随机需求下有产能约束的技术创新策略研究

在随机需求和技术变革的环境下,基于有产能约束的单供应商-单零售商的供应链结构,研究供应商分销价格决策和技术创新策略以及零售商订货决策。建立了三阶段Stackelberg博弈模型,通过逆推方法求得了供应商最优分销价格和技术创新策略以及零售商最优订货量,深入探讨了供应商产能、新技术出现概率以及市场需求期望与波动分别对供应商、零售商和供应链整体利润的影响。结果表明当供应商产能不足时进行技术创新会提高供应商和供应链的利润,但零售商因间接承担供应商技术创新的投资成本而利润下降;当供应商产能过剩时进行技术创新则会降低供应商及供应链的利润,而零售商的利润增加。新技术出现概率增加会提高供应链各成员的利润;提高市场需求期望并减小市场波动对供应商及供应链有利,但可能会降低零售商的利润。     

基于实物期权的双源供应链柔性采购协调策略

在需求不确定下,由风险规避的供应商和占主导地位的零售商组成的二级供应链中,构建了在现货市场影响下基于实物期权的双源柔性采购协调模型,给出了实现供应链协调的最优期权参数的求解算法,探讨了现货市场价格不确定性和供应商风险规避特性对零售商采购策略和双方利润的影响。研究结果表明,在考虑现货市场影响和供应商风险规避的条件下,实物期权契约可以实现供应链协调。     

双重价格规制下三渠道季节性产品供应链跨期风险共担机制研究

以双重价格规制下三渠道季节性产品供应链为研究对象,首先通过构建序贯博弈模型,研究供应链的淡季和旺季的最优决策和利润,在此基础上构建跨期风险共担协调契约和模型,以实现供应链总利润最大化和供应链企业的双赢。研究表明,由于渠道1的原材料价格受到上限规制,旺季供应商不能完全兑现制造商的订购量;由于最终产品的价格受到严格规制,旺季产成品的供应短缺的概率增加;跨期风险共担机制使得供应商和制造商的决策与集成供应链的决策完全一致,供应链总利润达到集成决策时的利润水平;研究还表明,供应商和制造商的渠道集成决策下,旺季产成品的供应缺货的概率进一步加大。     

基于电子交易市场的最优采购策略

随着电子交易市场的发展,企业在传统的远期合约采购基础上,开始从现货市场采购产品.在假定制造商通过远期合约和现货市场采购产品的情况下,研究了影响市场需求和现货市场价格的公共因子与特殊因子对制造商决策的影响.首先建立了最优采购策略的数学模型,其次对所建立的数学模型进行了求解,最后结合数值例子进行了灵敏度分析.研究表明:在相...     

基于套期保值的双寡头零售商供应链均衡策略分析

考虑一个供应商和两个零售商构成的供应链,零售商在面对市场需求风险时决策是否采用套期保值来规避风险.文章分别分析了Cournot和Bertrand两种博弈情景.研究表明:两种博弈存在相同的纳什均衡,两个零售商都会采取套期保值策略.在Cournot博弈下,零售商通过套期保值能够为供应商带来更多的利润;而在Bertrand博弈下,零售商选择套期保值却会降低供应商的利润.相比Cournot博弈,供应商在Bertrand博弈下获利更高.     

电子市场与期权合约市场并存下的供应链优化

在电子市场与期权合约市场并存条件下,构建供应商的生产成本函数模型,找出供应商的最优产能决策,分销商的最优期权订货量决策,集成化供应链的最优产能决策等.然后借助数值分析,找出供应商的最优期权合约参数,及各最优解的变化规律.分析得到,电子市场准入程度的增大、电子市场价格的增大都会促使供应商提高产能;电子市场价格的增大、供应商期权预订价格的降低、期权执行价格的降低、终端市场需求的增大都会促使分销商增大期权订货量和期权执行量,供应商应选择(期权预定价格较小,期权执行价格较大)的优化决策,并针对不同的市场风险选择不同的期权合约参数组合.     

供应中断风险承担策略下供应链产品质量决策

研究由一个制造商和一个零售商构成的二级供应链,引入供应中断风险并通过斯塔克伯格博弈对比分析制造商风险承担策略、零售商风险承担策略以及风险-收益协调策略三种不同的风险承担策略下供应链的产品质量决策及其影响.结果显示:当供应中断损失率较低时,无论采取哪种风险承担策略,供应中断风险损失率上升都会降低制造商的产品质量,影响零售商的销售价格以及市场需求,降低制造商和零售商的利润;制造商风险承担策略会降低产品质量、产品价格、市场需求以及供应链成员绩效;而零售商承担风险策略则有利于提高产品质量和供应链成员绩效;采取风险-收益协调策略能提高产品质量以及供应链成员利润,其程度取决于制造商和零售商的议价能力,制造商的议价能力越强,其产品质量和利润就越高,零售商的利润就越低.比较而言,风险-收益协调策略是最优的.     

供应中断风险下采购与定价决策分析

供应中断是供应链上的企业可能面临的问题,运用合理的采购策略可以帮助企业有效缓解供应中断风险。本文研究了供应中断下供应商和制造商之间的纵向竞争和两个制造商之间的横向竞争问题。供应商制定批发价,两个制造商采用不同的采购策略进行产量博弈,其中一个制造商采用紧急双源订货策略,另一个采用可靠单源订货策略。论文采用了多阶段博弈模型,分析了制造商之间的合谋与竞争两种行为,求出了供应商和制造商的最优决策,比较了这两种行为对供应商和制造商的影响。通过数值分析,讨论了成本参数和可靠性参数对于最优订货量的影响以及对于采用不同订货策略的制造商期望利润的影响。     

基于风险偏好的供应链企业社会责任投入与定价策略研究

本文研究制造商承担企业社会责任时,竞争市场下供应链的均衡价格策略。通过Stackelberg博弈模型,探讨供应链成员的风险规避程度、竞争市场的需求波动性和竞争市场的需求相关性以及制造商企业社会责任水平对供应链均衡策略的影响。研究表明,在制造商承担企业社会责任时,风险规避程度对价格策略的影响依赖于制造商企业社会责任水平的高低;竞争市场的需求波动性较大或竞争市场需求相关性较高时,制造商向下游风险规避型零售商提供较低的批发价格合约, 此时产品的市场价格降低,消费者福利增加;当制造商的生产成本较低时,承担越高的企业社会责任导致消费者福利增加;反之,当制造商的生产成本较高时,消费者福利总是减少。     

产能约束对闭环供应链回收渠道选择的影响

在制造商存在产能约束下,建立了再制造闭环供应链回收渠道决策的Stackelberg博弈模型,得出了三种回收渠道下的回收率、零售价以及制造商、零售商和供应链的利润,分析了制造商的生产能力对回收渠道决策的影响。研究表明:存在产能约束时,制造商回收渠道中的回收率总是最高的,这与无产能约束时零售商回收渠道中回收率最高的情况明显不同;同时,若废旧产品回收转移支付价格较低,制造商会选择自己回收,此时的零售价最低,制造商、零售商和供应链利润最高;若回收转移支付价格较高,制造商会选择零售商回收,此时的零售价最低,制造商和供应链利润最高。     

More than a second channel? Supply chain strategies in B2B spot markets

The emergence of B2B spot markets has greatly facilitated spot trading and impacted supply chain structures as well as the way commercial transactions take place between firms in many industries. While providing new opportunities, the B2B spot market also exposes participants to a price risk. This new business landscape raises some important questions on how the supplier and manufacturer should change their sales channel and procurement strategies and tailor their decisions to this changing environment. In this paper, we study the channel-choice, pricing and ordering/production decisions of the risk-averse supplier and manufacturer in a two-tier supply chain with a B2B spot market. Our analysis shows that, to benefit from the B2B spot market and control the risk exposure, the upstream supplier should develop an integrated channel-choice and pricing strategy. When the supplier adopts a dual-channel strategy, the equilibrium contract price decreases in the supplier’s risk attitude, but increases in the demand uncertainty. However, it first decreases and then increases in the manufacturer’s risk attitude and spot price volatility. We conclude that rather than simply being a second channel, the B2B spot market provides a strategic tool to supply chain members to achieve an advantageous position in their contract trading.     

Coordinating a decentralized supply chain with customer returns and price-dependent stochastic demand using a buyback policy

We investigate a decentralized supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a retailer where the retailer simultaneously determines the retail price and order quantity while experiencing customer returns and price dependent stochastic demand. We propose an agreement between the manufacturer and the retailer that includes two buyback prices, one for unsold inventory and a second for customer returns, and show that this type of easy-to-implement agreement can achieve perfect supply chain coordination and be a win-win for both manufacturer and retailer when a complementary profit-sharing agreement is included.     

产出不确定性的三级供应链风险分担组合契约设计

研究了供应商和制造商产出随机且零售商面临随机需求的三级供应链协调模型,决策变量为供应商的原材料投入量、制造商的订购量和零售商的订购量。分析了集中决策下供应链协调基准的唯一性,论证了回购契约及其与产出风险分担组合契约的协调性。研究结果表明,对于产出和需求不确定的三级供应链,仅考虑在制造商和零售商之间采用回购契约可改善供应链绩效,但并不能实现供应链的全局最优化,而从风险分担的角度设计的回购和产出风险分担组合契约不仅能有效的协调供应链,且在一定条件下,各供应链成员的利润还能获得帕累托改进。通过算例验证了以上结论的正确性,并分析了回购价格对订购量、原材料投入量和利润的影响,以及各供应链成员对契约的偏好。     

具有公平偏好成员的两阶段供应链分析

本论文分析具有公平偏好零售商与制造商组成的供应链,在制造商作为Stackelberg博弈的领导者提供批发价格合同给零售商时,零售商如何确定最优的订货量而制造商如何确定最优的批发价格.当需求满足均匀分布时,研究发现存在均衡的最优订货量以及最优批发价格.本论文也分析了需求分布参数对均衡最优解的影响.最后,通过数值计算对供应链的绩效如何随公平偏好参数变化的问题进行了研究.并且说明公平偏好是零售商获取其对供应链利润分配的一种手段.     

Demand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailer

This paper develops two coordination models of a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer, one dominant retailer and multiple fringe retailers to investigate how to coordinate the supply chain after demand disruption. We consider two coordination schedules, linear quantity discount schedule and Groves wholesale price schedule. We find that, under the linear quantity discount schedule, the manufacturer only needs to adjust the maximum variable wholesale price after demand disruption. For each case of the disrupted amount of demand, the higher the market share of the dominant retailer, the lower its average wholesale price and the subsidy will be under the linear quantity discount schedule, while the higher its fraction of the supply chain’s profit will be under Groves wholesale price schedule. When the increased amount of demand is very large and production cost is sufficiently low, linear quantity discount schedule is better for the manufacturer. However, when the production cost is sufficiently large, Groves wholesale price schedule is always better. We also find that the disrupted amount of demand largely affects the allocation of the supply chain’s profit.     

需求中断下具零售商激励的双渠道供应链价格与生产决策

研究了由一个制造商和一个零售商所组成的两周期双渠道供应链.在第一周期需求实现之前,建立了生产量;在第二周期,基于第一周期的生产量和需求的实现确定了最优销售价格,进而确定了最优的生产量,实现了生产量的优化.通过需求中断下制造商和零售商的垂直整合,讨论了中断情形下价格和生产量对利润的影响.实证结果证实,集中式供应链的最优价格决策受零售渠道顾客偏好和市场规模变化的影响较为显著.     

A spatiotemporal Data Envelopment Analysis (S-T DEA) approach: the need to assess evolving units

We consider a two-stage supply chain with one supplier and one manufacturer. The manufacturer faces a Poisson demand process where the arrival rate depends on the selling price, the announced delivery time, and the delivery reliability defined as the probability of satisfying the announced delivery time. Such a demand model generalizes the works in the literature by simultaneously considering the above three demand sensitivity factors. The main purpose of this paper is to study the equilibrium decisions in the supply chain with an all-unit quantity discount contract. We consider four scenarios regarding whether the leadtime standard, the delivery reliability standard, and the manufacturer’s capacity are endogenous, and whether the manufacturer’s production cost is its private information. We find that an all-unit quantity discount scheme can coordinate the supply chain for most cases. Managerial insights are observed regarding the impact of the three demand sensitivity factors. For example, the breakpoint in an optimal quantity discount contract always increases with the delivery reliability sensitivity under an exogenous delivery reliability, but may decrease under an endogenous delivery reliability; with asymmetric information, a higher variance of the manufacturer’s unit production costs leads to a lower unit wholesale price for the low-cost manufacturer.     

Supply chains in the presence of store brands

Increased competition from store brands is forcing manufacturers to re-evaluate their strategies in regard to pricing and contracting with trade intermediaries. We analyze a supply chain in which a retailer accepts (with the appropriate contractual agreements) a national brand for resale and then determines whether to introduce a store brand, how to price the store brand, and what quantities of the product(s) to order. We show that when the national brand’s cost per unit quality (CPUQ) is larger than the store brand’s CPUQ, then the retailer seeks to introduce the store brand (SB) and the national brand (NB) manufacturer/supplier is unable to deter him from doing so. We find that the efficiency loss in the decentralized supply chain becomes smaller when a store brand is introduced. Recognizing the inadequacy of standard contracts in coordinating this supply chain, we propose a simple minimum order quantity contract that can coordinate this supply chain.     

A fuzzy newsvendor approach to supply chain coordination

In the absence of a clear command and control structure, a key challenge in supply chain management is the coordination and alignment of supply chain members who pursue divergent and often conflicting goals. The newsvendor model is typically used as a framework to quantify the cost of misalignment and to assess the impact of various coordination initiatives. The application of the newsvendor framework, however, requires the specification of some probability distribution for the sources of uncertainty, and in particular, for the market demand. The specification of an adequate demand distribution becomes difficult in the absence of statistical data. We therefore consider a fuzzy approach to the newsvendor problem. We use several fuzzy parameters in the model for the demand, the wholesale price, and the market sales price. We solve the fuzzy newsvendor problem to study three coordination policies: quantity discounts, profit sharing, and buyback. For each coordination policy, the optimal order quantity of the retailer is computed. The possible profits of the members in the supply chain are calculated with minimum sharing of private information. We further extend the fuzzy newsvendor model to a setting with a single manufacturer and multiple retailers under the assumption of ample capacity for the manufacturer. Detailed numerical examples are also provided.