略,提升顾客感知价值.     

两阶段再制造企业的产品定价研究

二手产品的回收再处理是众多制造商和再制造商不得不面对的问题.企业根据实际情况,考虑到顾客对再制造产品的认知差异,一般都是先翻新产品然后再升级再制造产品,因此,顾客对再制造产品的接受程度影响着再制造企业的定价决策,针对该问题构建了一个两阶段模型,其中第一阶段再制造企业将回收的产品进行简单翻新并投放市场;第二阶段,则会将产品拆卸加工再升级.以两阶段的价格作为决策变量分析再制造企业的最优生产策略.通过仿真得出结论,为再制造企业的生产决策提供一些依据.     

基于风险厌恶零售商的双渠道闭环供应链运作策略

在对称信息框架下,针对零售商存在风险厌恶特性的双渠道闭环供应链,基于Stackelberg博弈理论探讨了不同的回收再制造模式下(制造商不回收再制造、制造商独立回收再制造、制造商依托零售商回收再制造)供应链各主体的运作决策。研究发现,在不同回收再制造模式下,制造商与风险厌恶的零售商合作能够获得更多收益。市场波动的增大对供应链各主体并非始终是有害的,随着市场波动的增大,带有风险厌恶的零售商收益不断减小,而风险中性的双渠道制造商收益逐步增大,零售商风险厌恶特性为制造商带来了更多的收益。制造商独立回收再制造以及通过零售商进行回收再制造时,双渠道产品定价均低于不进行任何回收再制造模式下的定价,双渠道需求和利润均高于不进行任何回收再制造模式下的渠道需求和利润,即回收再制造模式不仅为下游顾客带来了更多的消费实惠,同时也为供应链各主体带来了更多的收益。     

基于网络顾客行为意向的物流服务供应链定价策略

就一个运营网络购物的供应链,分析物流服务需求方和服务提供方的定价和服务水平决策等问题。在成本共担优化模型中考虑基于顾客购买行为意向的产品需求函数,进而分别给出非合作、准合作和完全合作模式下供应链企业决策间的关系,以及网购顾客重购概率对最优定价策略的影响。结论有:证明三种合作模式下双方最优策略的存在性及存在条件;给出最优产品定价策略和服务定价策略间的数量关系,并证明其与网购顾客行为意向有关。数值分析表明,最优定价策略随服务水平和网购顾客重购概率的变化趋势受成本共担系数的影响;较小的成本分摊系数使最优产品定价随着服务水平和网购顾客重购概率的变化幅度增大。     

考虑顾客使用行为的汽车租赁容量分配策略研究

随着物联网技术的发展, 租赁公司通过智能技术可以实时监测顾客的使用行为, 因此可以根据顾客使用行为设计补贴策略以激励顾客在使用过程中保持良好的行为习惯。本文将租赁价格作为顾客行为的函数, 构建随机动态规划模型, 研究了多产品、多周期下汽车租赁公司的容量分配决策和补贴机制。考虑到所构建模型的状态变量维度较高, 因此提出两种近似算法对模型进行求解, 并通过数值仿真验证了模型的相关性质。在考虑顾客行为可以转变的前提下, 得到相关结论:租赁公司以机会成本作为容量分配决策的重要依据;当所需等级汽车缺货时, 由于低等级汽车的机会成本低于高等级汽车的机会成本, 因此满足升级条件时, 租赁公司总是按照等级顺序进行升级;在合理的补贴策略下, 公司的总收益将会随着补贴的增加而增加。     

Stochastic optimization on social networks with application to service pricing

In this paper we develop a combined simulation and optimization approach for solving difficult decision problems on complex dynamic networks. For a specific reference problem we consider a telecommunication service provider who offers a telecommunication service to a market with network effects. More particularly, the service consumption of an individual user depends on both idiosyncratic characteristics and the popularity of this service among the customer’s immediate neighborhood. Both the social network and the individual user preferences are largely heterogeneous and changing over time. In addition the service provider’s decisions are made in absence of perfect knowledge about user preferences. The service provider pursues the strategy of stimulating the demand by offering differentiated prices to the customers. For finding the optimal pricing we apply a stochastic quasi-gradient algorithm that is integrated with a simulation model that drives the evolution of the network and user preferences over time. We show that exploiting the social network structure and implementing differentiated pricing can substantially increase the revenues of a service provider operating on a social network. More generally, we show that stochastic gradient methods represent a powerful methodology for the optimization of decisions in social networks.     

产品服务化供应链核心企业的服务模式决策研究

在以系统集成商为主导的产品服务化供应链中,考虑顾客效用的情况下,将服务提供商单独提供服务和系统集成商与服务提供商共同提供服务这两种情形下的最优决策进行比较,发现当服务提供商单独提供服务时,随着服务成本的增加,服务提供商的服务水平会降低,从而导致顾客需求、顾客的总效用、服务提供商的收益、系统集成商的收益和供应链总收益均会降低。当系统集成商与服务提供商共同提供服务时,可以增加顾客需求,提高系统集成商的收益、供应链的总收益和顾客的总效用,但降低了服务提供商的收益。     

基于在线评论的多个竞争制造商和零售商的产品定价策略

在线评论作为一种产品信息传播载体,越来越受到网上电商及消费者的重视,并在很大程度上影响消费者的购买决策。本文在多个竞争性制造商为在线零售商提供可替代性产品并通过零售商销售给网络消费者的电子商务环境下,研究在线评论信息如何影响网络消费者购买决策及在线零售商和制造商的定价策略。以neo-Hoteling模型为基础,构建了依赖零售渠道在线评论的消费者选择模型,并通过模型求解定量分析了二级供应链结构分散系统下在线评论对多个竞争性制造商及零售商最优决策的影响。得到当制造商基于评论制定最优定价策略时,在线评论对市场竞争强度没有影响,但决定潜在市场大小;各产品的均衡批发价及销售价按一定的比例随评论揭示的该产品与其他产品质量均值之差(正或负)增加或减少,评论信息通常会使制造商因好评而获利,由于评论增加了不同产品需求的不对称性,零售商因而具有更大的调价空间,往往通过提高(降低)占据有利(不利)评论的产品价格获得更高的利润。     

研发外包中考虑服务商道德风险与资金限制的支付契约

针对研发外包中服务商道德风险防范与激励问题,在考虑服务商自有资金限制下,设计了研发外包支付契约,分析了契约的特性。研究表明,服务商自有资金的多少会影响支付契约的激励效果。当服务商自有资金很少时,支付契约对道德风险的防范与激励效果较差。当服务商自有资金达到一定量时,随着自有资金的增多,支付契约的激励效果越来越强,特别的当服务商自有资金超过很大一个量时,支付契约能激励服务商实现系统最优的工作努力程度。     

Operationalizing technology improvements in product development decision-making

Achieving competitive advantage and price premiums in many technology-based markets requires the incorporation of current technology in new products. To do so, firms in hyper-competitive environments increasingly plan and design their products concurrent with the independent development and validation of underlying technologies. Simultaneous validation of a core technology has important implications for a company’s product positioning and launch sequence decisions making these traditional marketing decisions relevant to operations managers. Prior research has shown that to minimize cannibalization in the absence of such improvements in technology, a firm should not launch low-end products before high-end products. However, concurrent evolution of technology can make it desirable and even necessary to introduce low-end products before high-end products. This is because in technology-based industries, improvements in technology delay the introduction of a high-end product, and a firm must trade-off the benefit of launching the low-end product earlier (greater discounted profits) against the cost of cannibalization of high-end product sales. High-end product cannibalization can be further reduced by offering the customer an option to upgrade from the low-end to high-end product, with important implications for the firm’s product positioning and introduction sequence decisions. Based on our study in the high technology industry, we model the product positioning and introduction sequence decisions under the simultaneous evolution of technology. Our analysis indicates that it may be optimal in a variety of circumstances for a firm to launch products in an increasing order of performance, even in the absence of network externalities. Besides presenting analytical results for product positioning and profit from different introduction sequences, the paper also makes a contribution to managerial practice by providing insights in the form of a conceptual framework.     

Time-dependent and independent control rules for coordinated production and pricing under demand uncertainty and finite planning horizons

We address the effect of uncertainty on a manufacturer’s dynamic production and pricing decisions over a finite planning horizon. The demand for products, which depends on their price, is characterized by two stochastic processes: potential demand and customer price sensitivity. An optimal policy for coordinating production and pricing is a time-dependent feedback rule with respect to the state of the manufacturer’s inventories. We show that when the volatility of customer sensitivity to the product price is negligible, the optimal policy can be obtained analytically. Moreover, our simulations demonstrate that the volatility of stochastic customer price sensitivity does not have a strong effect on the manufacturer’s expected profit. Therefore, the solution derived for the case of customer price sensitivity with zero volatility can serve as a good approximation heuristic for the optimal policy if the true volatility of customer price sensitivity is within 40 % of its mean and the volatility of potential demand is within 25 % of its mean. Moreover, under these conditions, a simplified, time-independent control rule deteriorates expected profits by only 1.5 %.     

Supply planning models for a remanufacturer under just-in-time manufacturing environment with reverse logistics

We study a supply planning problem in a manufacturing system with two stages. The first stage is a remanufacturer that supplies two closely-related components to the second (manufacturing) stage, which uses each component as the basis for its respective product. The used products are recovered from the market by a third-party logistic provider through an established reverse logistics network. The remanufacturer may satisfy the manufacturer’s demand either by purchasing new components or by remanufacturing components recovered from the returned used products. The remanufacturer’s costs arise from product recovery, remanufacturing components, purchasing original components, holding inventories of recovered products and remanufactured components, production setups (at the first stage and at each component changeover), disposal of recovered products that are not remanufactured, and coordinating the supply modes. The objective is to develop optimal production plans for different production strategies. These strategies are differentiated by whether inventories of recovered products or remanufactured components are carried, and by whether the order in which retailers are served during the planning horizon may be resequenced. We devise production policies that minimize the total cost at the remanufacturer by specifying the quantity of components to be remanufactured, the quantity of new components to be purchased from suppliers, and the quantity of recovered used products that must be disposed. The effects of production capacity are also explored. A comprehensive computational study provides insights into this closed-loop supply chain for those strategies that are shown to be NP-hard.     

供应链纵向结构对EPR政策激励效果的影响研究

为了揭示供应链纵向结构对EPR政策激励效果的影响,本文通过构建EPR政策约束下由上游制造商和下游客户所组成的供应链决策模型,分别在纵向一体化和纵向分离两种典型的供应链纵向市场结构下,考察了EPR政策对制造商环保性能和可循环性设计决策的激励影响。结果表明:在不同的供应链纵向结构下,由于制造商与客户之间的利益协调机制存在着差异,使得EPR政策对制造商环境设计选择的激励效果将发生变化。在纵向一体化结构下EPR政策对制造商可循环性的激励效果更强;而EPR政策对环保性能的激励在哪种供应链纵向结构下更强是不确定的,最终还取决于行业本身在生产成本和环境成本等方面的特征。最后,基于本文的研究结论给出了EPR政策与产业政策相配套的政策建议。     

Integration of pricing and capacity allocation for perishable products

For years pricing and capacity allocation decisions in most revenue management models have been carried out independently. This article presents a comprehensive model to integrate these two decisions for perishable products. We assume that the supplier sells the same products to different micro-markets at distinct prices. Throughout the sales season, the supplier faces decisions as to which micro-markets or customer classes should be served and at what prices. We show that (i) at any time, a customer class is active (being served) if and only if the price offered is over a threshold level, but the optimal price may not be the highest one of the supplier’s choice; (ii) when the price decision is made in conjunction with inventory, it is similar to the procedure shown in pure pricing models, i.e., the optimal price comes from a subset of prices that forms a maximum increasing concave envelope; (iii) because of dynamic changes in the optimal prices, the nested-price structure does not necessarily hold in general and needs to be redefined; and (iv) the optimal pricing and capacity control policy is based on a sequence of threshold points that incorporate inventory, price and demand intensity. Numerical examples are provided.     

Service outsourcing under co-opetition and information asymmetry

Co-opetition refers to the phenomenon that firms simultaneously cooperate and compete in order to maximize their profits. This paper studies the contracting for an outsourcing supply chain (a user company vs. a service provider) in the presence of co-opetition and information asymmetry. The user company outsources part of his service capacity at a discount price to the service provider for sale. The service provider charges a commission for doing outsourcing work and competes with the user company for the service capacity to satisfy their respective demands. We solve for the service provider’s optimal commission decision and the user company’s optimal outsourcing decisions (outsourcing volume and price discount) when the user company has private information about his service capacity. Specifically, we highlight the following observations. For the service provider, a menu of two-part tariffs that consist of a fixed commission and a per-volume commission can reveal the true type of the user company’s capacity; the user company’s optimal outsourcing proportion is quasi-convex and the optimal price discount is non-decreasing in his capacity volume, which is counterintuitive.