基于SEC准则的油田开发规划不确定优化模型及算法

在油价低迷的国际背景下,上市石油公司进行油田开发规划时越来越重视经营效益。美国证券交易委员会(SEC)要求上市石油公司采用产量法计提折耗,极大地影响了石油公司开发规划方案的制定。油田开发受到自然、技术等多种不确定因素的影响,在制定开发规划时需充分考虑这些不确定性。本文基于不确定理论,考虑措施增油效果和新增投资两类不确定参数,以经营效益最大化和新增投资最小化为目标,构建了基于SEC准则的油田开发规划不确定优化模型,并利用差分进化算法求解,给出措施工作量的帕累托解集。本文以D油田年度规划为例,通过构建模型并求解,给出开发规划方案集,并进一步分析SEC储量的下降对上市石油公司经营效益、新增投资回报率、油气总产量、油气完全成本和措施工作量的影响,为企业制定开发规划方案提供参考。     

合作竞争条件下R&D项目投资决策分析

R&D项目的成功会为高新技术企业带来巨大收益,但是其研发过程中存在着技术风险、商业风险和突发风险等所带来的多种不确定性。为了应对这些不确定性,一些高新技术企业往往结成追求联盟整体利益最大化的成本共享联盟来进行R&D项目投资,然而由于不进行技术共享并争夺研发成功后的收益,联盟中的企业又会在合作的同时进行竞争,这就需要企业对R&D项目的估值非常的精确,以便在合作竞争条件下做出收益最大的最优投资决策。市场中两个合作竞争的高新技术企业各自拥有四种投资决策:成为市场先行者或跟随者,立刻与另一企业共同投资,与另一企业共同选择先等待时机再进行投资。本文以这两个高新技术企业为例,利用欧式期权理论量化了多种不确定性,建立相应的R&D项目投资决策数学模型,对R&D项目的投资时机和决策收益进行评估。当成本共享联盟整体收益最大时,得到的两个高新技术企业做出的投资决策即为在合作竞争条件下R&D项目投资中各自的最优投资决策,最后通过Shapley值的计算可对联盟中企业各自的收益进行合理分配。     

企业技术投资决策模型及其模拟

何时投资购买技术是企业技术战略研究的一个关键问题.传统的技术投资的决策准则是使用净现值(NPV)方法,这种方法会导致企业过早的投资于一项技术,也不能解释企业技术投资时间滞后的现象.企业技术投资时间的滞后可以通过技术本身的不确定性来解释,技术的不确定性主要表现为在技术演化过程中新技术出现的速度和新技术技术效率改进程度的不确定.本文针对企业技术投资中的技术效率决策问题,假设技术出现服从泊松分布、技术改进程度服从均匀分布,构建了技术投资决策模型,并对模型进行模拟,结论表明决策模型比NPV方法能更好的解释企业技术投资决策的行为.     

不确定环境下基于资金约束的技术授权策略

技术创新的价值实现需要后续的商业化开发,市场需求不确定会影响商业化投资的价值评估,在企业商业化受到资金约束时如果进行资金筹集就会有一定困难,而合理设计的授权合约这时可以作为项目的融资途径之一。本文研究了企业的最优授权策略在无资金约束时和资金约束时的差异,试图通过技术授权合约的设计进行筹资,发现利用授权合约的预付金可以满足部分融资需要,但是使用授权合约融资的成本较高,影响融资额度的主要因素包括接受授权企业的研发成本、市场需求的预期、单位产品税的承诺等。     

不确定需求下页岩气开发项目投资时机与钻井数量选择研究

基于工程化实现视角,结合规划产能与实际产出的不一致性和产量递减性,构建市场需求不确定情境下页岩气开发项目的投资时机与钻井数量决策模型,给出最佳投资时机和最优钻井数量的解析解,并探讨了不确定性、产量递减率、钻井成功率以及钻井成本变动对最佳投资时机和最优钻井数量的影响。结果表明最佳投资时机受单位有效钻井成本影响却与最优钻井数量多少无关,最优钻井数量受市场需求的期望增长率和波动影响而与市场需求量大小无关;不确定性、产量递减率或钻井成本的增大,将引起投资延迟和钻井数量增加,而钻井成功率的增大则会起到相反的作用;并发现投资阈值与最优钻井数量呈同向变动规律。     

随机扰动下的库存投资决策模型

本文讨论的是库存投资的最优决策问题.不同于确定性q理论,对于引入了市场不确定性扰动的库存控制系统,文章建立了库存投资随机优化决策模型.从市场利率波动的角度对库存决策模型进行分析,得出的结论是:小的市场利率的扰动能够提高企业折现利润的预期,进而导致公司库存投资的上升.     

多种风险下研发项目投资决策博弈分析

研发项目代表了高新技术企业的核心竞争力,但是其投资和研发的过程所包含的多种风险可能会造成企业经济上的损失。为了保证竞争优势和收益最大化,企业投资前需要对项目的估值非常的精确,以便在竞争中做出最优投资决策。本文以市场中的两个竞争性企业为例,利用欧式复合期权理论与博弈论,量化了技术风险、商业风险和突发风险等不确定性,在经过了信息披露过程之后,分析了市场中企业自身和竞争者的投资决策,建立相应的研发项目投资决策数学模型,对企业的研发项目投资时机和决策收益进行评估,通过博弈得到纳什均衡下的企业最优投资决策。     

企业研发投资的外部效应与最优补贴政策

本结合传统的企业研发决策理论，引入研发投资的外部效应，讨论了研发投资的不可撤回性、技术不确定性对企业研发投资决策、政府研发投资补贴政策和对撤资行为的税收政策的影响，并得出以下结论：政府补贴政策、税收政策与企业研发投资不可撤回性和技术不确定性无关，补贴率和税率的确定仅取决于研发投资外部性，且对研发投资的补贴率和对撤资行为征税的税率相等。     

房地产开发的最优时间和最优强度

房地产投资具有许多不确定性,对房地产投资进行评估尤为重要.利用实物期权理论,对房地产投资进行建模分析,确定出最优开发时间和最优开发强度;最后根据模型推导出来的结论进行数值分析.     

随机需求下专利供应链的不完全契约设计

企业在授权高技术专利时往往存在诸多不确定性且难以被第三方证实,于是在实践中,不完全专利授权契约及事后的再谈判十分常见.文章构建了随机需求下考虑不完全(专利授权)契约的供应链模型,求解了该模型中各成员的均衡决策.研究发现,与完全契约相比,不完全契约会增加制造商的产量,但专利供应商的专利授权费是否增加,取决于其谈判力的大小.尽管不完全契约提高了整条供应链的利润、消费者剩余和社会福利;但出人意料的是,不论从制造商还是从专利供应商的视角来看,存在再谈判选项的不完全契约并非总是优于完全契约.具体来说,当专利供应商的谈判力较小或较大时,只有一方愿意选择不完全契约;当该谈判力适中时,双方才都愿意选择不完全契约.     

Analysis of industry equilibria in models with sustaining and disruptive technology

This paper analyzes a special type of technology evolution, referred to in the literature as disruptive technology vs. sustaining technology. In general, “old” products based on sustaining technology are perceived to be superior to the “new” ones based on disruptive technology. However, the latter have distinctive features that allow them to attract an exclusive set of customers. Examples include notebooks vs. netbooks, hard-disk drives vs. solid-state drives, laser printers vs. inkjet printers, etc. We consider a model with an established firm and an entrant firm that have heterogeneous product-offering capabilities: the established firm can offer either or both types of products, while the entrant firm can only offer new products. Firms make capacity, pricing, and quantity decisions that maximize their ex-ante profit. Within this framework, we analyze deterministic games with perfect information and stochastic games with uncertain valuation of the disruptive technology. Equilibrium decisions are discussed under various market conditions, as well as under dedicated vs. flexible capacity assumptions.     

军工技术转移过程中的制约因素分析——基于南京、重庆两地的问卷调查

本文以问卷调查的形式对军工技术转移过程中的制约因素进行了分析,首先采用因子分析方法对初始确定的18项制约因素指标进行因子分析,提取出需求因子、供给因子、公共服务因子和市场因子4项公因子;进一步采用回归分析方法分析此4项公因子对技术转移效果的影响。结果表明,需求因子、公共服务因子和市场因子是制约军工技术成功转移的显著因素,而供给因子的影响并不显著。本文结论为我国"军转民"战略的成功实施提供启示。     

惯例复制与知识转移:作用机制的权变条件研究

针对惯例复制过程中与外部情景难以匹配的复制困境,分析了常规惯例复制和柔性惯例复制对知识转移的单独以及联合作用的关系悖论,对比分析作用机制在网络闭合性和环境不确定性约束下的权变性影响。以研发密集型企业为对象,运用多元回归分析进行实证检验。结果表明:网络闭合性和环境不确定性是惯例复制对知识转移的单独以及联合作用的权变条件;网络闭合性强化了常规惯例复制机制的促进作用,但限制了柔性惯例复制机制的效能发挥;环境不确定性削弱了常规惯例复制机制的促进作用,对柔性惯例复制机制的作用效果不显著;网络闭合性低或环境不确定性低时,两种惯例复制机制的联合作用相互补充,而网络闭合性高或环境不确定性高时,两种惯例复制机制相互替代。研究结论有助于揭示惯例复制的权变作用,对提升技术创新网络的知识转移效率具有重要意义。     

Design of insurance contracts using stochastic programming in forestry planning

This work addresses a tactical planning problem faced by a forestry firm, deciding which timber units to harvest and what roads to build to obtain the greatest possible benefits. We include uncertainty in prices by means of utility theory. This enables solutions to be found that the firm finds preferable to those obtained when risk aversion is ignored and makes it possible to design insurance contracts that benefit the firm while also being attractive to an insurer. Two types of contract are designed; one dependent on the firm’s operating result and the other independent of it. Metrics are then developed to quantify the benefits conferred by a contract, demonstrating that the latter contract type dominates the former. These results are then illustrated by applying them to a simplified planning problem of a forest owned by the Chilean forestry operator Millalemu.     

Investment decisions in the rent-to-own industry in the absence of inventory

This study addresses the product investment decision faced by firms in the rent-to-own industry. In this setting, a customer arrives according to a random process and requests one unit of a product to rent (and eventually own should he/she choose to make all the required payments). At the time of request, if the product is available in inventory, the firm enters into a contractual agreement (by accepting the customer's offer) and rents the merchandise. More interesting and the case considered here, if the requested item is not in inventory, the firm must decide whether to purchase the item in order to rent it out or to simply reject the request. The customer's offer specifies the desired maximum contract length and the payment frequency—from which the firm determines the fixed periodic payment charged. The firm makes its investment decision based on the characteristics of the offer as well as those of the product (eg, initial and resale values, useful life and carrying costs) in essence performing a complicated cost benefit analysis. An extension is also considered whereby instead of simply rejecting the request the firm can adjust the required payment amount. Dynamic programming techniques are used to address the problem and to solve for the firm's optimal decision.     

Uncertainty and stepwise investment

We analyze the optimal investment strategy of a firm that can complete a project either in one stage at a single freely chosen time point or in incremental steps at distinct time points. The presence of economies of scale gives rise to the following trade-off: lumpy investment has a lower total cost, but stepwise investment gives more flexibility by letting the firm choose the timing individually for each stage. Our main question is how uncertainty in market development affects this trade-off. The answer is unambiguous and in contrast with a conventional real-options intuition: higher uncertainty makes the single-stage investment more attractive relative to the more flexible stepwise investment strategy.     

Duopolistic competition under risk aversion and uncertainty

A monopolist typically defers entry into an industry as both price uncertainty and the level of risk aversion increase. By contrast, the presence of a rival typically hastens entry under risk neutrality. Here, we examine these two opposing effects in a duopoly setting. We demonstrate that the value of a firm and its entry decision behave differently with risk aversion and uncertainty depending on the type of competition. Interestingly, if the leader’s role is defined endogenously, then higher uncertainty makes her relatively better off, whereas with the roles exogenously defined, the impact of uncertainty is ambiguous.     

Operationalizing technology improvements in product development decision-making

Achieving competitive advantage and price premiums in many technology-based markets requires the incorporation of current technology in new products. To do so, firms in hyper-competitive environments increasingly plan and design their products concurrent with the independent development and validation of underlying technologies. Simultaneous validation of a core technology has important implications for a company’s product positioning and launch sequence decisions making these traditional marketing decisions relevant to operations managers. Prior research has shown that to minimize cannibalization in the absence of such improvements in technology, a firm should not launch low-end products before high-end products. However, concurrent evolution of technology can make it desirable and even necessary to introduce low-end products before high-end products. This is because in technology-based industries, improvements in technology delay the introduction of a high-end product, and a firm must trade-off the benefit of launching the low-end product earlier (greater discounted profits) against the cost of cannibalization of high-end product sales. High-end product cannibalization can be further reduced by offering the customer an option to upgrade from the low-end to high-end product, with important implications for the firm’s product positioning and introduction sequence decisions. Based on our study in the high technology industry, we model the product positioning and introduction sequence decisions under the simultaneous evolution of technology. Our analysis indicates that it may be optimal in a variety of circumstances for a firm to launch products in an increasing order of performance, even in the absence of network externalities. Besides presenting analytical results for product positioning and profit from different introduction sequences, the paper also makes a contribution to managerial practice by providing insights in the form of a conceptual framework.     

零售商主导型绿色供应链激励机制设计

以往有关绿色供应链激励机制的研究主要是围绕制造商为核心企业展开.而2014年12月颁布的《企业绿色采购指南(试行)》强调了采购商(或零售商)在绿色供应链当中所起的作用.以零售商(而不是供应商)作为核心企业,建立供应商-零售商绿色供应链博弈模型,用以研究零售商的激励制度设计以及绿色产品需求如何影响绿色供应链.分别求解供应商不进行绿色工艺研发、供应商单独进行绿色工艺研发的供应链均衡解,并且设计了转移支付激励机制.研究表明:1)供应商和零售商不一定都有激励提高产品绿色度,但在特定条件下,他们都有动力提高产品绿色度;2)如果供应商和零售商都有动力提高产品绿色度,那么供应商主导型的绿色供应链比零售商主导型的供应链在为整个供应链创造利润方面更佳;3)零售商主导型的绿色供应链可找到最优转移支付比例使得供应链整体利润最大化,且转移支付激励手段有效.