高频数据交易量久期与价格变化的动态行为研究

本文基于Log-ACD模型和一类非参数模型,研究了股票价格持续上升时期和价格持续下降时期,交易量久期与价格变化的动态关系。研究表明在不同的市场格局下,价格变化对交易量的影响会有显著区别。另一方面我们发现阈值的选取会影响交易量久期的统计性质,阈值变大时交易量久期的长记忆性会变弱。本文在理论上也有所创新,采用了本文前两位作者提出的新的方法估计Log-ACD模型的参数,该方法在误差服从厚尾分布时具有良好的统计性质。利用新的估计构造了Wald检验统计量,检验价格变化的方向对预期交易量久期是否有显著影响。     

独立项目的久期预估与融资优化研究

项目投资与融资匹配程度,不仅关系到项目资金成本的大小,还体现对项目利率风险的对冲。基于债券久期的概念内涵,提出了项目久期与融资结构久期的概念及计算方法。以具体项目的投融资为案例进行研究,对案例公司已拟定的针对独立项目的债券融资方案进行投融资久期匹配、各期现金流匹配评价,并从市场利率曲线中发现融资成本优化空间,从投融资久期差及各期投融资现金流量差中找到优化融资的方案。以此提出结论:项目久期与融资结构久期的匹配是降低项目利率风险的重要手段;应综合融资结构久期与项目久期、现金流大小选择融资结构。     

基于随机久期利率免疫的银行资产负债优化模型

银行资产负债管理是指商业银行在负债数量和结构一定的条件下、对资产进行优化配置,通过平衡资产的流动性、盈利性和安全性,以实现银行收益的最大化。本文通过Vasicek动态期限结构模型推导出随机久期,以包括存量与增量在内的全部资产随机久期等于全部负债随机久期为约束条件、控制利率风险,辅以现行法律法规等其他约束条件,建立全部资产负债组合的随机久期利率风险免疫模型,并通过算例说明本模型构建过程。本文的创新与特色有三:一是通过建立全部资产负债组合的利率免疫条件,对包括存量与增量在内的全部资产组合利率风险进行控制。改变了现有研究在进行资产配置时,仅对增量组合风险控制的弊端。二是通过资产负债的随机久期缺口等于0的利率风险免疫条件建立资产负债优化模型,确保在利率发生变化时,银行股东的所有者权益不受损失。三是以银行各项资产组合收益率最大化为目标函数,通过随机久期的利率免疫条件控制利率风险,建立了全部资产负债组合的随机久期利率风险免疫模型。改变了现有研究的资产负债管理模型忽略随机久期变动的影响。     

基于动态利率风险免疫的银行资产负债优化模型

本文以CIR动态久期缺口的免疫条件为约束进行多资产和多负债的利率风险控制,通过建立线性规划模型来进行银行资产的最优配置。本文的创新与特色:一是通过引进随时间变化的动态利率久期参数构造利率风险控制条件,建立了控制利率风险的资产负债优化模型。改变了现有研究忽略利率动态变化、进而忽略平均久期动态变化的弊端。事实上,利率的动态变化必然引起平均久期的变动,忽略利率变动的控制条件是无法高精度地控制资产配置的利率风险的。二是通过以银行资产收益最大为目标函数,以动态利率久期缺口免疫为主要约束条件,辅以监管的流动性约束匹配银行的资产负债,回避了利率风险对银行所有者权益的影响,避免了利率变动对银行资产所有者带来的损害。     

基于违约风险的Vasicek利率风险研究

本文将非瞬时利率作为状态变量,通过Vasicek双因素期限结构模型得到了随机久期和凸度,并且讨论了考虑违约风险的Vasicek随机久期和凸度,使得对债券进行投资时,用Vasicek模型进行利率风险管理更加符合实际情况。     

久期与免除战略在资产——负债管理中的应用原理初探

本文从债券最基本的概念入手 ,利用金融数学的观点方法 ,阐明久期的定义 ,并总结出久期的性质 ,利用性质分析免除战略的基本原理。各种免除战略模型的分析对我国即将到来的利率市场化条件下如何进行固定收益资产的投资具有现实意义     

基于债券久期的国债期货套期保值模型分析

使用久期的方法在中国国债期货市场上进行套期保值是否有效?使用久期的方法研究国债期货套期保值的效率问题在国外已经很多,然而这种方法是否适合于目前中国的国债市场,相关研究还不多见,还有待进一步的证实.为此借鉴国外相关理论,采用比较研究的方法,以国债期货上市后2013年9月到2014年5月初,国债现货和国债期货的数据为样本,以基于久期的最优套期保值比率模型为主,其他模型为辅,比较出最优套期保值效率.研究结果表明,基于久期的套期保值方法在目前中国的国债市场效果一般.     

债券组合的风险价值

风险的价值(VaR)越来越受到人们的关注，VaR的估计主要依赖于参数、数据、假设和方法。本提供了计算债券组合的VaR模型，并介绍了基准利率久期和凸度的概念。     

横观各向同性广义热弹性扩散Rayleigh波在自由表面上的传播

基于广义热弹性扩散理论，边界无应力作用、绝热／恒温和化学势边界条件作用下，研究均匀、横观各向同性、热弹性扩散半空间Rayleigh波的传播．采用Green和kndsay（GL）理论，热扩散和热扩散．力学松弛条件采用4个不同的时间常数加以控制．导出了所研究介质中表面波传播的久期方程．为了说明和比较分析结果，用图形示出了各向异性和扩散对相速度、衰减系数的影响．同时，还推导了某些特殊情况下的频率方程．     

债券的利率敏感性测量

基于中国债券市场研究了固定利率和浮动利率债券的利率敏感性度量 :久期和凸性 .     

股权激励、经理人异质性与控制权私利

文章探讨了不同类型的经理人对股权激励与控制权私利之间关系所起的作用,并以2008~2018年所有A股上市公司数据进行验证,结果发现:独立型经理人对股权激励抑制控制权私利的行为起着正向调节作用,依附型经理人并未发挥有效的监督效应;在内部控制质量较低的环境中,股权激励对控制权私利的抑制效应更显著,发挥的替代效果更佳。本文的研究深化了对经理人公司治理角色的认识,拓宽了对控制权私利的研究。     

管理者过度自信对高技术企业技术外部获取方式选择的影响研究

企业管理者的业绩预测偏差是衡量管理者是否过度自信的一个重要体现,值得关注和研究。本研究采用我国2004~2013年高技术上市公司的相关数据,应用Ordered-probit模型实证分析了管理者过度自信对高技术上市公司技术外部获取方式选择的影响。研究结果表明:我国高技术上市公司以非股权技术联盟作为首要的技术外部获取方式,公司风险投资是最后的选择;同时,研究发现:在对技术外部获取方式进行选择时,管理者过度自信的高技术上市公司选择并购优先于合资和少数持股联盟,而管理者非过度自信的高技术上市公司选择少数持股联盟优先于并购和合资。该研究方法简单、高效、合理,是企业高管提升公司管理水平和科学获取技术外部的一种新的方法选择。     

Cross-National Stability of a Quality Management Model: A Comparative Study of the United States and Turkey

This study explores the perceptions of American and Turkish managers with respect to different dimensions of product quality. Survey data on perceptions of product quality were obtained from managers in both countries. Analyses using structural equation modeling and mean comparison tests were performed to evaluate five research hypotheses. Results provided partial support for the hypothesized differences in quality perceptions. The data indicated that although the conceptualization of quality did not differ across the two samples, there were some differences in terms of importance assigned to various aspects of quality. In particular, Turkish managers rated aspects pertaining to communication and shared definition, quality execution, and quality control higher than American managers. Implications for the rationalist and culturalist approaches to international management are discussed.     

市场竞争与国有企业所有权安排

改进了张维迎对地区间竞争与国有企业民营化的分析,给出了经营者的剩余索取份额对竞争性的连续依赖关系:国有企业若要降低成本,就必须参与市场竞争,随着市场竞争的加强,国有企业经营者的剩余索取份额应该逐渐增大,而当市场竞争水平超过某一阈值,国有企业经营者拥有全部剩余索取权是最优的.     

Allocation of risk capital on an internal market

We propose an allocation process for economic risk capital using an internal sequential auction in which investment allowances are based on marginal risk contributions. Division managers have incentive to give truthful bids because of bonus payments, which are linear in the division’s profit and linked to the auction bids. With our model, the auction process reaches an equilibrium identical to the optimal allocation if division managers have no diverging interests. When division managers do have diverging preferences in terms of empire building, headquarters faces a trade-off between incurring opportunity costs for achieving a suboptimal allocation and bonus costs paid to division managers to overcome their diverging interests. However, bonus costs are partially offset by proceeds from the auction. Depending on the model parameters, total agency costs can become negative. We show that for large values of new risk capital to be allocated, headquarters can always choose a level of bonus payments so that total costs are negative.     

Optimal transfer pricing schemes for work averse division managers with private information

This paper models a decentralized firm under information asymmetry and effort disutility on the part of managers. We assume that managers choose efforts before observing some private information. However, after the effort choice managers receive private information on their cost parameters which they report to the headquarters. There exist many situations in which managers need to take efforts before obtaining private information; for example, the regular maintenance effort on the machine, the effort on R&D for reducing costs and the effort taken to build relationships with the supplier. Two models are considered in this paper based on the timing of acquisition of private information by the managers. We derive optimal coordination mechanisms to facilitate internal transactions for the models. The equilibrium outcome of this paper suggests that: 1) regardless of the timing of managers' information acquisition, the optimal output level under asymmetric information can have overproduction or underproduction when compared with the full information optimal output; 2) under certain demand conditions managers cannot receive any information rent benefit for their private information even if they have the option to renege on the contract after obtaining their private information.     

乡镇企业经营管理者环境意识的模糊AHP评价

根据模糊 AHP评价方法 ,从环境知识 ,环境政策 ,环境评价 ,正面环境行为 ,负面环境行为 5个原则对乡镇企业经营管理者的环境意识进行定量计算 ,可以较全面地评价其环境意识 .     

赎回风险约束的开放式基金管理费研究

从赎回风险的视角研究开放式基金的管理费.以赎回风险为内生变量构建了基金管理人的动态投资决策模型,利用动态优化的Bellman原理得到了最优管理费.进一步分析发现:一是基金管理费与基金管理人的投资能力正相关,即基金管理人的投资能力越强,收取的基金管理费越多;二是基金管理费与投资者的赎回率负相关,即投资者的赎回率越大,基金管理费越少.而且选取中国股票型开放式基金的数据构建VAR计量经济模型,检验基金管理人的投资能力与投资者的赎回风险对基金管理费的影响,实证结果支持理论模型的结论.     

Contracting over multiple parameters: Capacity allocation in semiconductor manufacturing

This paper is a generalization of Mallik and Harker [Mallik, S., Harker, P.T., 2004. Coordinating supply chains with competition: Capacity allocation in semiconductor manufacturing. European Journal of Operational Research 159, 330–347] that presented an integrated model of incentive problems arising in forecasting and capacity allocation. In that model, multiple product managers and multiple manufacturing managers forecast the means of their respective demand and capacity distributions, and a central coordinator allocates capacities based on these forecasts. A mechanism that elicits truthful information from the managers was the main contribution of that paper. The objective of this paper is to generalize our previous results to multiple statistics reporting. This work assumes that the central coordinator can ask the managers to report multiple statistics (mean and variance, for example) about their respective distributions. We propose a game theoretic model and design a mechanism (a bonus scheme and an allocation rule) that elicits truthful reporting of all statistics by all managers. It turns out that the structure of the optimal bonus schemes are rather simple with easily calculable parameters. We also show that a large class of allocation rules are manipulable. A bonus is often required for elicitation of truthful information. We compare our results of multiple statistics reporting with those from Mallik and Harker (2004). We also characterize under what conditions the reporting of the extra information is of limited use.     

Regional economic impacts of fish resources utilization from the Barents Sea: Trade-offs between economic rent,employment and income

A multi-objective programming model has been developed to investigate the trade-offs among regional employment, regional income, and economic rent of the North Norwegian cod fisheries in the Barents Sea, where all vessels are regulated by an individual quota system. Fishery managers are confronted with the problem on how best to allocate the total allowable catch (TAC) among four vessel groups. It is apparent that depending on how fishery managers view the importance of each objective, the desirable allocation of TAC will differ. Therefore, the trade-offs information can be very useful to fishery managers indicating the relative “expensiveness” of trading one objective with another. Decision maps are generated depicting how the trade-offs between two objectives are affected by the third objective. Compromise solutions taking into account all three objectives will allocate the TAC to satisfy the maximum capacity of both the factory trawlers and the small-scale vessels with the remaining TAC distributed to the coastal fleet and fresh fish trawlers.