具有限制结盟结构的供应链合作创新及其收益分配

针对具有限制结盟结构特征的三级供应链合作创新联盟问题,分析了由单个供应商、制造商和销售商组成的不同联盟系统下的收益情况,并运用图合作博弈的average tree solution(简称“A-T解”)法对各成员的收益进行了分配。结果表明,所有成员参与供应链联盟时总收益最大,且A-T解分配法与Shapley值法相比更具合理性和有效性,能充分突出成员在合作联盟中的特殊地位(位置)及其重要性,该结论进一步通过比较不同级别结构下的供应链收益分配问题进行说明。     

基于Shapley值法的三级闭环供应链收益分配模型

以合作博弈为基本研究方法,构建了由制造商、第三方物流和零售商组成的三级闭环供应链收益分配模型,不同合作方式下各合作联盟收益的特征函数的计算结果表明:在采取合作时,各合作联盟的收益均大于或等于各成员在不合作时各自的收益之和,文章验证了在三级闭环供应链收益分配模型中应用Shapley值法的可行性,说明构建的收益分配模型具有普遍适用性.然后运用Shapley值法求得三级闭环供应链收益分配的合理均衡解,最后结合算例进行了分析论证.     

碳标签制度下基于AT解的三级供应链收益分配研究

在提倡低碳减排的大背景下,为更好地促进供应链合作减排,研究碳标签制度下供应链收益分配问题具有重要意义.文章以具有限制联盟结构的三级供应链为研究对象,对由供应商,制造商和零售商构成的三级供应链可能形成的四种合作减排联盟情形进行分析,运用AT解和Shapley值对合作减排收益进行了收益分配.结果表明,供应链各参与者集中决策时该供应链总收益最大,且采用AT解进行收益分配的结果考虑了参与者在供应链结构中的作用,相比Shapley值其分配结果更加合理有效.     

不同决策模式下的双渠道供应链合作广告博弈分析

本文研究了双渠道供应链中非合作广告模式、合作广告模式和战略联盟模式下的合作广告问题,给出了不同决策模式下的均衡解。对比分析发现:战略联盟模式中品牌广告和零售商广告投入水平最高,网络广告投入水平最低且零售渠道的产品需求最高。合作广告模式和战略联盟模式中的系统收益与广告比率负相关,与产品网络适应度正相关。     

产业集群背景下模糊联盟结构合作博弈的核心

运用模糊延拓等方法将核心理论扩展到模糊联盟结构合作博弈中,提供一种兼顾局中人的模糊参与度与联盟偏好的稳定分配方法,并且给出模糊联盟结构合作博弈的模糊Owen值稳定的充分条件.基于供应链协同创新中的不确定因素较多,将此跨供应链协作问题抽象为模糊联盟结构合作博弈模型,计算模糊信息下合作利益分配策略,在两个层次上分配额外收益:产业集群,供应链.模糊联盟结构合作博弈理论以及求解方法的研究,理论上拓展了经典合作博弈的应用范围,实证上又为供应链协同创新问题提供了一定分析思路,降低了由于收益分配不均导致的跨区域供应链破裂的概率.     

包含第三方物流商的易腐商品供应链中最优决策与合作研究

本文在前人研究基础上,加人物流商这一供应链决策主体,研究了包含第三方物流商的易腐商品供应链中的最优决策与合作问题.分别研究了分散决策,局部合作下的决策和集中决策下的各供应链成员的决策和收益模型.之后针对包含三个供应链成员的合作问题设计了基于时间的价格折扣分配和赔偿合同相结合的三方契约.最后通过数值试验,验证了理论结论:随着合作程度的提高,供应链各成员的收益也提高.并揭示了一些理论结论中不易观察的现象:随着成员风险厌恶程度、产品的易腐程度和价格弹性的增加,通过合作更能够避免收益损失,因而在这些情况下,更有合作的必要.     

区间合作博弈Shapley值的矩阵计算方法

在合作博弈中,Shapley单点解按照参与者对联盟的边际贡献率对联盟的收益进行分配.联盟收益具有不确定性,往往不能用精确数值表示,更多学者关注特征函数取值为有限区间的合作博弈(区间合作博弈)的收益分配.文章利用矩阵半张量积,研究区间合作博弈中含有折扣因子的Shapley区间值的矩阵计算.首先利用矩阵的半张量积将合作博弈的特征函数表示为矩阵形式,得到特征函数区间矩阵.然后通过构造区间合作博弈Shapley矩阵,将区间合作博弈的Shapley值(区间)计算转化为矩阵形式.最后利用区间合作博弈Shapley值矩阵公式计算分析航空公司供应链联盟收益的Shapley值.文章给出的区间合作博弈Shapley值的矩阵计算公式形式简洁,为区间合作博弈的研究提供了新的思路.     

供应链中多供应商与单零售商的利益分配问题研究

本文利用合作博弈的方法，研究了“多供应商-单零售商”组成的供应链中成员的合作及利益分配问题。由于供应链中所有成员之间相互竞争时产生的利益是无效率的，供应链成员只有合作形成大联盟才能保证整体和成员局部利益更优。本文分析了大联盟的可行性，给出了相应的稳定利益分配方案。结果表明，零售商加入由供应商组成的“协作”联盟，是实现供应链各方利益最优化的有效途径。     

基于线性规划博弈的供应链配送问题

着重建立了供应链配送问题的线性规划模型,分析说明了配送合作联盟对各成员是有利的.在配送博弈中,根据配送问题的对偶最优解和配送博弈核心之间的关系,构造了收益分配函数并证明了配送博弈的核心非空、所对应的分配方案稳定等性质.最后通过算例应用验证了模型和分配函数的有效性.     

碳限额与交易机制下受资金约束的供应链优化

在碳限额与交易机制下,研究零售商受资金约束的供应链优化问题。构建了制造商占优的两级供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,通过引入减排成本分担机制,分别给出了分散决策和集中决策的最优解。通过收益共享契约,实现了供应链协调和供应链成员利润的帕累托改善。通过算例分析了不同减排成本分担系数、碳交易价格对供应链利润和订购量、碳减排决策的影响,为供应链各成员开展减排合作提供了理论依据。研究结果表明,供应链成员的合作不仅可以提高供应链总绩效,而且有利于为消费者提供更多、更绿色的产品;碳价格的提高,促使供应链更加努力减排,从而提高了供应链总利润。     

含有混合销售渠道的供应链合作策略研究

本文通过Stackelberg博弈方法研究含有混合销售渠道的供应链中双渠道制造商参与的不同合作策略对供应链中企业的定价和利润的影响。研究表明:在有双渠道制造商参与的合作中,合作策略不仅增加了合作联盟的利润,而且也能够增加合作联盟外其他成员的利润;供应链中参与合作的企业越多,给供应链带来的总利润也越大;在参与合作联盟的成员数相同的条件下,供应链的纵向合作比横向合作给供应链能够带来更多的利润。最后,通过数值实验验证了上述结论。     

一厂多商联盟的利润分享方案和整段返利方法的确定

供应链中厂家与商家是一种合作竞争关系.本文从一厂一商型联盟的最大利润化的销售问题入手,在追求厂商供应链利润最大化的前提下,建立了一厂多商型联盟的利润模型.基于该模型,确定了联盟及厂商均可增加利润的分享方案,提出了基于分享方案而实行非固定的整段返利的数学表达式,且对整段返利的机制进行了讨论.研究结论表明用这一方法建立的返利机制,可以保障厂商联盟利润分享方案的实施.     

敏捷供应链管理中最优激励方案的实现问题研究

合理的利益分配策略可以稳定敏捷供应链的运营过程,加速敏捷供应链目标的实现.基于委托-代理理论,研究了敏捷供应链利益分配中最优激励方案的设计问题,得出在信息对称条件下由于合作伙伴企业的努力水平可以为主导企业所观测,因而容易制定最优激励方案并实现利益分配.而在更多的信息不对称条件下,需要对合作伙伴企业的产出结果进行监督和评估,通过不同努力水平下的分布概率间接地获得努力水平信息.该结论对于敏捷供应链利益分配系统的设计与实现具有重要指导意义.对最优激励方案在敏捷供应链利益分配中的实现过程进行了说明,通过适当的评价指标体系和评价方法,实现了利益分配中考虑努力水平等因素的激励策略.     

Profit allocation games in supply chains

The paper considers a supply chain where a number of agents are connected in some network relationship. Game theory is a very powerful framework for studying decision making problems, involving a group of agents in a supply chain. Allocation games examine the allocation of value among agents connected by a network. The ongoing actions in the supply chain are a mix of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior of the participants. The paper proposes a two-stage procedure for profit allocation based on combination of non-cooperative and cooperative game approaches. In the first stage, retailers meet customer price-dependent stochastic demand and seek to maximize total profit from the sale. Retailers are trying to align goals with producers on a contract basis and share the total profit with them. In the second stage, the cooperating producers allocate individual profits.     

基于区间shapley值的中小企业融资联盟利益分配

融资联盟是一种新型的中小企业融资模式,结合中小企业融资联盟预期收益不确定的特点,运用区间shapley值法进行企业间的利益分配,引入联盟企业的风险因子和融资成本,改进后的利益分配方式更具合理性和可行性,有利于维护融资联盟的长期稳定.     

基于AHP-GEM-Shapley值法的低碳技术创新联盟利益分配研究

科学合理的利益分配机制是保持低碳技术创新联盟稳定运行,实现联盟预期目标的关键。结合低碳技术创新联盟的特点,构建了低碳技术创新联盟利益分配指标体系,提出了基于AHP-GEM-Shapley的利益分配法,运用有效克服Saaty矩阵不一致性问题的AHP-GEM法确定联盟利益分配影响因素权重,使投资、风险、成本和贡献等影响因素定量化,修正了Shapley值法的利益分配策略,实现了兼顾多因素的联盟利益分配策略,通过实证分析验证了该方法的有效性和合理性。     

Optimal contracts and the manufacturer’s pricing strategies in a supply chain with an inequity-averse retailer

Studies in the supply chain literature have typically focused on profit or revenue maximization and assumed that agents within the supply chain are self-interested and only care about their own monetary payoffs. Research in these areas, however, rarely considers an important phenomenon called inequity aversion in which the object pursued by agents within the supply chain is not only their own profit maximization but also the equity of profit allocation. In fact, when agents within a supply chain collaborate with each other to serve a market, the scheme of profit allocation between them usually plays a determinate role in cooperation. Taking into account the impact of agents’ behavior of inequity aversion on the coordination of the supply chain, this paper investigates the optimal contracts and the manufacturer’s pricing strategies in a single-manufacturer and single-retailer supply chain. In this way, we obtain two interesting results: (1) the retailer’s equity aversion largely affects the manufacturer’s decision making, which is not always bad for the manufacturer; and (2) the retailer’s inequity aversion as well as the consumer’s price-sensitive coefficient plays a dominant role in the manufacturer’s decision making.     

Fair transfer price and inventory holding policies in two-enterprise supply chains

A key issue in supply chain optimisation involving multiple enterprises is the determination of policies that optimise the performance of the supply chain as a whole while ensuring adequate rewards for each participant.In this paper, we present a mathematical programming formulation for fair, optimised profit distribution between echelons in a general multi-enterprise supply chain. The proposed formulation is based on an approach applying the Nash bargaining solution for finding optimal multi-partner profit levels subject to given minimum echelon profit requirements.The overall problem is first formulated as a mixed integer non-linear programming (MINLP) model. A spatial and binary variable branch-and-bound algorithm is then applied to the above problem based on exact and approximate linearisations of the bilinear terms involved in the model, while at each node of the search tree, a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) problem is solved. The solution comprises inter-firm transfer prices, production and inventory levels, flows of products between echelons, and sales profiles.The applicability of the proposed approach is demonstrated by a number of illustrative examples based on industrial processes.     

Social responsibility allocation in two-echelon supply chains: Insights from wholesale price contracts

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is considered in a two-echelon supply chain consisting of an upstream supplier and a downstream firm that are bound by a wholesale price contract. CSR performance (the outcome of CSR conduct) of the whole supply chain is gauged by a global variable and the associated cost of achieving this CSR performance is only incurred by the supplier with an expectation of being shared with the downstream firm via the wholesale price contract. As such, the key issue is to determine who should be allocated as the responsibility holder with the right of offering the contract and how this right should be appropriately restricted. Game-theoretical analyses are carried out on six games, resulting from different interaction schemes between the supplier and the firm, to derive their corresponding equilibriums. Comparative institutional analyses are then conducted to determine the optimal social responsibility allocation based on both economic and CSR performance criteria. Main results are furnished in a series of propositions and their implications to the real-world business practice are discussed. The key findings are threefold: under the current model settings: (1) the optimal allocation scheme is to assign the supplier as the responsibility holder with appropriate restrictions on the corresponding rights to determine the wholesale price; (2) inherent conflict exists between the economic and CSR performance criteria and, hence, the two maxima cannot be achieved simultaneously; and (3) although integrative channel profit is not attainable, the system-wide profit will be improved by implementing optimal social responsibility allocation schemes.