不对称信息下逆向供应链定价分析与对策

以博弈论为研究方法,对由零售商和制造商组成的逆向供应链的定价问题进行研究,通过分析在回收成本信息对称和信息不对称情况下逆向供应链中制造商和零售商的定价策略,得出了在信息不对称情况下,制造商承担更大的风险。因此制造商需要防范回收成本信息不对称带来的风险,文章进一步给出了制造商的信息甄别合同,通过合同制造商可以降低由回收成本信息不对称带来的风险。     

多因素干扰下的供应链最优定价与订货决策

在信息不对称条件下,市场需求、价格和风险厌恶等因素同时干扰时,构建数量折扣契约的供应链博弈模型,寻找其实现供应链协调的内在约束条件。根据显示原理,构建信息不对称条件下多因素干扰的CVaR模型并求解,然后用算例仿真,结果表明:供应商隐瞒生产成本信息会带来额外收益,但给零售商造成额外损失。价格随机与零售商厌恶风险的耦合作用是导致供应链上各决策变量发生分岔现象的内因,与信息是否对称无关。但信息不对称会损害供应链系统的稳定性。在分岔突变区域内供应链失调,在区域之外供应链协调。零售商风险中性的态度和提高信息透明度有利于提高整个供应链的绩效。     

非对称信息下的后端VMI协调模型

对VMI模式下的两层供应链,在考虑制造商的生产成本信息对称和不对称两种情形下,运用委托-代理理论设计了基于可转移效用-折扣策略的VMI协调机制,有效地改善了分散式供应链结构下由激励不一致、信息不对称等因素引起的供应链效率低下问题,以达到在提高供应链渠道效益的同时,实现制造商和零售商收益的pareto改进.     

贸易信用交易下的保险投资策略研究

贸易信用融资被广泛应用于解决中小企业融资困境,而保险正成为解决贸易信用融资风险的重要手段。本文站在核心企业角度,探究贸易信用融资保险的运营策略,运用Stackelberg博弈分析方法分别建立并比较了贸易信用融资、贸易信用融资保险、资金约束无融资、资金充足四类优化模型,探究了博弈均衡下的最优运营决策,并分析了零售商初始资金、生产商风险态度等关键参数的影响。研究表明:融资不仅对供应链有利,还能同时实现生产商及零售商共赢;当生产商风险厌恶程度、保险市场竞争程度较高,零售商初始资金较低时,融资保险能够为生产商及供应链创造价值,否则生产商应当放弃投保。研究结论为工业界合理且高效开展贸易信用融资保险运营提供了策略指导和管理启示。     

RFID对供应链提前期压缩的影响及协调研究

提前期压缩是基于时间竞争的供应链管理的核心,是供应链竞争优势的有力来源。RFID技术通过提高供应链中信息共享、加速物流操作,进而缩短提前期。在市场需求预测精度随提前期变化的假设下,研究由生产商和零售商组成的两阶段供应链中,生产商承担压缩成本采用RFID技术压缩提前期对供应链及其成员收益的影响。确定了可使供应链收益提高的标签成本约束条件,并提出了相应的收益协调机制。研究结果表明:供应链成员的收益随服务水平和标签成本变化而变化,通过引入收益协调机制,可以实现供应链成员收益的Pareto改进。最后通过数值算例对结论进行了验证。     

非对称信息证券交易的跨期动态博弈均衡解析

揭示了不对称信息条件下证券市场均衡的基本特征.Grossman和Stiglitz模型依据不知情交易者的弱理性,解析了证券交易的静态均衡状态.O'Hara模型增强了不知情交易者的理性,强调了市场均衡时的风险定价,但其命题的成立条件是相互矛盾的.认为不知情交易者信息收集和处理能力的提高会使决策更为理性,证券市场的均衡本质上是交易者的动态博弈均衡.依此思路,运用不完美信息的跨期动态博弈模型解析了非对称信息条件下证券交易者的精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡.结论显示出,市场失效的主要原因是交易者之间的信息分析能力不平衡,而不是信息不对称;市场流动性的决定因素不是信息不对称风险而是知情交易者与不知情交易者所研判的无风险收益率的差别.     

制造商公平偏好下双渠道闭环供应链定价与协调

将制造商公平偏好行为特征引入双渠道闭环供应链,针对非合作独立决策、完全合作联合决策两种不同情形分别建立相应的定价决策模型.运用博弈理论求得两种不同情形下的最优定价策略,并分析了公平偏好系数对供应链各成员最优定价策略及利润的影响.研究发现:制造商公平偏好行为特征能增强其讨价还价能力,但不利于提升供应链经济效益和社会绿色环保效益;非合作独立决策下的系统利润低于完全合作联合决策下的系统利润.为此,通过联合运用一个由批发价格、直销价格和回收转移价格组成的定价机制和一个两部定价补充协议对双渠道闭环供应链进行协调,可以实现双方的Pareto改进.     

制造商主导的供应链产品绿色度与定价协调

针对需求信息不对称下制造商主导型供应链中产品绿色度与定价协调决策问题,分析了产品绿色度与产品销售价格、批发价格及市场需求间的关系,运用收益共享契约原理,建立了以收益共享系数为变量的零售商产品销售价格函数和利润函数以及制造商产品绿色度函数、批发价格函数和利润函数,运用不对称Nash协商原理,进一步构建了在制造商谈判能力给定条件下的收益共享系数优化模型,并通过数值仿真分析验证了需求信息不对称下供应链产品绿色度与定价协调优化结果.研究表明:供应链产品绿色度和定价协调优化不仅有助于制造商和零售商实现共赢,而且有助于制造商为客户提供更好的绿色产品.制造商的谈判能力越强,产品最优绿色度越高,而最优收益共享系数和产品的批发/销售价格则越小.此外,客户对产品绿色度的敏感系数与制造商谈判能力系数的共同升高将会加快最优收益共享系数的降低.研究结论可为制造商产品绿色度和绿色供应链协调决策提供有益的参考.     

专利保护下再制造闭环供应链差别定价与协调研究

本文目的是研究当再制造闭环供应链系统中原制造商具专利保护以及新产品与再制造品之间存在差异情况下,闭环供应链系统成员的最优决策及系统协调机制设计问题。根据现实情形构建了再制造闭环供应链差别定价模型,利用博弈理论讨论了集中决策与分散决策情形下节点企业的最优定价策略及最优利润。研究结果表明,废旧产品的再造率和专利许可费用均对废旧产品的回收价格和回收量具有一定的影响;消费者对再制造品的接受程度会影响到供应链系统各方的最优定价策略及利润;提出的一种收益-费用分担契约协调机制,可以实现分散决策下闭环供应链系统的协调和效率优化。     

新三板精选层提高市场流动性和股价信息效率了吗?

市场流动性和股价信息效率是证券市场质量的重要体现.文章以2020年7月27日新三板市场设立精选层这一市场结构改革为背景,采用渐进双重差分方法研究了精选层设立对其挂牌公司股票流动性和定价效率的影响.研究发现,转入精选层的挂牌公司其股票流动性和股价信息效率得到显著提升,设立精选层等改革举措通过完善信息披露机制、提高市场流动性从而改善股价信息效率.进一步研究表明,信息不对称程度较低、市值规模较大的公司股价信息效率显著提高,而信息不对称程度较高、市值规模较小的公司股价信息效率并未发生显著变化,股票价格更多反映了市场和行业收益特征,并未充分吸收公司特质信息,表现为个股联动、股价同涨同跌.考虑到精选层挂牌公司大多为中小型高科技企业,而做市商为专业做市机构,具备为高科技企业股票定价的能力.因此,在精选层连续竞价交易机制基础之上,实施混合做市交易机制,能够进一步改善市场流动性,提高股价信息效率.     

Optimizing product service system by franchise fee contracts under information asymmetry

This paper studies the problem of how to effectively provide product service system (PSS) in a service-oriented manufacturing supply chain under asymmetric private demand information. The PSS in the supply chain is operated heterogeneously and complementarily, in which the manufacturer provides the product while the retailer who possesses private demand information is responsible for adding the necessary value-added service on the basic product. We address the issue of how different contracts affect the decisions and profitability of the supply chain members. Three types of contracts are developed to help supply chain partners to make decisions and enhance the supply chain’s efficiency. The first is the franchise fee (FF) contract, under which the manufacturer provides a two-part tariff contract (wholesale price and franchise fee) to influence the retailer’s decision and to detect her private demand information. The second is the franchise fee with service requirement (FFS) contract, under which the manufacturer specifies the service level required in addition to the two-part tariff contract terms. The third is the franchise fee with centralized service requirement (FFCS) contract, which is similar to the FFS contract but that the service level specified by the manufacturer is the system optimal solution. Our analytical results show that all three contracts enable the manufacturer to detect the retailer’s private demand information, with the FFCS contract achieving the greatest channel profit. Finally, numerical examples are presented, and sensitivity analysis of service level and profit are conducted to compare the performance of the three contracts under different settings. The paper provides managerial guidelines for the manufacturer in contract offering under different conditions.     

非对称信息和模糊需求下的闭环供应链协调决策研究

在模糊需求和非对称销售价格信息下,研究了由单一制造商和零售商组成的两级闭环供应链系统的协调问题。通过建立不确定环境下的集中决策和收益共享-费用共担契约决策模型,分别得到了不同模型下闭环供应链系统的最优策略。并进一步通过算例分析了契约下供应链各方收益随模糊需求和价格的变化情况,以及该契约对整个系统决策效率的影响。结果表明:收益共享-费用共担契约能有效实现模糊闭环供应链系统的协调,实现闭环供应链系统决策的最优化;其次,需求和零售价格的不确定性程度越高,对零售商的最优订购量、供应链成员及系统利润的影响也越大。     

碳交易机制下考虑竞争和信息非对称的供应链协调研究

本文在碳交易机制下,考虑制造商之间存在竞争且减排成本系数为低碳制造商私有信息的情况,分别构建信息完全对称和信息非对称情形下的供应链模型,对低碳制造商减排率和产品销售价格进行决策。通过引入由批发价和成本共担组成的联合契约,促使低碳制造商传递真实的减排成本信息,并通过算例对碳交易价格和减排成本系数等进行灵敏度分析。研究发现:引入联合契约能够使得信息非对称下的供应链利润基本达到集中决策水平;碳交易价格的增加会激励制造商积极减排、降低碳排放总量、提高供应链利润;低碳制造商减排成本系数的降低有助于减少碳排放量、增加产品市场需求、实现供应链利润增长。     

‘Too Little’ or ‘Too Late’: The timing of supply chain demand collaboration

This study examines the supply chain demand collaboration between a manufacturer and a retailer. We study how the timing of collaboration facilitates production decision of the manufacturer when the information exchanged in the collaboration is asymmetric. We investigate two collaboration mechanisms: ‘Too Little’ and ‘Too Late’, depending on the timing of information sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer. Our research results indicate that early collaboration as in the ‘Too Little’ mechanism leads to a stable production schedule, which decreases the need of production adjustment when production cost information becomes available; whereas a late collaboration as in the ‘Too Late’ mechanism enhances the flexibility of production adjustment when demand information warrants it. In addition, the asymmetric demand information confounds production decisions all the time; the manufacturer has to provide proper incentives to ensure truthful information sharing in collaboration. Information asymmetry might also reduce the difference in production decision between the ‘Too Little’ and ‘Too Late’ collaboration mechanisms. Numerical analysis is further conducted to demonstrate the performance implications of the collaboration mechanisms on the supply chain.     

Joint decision on production and pricing for online dual channel supply chain system

Online dual channel supply chain system and its joint decision on production and pricing under information asymmetry are investigated. First, optimal production and pricing strategies are depicted according to the centralized system. Next, two kinds of contracts are designed for the decentralized system to coordinate the channel system, and their production and pricing decisions are depicted using a principle-agent method for the asymmetric information on the traditional channel. Finally, some interesting insights are found: the centralized system is not always being better than the decentralized system with a feasible contract if the traditional and professional retailer has lower selling cost. When uncertainty in the traditional channel information is higher, the manufacturer prefers a menu of contracts according to different channel settings. When uncertainty is lower, the manufacturer prefers a single contract. Furthermore, the higher the uncertainty in the traditional channel, the more the information welfare of the traditional retailer will gain. Performance with a menu of contracts cannot outperform that with a single contract integrating optimistic and pessimistic market setting well; their difference in performance is bigger when uncertainty in the traditional channel information is less.     

信息不对称下多因素波动的应急数量弹性契约

考虑突发事件导致市场需求大幅波动、市场价格随机波动,构建生产成本信息不对称时应急供应链的数量弹性契约模型,寻找最优定价及订货策略;与完全信息情形对比,分析突发事件的信息共享及其对供应链最优决策的影响程度。研究发现,在生产成本信息不对称情形下,突发事件发生时,虽然零售商设计的数量弹性契约可以有效体现真实生产成本,但对供应链协调不起作用。同时,如果市场需求规模缩减,制造商表现出隐藏信息行为,可以促使供应链整体效益增加。最后通过算例验证了这些结论。     

信息不对称下具有过度自信零售商的供应链激励契约研究

在有过度自信零售商的分销供应链中,利用委托代理模型分别得出了信息对称及信息不对称时(努力程度无法监控)的最优特许经营费契约。探究了在两种情况下,零售商过度自信程度对其努力程度及制造商利润的影响。从比较中得知信息不对称下零售商的努力程度及制造商利润都小于信息对称下的情况,两种差别分别与零售商的过度自信程度成反比。零售商的过度自信行为有正面的信息价值,能减少信息不对称的影响;制造商偏爱过度自信程度较高的零售商。     

产出不确定性的三级供应链风险分担组合契约设计

研究了供应商和制造商产出随机且零售商面临随机需求的三级供应链协调模型,决策变量为供应商的原材料投入量、制造商的订购量和零售商的订购量。分析了集中决策下供应链协调基准的唯一性,论证了回购契约及其与产出风险分担组合契约的协调性。研究结果表明,对于产出和需求不确定的三级供应链,仅考虑在制造商和零售商之间采用回购契约可改善供应链绩效,但并不能实现供应链的全局最优化,而从风险分担的角度设计的回购和产出风险分担组合契约不仅能有效的协调供应链,且在一定条件下,各供应链成员的利润还能获得帕累托改进。通过算例验证了以上结论的正确性,并分析了回购价格对订购量、原材料投入量和利润的影响,以及各供应链成员对契约的偏好。     

Supply contracting and process innovation in a dynamic supply chain with information asymmetry

We investigate the process innovation and contracting decisions of a dynamic supply chain consisting of a supplier and a manufacturer, with the manufacturer possessing private information about her efficiency of process innovation. To overcome the potential adverse selection problem due to the asymmetric information, the supplier designs a menu of supply contracts that stipulates both the wholesale price and the purchasing quantity. We find that under information asymmetry, the supplier will optimally set a higher wholesale price but a lower purchasing quantity for the manufacturer with high innovation efficiency than that for the manufacturer with low innovation efficiency. As a consequence, the manufacturer with high innovation efficiency will significantly underinvest in innovation due to information asymmetry in addition to the impact of the double marginalization effect. Moreover, although a longer contract period tends to better motivate innovation, it can also magnify the influences of adverse selection on supply chain contracting, leading to a higher wholesale price for the manufacturer with high innovation efficiency.