基于顾客排队的服务供应链协调策略研究

现阶段对于服务供应链的研究仍受限于传统产品供应链的研究框架,专门针对服务特性的供应链研究是该领域的核心议题。基于服务供应链面向顾客的独有特性,首先分析了服务供应链中服务提供商、集成商与顾客之间的服务关系,然后构建了基于顾客排队的服务供应链模型,其次探讨了集中式和分散式服务供应链下双方的决策问题。研究结果表明,服务提供商、服务集成商通过选择合理的成本共担系数,制定相应的成本共担契约,是协调分散式服务供应链、实现帕累托最优的最佳策略。研究结论对于开拓和深化服务供应链研究具有一定的启示意义。     

客户企业参与下服务外包激励机制设计

服务外包下,由于客户企业参与程度、服务提供商的努力水平以及专用性资产投入水平都难以让合作双方有效验证,这三种不可验证性风险因素可能引发道德风险,从而降低服务外包的绩效,甚至导致服务外包的失败。为此,本文建立了服务外包下的委托—代理框架,设计了客户企业参与下的服务外包激励机制模型,运用最优化理论分析了客户企业的参与程度以及服务提供商的专用性资产投入水平等因素对激励机制契约设计的影响,并运用数值仿真验证客户企业参与程度和服务提供商专用性资产投入水平对激励系数和服务提供商的努力水平的影响。研究分析表明:在服务外包活动中客户企业更多的投入到合作生产中时,对服务提供商的激励也会增加但是增加的幅度较慢,同时服务提供商付出的努力将会加速的提高;服务提供商投入的专用性资产投入水平越高时,其自身的努力水平也会加速增长,客户企业对其的激励系数也会增长,当专用性资产投入水平达到某一程度时,激励系数增长速度达到最大。     

云计算模式下SLA中的补偿策略及风险

本文基于云计算的特性,首次提出了服务水平协议(Service Level Agreement,SLA)中的三种补偿策略(分别为基于服务失败数量、基于长服务中断数量和基于累积中断时间的补偿策略),通过在SLA中约定客户容忍阀值,针对服务失败等级对客户进行分级补偿。针对三种策略的补偿成本,本文对云服务提供商造成的损失风险进行了测量和分析,得到了风险价值(Value-at-Risk,VaR)变化的特征和规律。在平均损失相同情况下,基于累积中断时间补偿策略的VaR值大于基于服务失败数量补偿策略的VaR值,因此采取基于中断时间的补偿策略风险更大。实例数据分析表明,本文提出的补偿策略是合理可行的。本文结论对于云服务提供商的补偿策略制定具有指导意义。     

规模效应下产品具有可替代性的竞争企业的外包决策

针对产品具有一定替代性的两个竞争企业(分别为企业1和企业2)和存在规模效应的上游供应商的外包决策问题, 构建了企业1 外包前后各方的利润模型,求解了下游企业的外包和自产的最优策略以及供应商的最佳批发价格,分析了企业1 的外包策略对企业2 和供应商的外包决策的影响,比较了产品替代性对外包前后各决策变量的影响。研究发现:当企业的单位生产成本高于外包成本时,企业也可能选择自产;而当企业的单位生产成本低于外包成本时,企业也可能选择产品外包。并对模型进行进一步的拓展,比较了下游企业作顺序和同时外包决策两种情景的异同。     

两服务商竞争的研发外包知识转移信息披露决策

针对两服务商竞争的研发外包知识转移,考虑两个服务商知识吸收能力、信息获取能力均不同,且信息劣势方不知道信息优势方的知识吸收能力。通过建立以企业为领导者,两个服务商为跟随者的Stackelberg主从博弈模型,研究了企业和信息优势方的知识吸收能力披露决策,以及信息劣势方的信息处理决策,并用算例对结论加以说明。研究表明:仅当知识吸收能力较弱的服务商索取的单位报酬相对较低时,企业应披露信息优势方的知识吸收能力;仅当信息优势方知识吸收能力较弱时,其应披露自身知识吸收能力;信息劣势方应始终遵循信息优势方的信息披露策略;各方信息披露决策对企业和服务商均有不同影响。     

考虑信息粘滞性和知识溢出的企业创新策略演化分析

企业创新发展已成为企业可持续发展的关键,是国家经济发展的重要助推器。企业创新研发过程会出现知识溢出行为,而知识溢出行为一方面将打击创新企业的创新积极性,但另一方面会促进企业与其他合作成员的合作关系。从知识传播过程入手,运用信息粘滞性去控制知识溢出程度,根据企业创新进程构建企业创新策略演化模型。研究发现独立创新阶段,采取知识投入策略的企业短期内会通过增加信息粘滞性来避免知识溢出,当企业双方都进行知识投入时,合作逐渐向协同创新发展;协同创新阶段,企业双方同时采用知识投入策略时,知识转移促进企业形成“溢出-吸收-反吸收”合作回路,知识内化能力、知识投入水平与政府补贴正向激励合作,信息粘滞性影响被合作优势消除。     

基于分类服务机制的可预约排队系统设计和服务定价研究

采取合理有效的服务机制和服务定价是确保服务型企业持续有效运行的重要方式,服务提供商设计合理的服务策略可以使得服务收益达到最优。本文以服务可预约的排队系统为研究背景,对服务提供商分类服务机制选择和服务定价策略进行研究。通过考虑由两种服务策略下顾客之间的平均等待时间的对比和顾客等待厌恶心理参数形成的全新顾客服务效用模型,给出服务提供商在不同服务机制下的最优服务策略以及顾客市场规模对其服务策略选择的影响。研究表明,当预约顾客的市场规模相对较小时,服务提供商可以采取分类服务机制,即同时服务预约顾客和未预约顾客以增加服务收益,反之亦然。此外,预约顾客等待厌恶程度能够显著增大服务提供商的服务定价。     

考虑相互信息监督下的服务合作生产契约

知识密集型服务合作生产由于存在相互之间的知识依赖和信息粘性,双方信息管理效率影响合作激励机制的设计。从相互信息监督视角出发,综合考虑双方信息监督效率和相对重要性参数对服务合作生产契约设计的影响。结果表明,在双方信息监督效率相同情况下,相对更重要的一方拥有剩余激励是最优的;在双方信息监督效率不同时,让监督更有效且相对更重要的一方拥有剩余激励是最优的;如果监督效率优势和相对重要性优势没有集中于一方,则结果取决于两者的比较,具有更强优势的一方应该成为剩余激励索取者。双方的相对重要性和信息监督效率共同决定合作契约。     

基于博弈论的供应链知识服务网络知识投入成本策略研究

在供应链知识服务网络中,知识创造、技术更新是企业持续发展、获得竞争优势的最重要方式。对具有企业核心价值的知识来说,知识成本的投入是采用自我研发的方式还是由专业化的知识服务商提供,对企业的未来发展战略以及投资回报都有直接影响。本文在研究一个知识提供方和一个知识需求方的条件下,通过构建Nash博弈、以知识提供方为主导的Stackelberg博弈、以知识需求方为主导的Stackelberg 博弈和合作博弈四种模型,对知识投入成本、价格以及收益进行博弈研究,最终给出最优解。结论指出,供应链若获得最大收益,则知识提供方与知识需求方应该建立战略联盟或合作框架,在供应链最大收益的情况下协商内部分配问题,同时该种情况下的知识成本投入也最大;对于以投入知识获取收益的企业来说,以知识提供方为主导的Stackelberg 均衡博弈模型是较好的选择。     

基于关系契约视角的农户与农产品电子商务企业合作机制演化博弈分析

本文基于关系契约的视角,运用演化博弈理论,构建有限理性特性下的农户与农产品电子商务企业合作演化博弈模型,分析双方合作策略的演进过程、稳定策略及其影响因素,并通过Matlab仿真模拟分析影响双方合作策略选择的因素,验证博弈结果正确性。研究结果表明:农户和农产品电子商务企业选择合作策略与合作投入成本、实现的超额收益密切相关,博弈初始状态、再交易成本、单方不合作获得的收益及违约罚金等因素影响系统的演化稳定结果。因此完善农户与农产品电子商务企业的合作机制,需要构建合理的利益分配机制、良好的关系治理机制、有效的监督和惩罚机制和信息共享、沟通与协调机制。     

Analysis of back-office outsourcing contracts for financial services operations

Managing back-office operations for financial services is a challenging task because of highly volatile and dynamic demand requirements. Lack of service inventories, the inability to backlog demand and significant shortage and overage costs complicate the problem. In such situations, outsourcing all or part of the demand to third-party vendors provides a viable and cost effective option for the firm. Motivated by the remittance processing operations of a Fortune 100 company we examine the usefulness of complementing in-house staffing with different outsourcing arrangements. We study capacity-based and volume-based contracts between a financial services firm and an outsourcing vendor. We examine the impact of demand characteristics on the parameters of contract choice. Through extensive numerical analysis, we ascertain that neither contract is universally preferred, but cost and revenue structures along with demand characteristics determine contract choice.     

Investment decisions in the rent-to-own industry in the absence of inventory

This study addresses the product investment decision faced by firms in the rent-to-own industry. In this setting, a customer arrives according to a random process and requests one unit of a product to rent (and eventually own should he/she choose to make all the required payments). At the time of request, if the product is available in inventory, the firm enters into a contractual agreement (by accepting the customer's offer) and rents the merchandise. More interesting and the case considered here, if the requested item is not in inventory, the firm must decide whether to purchase the item in order to rent it out or to simply reject the request. The customer's offer specifies the desired maximum contract length and the payment frequency—from which the firm determines the fixed periodic payment charged. The firm makes its investment decision based on the characteristics of the offer as well as those of the product (eg, initial and resale values, useful life and carrying costs) in essence performing a complicated cost benefit analysis. An extension is also considered whereby instead of simply rejecting the request the firm can adjust the required payment amount. Dynamic programming techniques are used to address the problem and to solve for the firm's optimal decision.     

Price competition in the Hotelling model with uncertainty on costs

For the linear Hotelling model with firms located at the boundaries of the segment line, we study the price competition in a scenario of incomplete information in the production costs of both firms. We introduce the bounded uncertain costs (BUC) condition in the production costs and we prove that there is a local optimum price strategy if and only if the BUC condition holds. We compute explicitly the local optimum price strategy and we prove that it does not depend upon the distributions of the production costs of the firms, except on their first moments. We prove that the ex-post profit of a firm is smaller than its ex-ante profit if and only if the production cost of the other firm is greater than its expected cost.     

Making the information systems outsourcing decision: A transaction cost approach to analyzing outsourcing decision problems

During the last several years outsourcing has emerged as a major issue in information systems management. As competitive forces impinge on business firms, senior managers are re-structuring their organizations with an eye on attaining or maintaining competitive advantage. Various strategies to IS outsourcing have emerged, for example, some outsourcers contract with a sole vendor while others contract with several. To date no studies have been done to determine which strategies are appropriate under what conditions. And while some firms have achieved varying degrees of success with any of these strategies, many have encountered significant difficulties. How then are managers to choose from a set of options that which is most appropriate for their firm? Outsourcing problems are complex and entail considerable implications for the strategy of the firm. A wrong decision can result in loss of core competencies and capabilities, and exposure to unexpected risks. Although many articles have appeared on outsourcing, few have extended the discussion beyond simple cost–benefit analysis. In this paper we discuss a transaction cost theory approach to the analysis of outsourcing decision making. Our approach provides managers with a strategy and techniques for analyzing some of the more subtle issues they may face when dealing with complex outsourcing decisions problems.     

Service quality,outsourcing and upward channel decentralization

We build a model to analyse the benefit of upward channel decentralization for a firm choosing service outsourcing and integration. The key findings of this paper are as follows. First, we formulate an upward channel decentralization problem as a game incorporating consumer behaviour of willingness to pay in a channel duopoly. Our model considers (i) service quality, (ii) consumer marginal willingness to pay (MWTP), and (iii) consumer perceivable difference. A supply chain firm’s preference of outsourcing strategy depends on the monotonicity of both the failure rate (or Mills Ratio) and CDF-PDF ratio of MWTP distribution function. Second, we use this model to explore the benefit of retailer strategy of upward channel decentralization. An equilibrium can be achieved by benefiting the low-label product with low quality service but deteriorating the high-label channel product with high quality.     

The construction of a comprehensive model for production strategy evaluation

To acquire reasonable profits and to be competitive in the globalize market, more and more firms today have exploited various kinds of production strategies, such as outsourcing, joint venture, or some kind of strategic alliance. Since every production strategy has its benefits and costs and may bring a firm different opportunities and risks, which kind of production strategy is the most suitable for a firm to carry out is a difficult and complicated decision with a high degree of uncertainty. Therefore, this research proposes a comprehensive production strategy evaluation model that can facilitate such a decision making for a firm. The factors that should be considered for devising a production strategy are listed for the benefits, opportunities, costs and risks (BOCR) merits first, and fuzzy Delphi method is applied next to select the most important factors under each merit. A network with BOCR merits is constructed to incorporate the selected factors, and fuzzy analytic network process is then applied to consider the interdependence and feedback inside the network. The proposed model can effectively aid decision making on which kind of production strategy should be adopted by a firm. A case of a printed circuit board manufacturer is presented for the illustration of the proposed model.     

Equilibrium two-part cost structures

We consider an oligopolistic product market in which two competing firms instead of paying a competitive input price choose a two-part tariff. Costs for the input are divided up into upfront fixed costs independent of the output level and reductions in marginal costs. We explore under which competitive settings will such a two-part cost structure correspond to equilibrium behavior in a two stage game. We find that firms in a static model do have an incentive to choose a two-part cost structure when competition in the product market is not too strong and oligopoly rents can be shifted form the rival to the own firm. In a dynamic market when firms use Markov strategies competition is so intense that there are no rents to be shifted and firms do not benefit from two-part cost structures.     

Vehicle routing in the 1-skip collection problem

In this paper, we consider a real problem, which we call the 1-skip collection problem, where a fleet of vehicles must collect a number of skips situated in different locations and transport them to one among different plants chosen on the basis of the kind of waste contained in the skip. Each vehicle has a capacity of one skip and it starts and ends its tour at the depot. Each time a vehicle collects a skip, it has to go to a plant and empty it. A number of constraints are imposed, which involve time windows for the customers and the plants, shift-time, different kinds of skips, number of drivers available to carry out the service and priorities assigned to the customers who have to be served. The objective is to minimize the total cost of the service given by the fixed cost of the drivers engaged to carry out the service, the cost of the extra time and the penalty cost paid if a customer is not served. A heuristic algorithm to solve the real problem is presented. The algorithm first constructs a feasible solution by means of the nearest-neighbour algorithm. Then, if it finds a feasible solution, it improves it. The computational results show that the solution of the algorithm is much better than the solution applied by the firm that carries out the service since it serves a higher number of skips with a smaller number of drivers.     

Outsourcing suppliers as downstream competitors: Biting the hand that feeds

In this paper, we highlight an aspect of supplier opportunism in the outsourcing paradox that has largely been ignored by extant research – the supplier as a direct competitor of the buyer firm. In light of this paradox, we offer a game-theoretic framework in which we identify conditions under which firms could alleviate or mitigate this outsourcing problem. Our results show that apart from transaction costs, firm-level capabilities (both ordinary and dynamic) play important roles in determining the make only, buy only, or make-and-buy options a firm could exercise in countering the threat of the supplier as a potential competitor in the downstream marketplace.