考虑不同融资金额需求的授权再制造融资策略研究

考虑授权再制造企业融资金额无法满足资金短缺需求的情况,构建资金约束下再制造企业的决策模型,研究初始资金及融资策略对再制造企业生产决策的影响。研究表明:资金约束下初始资金成为影响再制造企业生产决策的关键,同时授权费的增加会增大资金压力,限制其利润的增长;不论融资金额是否能满足资金短缺需求,再制造企业融资策略的选择都受初始资金限制,当其融资偏好为风险厌恶型时,可选择混合融资策略;在一定条件下再制造企业选择股权融资可提升再制造产品的社会效益。     

碳交易机制下资金约束制造商替代产品的最优生产策略研究

碳交易机制和资金约束在很大程度上影响企业的生产决策,但很少有文献研究碳排放和资金双约束下企业对普通与低碳两种替代品生产决策问题。因此,本文在碳交易机制下讨论了资金约束下制造商两种产品的生产决策问题。本文采用基于有无碳交易和银行融资划分四种情形,基于报童模型构建优化模型分析制造商的最优决策。研究发现:(1)无融资情形下,如果制造商的初始资金很少,则制造商生产更多的普通产品;如果制造商的初始资金很多,则制造商生产更多的低碳产品;(2)在银行融资情形下,当利率较小时,制造商生产更多的低碳产品;当利率较大时,制造商生产更多的普通产品;(3)在银行融资情形下,如果碳排放配额较大,无碳交易机制时的融资量和融资成本高于有碳交易机制时的融资量和融资成本;如果碳排放配额较低则结论相反。     

不确定环境下零售商融资决策选择:3PL融资VS银行融资

以供应商、3PL企业和零售商构成的供应链为研究背景,针对零售商存在资金约束且面临不确定市场需求情形,本文研究了零售商在3PL融资与银行融资模式下的最优决策。构建了动态博弈模型来挖掘不同融资方式如何影响供应链各参与主体的决策,探究零售商选择3PL融资的运费可行区间以及选择银行融资的银行利率可行区间。研究发现:一般情况下,零售商最终会选择3PL融资。当银行利率较低或者运费很高时,零售商最终选择银行融资;当3PL企业与零售商通过利润转移契约进行合作时,零售商选择3PL融资,合作的双方能够实现帕累托改进。     

基于技术创新的资金约束供应链融资策略分析

新兴技术进入竞争市场时,供应链成员往往存在资金约束,为了尽早占据市场份额、获得更高的利润流,上下游企业有意愿进行供应链的内外部融资。文章对上游企业存在资金约束、下游核心企业资金充裕的供应链融资策略进行决策分析。研究表明:上下游的融资策略会使上游企业得到帕累托改进,且随上游企业自有资金的增大,下游企业的利率阈值逐渐减小;存在最优融资利率使得下游企业的期望利润达到最大。在上下游企业财务不透明的前提下,存在下游企业的融资利率区间使上游企业有隐藏真实资金状况以期获得更低融资利率的动机,文章基于博弈论的信息甄别模型给出了相应的激励合同对上游企业的期望利润进行修正,诱使上游企业提供真实的资金状况。     

随机环境下技术开发和授权的最优策略

技术创新的价值实现需要后续的商业化投资,在随机不确定的市场环境下,创新企业面对着投资或等待、自身开发或技术授权的策略选择.利用实物期权方法建立了市场不确定时的决策模型,分析开发能力、不确定性等多种因素对企业授权的影响,在多种情况下得到企业的最优决策并对相关现象给出了解释.研究发现不确定性提高了企业投资的临界值,提高了企业的技术授权价格,高度的不确定性减少了技术授权的可能,较高的能力差异会促进技术交易.     

基于随机市场需求的供应链融资模式研究

传统供应链融资模型大都在线性市场需求情形下分析零售商的商业信用、债权融资等内外部融资模式。本文同时了考虑零售商的股权融资、债权融资以及商业信用融资模式, 并引入随机市场需求因素, 针对一个供应商和两个具有资金约束零售商组成的两级供应链, 分析债权股权融资比例、商业信用等因素对零售商融资策略的影响, 并构建基于随机市场需求的融资模型;进一步, 利用数值示例和敏感性分析对此融资模型进行深入探讨。研究发现:当债权融资比例小于某临界值时, 零售商债权融资比例与订购量正相关, 反之债权融资比例与订购量负相关;对于一个服从均匀分布函数的随机市场需求而言, 若供应链采用外部融资模式, 那么随着其债权融资比例的增大, 利润将逐渐增加;若零售商采用商业信用融资模式, 那么其融资利率与利润负相关。相关研究结论对于供应链上中小企业融资模式的选择具有重要理论指导意义和实际引用价值。     

考虑RFID应用的资金约束供应链订购决策研究

RFID技术的应用在有效降低商品库存损耗率的同时,也增加了供应链企业的运营成本,尤其是具有资金压力的供应链中小企业。在零售商具有资金约束的二级供应链下分析RFID技术的应用对资金约束供应链绩效的影响,通过构建贸易信贷下基于批发价合同的Stackelberg博弈模型,对比采用RFID前后资金约束供应链成员的均衡决策及期望收益,探讨了该供应链采用RFID的必要条件。结果显示当RFID标签成本低于某个阈值,或RFID库存损耗恢复率高于某个阈值时,供应链成员会选择采用RFID。此外,当RFID单位标签成本或零售商标签成本分摊系数较低,或RFID库存损耗恢复率较高时,制造商会提供比不采用RFID时更高的批发价;在采用RFID的条件下,零售商订购数量低于不采用RFID时的数量。通过设计收益分享契约实现了采用RFID时资金约束供应链的协调。     

考虑隐性股权的电商供应链融资模式研究

摘要:研究隐性股权下,电商参与的供应链金融系统中,具有资金约束的制造商对银行和电商平台两种融资模式的选择。构建了以电商平台为核心企业,具有资金约束的上游制造商参与的两级供应链融资模型,并运用股利贴现模型(DDM)对隐性股权进行量化,结合Stackelberg博弈分别对两种融资模式下的制造商和电商平台的收益进行分析。研究表明,银行利率是影响制造商融资模式选择的主要因素;并且得出,具有资金约束的制造商选择向银行融资时,电商平台是否考虑隐性股权对其自身收益不会产生影响;具有资金约束的制造商选择向电商平台融资时,电商平台在考虑隐性股权的情形下其收益更优。     

社会责任情境资金约束生产商的供应链融资

考虑社会责任情境下,资金短缺的生产商和零售商之间进行Stackelberg博弈,建立无资金约束、提前支付和银行贷款三种供应链融资模型,分析社会责任因子和初始资金如何影响供应链成员的最优决策和利润,以及生产商选择何种融资方式.结果表明:一旦生产商有资金约束时,其社会责任水平会降低.当供应链外部融资(银行)利率大于提前支付折扣时,生产商选择银行贷款融资策略,社会责任因子超过临界值后,生产商选择提前支付融资策略;当供应链外部融资(银行)利率小于提前支付折扣时,生产商先选择提前支付融资策略,社会责任因子超过临界值后,生产商选择银行贷款融资策略.此研究可为履行社会责任的企业提供融资参考及借鉴意义.     

产出不确定条件下农产品供应链内部融资研究

农产品供应链的研究较少考虑农户资金不足,供应链内部融资手段实现产销均衡的情况.文章针对二级农产品供应链产出不确定,构建核心企业为资金约束农户提供内部融资的模型,通过求解最优化的农产品订购量、投产量并进行算例分析,提出内部融资服务规则及最优生产运作策略.结果表明:在不考虑农户缺货成本和残值收益情况下,存在资金约束的农户倾向投入少于订购量的投产量来减少成本投入和还款金额,实现自己期望收益最优;资金约束条件下采取分散决策,供应链成员存在最优的投产量和订购量使得自身期望收益实现最优;资金约束条件下,文章设计的融资模式使得销售商的期望收益随着农户自有资金的增加而减少.     

The impact of delivery lags on irreversible investment under uncertainty

We consider the valuation and rational exercise of irreversible investment opportunities in the presence of revenue uncertainty and delivery lags. In order to capture supply side market imperfections in the markets for investment goods, we assume that the lag depends on the revenue process faced by the investor. We show that such imperfections have a pronounced decelerating impact on rational investment demand as they may increase the value of waiting in excess of the exercise payoff even for projects which otherwise would be perceived as highly remunerative. We also consider the comparative static properties of the optimal investment policy and its value, and demonstrate that typically increased uncertainty decreases the investment incentives by increasing the value of waiting.     

Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire

This paper reconsiders the licensing of a common value innovation to a downstream duopoly, assuming firms observe imperfect signals of the cost reduction induced by the innovation. The innovator adopts a direct revelation mechanism and awards an unrestricted license to the firm that reports the highest signal and a royalty contract to the other. Firms may signal strength to their rivals through exaggerated messages, which may however backfire, and give rise to higher royalty payments. We provide sufficient conditions for truthful implementation, and for the profitability of adding royalty contracts to what is otherwise a first-price license auction.     

Licensing of a quality-improving innovation

We study the licensing of a quality-improving innovation in a duopoly model with heterogeneous consumers. Firms compete in prices facing a logit demand framework. The innovator is an outsider to the market and sells licenses via up front fee (determined in an auction), royalty or their combination. We show that if the market is covered then irrespective of the magnitude of the innovation both firms acquire the new technology and pay positive royalty and zero up-front fee. The increase in social welfare due to the innovation is totally extracted by the innovator. For the uncovered market case we show that if the consumer heterogeneity is sufficiently high, then both firms become licensees. The licensees pay positive royalty and zero up-front fee–if the value of an outside alternative option is low–and both positive royalty and positive up-front fee — if the value of the outside alternative option is high.     

负债代理冲突下企业投融资互动行为的实物期权分析

准确分析企业投融资之间的互动关系,实现两种决策的协同,有助于提高企业决策效率和项目价值.通过把项目融资政策内生到投资决策的实物期权模型中,构建基于股东价值最大化和企业价值最大化的投融资决策互动模型,得到两种情形下的投融资决策临界点和期权价值,并借助数值分析负债代理冲突对企业投融资行为的影响.研究结果表明,负债融资既可能引发过度投资问题,也可能抑制投资.这种非效率投资将相应地提高负债融资的成本,对企业的负债融资产生抑制作用.     

不确定竞争市场的R&D投资决策分析

本文针对不确定的竞争市场 ,分析降低成本的不可逆 R& D投资决策 .考虑到 R& D结果不确定 ,而这种不确定与投资量有关 ,在利用博弈论方法分析和给出了投资结果不确定的投资期权价值后 ,设随机市场需求规模服从均匀分布 ,本文分析了各种因素对 R& D投资的影响 ,发现较大的市场需求预期和较强的成本节约效果鼓励了 R& D投资 ;相反地 ,较大的成功 R& D所需的最大投资量挫败了 R& D投资 ;而投资期望净收益与投资成本之间的权衡使得存在事前最优投资量最大化投资期权价值     

考虑投资需求的易损耗物品质押融资决策模型

质押物发生损耗会降低质押物的市场价值,增加中小企业的违约风险,影响质押融资业务参与方的期望收益。同时,中小企业从金融机构获得的资金在扣除各项支出后如有剩余,还可以在资本市场进行短期投资以获利。基于此,本文设定质押物为易损耗物品且中小企业存在投资需求,构建存货质押融资决策模型。考虑两种情形:首先,给定金融机构的融资利率,决策中小企业的最佳投资回报率和物流企业的最优监管努力水平;其次,给定中小企业的投资回报率,决策金融机构的最佳融资利率和物流企业的最优监管努力水平。通过数值算例模拟决策变量的求解过程,敏感性分析验证了文中所给结论。     

Impact of product pricing and timing of investment decisions on supply chain co-opetition

In supply chain co-opetition, firms simultaneously compete and co-operate in order to maximize their profits. We consider the nature of co-opetition between two firms: The product supplier invests in the technology to improve quality, and the purchasing firm (buyer) invests in selling effort to develop the market for the product before uncertainty in demand is resolved. We consider three different decision making structures and discuss the optimal configuration from each firm’s perspective. In case 1, the supplier invests in product quality and sets the wholesale price for the product. The buyer then exerts selling effort to develop the market and following demand potential realization, sets the resale price. In case 2, the supplier invests in product quality followed by the buyer’s investment in selling effort. Then, after demand potential is observed, the supplier sets the wholesale price and the buyer sets the resale price. Finally, in case 3, both firms simultaneously invest in product quality and selling effort, respectively. Subsequently, observing the demand potential, the supplier sets the wholesale price and the buyer sets the resale price. We compare all configuration options from both the perspective of the supplier and the buyer, and show that the level of investment by the firms depends on the nature of competition between them and the level of uncertainty in demand. Our analysis reveals that although configuration 1 results in the highest profits for the integrated channel, there is no clear dominating preference on system configuration from the perspective of both parties. The incentives of the co-opetition partners and the investment levels are mainly governed by the cost structure and the level of uncertainty in demand. We examine and discuss the relation between system parameters and the incentives in desiging the supply contract structure.     

产需不确定下面向资金约束供应商的供应链融资策略研究

以包含一个供应商和一个分销商的供应链为研究对象,其中分销商面临市场需求不确定性,供应商存在资金约束且面临产出不确定性。 提出期望利率的概念,研究银行贷款期望利率一定的情况下,供应链银行融资最优策略。 构建了供应链预付款融资机制,在此基础上研究预付款模式下供应链的融资与生产订购的最优策略,并讨论了预付款期望利率的可行范围。 研究表明,预付款融资模式下,分销商愿意以低于银行贷款利率的期望利率向供应商提供预付款; 存在预付款期望利率可行区间,实现预付款协调模式下供应链系统的帕累托改进。     

受融资影响的项目组合选择研究

本文构建了一个考虑融资的项目组合选择模型,允许企业根据每期的投资计划,合理地调节当期所需要投入的资金预算。如果期初的可用资金量超过了当期的投资额,企业可以尽早将多余的资金释放;反之,若期初的可用资金量不足以支持本期项目的执行,允许企业从外部融资,如银行贷款等,以满足企业实际的需求。融资需要付出一定的代价,且代价与执行项目的风险程度相关。基于此,偿还融资代价对项目组合经济性的影响被引入到项目组合选择模型中。企业需要在全部资金带来的投资收益及融资代价之间进行权衡,以谋求利润最大化。鉴于所构建模型非线性化的特点,本文给出了该模型的等价形式,并进行了理论证明。最后,通过企业实际算例分析,得出结论:1)考虑融资后能够为企业带来更高回报;2)融资相关因素对项目组合的经济性有显著影响。     

Investment and the dynamic cost of income uncertainty: The case of diminishing expectations in agriculture

This paper studies optimal investment and the dynamic cost of income uncertainty, applying a stochastic programming approach. The motivation is given by a case study in Finnish agriculture. The investment decision of a representative farm is modelled as a Markov decision process, extended to account for risk. A numerical framework for studying the dynamic uncertainty cost is presented, modifying the classical expected value of perfect information to a dynamic setting. The uncertainty cost depends on the volatility of income: e.g. with stationary income, the dynamic uncertainty cost corresponds to a dynamic option value of postponing investment. The model can be applied to agricultural policy planning. In the case study, the investment decision is sensitive to risk.