基于技术创新的资金约束供应链融资策略分析

新兴技术进入竞争市场时,供应链成员往往存在资金约束,为了尽早占据市场份额、获得更高的利润流,上下游企业有意愿进行供应链的内外部融资。文章对上游企业存在资金约束、下游核心企业资金充裕的供应链融资策略进行决策分析。研究表明:上下游的融资策略会使上游企业得到帕累托改进,且随上游企业自有资金的增大,下游企业的利率阈值逐渐减小;存在最优融资利率使得下游企业的期望利润达到最大。在上下游企业财务不透明的前提下,存在下游企业的融资利率区间使上游企业有隐藏真实资金状况以期获得更低融资利率的动机,文章基于博弈论的信息甄别模型给出了相应的激励合同对上游企业的期望利润进行修正,诱使上游企业提供真实的资金状况。

Analysis of the Financing Strategy for Technical Innovation in a Capital-constrained Supply Chain

When emerging technology enters the competitive market, supply chain members often have financial constraints. In order to obtain higher profit flow and occupy a market share as quickly as possible, upstream and downstream enterprises are willing to provide internal and external financing to the supply chain. This paper conducts a concrete analysis of the supply chain financing strategy when upstream enterprises have financial constraints and downstream enterprises are the core enterprises and hold abundant capital. The literature shows that the upstream and downstream financing strategy allows upstream enterprises to achieve Pareto improvement, and with the increase of upstream enterprises’ own capital, the interest rate threshold of downstream enterprises will gradually decrease. There exists an optimal financing interest rate that makes the expected profits of the downstream enterprises reach their maximum. Assuming the financial opacity of upstream and downstream enterprises, the existence of downstream firms’ financing interest rate interval motivates upstream enterprises to hide their real capital status in order to obtain financing at a lower interest rate. Based on an information screening model and game theory, this paper develops a corresponding incentive contract that modifies the expected profit of upstream enterprises and induces upstream enterprises to reveal their real capital status.