Mean-field type forward-backward doubly stochastic differential equations and related stochastic differential games

We study a kind of partial information non-zero sum differential games of mean-field backward doubly stochastic differential equations, in which the coefficient contains not only the state process but also its marginal distribution, and the cost functional is also of mean-field type. It is required that the control is adapted to a sub-filtration of the filtration generated by the underlying Brownian motions. We establish a necessary condition in the form of maximum principle and a verification theorem, which is a sufficient condition for Nash equilibrium point. We use the theoretical results to deal with a partial information linear-quadratic (LQ) game, and obtain the unique Nash equilibrium point for our LQ game problem by virtue of the unique solvability of mean-field forward-backward doubly stochastic differential equation.     

Necessary and Sufficient Optimality Conditions for Regular–Singular Stochastic Differential Games with Asymmetric Information

We consider a class of regular–singular stochastic differential games arising in the optimal investment and dividend problem of an insurer under model uncertainty. The information available to the two players is asymmetric partial information and the control variable of each player consists of two components: regular control and singular control. We establish the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for the saddle point of the zero-sum game. Then, as an application, these conditions are applied to an optimal investment and dividend problem of an insurer under model uncertainty. Furthermore, we generalize our results to the nonzero-sum regular–singular game with asymmetric information, and then the Nash equilibrium point is characterized.     

A Type of General Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations and Applications

The authors discuss one type of general forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) with It?o’s stochastic delayed equations as the forward equations and anticipated backward stochastic differential equations as the backward equations. The existence and uniqueness results of the general FBSDEs are obtained. In the framework of the general FBSDEs in this paper, the explicit form of the optimal control for linearquadratic stochastic optimal control problem with delay and the Nash equilibrium point for nonzero sum differential games problem with delay are obtained.     

带停时的奇异型随机控制问题在金融投资模型中的应用

以随机分析的知识和最优控制理论为基础,讨论了一类带停时的奇异型随机控制的折扣费用问题在金融投资模型中的应用,将该带停时的奇异型随机控制模型的受控状态过程和费用函数结构都推广到了最一般的形式,使该模型的应用范围更加广泛.通过讨论一组相应的变分不等式的解,分别对退化和非退化两种情况给出了此随机控制问题的最优策略,相应得出了投资模型中的最佳决策,并且证明了变分不等式的解即为最优费用函数.与以往不同的是,所得的相关结论应用到了金融投资模型中,从而解决了一类金融投资问题.     

条件平均场随机微分方程的最优控制问题

作者研究了一个条件平均场随机微分方程的最优控制问题.这种方程和某些部分信息下的随机最优控制问题有关,并且可以看做是平均场随机微分方程的推广.作者以庞特里雅金最大值原理的形式给出最优控制满足的必要和充分条件.此外,文中给出一个线性二次最优控制问题来说明理论结果的应用.     

Nonzero-sum stochastic games with unbounded costs: Discounted and average cost cases

We treat non-cooperative stochastic games with countable state space and with finitely many players each having finitely many moves available in a given state. As a function of the current state and move vector, each player incurs a nonnegative cost. Assumptions are given for the expected discounted cost game to have a Nash equilibrium randomized stationary strategy. These conditions hold for bounded costs, thereby generalizing Parthasarathy (1973) and Federgruen (1978). Assumptions are given for the long-run average expected cost game to have a Nash equilibrium randomized stationary strategy, under which each player has constant average cost. A flow control example illustrates the results. This paper complements the treatment of the zero-sum case in Sennott (1993a).     

具有有限燃料的奇异型最佳随机控制问题之推广

本文推广了有限燃料情况下的奇异型随控制模型，对推广后的模型求出了最佳费用函数的结构表达式及最佳控制的存在条件，且当最佳控制存在时具体地构造出了该最佳控制。     

N-person differential games governed by semilinear stochastic evolution systems

In this paper the problem ofN-person infinite-dimensional stochastic differential games governed by semilinear stochastic evolution control systems is discussed. First the minimax principle which is the necessary condition for the existence of open-loop Nash equilibrium is proved. Then the necessary and sufficient conditions of open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibrium for linear quadratic infinite-dimensional stochastic differential games are derived.     

Remarks on sensitive equilibria in stochastic games with additive reward and transition structure

A class of stochastic games with additive reward and transition structure is studied. For zero-sum games under some ergodicity assumptions 1-equilibria are shown to exist. They correspond to so-called sensitive optimal policies in dynamic programming. For a class of nonzero-sum stochastic games with nonatomic transitions nonrandomized Nash equilibrium points with respect to the average payoff criterion are also obtained. Included examples show that the results of this paper can not be extented to more general payoff or transition structure.     

A BSDE approach to Nash equilibrium payoffs for stochastic differential games with nonlinear cost functionals

In this paper, we study Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games via the theory of backward stochastic differential equations. We obtain an existence theorem and a characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with nonlinear cost functionals defined with the help of doubly controlled backward stochastic differential equations. Our results extend former ones by Buckdahn et al. (2004) [3] and are based on a backward stochastic differential equation approach.     

带随机跳跃的线性二次非零和微分对策问题

对于一类以布朗运动和泊松过程为噪声源的正倒向随机微分方程,在单调性假设下,给出了解的存在性和唯一性的结果．然后将这些结果应用于带随机跳跃的线性二次非零和微分对策问题之中,由上述正倒向随机微分方程的解得到了开环Nash均衡点的显式形式．     

A regular equilibrium solves the extended HJB system

Control problems not admitting the dynamic programming principle are known as time-inconsistent. The game-theoretic approach is to interpret such problems as intrapersonal dynamic games and look for subgame perfect Nash equilibria. A fundamental result of time-inconsistent stochastic control is a verification theorem saying that solving the extended HJB system is a sufficient condition for equilibrium. We show that solving the extended HJB system is a necessary condition for equilibrium, under regularity assumptions. The controlled process is a general Itô diffusion.     

Sensitive equilibria for ergodic stochastic games with countable state spaces

We consider stochastic games with countable state spaces and unbounded immediate payoff functions. Our assumptions on the transition structure of the game are based on a recent work by Meyn and Tweedie [19] on computable bounds for geometric convergence rates of Markov chains. The main results in this paper concern the existence of sensitive optimal strategies in some classes of zero-sum stochastic games. By sensitive optimality we mean overtaking or 1-optimality. We also provide a new Nash equilibrium theorem for a class of ergodic nonzero-sum stochastic games with denumerable state spaces.     

Equivalent models for finite-fuel stochastic control

A stochastic control problem with finite-fuel constraint, of the type studied by Bene?, Shepp and Witsenhausen (1980), is solved explicitly. It is shown to be reducible to “simpler” stochastic optimization problems, such as optimal stopping and singular control for Brownian motion with unlimited fuel.     

A general characterization of the mean field limit for stochastic differential games

The mean field limit of large-population symmetric stochastic differential games is derived in a general setting, with and without common noise, on a finite time horizon. Minimal assumptions are imposed on equilibrium strategies, which may be asymmetric and based on full information. It is shown that approximate Nash equilibria in the n-player games admit certain weak limits as n tends to infinity, and every limit is a weak solution of the mean field game (MFG). Conversely, every weak MFG solution can be obtained as the limit of a sequence of approximate Nash equilibria in the n-player games. Thus, the MFG precisely characterizes the possible limiting equilibrium behavior of the n-player games. Even in the setting without common noise, the empirical state distributions may admit stochastic limits which cannot be described by the usual notion of MFG solution.     

一类奇异型平稳随机控制问题

本文研究了一个平稳的奇异型随机控制模型,其状态过程为由随机微分方程生成的扩散过程,这个模型实质性地推广了此前的平稳奇异型随机控制模型．     

A maximum principle for Markov regime-switching forward–backward stochastic differential games and applications

In this paper, we present an optimal control problem for stochastic differential games under Markov regime-switching forward–backward stochastic differential equations with jumps. First, we prove a sufficient maximum principle for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games problems and obtain equilibrium point for such games. Second, we prove an equivalent maximum principle for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games. The zero-sum stochastic differential games equivalent maximum principle is then obtained as a corollary. We apply the obtained results to study a problem of robust utility maximization under a relative entropy penalty and to find optimal investment of an insurance firm under model uncertainty.     

基于再保险和投资的随机微分博弈

本文研究了具有再保险和投资的随机微分博弈.应用线性-二次控制的理论,在指数效用和幂效用下,求得了最优再保险策略、最优投资策略、最优市场策略和值函数的显示解,推广了文[8]的结果.通过本文的研究,当市场出现最坏的情况时,可以指导保险公司选择恰当的再保险和投资策略使自身所获得的财富最大化.     

Stationary,completely mixed and symmetric optimal and equilibrium strategies in stochastic games

In this paper, we address various types of two-person stochastic games—both zero-sum and nonzero-sum, discounted and undiscounted. In particular, we address different aspects of stochastic games, namely: (1) When is a two-person stochastic game completely mixed? (2) Can we identify classes of undiscounted zero-sum stochastic games that have stationary optimal strategies? (3) When does a two-person stochastic game possess symmetric optimal/equilibrium strategies? Firstly, we provide some necessary and some sufficient conditions under which certain classes of discounted and undiscounted stochastic games are completely mixed. In particular, we show that, if a discounted zero-sum switching control stochastic game with symmetric payoff matrices has a completely mixed stationary optimal strategy, then the stochastic game is completely mixed if and only if the matrix games restricted to states are all completely mixed. Secondly, we identify certain classes of undiscounted zero-sum stochastic games that have stationary optima under specific conditions for individual payoff matrices and transition probabilities. Thirdly, we provide sufficient conditions for discounted as well as certain classes of undiscounted stochastic games to have symmetric optimal/equilibrium strategies—namely, transitions are symmetric and the payoff matrices of one player are the transpose of those of the other. We also provide a sufficient condition for the stochastic game to have a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. We also provide examples to show the sharpness of our results.