不同权力结构对制造商双渠道供应链的影响研究

在一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链中, 制造商拥有线下传统渠道及线上直销双渠道。首先根据消费者剩余理论, 构建了制造商双渠道需求函数;接着分别构建了两类Stackelberg博弈及Nash博弈三种权力结构下制造商和零售商的利润模型并对模型进行了求解;最后分析了三种不同权力结构对制造商双渠道供应链的影响。研究发现:制造商线上直销渠道价格不受三种博弈权力结构的影响;线下传统渠道零售价格、需求, 线上直销渠道需求及制造商双渠道供应链总利润不受两类Stackelberg博弈权力结构的影响;线下传统渠道零售价格及线上直销渠道需求在Nash博弈权力结构下最小, 而线下传统渠道需求及供应链总利润在Nash博弈权力结构下最大;制造商批发价格、利润及零售商利润对三种博弈权力结构较敏感, 随供应链成员自身博弈权力地位的下降而逐渐降低。     

Consumer returns reduction and information revelation mechanism for a supply chain

In this paper, we develop two revelation mechanism models of a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer under asymmetric information, where the retailer provides store assistance (SA) to reduce consumer returns rate and increase demand. Under full information, we find that a higher returns rate or returns handling cost increases the SA level if the market scale is sufficiently high. In the demand information asymmetry model, we find that: (i) the low-type retailer (facing a low demand) has no incentive to distort demand information while the high-type retailer may report wrong information; (ii) the manufacturer would like to design a menu of wholesale price-order quantity contract to induce truthful demand information and the manufacturer pays an information rent to the high-type retailer if the returns rate or returns handling cost for the retailer is sufficiently low; (iii) asymmetry of information does not change the monotonicity of the unit wholesale price in the retailer’s type, and information asymmetry decreases the retail price but increases the SA level. Unlike the demand information asymmetry model, a higher retailer’s returns handling cost expands the effects of information asymmetry on the retail price and the SA level, and using revelation mechanism decreases the channel profit if the retailer’s returns handling cost is sufficiently high under the returns rate information asymmetry model.     

强制减排规制下基于碳减排利润增量分享契约的供应链协调研究

碳减排会增加制造商的成本,导致批发价和零售价提高,从而抑制市场需求。以此为背景,本文针对由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链,研究了强制减排规制下考虑消费者低碳偏好时的供应链决策与协调。通过设计碳减排利润增量分享契约协调制造商和零售商的决策,实现帕累托改进,利用Rubinstein讨价还价模型最终确定减排利润分享比例。研究发现,实施碳减排利润分享契约能有效提高零售商的订货量,并降低批发价格;制造商的利润随着消费者低碳意识提高而提高;当净化率较低时,零售商的利润随消费者低碳意识提高而提高;当净化率较高时,零售商的利润随消费者低碳意识提高而降低;最后,论文通过数值模拟验证了碳减排利润分享契约的有效性。     

Inventory,channel coordination and bargaining in a manufacturer-retailer system

Substantial research literature has been developed over the years on the subject of inventory. The more recent literature has examined the fundamental relationships between inventory control and price theory. A significant portion of this literature assumes the ultimate consumer demand as a constant and characterizes the relationship between a manufacturer and a retailer as a leader-follower problem. A primary assumption in these studies is that the manufacturer, as the leader, exerts almost complete control over the behavior of the retailer. However, in practice, the retailer does exert some control over the manufacturer. This paper develops a framework that integrates inventory control with constant demand and the economic relationship between consumer demand and retail price. Within this framework, the impact of order quantity, wholesale price and retail price on the behavior of both the manufacturer and the retailer is investigated. Furthermore, this paper explores the issues and conclusions that results from coordinating the relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer. Our analyses demonstrate that channel coordination can be achieved by utilizing well-known bargaining models. A numerical example is provided to illustrate our theoretical findings.     

A supply chain model with direct and retail channels

We study a dual channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells to a retailer as well as to consumers directly. Consumers choose the purchase channel based on price and service qualities. The manufacturer decides the price of the direct channel and the retailer decides both price and order quantity. We develop conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer share the market in equilibrium. We show that the difference in marginal costs of the two channels plays an important role in determining the existence of dual channels in equilibrium. We also show that demand variability has a major influence on the equilibrium prices and on the manufacturer’s motivation for opening a direct channel. In the case that the manufacturer and the retailer coordinate and follow a centralized decision maker, we show that adding a direct channel will increase the overall profit. Our numerical results show that an increase in retailer’s service quality may increase the manufacturer’s profit in dual channel and a larger range of consumer service sensitivity may benefit both parties in the dual channel. Our results suggest that the manufacturer is likely to be better off in the dual channel than in the single channel when the retailer’s marginal cost is high and the wholesale price, consumer valuation and the demand variability are low.     

低碳双渠道供应链的需求信息共享策略研究

在需求不确定环境下,研究考虑消费者低碳意识的双渠道供应链的需求信息共享策略。论文考虑由单个零售商和单个进行碳减排的制造商构成的两级双渠道供应链,构建三种情形的模型:信息不共享、信息共享和只有零售商作预测。通过三种情形下供应链中成员最优决策和利润的比较,得到需求信息共享策略对供应链的影响;并进一步研究消费者低碳意识等参数对供应链运营的影响。研究发现,需求信息共享未必使得供应链成员利润均提高,当制造商预测准确度优于零售商时,零售商会选择信息共享,制造商选择信息不共享情形;当零售商比制造商预测准确时,零售商会选择信息不共享的情形,而制造商会选择仅有零售商预测,此时制造商应采取一定的激励措施以获得零售商的预测信息;消费者低碳意识对批发价、零售价、单位产品减排量、供应链成员利润均产生正向影响。     

低碳双渠道供应链的需求信息共享策略研究

在需求不确定环境下,研究考虑消费者低碳意识的双渠道供应链的需求信息共享策略。论文考虑由单个零售商和单个进行碳减排的制造商构成的两级双渠道供应链,构建三种情形的模型:信息不共享、信息共享和只有零售商作预测。通过三种情形下供应链中成员最优决策和利润的比较,得到需求信息共享策略对供应链的影响;并进一步研究消费者低碳意识等参数对供应链运营的影响。研究发现,需求信息共享未必使得供应链成员利润均提高,当制造商预测准确度优于零售商时,零售商会选择信息共享,制造商选择信息不共享情形;当零售商比制造商预测准确时,零售商会选择信息不共享的情形,而制造商会选择仅有零售商预测,此时制造商应采取一定的激励措施以获得零售商的预测信息;消费者低碳意识对批发价、零售价、单位产品减排量、供应链成员利润均产生正向影响。     

存在强势零售商时双渠道制造商在线推介策略研究

研究了存在强势零售商时双渠道制造商的推介策略问题。首先,以零售商弱势模型为基准,研究发现:较大的推介市场规模有助于制造商采取都推介策略,且零售商和制造商具有高度一致的推介策略偏好。其次,构建零售商强势决策模型,发现相对零售商弱势而言,制造商推介策略存在显著变化:当推介市场规模较小时,若批发价格较高,则制造商采取都推介策略;当推介市场规模较大时,若批发价格较低,则制造商仅推介官方商城。当且仅当推介市场规模和批发价格同时较小或较大时,零售商与制造商才能达成推介策略共识。此外,无论零售商弱势或强势,都推介策略下消费者剩余和社会福利优于仅推介官方商城策略。     

Demand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailer

This paper develops two coordination models of a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer, one dominant retailer and multiple fringe retailers to investigate how to coordinate the supply chain after demand disruption. We consider two coordination schedules, linear quantity discount schedule and Groves wholesale price schedule. We find that, under the linear quantity discount schedule, the manufacturer only needs to adjust the maximum variable wholesale price after demand disruption. For each case of the disrupted amount of demand, the higher the market share of the dominant retailer, the lower its average wholesale price and the subsidy will be under the linear quantity discount schedule, while the higher its fraction of the supply chain’s profit will be under Groves wholesale price schedule. When the increased amount of demand is very large and production cost is sufficiently low, linear quantity discount schedule is better for the manufacturer. However, when the production cost is sufficiently large, Groves wholesale price schedule is always better. We also find that the disrupted amount of demand largely affects the allocation of the supply chain’s profit.     

Resale price maintenance in supply chains with general multiplicative demand

We analyze a supply chain with a Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) contract in which the manufacturer sets the retail price with a general multiplicative price–demand function and prove the existence/uniqueness of an equilibrium. We also compare the equilibrium prices and quantities, consumer surplus and total system welfare for the RPM and wholesale price contracts. We conclude that a manufacturer may capture a smaller share of the total supply chain profit despite her ability to set the retail price.     

Some properties of buyback and other related schemes in a newsvendor-product supply chain with price-sensitive demand

A manufacturer wholesaling to a retailer a ‘newsvendor-type’ product such as a seasonal/fashion good or a perishable food item is considered here. It is known that such a manufacturer/retailer channel has difficulties in fully realizing the market's profit potential. We study a theoretical construct of such a channel and present practically useful results for a manufacturer trying to design more profitable pricing schemes. Specifically, we consider a ‘dominant’ manufacturer supplying a newsvendor-type product to a retailer. The retail market volume varies with the unit retail price according to a stochastic demand curve. We study the design and performance of ‘price-only’, ‘buyback’ and ‘manufacturer-imposed retail price’ schemes. All these schemes have been considered in earlier works. The first part of this paper studies some important but previously overlooked aspects of price-only and buyback schemes. We show that the performance of these schemes is strongly and somewhat counter-intuitively affected by the specific form of demand curve and of demand randomization. Thus, we identify hitherto neglected factors that must be carefully considered when designing pricing schemes for actual implementation. The second part of this paper demonstrates the practicality and merit of using buyback in conjunction with a manufacturer-imposed retail price—an arrangement overlooked in the literature because it is widely mistaken as illegal. Overall, the paper shows how a manufacturer can better realize the market's potential by: (i) modifying slightly the well-known buyback arrangement; and (ii) carefully modelling certain hitherto neglected aspects of the price/demand relationship—a conclusion quite contrary to what one might surmise from the current theoretical literature.     

货架展示量与定价模型及供应链协调分析

针对单生产商和单零售商组成的供应链,假定需求依赖于货架展示量与零售价格,分别建立了集中式控制下和分散式控制下的货架展示量与定价决策模型,给出了协调供应链的批发价加货架补贴合同。针对单生产商和n个零售商组成的供应链,假定总需求是n个零售商的总货架展示量和平均零售价格的函数、每个零售商的需求与其货架展示相关的促销努力成正比,分析了相应的集中式与分散式决策,并给出了协调供应链的批发价加货架补贴加转移支付合同。     

Pricing and two-tier advertising with one manufacturer and one retailer

This paper considers the pricing decisions and two-tier advertising levels between one manufacturer and one retailer where customer demand depends on the retail price and advertisement by a manufacturer and a retailer. We solve a Stackelberg game with the manufacturer as the leader and the retailer as the follower. With price sensitive customer demand and a linear wholesale contract, we obtain the optimal decisions by the manufacturer and the optimal responses by the retailer. Our results show that cost sharing of local advertising does not work well, it is better for the manufacturer to advertise nationally and offer the retailer a lower wholesale price.     

双渠道模式下制造商线上定制策略研究

本文针对制造商在传统零售渠道和线上网络渠道同时销售标准产品的情况下,是否应该开放线上定制策略的相关问题进行分析。首先通过圆形市场模型完成市场划分;其次,在制造商不开放线上定制策略和开放线上定制策略两种情况下分别构建制造商和零售商利润最大化模型,得到了两种情况下的市场均衡结果。通过分析和比较两种情况下制造商和零售商的最优决策结果发现,当标准产品的边际生产成本较大且开放线上定制策略的成本较小时,制造商应该开放线上定制策略;制造商开放线上定制策略后,会使标准产品的批发价格和零售价格增加,并削弱零售商的利润;定制产品的生产成本越高,制造商开放定制产品的动机越小;消费者对标准产品的适应成本越高,制造商开放定制产品的动机越大。     

Revenue-sharing versus wholesale price mechanisms under different channel power structures

We consider a supply chain channel with two manufacturers and one retailer. Each manufacturer can choose either a wholesale price contract or a revenue-sharing contract with the retailer. We discuss and compare the results of two different types of contracts under different channel power structures, to check whether it is beneficial for manufacturers to use revenue-sharing contracts under different scenarios. Then we consider a supply chain channel with one manufacturer and two retailers. Each retailer can choose either a wholesale price contract or a revenue-sharing contract with the manufacturer. We analyze the likely outcomes under different scenarios to discover whether it is beneficial to use revenue-sharing contracts.     

Channel coordination in green supply chain management

Environmental consciousness has become increasingly important in everyday life and business practice. The effort to reduce the impact of business activities on the environment has been labelled as green supply chain management. Any major greening project would require efforts on the part of the entire supply chain. However, very few studies have addressed the issue of coordinating the green supply chain. We consider the problem of coordination of a manufacturer and a retailer in a vertical supply chain, who put in efforts for ‘greening’ their operations. We address some pertinent questions in this regard such as extent of effort in greening of operations by manufacturer or retailer, level of cooperation between the two parties, and how to coordinate their operations in a supply chain. The greening efforts by the manufacturer and retailer result in demand expansion at the retail end. The decision variables of the manufacturer are wholesale price and greening effort, while those of the retailer are retail price and its greening effort. We find that the ratio of the optimal greening efforts put in by the manufacturer and retailer is equal to the ratio of their green sensitivity ratios and greening cost ratios. Further, profits and efforts are higher in the integrated channel as compared to the case of the decentralized channel. Finally, a two-part tariff contract is found to produce channel coordination in this problem. A numerical example illustrates the results.     

Contract type and decision right of sales promotion in supply chain management with a capital constrained retailer

From the practices of Chinese consumer electronics market, we find there are two key issues in supply chain management: The first issue is the contract type of either wholesale price contracts or consignment contracts with revenue sharing, and the second issue is the decision right of sales promotion (such as advertising, on-site shopping assistance, rebates, and post-sales service) owned by either manufacturers or retailers. We model a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer who has limited capital and faces deterministic demand depending on retail price and sales promotion. The two issues interact with each other. We show that only the combination (called as chain business mode) of a consignment contract with the manufacturer’s right of sales promotion or a wholesale price contract with the retailer’s right of sales promotion is better for both members. Moreover, the latter chain business mode is realized only when the retailer has more power in the chain and has enough capital, otherwise the former one is realized. But which one is preferred by customers? We find that the former is preferred by customers who mainly enjoy low price, while the latter is preferred by those who enjoy high sales promotion level.     

零售商占优下的两部定价合同与通道费

本文考虑由单个占优的零售商和单个供应商组成的二级供应链模型.在价格相依的随机需求下,研究分散系统下的批发价格合同与两部定价合同.在一定的条件下得到两种合同中供应链成员的最优决策和利润以及供应链系统的利润.分析表明,当零售商占优时两部定价合同比批发价格合同更有效.这在一定程度上说明当前零售业中收取通道费的合理性.     

A comparison of different quantity discount pricing policies in a two-echelon channel with stochastic and asymmetric demand information

In this paper, we study quantity discount pricing policies in a channel of one manufacturer and one retailer. The paper assumes that the channel faces a stochastic price-sensitive demand but the retailer can privately observe the realization of an uncertain demand parameter. The problem is analyzed as a Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer declares quantity discount pricing schemes to the retailer and then the retailer follows by selecting the retail price and associated quantity. Proposed in the paper are four quantity-discount pricing policies: “regular quantity discount”; “fixed percentage discount”; “incremental volume discount” and “fixed marginal-profit-rate discount”. Optimal solutions are derived, and numerical examples are presented to illustrate the efficiency of each discount policy.     

具有价格粘性的供应链动态模型及其协调策略

本文针对由一个制造商和一个零售商构成的供应链系统,在市场价格具有粘性的情况下,利用动态博弈理论分析了制造商和零售商如何确定其最优的批发价格和产品订购量以实现自身长期利润的最大化。本文首先利用汉密尔顿-雅可比-贝尔曼方程分别求解了供应链系统在Stackelberg博弈下的最优批发价格和最优产品订购数量。然后,利用数值算例说明了该供应链系统协调的必要性。最后,利用数量折扣契约协调了该供应链系统,并证明了协调的有效性。