有限合作博弈的Shapley分配

以Myerson关于有限合作的图博弈模型为基础,结合经典合作博弈的相关结论,建立了有限合作博弈的Shapley分配,讨论了分配的相关性质.同时在支付函数满足链递增性的假设下,进一步研究了有限合作关系变化对收益分配的影响,给出了相关的研究结论.     

带模糊时间窗的配送问题多目标优化研究

针对配送多目标优化问题,综合考虑车辆使用数、运输总里程和客户服务水平,基于双层规划的思想,解决了车辆数函数和运输里程函数的区间伸缩指标问题,并引入客户不满意度的模糊隶属度函数来描述配送服务水平。通过去量纲将三个优化目标转化为总目标函数的功效函数,并运用模糊层次分析法对三个函数分配权重,建立以车辆使用数最少、运输总里程最小、客户不满意度最低的标量化多目标模型,并运用模拟退火算法验证了模型的合理性和普适性。     

具有受限支付的合作博弈研究

n人合作博弈(N,υ)中的解是一个支付向量,用来将该合作博弈的收益值υ(N)公平合理地分配给参与合作的每个参与者.核心是研究最多的解概念之一.在考虑到合作博弈(N,υ)的收益值υ(N)不完全用来分配的情况时,本文推广了传统合作博弈的分配和核心等概念,称之为广义分配和广义核心,建立了广义核心的一些基本结果.     

中小制造企业物流配送模式选择的研究

本文从供应链的角度研究了中小制造企业物流配送模式及其选择的问题。利用合作博弈理论建立配送博弈费用模型,通过对中小制造企业可能采取的四种配送模式的费用模型求解,提出了适用于中小制造企业的物流配送模式,即第三方配送和共同配送相结合的配送模式,为中小制造企业物流配送模式的选择提供可行的决策参考。本文的研究结果突破了现有研究在单一配送模式下企业物流配送问题的局限,通过比较几种配送模式的费用,提出适合中小制造企业的复合式的物流配送模式。     

产业集群背景下模糊联盟结构合作博弈的核心

运用模糊延拓等方法将核心理论扩展到模糊联盟结构合作博弈中,提供一种兼顾局中人的模糊参与度与联盟偏好的稳定分配方法,并且给出模糊联盟结构合作博弈的模糊Owen值稳定的充分条件.基于供应链协同创新中的不确定因素较多,将此跨供应链协作问题抽象为模糊联盟结构合作博弈模型,计算模糊信息下合作利益分配策略,在两个层次上分配额外收益:产业集群,供应链.模糊联盟结构合作博弈理论以及求解方法的研究,理论上拓展了经典合作博弈的应用范围,实证上又为供应链协同创新问题提供了一定分析思路,降低了由于收益分配不均导致的跨区域供应链破裂的概率.     

加工时间离散可控的分批配送排序问题

研究了工件的加工时间是离散可控的,并且工件加工完后需要分批配送到客户的单机排序问题.一个客户在初始时刻将一批工件交给一个制造商进行加工.每个工件有多种加工模式,分配给每个工件的加工资源越多,则其加工时间越短.工件生产完后需要分批配送到客户处,每一批需要花费一定的时间和费用.研究了排序理论中主要的四个目标函数,构建了单机情况下的具体模型,分析了问题的复杂性,对具体的问题给出了它们的最优算法.     

考虑边流量有限的网络路径博弈问题研究

考虑每条边有流量约束的网络路径博弈问题, 根据收益函数单调递增的特点分析其内在零和性质, 并建模为存在公共边的路径博弈模型。在寻找均衡解的过程中, 首先考虑非合作的情形, 在局中人风险中性的假设下, 给出了求Nash均衡流量分配的标号法并证明该均衡分配的唯一性。接着进一步考虑局中人合作的可能性, 给出模型求得所有局中人的整体最大收益, 并基于纳什谈判模型给出目标函数为凸函数的数学模型确定唯一收益分配方案。事实上, 该方案是对剩余价值的平均分配。最后给出一个算例, 验证本文理论和方法的可行性。关键词:流量约束; 均衡流量; 网络路径博弈; 收益分配     

基于信息共享因子的玉米供应链合作博弈及利润分配机制构建

2016年玉米收储政策调整为“市场化收购”加“补贴”的新机制,粮食产后收储企业成为玉米供应链的参与主体,玉米供应链出现了合作不稳定、信息共享程度低等问题.以种植户、粮食产后收储企业和需求商组成的玉米供应链为研究对象,引入信息共享因子和合作关系系数,利用Stackelberg主从博弈构建合作定价博弈模型,结合合作利润分配机制的构建原则和内在运行方式,建立玉米供应链的合作利润分配机制模型,确定合作利润运行性分配量.结果表明企业利润随信息共享因子和合作关系系数的增加而不断增加,且增加的幅度逐渐变大;各企业获取利润大小不同,但利润函数曲线变化是一致的;有利于链上各企业合作的区间为[2/3,5/6];合作博弈性的利润分配更有利于主导供应链的核心企业,为激励合作,核心企业必须对合作企业进行利润补偿.     

物流企业共同配送利益分配机理研究——基于Shapley值法修正模型

配送企业通过结成联盟、实施共同配送可以集约资源,降低各配送成本,改善社会效益.针对联盟协作下配送企业间的利润分配问题构建收益分配的基础模型,引入风险,资源,商誉、品牌、市场地位等因素进行二次修正,用数值模拟的方法,揭示共同配送联盟利益分配机理.研究结论表明,修正后的利益分配机制,能有效地避免共同配送成员"搭便车"现象及平均主义思想,更能够体现分配的科学性.对促进配送企业积极参与共同配送、保持物流联盟的稳定具有重要意义.     

具有可变配送费用和固定配送时刻的单机排序问题

研究了单机环境下生产与配送的协同排序问题.有多个工件需要在一台机器上进行加工,加工完的工件需要分批配送到一个客户.每批工件只能在固定的几个配送时刻出发,不同的配送时刻对应着不同的配送费用.我们的目标是找到生产与配送的协同排序,极小化排序的时间费用与配送费用的加权和.研究了排序理论中主要的四个目标函数,构建了单机情况下的具体模型,分析了问题的复杂性,对于配送费用单调非增的情况给出了它们的最优算法.     

On computational methods for solutions of multiobjective linear production programming games

In this paper we consider a production model in which multiple decision makers pool resources to produce finished goods. Such a production model, which is assumed to be linear, can be formulated as a multiobjective linear programming problem. It is shown that a multi-commodity game arises from the multiobjective linear production programming problem with multiple decision makers and such a game is referred to as a multiobjective linear production programming game. The characteristic sets in the game can be obtained by finding the set of all the Pareto extreme points of the multiobjective programming problem. It is proven that the core of the game is not empty, and points in the core are computed by using the duality theory of multiobjective linear programming problems. Moreover, the least core and the nucleolus of the game are examined. Finally, we consider a situation that decision makers first optimize their multiobjective linear production programming problem and then they examine allocation of profits and/or costs. Computational methods are developed and illustrative numerical examples are given.     

Airport games: The core and its center

An approach to define a rule for an airport problem is to associate to each problem a cooperative game, an airport game, and using game theory to come out with a solution. In this paper, we study the rule that is the average of all the core allocations: the core-center (González-Díaz and Sánchez-Rodríguez, 2007). The structure of the core is exploited to derive insights on the core-center. First, we provide a decomposition of the core in terms of the cores of the downstream-subtraction reduced games. Then, we analyze the structure of the faces of the core of an airport game that correspond to the no-subsidy constraints to find that the faces of the core can be seen as new airport games, the face games, and that the core can be decomposed through the no-subsidy cones (those whose bases are the cores of the no-subsidy face games). As a consequence, we provide two methods for computing the core-center of an airport problem, both with interesting economic interpretations: one expresses the core-center as a ratio of the volume of the core of an airport game for which a player is cloned over the volume of the original core, the other defines a recursive algorithm to compute the core-center through the no-subsidy cones. Finally, we prove that the core-center is not only an intuitive appealing game-theoretic solution for the airport problem but it has also a good behavior with respect to the basic properties one expects an airport rule to satisfy. We examine some differences between the core-center and, arguably, the two more popular game theoretic solutions for airport problems: the Shapley value and the nucleolus.     

A new approach to agglomeration problems

In this paper, we study a location problem with positive externalities. We define a new transferable utility game, considering there is no restriction on the transfer of benefits between firms. We prove that the core of this game is non-empty, provide an expression for it, and an axiomatic characterization. We also study several core allocations, selected by means of a certain bankruptcy problem.     

Modeling cooperation on a class of distribution problems

In this paper we study models of cooperation between the nodes of a network that represents a distribution problem. The distribution problem we propose arises when, over a graph, a group of nodes offers certain commodity, some other nodes require it and a third group of nodes neither need this material nor offer it but they are strategically relevant to the distribution plan. The delivery of one unit of material to a demand node generates a fixed profit, and the shipping of the material through the arcs has an associated cost. We show that in such a framework cooperation is beneficial for the different parties. We prove that the cooperative situation arising from this distribution problem is totally balanced by finding a set of stable allocations (in the core of an associated cooperative game). In order to overcome certain fairness problems of these solutions, we introduce two new solution concepts and study their properties.     

The sigma-core of convex games and the problem of measure extension

The present paper was inspired by the observation that the problem of extending a measure from a smaller σ-algebra to a larger one can be interpreted as a core problem in cooperative game theory. Here, conversely, measure extension theorems of Bierlein, Ascherl-Lehn, and Lipecki are generalized to a game theoretic setting.     

Minimum cost spanning tree games

We consider the problem of cost allocation among users of a minimum cost spanning tree network. It is formulated as a cooperative game in characteristic function form, referred to as a minimum cost spanning tree (m.c.s.t.) game. We show that the core of a m.c.s.t. game is never empty. In fact, a point in the core can be read directly from any minimum cost spanning tree graph associated with the problem. For m.c.s.t. games with efficient coalition structures we define and construct m.c.s.t. games on the components of the structure. We show that the core and the nucleolus of the original game are the cartesian products of the cores and the nucleoli, respectively, of the induced games on the components of the efficient coalition structure.This paper is a revision of [4].     

On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games

We are concerned with the problem of core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games, which is to decide whether a certain coalition structure belongs to the core of a given game. We show that this problem is co-NP complete when players’ preferences are additive.     

On the core of cost-revenue games: Minimum cost spanning tree games with revenues

In this paper, we analyze cost sharing problems arising from a general service by explicitly taking into account the generated revenues. To this cost-revenue sharing problem, we associate a cooperative game with transferable utility, called cost-revenue game. By considering cooperation among the agents using the general service, the value of a coalition is defined as the maximum net revenues that the coalition may obtain by means of cooperation. As a result, a coalition may profit from not allowing all its members to get the service that generates the revenues. We focus on the study of the core of cost-revenue games. Under the assumption that cooperation among the members of the grand coalition grants the use of the service under consideration to all its members, it is shown that a cost-revenue game has a nonempty core for any vector of revenues if, and only if, the dual game of the cost game has a large core. Using this result, we investigate minimum cost spanning tree games with revenues. We show that if every connection cost can take only two values (low or high cost), then, the corresponding minimum cost spanning tree game with revenues has a nonempty core. Furthermore, we provide an example of a minimum cost spanning tree game with revenues with an empty core where every connection cost can take only one of three values (low, medium, or high cost).     

A cost allocation problem arising in hub–spoke network systems

This paper studies a cost allocation problem arising from hub–spoke network systems. When a large-scale network is to be constructed jointly by several agents, both the optimal network design and the fair allocation of its cost are essential issues. We formulate this problem as a cooperative game and analyze the core allocation, which is a widely used solution concept. The core of this game is not necessarily non-empty as shown by an example. A reasonable scheme is to allocate the cost proportional to the flow that an agent generates. We show that, if the demand across the system has a block structure and the fixed cost is high, this cost allocation scheme belongs to the core. Numerical experiments are given with real telecommunication traffic data in order to illustrate the usefulness of our analytical findings.     

Constrained core solutions for totally positive games with ordered players

In many applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems, such as river-, polluted river- and sequencing games, the game is totally positive (i.e., all dividends are nonnegative), and there is some ordering on the set of the players. A totally positive game has a nonempty core. In this paper we introduce constrained core solutions for totally positive games with ordered players which assign to every such a game a subset of the core. These solutions are based on the distribution of dividends taking into account the hierarchical ordering of the players. The Harsanyi constrained core of a totally positive game with ordered players is a subset of the core of the game and contains the Shapley value. For special orderings it coincides with the core or the Shapley value. The selectope constrained core is defined for acyclic orderings and yields a subset of the Harsanyi constrained core. We provide a characterization for both solutions.