RFID对供应链提前期压缩的影响及协调研究

提前期压缩是基于时间竞争的供应链管理的核心,是供应链竞争优势的有力来源。RFID技术通过提高供应链中信息共享、加速物流操作,进而缩短提前期。在市场需求预测精度随提前期变化的假设下,研究由生产商和零售商组成的两阶段供应链中,生产商承担压缩成本采用RFID技术压缩提前期对供应链及其成员收益的影响。确定了可使供应链收益提高的标签成本约束条件,并提出了相应的收益协调机制。研究结果表明:供应链成员的收益随服务水平和标签成本变化而变化,通过引入收益协调机制,可以实现供应链成员收益的Pareto改进。最后通过数值算例对结论进行了验证。     

考虑公平关切的鲜活农产品供应链收益共享契约

研究收益共享契约下供应链成员具有公平关切时的鲜活农产品供应链协调问题。基于鲜活农产品的新鲜度和运输损耗因素,考虑供应链成员的公平关切特性,建立二级鲜活农产品供应链收益共享契约模型。进而分析了仅有零售商或供应商一方考虑公平关切,以及双方都考虑公平关切等不同情形下的供应链协调机制。分析结果表明,考虑供应链成员公平关切特性的情况下,当批发价满足一定条件时,收益共享契约能够使鲜活农产品供应链实现协调,且公平关切对供应链成员的效用有一定影响。最后运用算例对研究结果进行了验证。     

零售商资金约束下两级供应链的延期支付与协调策略研究

本文研究了随机需求下两级供应链的延期支付问题，其中供应商作为主导者将首先设置延期支付利率，而受资金约束的零售商作为追随者将根据利率来确定订货量。通过构建Newsvendor模型对供应链各成员的利润进行了分析，并基于Stackelberg博弈研究了两级供应链下的延迟支付策略，得到了零售商的最优订货量及供应商的最优利率。此外，我们还研究了延期支付条件下的供应链协调问题，分别探讨了产品回购契约和收益共享契约下的供应链协调。研究结果表明：只有当供应商设置的利率低于特定阈值时，受资金约束的零售商才会采用延期支付，否则零售商会将全部初始资金用于采购而不采用延期支付；在延期支付条件下，提高利率将导致零售商订货量减少，并且供应商设置的利率不会随零售商的初始资金增大；延期支付只能部分协调供应链，同时在延期支付条件下，通过产品回购契约无法实现供应链的完全协调；在延期支付条件下，存在关于收益占比的帕累托改进区间，使得收益共享契约在该区间内能够实现供应链协调。最后，我们通过数值实验对研究结论进行了验证。     

使用收益分享合同获得渠道协调

考虑单周期库存(报童)类型的供应链协调问题,制造商将采用两种方式销售给零售商:直接销售方式(也称批发价合同)和收益分享方式.在收益分享方式中,零售商支付给制造商的批发价将小于直接由零售商购买时的批发价,但零售商必须将部分收益与制造商分享.文研究借助数值方法分析了制造商采用收益分享合同时的效果并证明收益分享合同可以获得渠道协调(帕累托提高).     

基于资金约束零售商的双层混合渠道供应链运作策略

针对一个双渠道制造商和一个存在资金约束的双渠道零售商组成的双层混合渠道供应链,研究了延期支付与金融机构借贷两种不同融资模式下,供应链博弈均衡策略和收益.指出在两种不同的融资模式下,供应链中三个渠道产品定价均高于零售商无资金约束时三个渠道产品定价,即零售商由于资金约束而导致的融资成本最终转嫁给了下游消费者,由消费者买单.进一步,研究指出供应链渠道间价格替代性的增强对零售商和供应链总收益始终产生消极的影响,但对制造商收益并非始终是有害的,一定条件下会促进制造商收益的增加.对比不同融资模式下各主体利润,指出当制造商延期支付时间长度敏感系数相对较小时,零售商会倾向选择延期支付合同模式;否则零售商倾向选择外部金融机构借贷融资模式.     

需求信息更新下资金约束供应链贸易信贷定价及订购决策

研究了需求信息更新情形下,单一制造商和单一资金约束零售商组成的两级供应链的定价与融资订购决策问题。研究发现当零售商初始资金水平越低或更新的需求估计值越大时,制造商将会采取更为激进的定价策略;零售商初始资金水平越低,其订购数量越大,仅当更新的需求估计值低于某一阈值时,零售商订购数量关于更新的需求估计值递增。此外,数值模拟显示,相对于制造商,需求信息更新更容易为零售商带来额外价值;在一定条件下,制造商和零售商可同时从需求信息更新中获得额外价值。     

资金成本下延迟支付期限的收益分享契约

针对由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的供应链系统,建立了随机需求下考虑有资金成本延迟支付期限的收益分享契约模型,研究两种决策(分散化和集中化)下,延迟支付期限是如何影响资金约束零售商的最优订货数量以及供应链系统的利润.分析表明,不管是分散化还是集中化决策,考虑有资金成本延迟支付期限的收益分享契约使供应链系统的最优订货量和利润都增大.最后,运用数值分析验证了结论.     

带有资金约束的风险厌恶零售商的双渠道供应链运作策略

在对称信息框架下,针对一个风险中性的双渠道制造商和一个存在资金约束的风险厌恶零售商组成的供应链系统,基于Stackelberg博弈理论构建了两种不同的融资模式下(延期支付模式与金融机构借贷模式)双渠道供应链的最优运作决策模型。通过模型分析,分别给出了两种不同融资模式下零售商和制造商的最优运作策略。研究发现,当零售商资金充足或存在资金约束但通过两种不同融资模式融资时,风险中性的双渠道制造商都更愿意和具有风险厌恶特性的零售商合作。当零售商资金不足时,制造商延期支付合同的设计可以有效解决零售商资金不足问题,实现供应链无资金约束时的收益。进一步研究指出,尽管金融机构提供借贷,但在一定条件下,零售商始终不会选择金融机构借贷模式。数值例子发现当制造商对延期支付时间长度敏感性很低时,零售商会偏爱金融机构借贷融资模式。否则,零售商始终偏爱延期支付模式。     

考虑退货策略和贸易信贷的库存运营策略选择研究

在贸易信贷背景下,研究了退货策略对供应链和供应链中各成员库存运营策略选择的影响,把不提供退货策略作为基准,通过建立模型求解表明:无论是否提供退货策略,供应链和供应链中各成员都会选择零售商管理库存的库存运营策略,并且提供退货策略要始终优于不提供退货策略;贷款利率对零售价、订购量和供应链利润无影响,对批发价和供应商的利润有负向影响,对零售商的利润有正向影响;供应商在市场中要通过平衡批发价和贷款利率来使供应链和供应链中各成员都获益.     

基于链与链竞争的零售商线上线下同价O2O销售策略研究

本文从链与链竞争的角度分析了零售商采用线上线下同价的O2O销售策略对所在供应链成员及竞争供应链成员运营和利润的影响。依据两种竞争模式建立链与链竞争的Stackelberg博弈模型,并得到了博弈均衡解。研究结果表明,当单位赶路成本相对电子渠道感知系数大于一定阈值时,理性的零售商将采用线上线下同价的O2O销售策略来增加自身利润。更重要的发现是,此时零售商所在供应链和竞争供应链上的制造商利润也会随之增加,而且当单位赶路成本相对电子渠道感知系数继续增大到另一阈值时,两条链上的所有成员均将受益。但线上线下同价的O2O销售策略会抬高售价,降低消费者剩余。     

Study on the coordination contract in supply chain under trade credit based on risk compensation

Trade credit changes the inventory risk between supplier and retailer. This leads to failure in the coordination of the supply chain. Considering that the supplier bears the retailer’s inventory risk under the credit condition, in this paper, the contract is constructed by combining the risk compensation and quantity discount contract to re-coordinate the supply chain and analyze the contract. The results show that the contract can achieve voluntary supply chain coordination; and when the seller’s funds is within a certain range, the coordinate contract can perform in the form of the wholesale price contract, and the wholesale price is influenced by its own funds and product value. In the end, a numerical example is given to verify this conclusion.     

Selling to the “Newsvendor” with a forecast update: Analysis of a dual purchase contract

We consider a supply chain in which a manufacturer sells to a procure-to-stock retailer facing a newsvendor problem with a forecast update. Under a wholesale price contract, the retailer waits as long as she can and optimally places her order after observing the forecast update. We show that the retailer’s wait-and-decide strategy, induced by the wholesale price contract, hinders the manufacturer’s ability to (1) set the wholesale price and maximize his profit, (2) hedge against excess inventory risk, and (3) reduce his profit uncertainty. To mitigate the adverse effect of wholesale price contract, we propose the dual purchase contract, through which the manufacturer provides a discount for orders placed before the forecast update. We characterize how and when a dual purchase contract creates strict Pareto improvement over a wholesale price contract. To do so, we establish the retailer’s optimal ordering policy and the manufacturer’s optimal pricing and production policies. We show how the dual purchase contract reduces profit variability and how it can be used as a risk hedging tool for a risk averse manufacturer. Through a numerical study, we provide additional managerial insights and show, for example, that market uncertainty is a key factor that defines when the dual purchase contract provides strict Pareto improvement over the wholesale price contract.     

Comparing improvement strategies for inventory inaccuracy in a two-echelon supply chain

Classical inventory theory often assumes no discrepancies between recorded inventory and actual inventory. However, inventory records are usually inaccurate due to many reasons in practice. For example, inventory shrinkage refers to the difference between booked inventory that a company should have as a result of its sales, purchasing, and manufacturing processes and actual inventory that it has on hand. This paper concerns the impact of inventory shrinkage to a supply chain and investigates different strategies to deal with inventory shrinkage. We consider a single-period two-echelon supply chain consisting of a Stackelberg manufacturer and a retailer whose inventory is subject to shrinkage errors. Our analysis is based on a single-period newsvendor model and considers the following cases of order decisions: (a) the retailer ignores the inventory errors; (b) the retailer estimates the errors; (c) the retailer shares the inventory error information with the manufacturer; and (d) RFID technology is used to reduce or eliminate the errors. The first case is the base strategy and a common practice for many supply chains, the other two represent certain non-technological strategies of the retailer when dealing with inventory inaccuracy, and the last one represents a technology improvement strategy by the manufacturer to reduce or eliminate inventory shrinkage errors. We compare these improvement strategies and derive critical tag price for RFID implementation as a technological remedy for the inventory inaccuracy problem. Conditions for the profitability of RFID adoption are discussed.     

Revenue-sharing versus wholesale price mechanisms under different channel power structures

We consider a supply chain channel with two manufacturers and one retailer. Each manufacturer can choose either a wholesale price contract or a revenue-sharing contract with the retailer. We discuss and compare the results of two different types of contracts under different channel power structures, to check whether it is beneficial for manufacturers to use revenue-sharing contracts under different scenarios. Then we consider a supply chain channel with one manufacturer and two retailers. Each retailer can choose either a wholesale price contract or a revenue-sharing contract with the manufacturer. We analyze the likely outcomes under different scenarios to discover whether it is beneficial to use revenue-sharing contracts.     

基于CVaR和期末二次订购的供应链协调模型

运用条件风险值CVaR度量准则,考察了两生产模式下风险规避且有促销努力的零售商和风险中性制造商的回购契约协调问题。讨论了供应链各成员的策略分析和如何利用回购契约协调供应链,然后分析了延期供给率、零售商风险规避系数和回购价格、两生产模式下的不同批发价格等参数对供应链各成员决策的影响。研究发现引入成本分担机制的回购契约能否协调供应链与零售商的风险规避程度有关。最后通过数值仿真验证了文中的主要结论,并得出一些管理启示。     

政府规制下不同市场力量主导的CLSC决策

为了研究不同市场力量主导下电器电子产品闭环供应链(CLSC)决策的差异以及政府规制对决策的影响,在政府规制和无政府规制下建立由制造商、销售商和消费者构成的闭环供应链模型,并分别在制造商和销售商主导市场的情形下,基于博弈方法求得政府最优规制工具、CLSC各成员的最优经营策略和利润以及社会福利。结果表明:无论政府规制与否,不同市场力量主导不会影响销售价、再生利用率和政府规制工具的制定,也不会影响社会福利,但会影响批发价和回收价决策以及各成员的利润,并且当制造商主导市场时批发价更高,销售商主导市场时回收价更高。制造商和销售商通常都在自己主导市场时利润最大。此外,无论市场主导力量是制造商还是销售商,政府规制都将提高批发价和销售价,且当再生利用率指标不高于制造商的最优再生利用率时,政府规制一般都有助于提高回收价以及各成员的利润。     

Analysis of the impact of price-sensitivity factors on the returns policy in coordinating supply chain

This paper analyzes the impact of price-sensitivity factors on characteristics of returns policy contracts in a single-period product supply chain. The contract considers stochastic and price-dependent demand. We present an analytical model and then use numerical methods with the Stackelberg game to identify the contract properties. We numerically show that a returns policy indeed improves supply chain performance. However, the benefits earned from the returns policy, under price-sensitive and variable demand, are different for different supply chain partners. First, when price-sensitivity is high, profit of the manufacturer decreases with increase in demand variability. Second, when price-sensitivity is sufficiently high and demand variability increases, the manufacturer has to surrender part of the profits to the retailer, in order to continue sales. However, even after surrendering part of the profits to the retailer, the manufacturer still earns profits that are higher than those available in a wholesale price contract. Last, from the perspective of division of channel profits, the retailer is always worse off in case of returns policies than in a wholesale price contract. Therefore, to apply this form of incentive in practice, managements should consider the impact of price-sensitivity on the returns policy and its performance.     

Coordination of supply chains by option contracts: A cooperative game theory approach

Manufacturer–retailer supply chains commonly adopt a wholesale price mechanism. This mechanism, however, has often led manufacturers and retailers to situations of conflicts of interest. For example, due to uncertain market demand, retailers prefer to order flexibly from manufacturers so as to avoid incurring inventory costs and to be able to respond flexibly to market changes. Manufacturers, on the other hand, prefer retailers to place full orders as early as possible so that they can hedge against the risks of over- and under-production. Such conflicts between retailers and manufacturers can result in an inefficient supply chain. Motivated by this problem, we take a cooperative game approach in this paper to consider the coordination issue in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain using option contracts. Using the wholesale price mechanism as a benchmark, we develop an option contract model. Our study demonstrates that, compared with the benchmark based on the wholesale price mechanism, option contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve Pareto-improvement. We also discuss scenarios in which option contracts are selected according to individual supply chain members’ risk preferences and negotiating powers.     

零售商占优下的两部定价合同与通道费

本文考虑由单个占优的零售商和单个供应商组成的二级供应链模型.在价格相依的随机需求下,研究分散系统下的批发价格合同与两部定价合同.在一定的条件下得到两种合同中供应链成员的最优决策和利润以及供应链系统的利润.分析表明,当零售商占优时两部定价合同比批发价格合同更有效.这在一定程度上说明当前零售业中收取通道费的合理性.     

多重参照点、公平偏好和三级供应链协调机制设计

在“单个制造商—单个分销商—单个零售商”三级供应链框架下,考察零售商依赖于多重参照点的公平偏好对于供应链运作造成的偏差,并在此基础上设计一个能够实现供应链整体协调的利润共享组合契约。研究发现:零售商对分销商利润和制造商利润的公平感知影响批发价格和分销价格变动的机制具有差异性;零售商的公平偏好不影响供应链的整体利润,但是会引起利润在各厂商间的重新分配;通过实行一个合理的利润共享组合契约,可以在零售商具有公平偏好的情形下达到供应链全局最优。最后用数值仿真验证了该利润共享组合契约作为协调机制的可行性。