不同权力结构对制造商双渠道供应链的影响研究

在一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链中, 制造商拥有线下传统渠道及线上直销双渠道。首先根据消费者剩余理论, 构建了制造商双渠道需求函数;接着分别构建了两类Stackelberg博弈及Nash博弈三种权力结构下制造商和零售商的利润模型并对模型进行了求解;最后分析了三种不同权力结构对制造商双渠道供应链的影响。研究发现:制造商线上直销渠道价格不受三种博弈权力结构的影响;线下传统渠道零售价格、需求, 线上直销渠道需求及制造商双渠道供应链总利润不受两类Stackelberg博弈权力结构的影响;线下传统渠道零售价格及线上直销渠道需求在Nash博弈权力结构下最小, 而线下传统渠道需求及供应链总利润在Nash博弈权力结构下最大;制造商批发价格、利润及零售商利润对三种博弈权力结构较敏感, 随供应链成员自身博弈权力地位的下降而逐渐降低。

Impact of Different Game Power Structures on the Manufacturer Dual-channel Supply Chain

Considering a supply chain composed of a manufacturer with both an offline traditional channel and an online direct channel and a retailer, a dual-channel demand function for the manufacturer is established based on the theory of consumer surplus. Then, it analyzes the impact of three power structures on supply chain participants’ pricing decisions, demands, and profits through constructing the manufacturer Stackelberg game, retailer Stackelberg game and Nash game models. The results show that the three games are shown to have no effect on manufacturer’s online direct channel price; the impacts of the two Stackelberg games on the retail price and the demand of the offline traditional channel, manufacturer’s online direct channel demands and supply chain’s total profits are identical. In Nash game, the offline channel retailer’s price and manufacturer’s online direct channel demands are the minimum, however, the offline channel retailer’s demands and supply chain’s total profits are the maximum. The manufacturer’s wholesale price and profits and the retailer’s profits decrease with the decline of the game dominance in the three games.