Risk sharing and information revelation mechanism of a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain facing an integrated competitor

This paper develops an information revelation mechanism model of a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain facing an outside integrated-competitor under demand uncertainty. We investigate how the manufacturer designs a wholesale price-order quantity contract to induce the retailer to report his risk sensitivity information truthfully. We try to explore the effects of the outside competitor and the risk-sharing rule on the optimal price-service level decisions of the retailer and the optimal wholesale prices of the manufacturer. We find that the strategic interaction plays an important role in the effect of risk sensitivity on the order quantity for the retailer. When the fraction of the risk cost shared by the manufacturer is sufficiently large (small), the optimal wholesale price for the high risk-averse retailer is higher (lower) than that for the low risk-averse retailer.     

强制减排规制下基于碳减排利润增量分享契约的供应链协调研究

碳减排会增加制造商的成本,导致批发价和零售价提高,从而抑制市场需求。以此为背景,本文针对由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链,研究了强制减排规制下考虑消费者低碳偏好时的供应链决策与协调。通过设计碳减排利润增量分享契约协调制造商和零售商的决策,实现帕累托改进,利用Rubinstein讨价还价模型最终确定减排利润分享比例。研究发现,实施碳减排利润分享契约能有效提高零售商的订货量,并降低批发价格;制造商的利润随着消费者低碳意识提高而提高;当净化率较低时,零售商的利润随消费者低碳意识提高而提高;当净化率较高时,零售商的利润随消费者低碳意识提高而降低;最后,论文通过数值模拟验证了碳减排利润分享契约的有效性。     

Pricing and two-tier advertising with one manufacturer and one retailer

This paper considers the pricing decisions and two-tier advertising levels between one manufacturer and one retailer where customer demand depends on the retail price and advertisement by a manufacturer and a retailer. We solve a Stackelberg game with the manufacturer as the leader and the retailer as the follower. With price sensitive customer demand and a linear wholesale contract, we obtain the optimal decisions by the manufacturer and the optimal responses by the retailer. Our results show that cost sharing of local advertising does not work well, it is better for the manufacturer to advertise nationally and offer the retailer a lower wholesale price.     

风险规避型零售商资金约束下双渠道闭环供应链的定价决策

针对单一风险中性制造商和单一风险规避零售商组成的双渠道闭环供应链,建立制造商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,讨论零售商分别通过银行贷款和延期支付解决资金约束问题时,各参与方的最优定价,分析回收率和零售商风险规避程度对决策结果的影响,并比较两种融资方式中决策结果的差异。研究表明:在双渠道闭环供应链中,零售商的资金约束不会影响批发价格、直销价格和零售价格随回收率的变化趋势。随着零售商风险规避程度的提高,银行贷款中批发价格的变化还与利率有关,直销价格始终降低;延期支付中批发价格始终提高,直销价格与之无关。当融资利率相等时,银行贷款中的批发价格始终高于延期支付,而直销价格和零售价格的相对大小还受利率和回收率的影响。     

双渠道模式下制造商线上定制策略研究

本文针对制造商在传统零售渠道和线上网络渠道同时销售标准产品的情况下,是否应该开放线上定制策略的相关问题进行分析。首先通过圆形市场模型完成市场划分;其次,在制造商不开放线上定制策略和开放线上定制策略两种情况下分别构建制造商和零售商利润最大化模型,得到了两种情况下的市场均衡结果。通过分析和比较两种情况下制造商和零售商的最优决策结果发现,当标准产品的边际生产成本较大且开放线上定制策略的成本较小时,制造商应该开放线上定制策略;制造商开放线上定制策略后,会使标准产品的批发价格和零售价格增加,并削弱零售商的利润;定制产品的生产成本越高,制造商开放定制产品的动机越小;消费者对标准产品的适应成本越高,制造商开放定制产品的动机越大。     

Demand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailer

This paper develops two coordination models of a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer, one dominant retailer and multiple fringe retailers to investigate how to coordinate the supply chain after demand disruption. We consider two coordination schedules, linear quantity discount schedule and Groves wholesale price schedule. We find that, under the linear quantity discount schedule, the manufacturer only needs to adjust the maximum variable wholesale price after demand disruption. For each case of the disrupted amount of demand, the higher the market share of the dominant retailer, the lower its average wholesale price and the subsidy will be under the linear quantity discount schedule, while the higher its fraction of the supply chain’s profit will be under Groves wholesale price schedule. When the increased amount of demand is very large and production cost is sufficiently low, linear quantity discount schedule is better for the manufacturer. However, when the production cost is sufficiently large, Groves wholesale price schedule is always better. We also find that the disrupted amount of demand largely affects the allocation of the supply chain’s profit.     

Product variety and channel structure strategy for a retailer-Stackelberg supply chain

Motivated by the observations that the direct sales channel is increasingly used for customized products and that retailers wield leadership, we develop in this paper a retailer-Stackelberg pricing model to investigate the product variety and channel structure strategies of manufacturer in a circular spatial market. To avoid channel conflict, we consider the commonly observed case where the indirect channel sells standard products whereas the direct channel offers custom products. Our analytical results indicate that if the reservation price in the indirect channel is sufficiently low, adding the direct channel raises the unit wholesale price and retail price in the indirect channel due to customization in the direct channel. Despite the fact that dual channels for the retailer may dominate the single indirect channel, we find that the motivation for the manufacturer to use dual channels decreases with the unit production cost, while increases with (i) the marginal cost of variety, (ii) the retailer’s marginal selling cost, and (iii) the customer’s fit cost. Interestingly, our equilibrium analysis demonstrates that it is more likely for the manufacturer to use dual channels under the retailer Stackelberg channel leadership scenario than under the manufacturer Stackelberg scenario if offering a greater variety is very expensive. When offering a greater variety is inexpensive, the decentralization of the indirect channel may invert the manufacturer’s channel structure decision. Furthermore, endogenization of product variety will also invert the channel structure decision if the standard product’s reservation price is sufficiently low.     

The impact of sharing customer returns information in a supply chain with and without a buyback policy

In this paper, we examine a single period problem in a supply chain in which a Stackelberg manufacturer supplies a product to a retailer who faces customer returns and demand uncertainty. We show that the manufacturer incurs a significant profit loss with and without a buyback policy if it fails to account for customer returns in the wholesale price decision. Under the assumption that the retailer is better informed than the manufacturer on customer returns information, we show that without a buyback policy, the retailer prefers not to share if the manufacturer overestimates while it prefers to share customer returns information if the manufacturer underestimates this information. If the manufacturer offers a buyback policy, we have the opposite results. We also discuss incentives to share the customer returns information and some of the issues that are raised in sharing this information.     

Analysis of the impact of price-sensitivity factors on the returns policy in coordinating supply chain

This paper analyzes the impact of price-sensitivity factors on characteristics of returns policy contracts in a single-period product supply chain. The contract considers stochastic and price-dependent demand. We present an analytical model and then use numerical methods with the Stackelberg game to identify the contract properties. We numerically show that a returns policy indeed improves supply chain performance. However, the benefits earned from the returns policy, under price-sensitive and variable demand, are different for different supply chain partners. First, when price-sensitivity is high, profit of the manufacturer decreases with increase in demand variability. Second, when price-sensitivity is sufficiently high and demand variability increases, the manufacturer has to surrender part of the profits to the retailer, in order to continue sales. However, even after surrendering part of the profits to the retailer, the manufacturer still earns profits that are higher than those available in a wholesale price contract. Last, from the perspective of division of channel profits, the retailer is always worse off in case of returns policies than in a wholesale price contract. Therefore, to apply this form of incentive in practice, managements should consider the impact of price-sensitivity on the returns policy and its performance.     

政府规制下不同市场力量主导的CLSC决策

为了研究不同市场力量主导下电器电子产品闭环供应链(CLSC)决策的差异以及政府规制对决策的影响,在政府规制和无政府规制下建立由制造商、销售商和消费者构成的闭环供应链模型,并分别在制造商和销售商主导市场的情形下,基于博弈方法求得政府最优规制工具、CLSC各成员的最优经营策略和利润以及社会福利。结果表明:无论政府规制与否,不同市场力量主导不会影响销售价、再生利用率和政府规制工具的制定,也不会影响社会福利,但会影响批发价和回收价决策以及各成员的利润,并且当制造商主导市场时批发价更高,销售商主导市场时回收价更高。制造商和销售商通常都在自己主导市场时利润最大。此外,无论市场主导力量是制造商还是销售商,政府规制都将提高批发价和销售价,且当再生利用率指标不高于制造商的最优再生利用率时,政府规制一般都有助于提高回收价以及各成员的利润。     

不同权力结构对制造商双渠道供应链的影响研究

在一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链中, 制造商拥有线下传统渠道及线上直销双渠道。首先根据消费者剩余理论, 构建了制造商双渠道需求函数;接着分别构建了两类Stackelberg博弈及Nash博弈三种权力结构下制造商和零售商的利润模型并对模型进行了求解;最后分析了三种不同权力结构对制造商双渠道供应链的影响。研究发现:制造商线上直销渠道价格不受三种博弈权力结构的影响;线下传统渠道零售价格、需求, 线上直销渠道需求及制造商双渠道供应链总利润不受两类Stackelberg博弈权力结构的影响;线下传统渠道零售价格及线上直销渠道需求在Nash博弈权力结构下最小, 而线下传统渠道需求及供应链总利润在Nash博弈权力结构下最大;制造商批发价格、利润及零售商利润对三种博弈权力结构较敏感, 随供应链成员自身博弈权力地位的下降而逐渐降低。     

低碳双渠道供应链的需求信息共享策略研究

在需求不确定环境下,研究考虑消费者低碳意识的双渠道供应链的需求信息共享策略。论文考虑由单个零售商和单个进行碳减排的制造商构成的两级双渠道供应链,构建三种情形的模型:信息不共享、信息共享和只有零售商作预测。通过三种情形下供应链中成员最优决策和利润的比较,得到需求信息共享策略对供应链的影响;并进一步研究消费者低碳意识等参数对供应链运营的影响。研究发现,需求信息共享未必使得供应链成员利润均提高,当制造商预测准确度优于零售商时,零售商会选择信息共享,制造商选择信息不共享情形;当零售商比制造商预测准确时,零售商会选择信息不共享的情形,而制造商会选择仅有零售商预测,此时制造商应采取一定的激励措施以获得零售商的预测信息;消费者低碳意识对批发价、零售价、单位产品减排量、供应链成员利润均产生正向影响。     

Coordinating a three-echelon supply chain under price and quality dependent demand with sub-supply chain and RFM strategies

The paper considers a three-echelon supply chain which consists of one supplier, one manufacturer and one retailer for trading a single product. The market demand at the retailer is influenced by the retail price and the quality of the product. The quality of the finished product at the manufacturer depends on the supplier’s raw material quality. We analyze the model for both deterministic and stochastic demand patterns. We first study the centralized and decentralized systems, and then the decentralized system with a sub-supply chain coordination strategy (where the manufacturer chooses to merge with either the supplier or the retailer and then acts as a single entity) and the two-level retail fixed mark-up (RFM) strategy. In the case of the two-level RFM strategy, the manufacturer and the retailer use fixed mark ups over the supplier’s wholesale price. The proposed models are demonstrated through numerical examples. It is observed from the numerical study that the two-level RFM strategy is superior to the sub-supply chain coordination strategy. Further, the two-level RFM strategy in the stochastic demand scenario is not as effective as in the deterministic demand scenario.     

低碳双渠道供应链的需求信息共享策略研究

在需求不确定环境下,研究考虑消费者低碳意识的双渠道供应链的需求信息共享策略。论文考虑由单个零售商和单个进行碳减排的制造商构成的两级双渠道供应链,构建三种情形的模型:信息不共享、信息共享和只有零售商作预测。通过三种情形下供应链中成员最优决策和利润的比较,得到需求信息共享策略对供应链的影响;并进一步研究消费者低碳意识等参数对供应链运营的影响。研究发现,需求信息共享未必使得供应链成员利润均提高,当制造商预测准确度优于零售商时,零售商会选择信息共享,制造商选择信息不共享情形;当零售商比制造商预测准确时,零售商会选择信息不共享的情形,而制造商会选择仅有零售商预测,此时制造商应采取一定的激励措施以获得零售商的预测信息;消费者低碳意识对批发价、零售价、单位产品减排量、供应链成员利润均产生正向影响。     

Pricing/inventory decisions and profit shares in a non-integrated marketing channel for a single-period product

We consider the situation in which the manufacturer of a single-period product first sets the unit wholesale price and then the retailer responds with an order size. We present mostly analytical results on the effects of the problem's environmental parameters (such as shortage cost and demand uncertainty) on the optimal decisions (ie, the unit wholesale price and retailer's order size) and on the expected profits of the manufacturer and of the retailer. Some of these effects are counter-intuitive and/or contradict related results published recently for similar models. The most important finding is that demand uncertainty is always harmful to the manufacturer but is very often beneficial to the retailer. This means that when the manufacturer can set the wholesale price, the manufacturer should be much more supportive (or even aggressive) than previously advised towards activities such as market surveys and ‘Quick Response’ that reduce the retailer's market uncertainty; in contrast, the retailer need not be as enthusiastic about these activities.     

考虑零售商销售努力的制造商入侵策略研究

渠道入侵正逐渐成为企业开拓市场,实现多渠道销售的重要策略。在考虑零售商销售努力的前提下,研究了制造商渠道入侵策略。构建了四种Stackelberg博弈模型:不入侵和无销售努力、入侵和无销售努力、不入侵和有销售努力、入侵和有销售努力。研究结果表明,线上直销渠道与线下零售渠道之间的不对称替代水平越高,越不利于制造商入侵;在制造商入侵的情况下,零售商销售努力促使制造商降低批发价格;渠道入侵成本较大且零售商销售努力投资效率高的前提下,销售努力可以有效缓解制造商入侵带来的负面影响;渠道入侵降低了零售商销售努力的动机。     

可再生能源配额制与碳排放权交易并行实施的政策效果

中国将同时实施可再生能源配额制与碳排放权交易,并以售电商为配额制的考核主体。本文建立两级供应链模型分析两者相互作用的政策效果。研究结果表明,引入碳排放权交易将导致火电价格上涨与可再生能源电力价格下降,有利于实现两者在同一价格水平竞争。然而,碳排放权交易亦将造成零售电价上涨,电力需求减少,且变化幅度与碳排放权价格和减排成本成正比。若配额比例与售电商差异性提高,在不影响环境成本内化于火电批发价格的同时,可降低售电商的转嫁成本。从而减小了可再生能源电力价格降幅与零售电价涨幅,并平抑碳排放权价格与减排成本上涨造成的电价与需求波动。     

基于风险偏好的供应链企业社会责任投入与定价策略研究

本文研究制造商承担企业社会责任时,竞争市场下供应链的均衡价格策略。通过Stackelberg博弈模型,探讨供应链成员的风险规避程度、竞争市场的需求波动性和竞争市场的需求相关性以及制造商企业社会责任水平对供应链均衡策略的影响。研究表明,在制造商承担企业社会责任时,风险规避程度对价格策略的影响依赖于制造商企业社会责任水平的高低;竞争市场的需求波动性较大或竞争市场需求相关性较高时,制造商向下游风险规避型零售商提供较低的批发价格合约, 此时产品的市场价格降低,消费者福利增加;当制造商的生产成本较低时,承担越高的企业社会责任导致消费者福利增加;反之,当制造商的生产成本较高时,消费者福利总是减少。     

不同补贴对象下闭环供应链信息共享价值研究

在一个制造商和一个零售商组成的二级闭环供应链中,为研究政府补贴下供应链需求信息共享对决策的影响及共享价值,针对两种补贴对象,构建并求解无信息共享和信息共享博弈模型,并进行仿真验证.研究表明:1)两种补贴对象下,制造商均能从信息共享中获益,零售商仅在绿色成本和回收成本较低时才会从信息共享中获益;绿色成本和回收成本稍高时,设计基于谈判势力的信息补偿机制能有效促进零售商共享信息.2)产品绿色度和回收率随预测需求量的提高而提高,批发价和零售价仅在回收成本较低时,才会随预测需求量的提高而提高.3)在仅补贴一方情况下,当补贴对象为低补贴一方时,两个主体所获的信息共享价值大;若对两者的补贴均较低,两个主体均希望补贴对象为零售商;若对两者的补贴均较高,零售商不愿共享需求信息.     

考虑政府补贴和公平偏好的可追溯食品供应链决策研究

考虑消费者溯源偏好与食品供应链可追溯水平对市场需求的影响,构建由一个食品生产企业和一个食品零售企业组成的可追溯食品供应链博弈模型,研究政府补贴、可追溯努力成本分担和公平偏好对可追溯食品供应链决策及利润的影响.结果 表明:政府补贴与可追溯努力成本分担均能促进食品生产企业提高可追溯努力水平,进而提升食品供应链可追溯水平.政...