企业关系视角下的知识流程外包策略研究

基于企业的关系视角,讨论了企业选择知识流程外包的可能动机。具体而言,在控制服务成本差的背景下,考虑企业间协同合作产生的关系租金与知识传递的信息粘性对企业选择外包策略进行分析。区别于传统基于服务成本差的外包策略,结论指出由于存在信息粘性的影响,服务提供商仅仅具有较高信息处理能力是不能保证企业选择外包。同时指出,即使当服务提供商不具有任何成本优势,基于合作战略的高关系租金也能成为企业选择知识流程外包的又一动机。通过将成本优势和关系优势进行比较,我们指出两类优势对于企业的外包绩效具有互补性,对于企业进行知识流程外包的决策具有替代性。     

考虑促销努力与生产努力的供应链召回努力策略研究

考虑一条由单个供应商和单个制造商组成的二级供应链,面对产品召回事件,供应商和制造商都可以通过召回努力来降低召回事件发生的概率。本文研究了供应链最优召回努力策略,研究发现双方的召回努力与初始期望单位召回成本和潜在市场规模有关。当潜在市场规模和初始期望单位召回成本都较小时,双方均选择部分召回努力,当潜在市场规模和初始期望单位召回成本都较大时,双方均选择全部召回努力,否则,供应商选择全额召回努力而制造商选择部分召回努力。由于制造商的促销努力与供应商的生产努力是企业扩大市场规模常用的策略,因此,本文还研究了这两种策略分别对供应链召回努力策略的影响。我们发现这两种策略都能降低双方采取全额召回努力时潜在市场规模的门槛,激励双方增加召回努力,降低产品召回概率并增加供应链成员的利润。特别的,我们还对比了这两种策略对双方召回努力的影响,发现当促销努力成本系数与生产努力成本系数都较小时,两种策略对召回努力的影响相同,当生产努力成本系数足够大时,考虑促销努力时双方的召回努力水平更高,否则,考虑生产努力时双方的召回努力水平更高。     

绿色混合产品市场下制造企业应对成本突增的策略

在绿色产品和非绿色产品并存的市场环境下,针对绿色产品和非绿色产品的生产成本突增的情况,研究了制造企业的生产调整策略.首先给出了常规环境下,制造企业对绿色产品和非绿色产品的生产策略;接着,研究了绿色产品和非绿色产品生产成本突然增加的情况下,制造企业的生产调整策略.最后,采用数值分析进一步证明了结论的正确性.研究表明:1)常规下的生产策略具有一定的鲁棒性,当突发事件引起生产成本扰动比较小时,应保持常规下的生产策略不变.2)当产品的生产成本突然增加时,会减少产品的市场规模,导致企业的利润受损.3)当产品的生产成本增加幅度比较大时,应该首先适度上调产品的销售价格,同时还要适度调整产品的产量:当其中一类产品的生产成本增加比较大,而另一类产品的生产成本增加比较小(扰动幅度在一定的范围内)时,对成本增加幅度大的产品,应减少产量;对成本增加幅度比较小的产品,应保持常规下的产量不变.随着两类产品的生产成本进一步增加,对成本增加幅度比较大的产品,应进一步减少产量,对成本增加幅度比较小的产品,应适度增加产量.当两类产品的生产成本增加都比较大时,不仅应增加两类产品的销售价格,而且还要减少两类产品的产量,尽管如此,企业的利润还是会大幅度减少.研究结论进一步丰富发展了企业应急管理的理论基础,为企业有效应对突发事件提供了理论指导的作用.     

利他偏好对双渠道供应链成员企业的策略影响研究

电子商务环境下,创新投入成为企业提升竞争优势的核心手段,而企业的偏好行为对其创新投入决策产生影响。本文探讨基于利他行为的供应链管理,通过在两类典型双渠道供应链研究中引入参与者的利他偏好,得到了供应商和零售商的均衡策略,并分析了利他偏好对均衡策略的影响。研究表明,当产品单位可变成本较低时,供应商和零售商的利他偏好有利于他方而不利于己方;当产品单位可变成本较高时,供应商和零售商的利他偏好只对己方有利而对他方不利。本研究在一定程度上揭示了供应链管理中利他行为存在的必要性和适度性,对促进供应链成员之间的合作具有积极意义。     

竞争市场下考虑再制造产品售后服务的供应链运营策略

在同时生产新产品和再制造产品的原始制造企业(企业1)与生产具有替代性产品的企业(企业2)构成竞争关系下的供应链系统中,探讨供应链在不同售后服务策略下供应链的运营策略,分析在竞争市场下供应链定价策略和再制造产品的售后服务对定价策略及供应链中各企业利润的影响。揭示再制造产品售后服务对定价策略和供应链各企业最优利润的影响。得到如下主要研究结论:(1)当制造企业为再制造产品提供售后服务时,再制造产品销售量增加,新产品和竞争替代产品销售量降低;有趣的是新产品和再制造产品的市场零售价格同时增加,竞争替代产品的市场零售价格降低。(2)制造企业为再制造产品提供售后服务时的利润总是大于没有售后服务时的利润,且不受单位产品生产成本影响。同时当单位产品生产成本较高时,制造企业为再制造产品提供售后服务策略会带来竞争对手企业利润增加。这些结论对具有再制造产品供应链如何提供再制造产品售后服务具有一定指导作用和管理启示。     

闭环供应链应对产品召回的应急渠道决策及协调分析

针对具突发事件性的产品召回事件会干扰闭环供应链正常运营的实际,构建了零售商回收、制造商回收和第三方企业回收等渠道闭环供应链的应急决策模型.比较研究发现:在各类系统中,产品召回事件使得其单位生产成本增加不大时,应保持正常运营环境下产品的单位销售价和销售量,以及废旧品的回收率等决策不变更好;当产品的单位生产成本增加较大时,应提高其单位销售价,并降低产品的销售量和废旧品的回收率更好;当产品的单位生产成本增加非常大时,供应链系统会被破坏.产品召回下,零售商回收渠道系统具有较好的应对性;当产品的单位生产成本增加很大时,因集中式决策系统会承担较多的额外处理成本,故系统保持分散式决策会更好;然而,当产品的单位生产成本增加不是很大时,设计应急收益费用共享契约可协调解决各企业的独立决策行为所产生"双重边际效应"问题,并能使各企业均获得帕累托改进的利润.     

考虑零售商促销策略的供应链融资及运营策略研究

当零售商的促销策略影响商品市场需求时,本文将促销分摊决策嵌入到经典报童模型,在银行信用与商业信用两种不同的融资模式下,对供应商及供应链整体的利润进行分析。研究发现:当零售商的行为对市场需求有影响时,商业信用在一定程度上减少了供应链的融资成本,增加了供应链的利润;核心企业的融资策略与自身成本及促销分摊策略有关;商业信用对供应链资本配置及零售商的激励,受供应商生产成本及激励策略的影响;商业信用在一定程度上减少了双重边际化效应。     

需求不确定情形下采用延迟定价的延迟生产系统最优生产决策

本文在考虑采用延迟生产的大规模定制企业能够实施延迟定价的环境下,建立了需求不确定情形下关于替代产品的延迟生产模型(企业在需求不确定的情况下生产通用中间产品,等待需求出现后再按客户需求定制最终产品并定价销售)和无延迟生产模型(企业在需求不确定的情况下按预测直接生产最终产品,等待需求出现后再定价并销售),通过对模型的推理分析,给出了企业采用延迟生产策略的适用条件以及当采用延迟生产策略时通用中间产品单位生产成本、延迟定制成本、产品之间的替代性、客户需求的方差和相关性与通用中间产品的最优生产数量和利润之间的关系,为企业在决策是否采用延迟生产策略以及通用中间产品生产数量提供理论支持。     

异质性生鲜农产品供应链的差别定价与协调策略

在单一供应商生产的两种产品存在替代性,需求受自身价格、新鲜度以及替代品价格共同影响的条件下,研究了受数量损耗影响的生鲜农产品供应链的定价策略及协调问题.比较分析了集中式与分散式决策下的最优策略,讨论了竞争替代系数以及可控的新鲜度和数量损耗率对最优决策的影响,进而给出了继续提升系统总利润的决策空间和顾客共赢的决策范围.并设计了"利润共享契约"对供应链进行协调,当契约参数在一定范围内变化时,该契约能实现供应商、零售商和顾客三方的共赢,供应商也拥有继续提升系统总利润的动力.     

收益共享的寄售契约下供应商生产成本谎报行为分析

在收益共享寄售契约下的两级供应链中,供应商向零售商报告其生产成本;零售商根据供应商报告的生产成本,决定零售商的收益分配比例;供应商决定零售价格和生产数量,并且保持产品的所有权.由于信息不对称,供应商可能谎报其生产成本.作者应用博弈论分析了供应商谎报行为对供应链及其成员决策及绩效的影响.利用解析的方法得出一些理论结果:零售价格在信息对称时小于生产成本信息不对称时;订货数量在信息对称时大于生产成本信息不对称时;零售商的利润分配比例在信息对称时大于生产成本信息不对称时.供应商的谎报行为使其自身利润增加,使零售商和供应链的利润减少.     

The impact of decision timing on the suppliers’ interactions: simultaneous moves <Emphasis Type="Italic">versus</Emphasis> sequential moves

The last few decades have witnessed a huge growth of outsourcing in industry where the downstream firm assigns its production tasks to different upstream suppliers. This makes the supply chain structure more complicated and gives rise to some relevant operational questions. This paper focuses on a supply chain structure that consists of one assembler and two suppliers, and both suppliers’ production yields are stochastic. The assembler delegates the quantity decisions to the suppliers, and the two suppliers choose their production quantities either simultaneously or sequentially. We compare the suppliers’ equilibrium production strategies under these two scenarios. Our results show that the decision sequence can exert significant influences on the firm’s and channel’s equilibrium payoffs. At any given wholesale price, both suppliers produce more components under sequential moves than under simultaneous moves, and this results in higher payoffs for the suppliers, the assembler and the entire supply chain. The supplier’s profit increases if he can make the decision later under sequential moves. From the channel’s perspective, it is more beneficial for the supplier with a higher production cost to make the decision first. The assembler is able to extract more surplus by endogenously setting the wholesale price. However, this may make the suppliers worse off under sequential moves than under simultaneous moves.     

供应中断风险下采购与定价决策分析

供应中断是供应链上的企业可能面临的问题,运用合理的采购策略可以帮助企业有效缓解供应中断风险。本文研究了供应中断下供应商和制造商之间的纵向竞争和两个制造商之间的横向竞争问题。供应商制定批发价,两个制造商采用不同的采购策略进行产量博弈,其中一个制造商采用紧急双源订货策略,另一个采用可靠单源订货策略。论文采用了多阶段博弈模型,分析了制造商之间的合谋与竞争两种行为,求出了供应商和制造商的最优决策,比较了这两种行为对供应商和制造商的影响。通过数值分析,讨论了成本参数和可靠性参数对于最优订货量的影响以及对于采用不同订货策略的制造商期望利润的影响。     

Impact of product pricing and timing of investment decisions on supply chain co-opetition

In supply chain co-opetition, firms simultaneously compete and co-operate in order to maximize their profits. We consider the nature of co-opetition between two firms: The product supplier invests in the technology to improve quality, and the purchasing firm (buyer) invests in selling effort to develop the market for the product before uncertainty in demand is resolved. We consider three different decision making structures and discuss the optimal configuration from each firm’s perspective. In case 1, the supplier invests in product quality and sets the wholesale price for the product. The buyer then exerts selling effort to develop the market and following demand potential realization, sets the resale price. In case 2, the supplier invests in product quality followed by the buyer’s investment in selling effort. Then, after demand potential is observed, the supplier sets the wholesale price and the buyer sets the resale price. Finally, in case 3, both firms simultaneously invest in product quality and selling effort, respectively. Subsequently, observing the demand potential, the supplier sets the wholesale price and the buyer sets the resale price. We compare all configuration options from both the perspective of the supplier and the buyer, and show that the level of investment by the firms depends on the nature of competition between them and the level of uncertainty in demand. Our analysis reveals that although configuration 1 results in the highest profits for the integrated channel, there is no clear dominating preference on system configuration from the perspective of both parties. The incentives of the co-opetition partners and the investment levels are mainly governed by the cost structure and the level of uncertainty in demand. We examine and discuss the relation between system parameters and the incentives in desiging the supply contract structure.     

Optimal Contract Design of Supplier-Led Outsourcing Based on Pontryagin Maximum Principle

This paper provides a supplier-led outsourcing model to maximize the supplier’s profits based on a principal-agent framework with both asymmetric cost information and uncertain market demand information described by continuous random variables. The salvage value of the unsold product is processing-cost dependent. By converting the proposed model, which is a dynamic optimization problem, to an optimal control problem, we obtain the analytical form of the optimal supplier outsourcing contract composed of the wholesale price and the transfer payment by applying Pontryagin’s maximum principle. It is shown that the optimal contract is directly related to the supplier’s beliefs about the manufacturer’s unit cost and the salvage value function. The Pontryagin’s maximum principle-based solution method serves as a powerful tool to support the decision making for the best sourcing strategy, and it provides analytical insights for outsourcing management. Finally, numerical examples are presented to illustrate the validness of the theoretical results.     

基于电商平台的混合销售渠道对供应链决策的影响研究

考虑到电商平台对消费者强大的吸引力,本文建立了由供应商和平台商构成的基于电商平台混合销售的供应链模型。混合销售渠道包含直销和分销,其中平台商拥有电商平台,供应商通过电商平台进行直销,平台商分享一定的收益;而分销是指平台商从供应商处批发产品进行销售。分别建立了集中式和分散式决策模型,研究发现:随着消费者对分销渠道接受程度的提高,两种情形下直销渠道的零售价不变,分销渠道的零售价提高;分散式情形下的批发价、供应商和平台商的利润均提高;随着供应商分享收益比例的提高,两种渠道的零售价都降低,但批发价提高,供应商的利润提高,而平台商的利润下降,但供应链的总利润提高;研究得到了保证博弈双方都能从直销渠道中获利的收益分享比例范围。     

外包制造下政府补贴对低碳供应链影响分析

为分析外包制造下,政府补贴对低碳供应链竞争的影响,基于低碳产品外包制造,构建一个制造商、一个外包制造商和一个销售商组成的博弈模型。基于此模型,对比分析政府三种补贴策略对两种产品市场竞争机理的影响。研究得到:政府补贴给制造商或销售商时,单位委托制造价格要高于补贴给外包制造商时,也即,当政府采取补贴策略且不补贴给外包制造商时,外包制造商会通过增加单位委托制造价格转移政府补贴;政府补贴策略对单位普通产品批发价格和零售价格无影响,但政府补贴策略会减少普通产品销售量,增加低碳产品销售量;政府补贴虽然减少普通产品收益,但政府补贴增加低碳产品收益,且低碳产品增加收益大于普通产品减少收益,也即政府补贴增加制造商和销售商的利润;政府补贴策略减少两种产品对环境造成的影响,增加消费者剩余和社会剩余。     

Social responsibility allocation in two-echelon supply chains: Insights from wholesale price contracts

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is considered in a two-echelon supply chain consisting of an upstream supplier and a downstream firm that are bound by a wholesale price contract. CSR performance (the outcome of CSR conduct) of the whole supply chain is gauged by a global variable and the associated cost of achieving this CSR performance is only incurred by the supplier with an expectation of being shared with the downstream firm via the wholesale price contract. As such, the key issue is to determine who should be allocated as the responsibility holder with the right of offering the contract and how this right should be appropriately restricted. Game-theoretical analyses are carried out on six games, resulting from different interaction schemes between the supplier and the firm, to derive their corresponding equilibriums. Comparative institutional analyses are then conducted to determine the optimal social responsibility allocation based on both economic and CSR performance criteria. Main results are furnished in a series of propositions and their implications to the real-world business practice are discussed. The key findings are threefold: under the current model settings: (1) the optimal allocation scheme is to assign the supplier as the responsibility holder with appropriate restrictions on the corresponding rights to determine the wholesale price; (2) inherent conflict exists between the economic and CSR performance criteria and, hence, the two maxima cannot be achieved simultaneously; and (3) although integrative channel profit is not attainable, the system-wide profit will be improved by implementing optimal social responsibility allocation schemes.     

The more the better? Optimal degree of supply-chain cooperation between competitors

We consider the outsourcing strategy problem of two competing original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) whose products are each made up of two components. The OEMs have different specializations, and therefore the component that each firm can produce in-house is different. Each firm must decide whether to outsource the other component to the competing OEM or to a third-party supplier. Prior research has demonstrated that competitors can be better off cooperating as supply-chain partners; therefore, one might expect that, as long as the OEMs are not at a severe cost disadvantage, they should maximize their cooperation as supply-chain partners, especially when competition between products is strong. Interestingly, this study finds that more cooperation between competitors may actually be harmful. Under certain conditions, while one of the OEMs should outsource to the competing firm, the other should outsource to a third-party supplier, even when the third-party supplier is more expensive and the competition is intense.     

Design outsourcing in the fashion supply chain: OEM <Emphasis Type="Italic">versus</Emphasis> ODM

Design innovation is the engine of fashion. Many fashion firms outsource design innovation to their suppliers. Design outsourcing is on the rise in the fashion supply chain, but research in this area lags behind industry practice. In this paper, we examine how design outsourcing affects the supply chain, and we compare supply chain performance under an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) strategy versus an Original Design Manufacturer (ODM) strategy. We evaluate a market size outsourcing model where design enhancement influences market size, and a success probability outsourcing model where design enhancement influences the success probability of innovation. We find that when the supplier trades with the retailer via a wholesale price contract under the ODM strategy, the supplier has no incentive to invest in innovation. In the market size outsourcing model, the design innovation in the centralized supply chain is higher than that under the OEM strategy. However, in the success probability outsourcing model, the success probability of innovation under the OEM strategy is higher than that in the centralized supply chain. Furthermore, we find that a profit sharing contract can achieve supply chain coordination under both OEM and ODM strategies; whereas, revenue sharing and buyback contracts cannot.     

Mitigating supply risk: an approach with quantity flexibility procurement

This paper considers a buyer that procures from its major supplier whose production is subject to random yield risk. To mitigate supply risk, the buyer can procure from another reliable supplier who provides quantity flexibility (QF) contract. Under both deterministic and stochastic demand, we study the buyer’s optimal procurement decisions. We analyze the structural properties of optimal solutions and identify the conditions under which the quantity flexibility procurement policy should be used. We also examine the effect of supply risk, flexibility, wholesale price and demand risk on the procurement decisions. We find that the higher supply risk and demand risk reduce the buyer’s profit but have different impact on the buyer’s order policy. For the QF supplier, it may not obtain more orders by providing larger flexibility to the buyer, on the contrary, doing this may benefit the risky supplier. For the QF supplier or risky supplier, given its competitor’s wholesale price, it can increase its order share by lower wholesale price.