不同渠道偏好和运营成本下双渠道闭环供应链定价决策研究

本文以消费者对传统零售渠道和网络直销渠道的不同偏好和不同渠道运营成本为基础,研究零售商销售新产品并回收废旧产品、制造商开辟网络直销渠道的双渠道闭环供应链中成员的定价决策问题。建立三种不同市场权力结构下的定价博弈模型,用逆向归纳法得到模型的最优解,并用解析分析和数值分析得到消费者的渠道偏好程度和渠道运营成本对定价决策和利润的影响。研究表明:最优直销价格随网络直销渠道偏好程度的增加而上升,最优零售价格随网络直销渠道偏好程度的增加而下降;网络直销渠道运营成本增加对零售商有利但不利于制造商;传统渠道运营成本的增加对所有成员都不利。     

非线性定价的贝叶斯均衡策略研究

本文利用贝叶斯均衡策略研究非线性定价问题,将消费需求类型推广到三种,设计一个非线性价格机制博弈,推导出该博弈的贝叶斯均衡,得出结论:当消费者类型满足不同假设条件时,得到贝叶斯均衡策略也不同.文中还将贝叶斯均衡与纳什均衡进行比较,并从博弈角度为一类企业(如电信公司等)的定价提供理论依据.     

二级供应链上不完美互补产品的定价决策

建立一个由两个制造商和一个零售商组成供应链模型,以求解制造商和零售商的最优定价决策,其中两个制造商向零售商批发的产品是不完美互补的,且零售商采取混合捆绑策略销售这两种产品。考虑三种情形下的决策:(1)完全非合作博弈;(2)局部合作博弈;(3)合作博弈。通过比较前两种情形下的决策,利用Nash协商模型求解得到消除水平和垂直供应链冲突的最优定价决策。与完全非合作博弈决策相比,局部合作博弈决策对制造商是有利的,在一定的条件下也可以实现对零售商收益的帕累托改进;而合作博弈决策在任何情况下都要明显地优于完全非合作博弈决策以及局部合作博弈决策,同时合作博弈决策下的最优产品需求量相比局部合作博弈决策下的最优产品需求量提高了一倍。最后,通过数值试验验证了文章所得结论。     

两阶段双寡头垄断市场Hotelling定价模型

激烈的双寡头垄断市场竞争环境下,单一定价和歧视定价成为厂商选择的两大定价策略.考虑到网络外部效用的广泛存在性与对称性,对传统的Hotelling模型加以改进,分价格竞争和策略选择两个阶段,对双寡头垄断厂商的定价策略进行了博弈分析,指出了各种均衡情况及需满足的条件,并验证了歧视定价相对单一定价的边际成本、网络外部效应、消费者对产品的忠诚度等因素对厂商进行定价策略选择的重要影响,为其制定最优定价策略提供了指导.     

不同权力结构对制造商双渠道供应链的影响研究

在一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链中, 制造商拥有线下传统渠道及线上直销双渠道。首先根据消费者剩余理论, 构建了制造商双渠道需求函数;接着分别构建了两类Stackelberg博弈及Nash博弈三种权力结构下制造商和零售商的利润模型并对模型进行了求解;最后分析了三种不同权力结构对制造商双渠道供应链的影响。研究发现:制造商线上直销渠道价格不受三种博弈权力结构的影响;线下传统渠道零售价格、需求, 线上直销渠道需求及制造商双渠道供应链总利润不受两类Stackelberg博弈权力结构的影响;线下传统渠道零售价格及线上直销渠道需求在Nash博弈权力结构下最小, 而线下传统渠道需求及供应链总利润在Nash博弈权力结构下最大;制造商批发价格、利润及零售商利润对三种博弈权力结构较敏感, 随供应链成员自身博弈权力地位的下降而逐渐降低。     

基于多周期合作的物流服务供应链质量协调研究

如何提高物流服务供应链质量是LSSC管理中面临的重要问题,探究物流服务集成商与物流服务提供商间的多周期合作关系对服务质量具有重要意义.首先创新性地引入客户作为LSSC质量协调博弈模型的影响因素之一,构建考虑客户影响因素的多周期合作LSSC质量协调博弈模型,通过求得混合策略纳什均衡解,得出可以通过加强过程监控、灵活运用惩罚策略、合理设置惩罚系数等措施,促使物流服务提供商更有效地按质量完成物流服务任务,保障整个LSSC的合作效益.     

网络团购的定价与收益协调策略研究

如何实现团购网站和团购参与商家之间的双赢是我国网络团购目前面临的一大挑战性问题。结合我国网络团购的特点,构建团购网站和商家之间定价与收益分配的博弈模型,针对博弈结果运用纳什谈判模型给出协调策略。最后,通过数值算例分析主要参数的变化对价格与收益的影响。结果表明,敏感市场的规模和团购网站的广告效应越大、商品的单位成本越小、开展网络团购对商家和团购网站越有利。     

基于Stackelberg博弈论的边缘计算卸载决策方法

为了解决移动边缘计算中移动用户的计算卸载决策问题,设计了一种基于Stackelberg博弈的卸载决策方法.方法将边缘云和移动用户分别视为博弈主导者和跟随者,边缘云通过对自身计算能力的定价实现有限计算能力下的效用最大化,而移动用户针对边缘云的定价策略,作出数据卸载的相应决策,实现效用最大化,通过单主多从Stackelberg博弈过程中策略的相互影响与进化,实现了双方效用的最优.证明了该Stackelberg博弈存在使得效用最优的纳什均衡解,并提出了一种分布式迭代算法求解博弈双方的纳什均衡解.通过数值分析,证明算法具有很好的收敛性,且分布式博弈算法可以得到比集中式算法更高的效用均值.     

绿色产品定价与市场入侵研究:基于市场权力结构的视角

为研究绿色产品定价与市场入侵问题,针对由两个制造商和一个零售商组成的系统,构建了制造商主导、零售商主导以及供需双方均势等三种权力结构模型,分析了权力结构、消费者绿色偏好等因素对绿色产品定价和市场入侵的影响。研究发现:绿色产品入侵市场存在可行条件,并且绿色产品市场入侵会导致普通产品制造商的利润损失;市场入侵对零售商有利,说明零售商会有动机引入绿色产品;绿色产品入侵市场和市场权力结构均会影响各个企业最优定价策略,其中拥有主导权的企业会选择高价策略;权力结构会影响供需双方的利润分配,以及导致系统利润的损失。     

不同权力结构下考虑消费者后悔预期的再制造供应链定价研究

文章以再制造供应链为研究背景,在考虑消费者后悔预期的情况下,构建了新产品和再制品的需求函数,研究了分散决策无领导(N)、制造商领导(M)和零售商领导(R)3种权力结构下再制造供应链的最优定价问题,并比较了3种权力结构下再制造供应链的最优价格和利润.最后通过数值仿真方法分析了新产品和再制品的批发价格、销售价格、需求量与消费者对再制品偏好程度差异和消费者后悔预期敏感系数的关系.通过研究,我们得到如下结论:消费者偏好程度差异和消费者后悔预期敏感系数较高时,供应链各成员应采用较低的定价策略以扩大需求;在3种权力结构中,制造商领导和零售商领导模式下产品的零售价格相等,且高于无领导模式下产品的零售价格;制造商和零售商的利润分别在各自领导模式下达到最高,再制造供应链总利润在无领导模式下最高,从消费者和供应链整体角度出发,采取无领导模式最有利.     

多目标协商模型的标量化方法

多目标协商问题是协商理论的一个新的研究领域.本文讨论了由Bronisz和Krus提出的多目标协商模型和Bronisz-Krus-协商解概念,构造了由Bronisz-Krus多目标协商模型诱导的单目标协商模型并对其提出了一套公理系统和引入了Raiffa-协商解概念,讨论了诱导结局空间的性质,给出了Bronisz-Krus多目标协商模型与其诱导的单目标协商模型在某种意义下的等价性,即Bronisz-Krus-协商解与Raiffa-协商解可以互相确定,并给出了这种相互确定的关系式.     

带有乘积型多目标权函数的调度谈判问题

在供应链环境下的生产活动中,各成员对所辖资源具有独立的支配权,因此需要合理的机制使得协同调度方案得以实施,以提高供应链整体的效率.研究由具备不同讨价还价能力的成员所组成的供应链,建立了以纳什讨价还价公理体系为基础的调度谈判模型.在装配系统中,讨论两供应商关于交付顺序的协商.为求取纳什谈判解,提出了一类新的以多目标乘积项作为目标函数的调度问题.对于单机型供应商,新问题的计算复杂性尚未确定,设计了一种多项式时间的启发式算法以求得近优解,并通过数值算例进行验证.该谈判模型为供应链中各成员提供了一种合理的调度协调机制.     

On the implementation of the L-Nash bargaining solution in two-person bargaining games

The “Nash program” initiated by Nash (Econometrica 21:128–140, 1953) is a research agenda aiming at representing every axiomatically determined cooperative solution to a game as a Nash outcome of a reasonable noncooperative bargaining game. The L-Nash solution first defined by Forgó (Interactive Decisions. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 229. Springer, Berlin, pp 1–15, 1983) is obtained as the limiting point of the Nash bargaining solution when the disagreement point goes to negative infinity in a fixed direction. In Forgó and Szidarovszky (Eur J Oper Res 147:108–116, 2003), the L-Nash solution was related to the solution of multiciteria decision making and two different axiomatizations of the L-Nash solution were also given in this context. In this paper, finite bounds are established for the penalty of disagreement in certain special two-person bargaining problems, making it possible to apply all the implementation models designed for Nash bargaining problems with a finite disagreement point to obtain the L-Nash solution as well. For another set of problems where this method does not work, a version of Rubinstein’s alternative offer game (Econometrica 50:97–109, 1982) is shown to asymptotically implement the L-Nash solution. If penalty is internalized as a decision variable of one of the players, then a modification of Howard’s game (J Econ Theory 56:142–159, 1992) also implements the L-Nash solution.     

Intergenerational risk sharing in closing pension funds

We model intergenerational risk sharing in closing funded pension plans. Specifically, we consider a setting in which in each period, the pension fund’s investment and indexation policy is the outcome of a bargaining process between representatives of the then living generations. Because some generations might be under- or overrepresented in the board, we use the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution to allow for differences in bargaining powers. In a numerical study, we compare the welfare that the generations derive from the outcome of this repeated bargaining to the welfare that they would derive if a social planner’s optimal policy would instead be implemented. We find that as compared to the social optimum, older generations benefit substantially from the repeated bargaining, even if all generations are equally well-represented in the board. If older generations are relatively over-represented, as is sometimes argued, these effects are attenuated.     

Bargaining on whales: A differential game model with pareto optimal equilibria

A two-country differential game model of whaling is used for analysing a dynamic bargaining problem. At a given initial time, the two countries may either continue on a noncooperative mood of play characterized by an open-loop Nash-equilibrium, or negotiate a bargaining solution which we define as the Kalaï-Smorodinsky solution. The cooperative solution calls for a restraint in the whaling efforts which leaves a temptation to cheat for any player. The model shows how, by announcing a credible threat, namely to make whaling an ‘open-access’ fishery, a country can eliminate this temptation to cheat and transform the cooperative solution into an equilibrium.     

Top percentile network pricing and the economics of multi-homing

Top-Percentile pricing is a relatively new and increasingly popular pricing policy used by network providers to charge service providers. In contrast to fixed cost pricing and to pure per-usage pricing, top-percentile pricing has not been studied. Thus the efficient design and operation of networks under top-percentile pricing is not well understood yet. This work studies top-percentile pricing and provides an analysis of the expected costs it inflicts on a service provider. In particular we use our analysis framework to investigate the popular multi-homing architecture in which an Internet Service Provider (ISP) connects to the Internet via multiplicity of network providers. An ISP that uses multi-homing is subject to extra charges due to the use of multiple networks. Important questions that are faced by such an ISP are what is an efficient routing strategy (as to reduce costs) and how large the costs are. We provide a general formulation of this problem as well as its probabilistic analysis, and derive the expected cost faced by the ISP. We numerically examine several typical scenarios and demonstrate that despite the fact that this pricing aims at the peak traffic of the ISP (similarly to fixed cost), the expected bandwidth cost of multi-homing is not much higher than that of single-homing. Part of the results of this work was reported in Levy, Levy, and Kahana (2003). The work was done while J.Levy and Y. Kahana were with Comgates Ltd. and H. Levy was partially with Comgates Ltd.     

Decentralized versus collective bargaining – An experimental study

Two parties X, and Y, can either bargain separately with a third party Z or merge to become XY and bargain collectively with Z. Depending on the payoff implications of the two possible contracts and on the asymmetry inherent in the conflict payoffs of X and Y collective bargaining will increase, decrease or leave constant what X and Y achieve together. In the experiment, first X and Y vote for or against collective bargaining and then negotiate accordingly. Participants react adequately to strategic aspects, but not as predicted by the (Nash-)bargaining solution. Received: April 2000/Final version: December 2001     

基于VC谈判力的内生投资模型

近来,对风险投资的研究大都是从信息不对称、控制权的私有收益的角度出发,并且把首次投资水平看成是外生决定的变量.把其内生化并从谈判力的视角出发建立了一个两期信号博弈模型.通过模型分析,①得到了影响首次投资水平的关键因素:投资双方的谈判力、双方信息不对称以及事后不确定性程度;②对相关因素进行了量化分析,并讨论了投资双方谈判力的分配问题.     

The semireactive bargaining set of a cooperative game

The semireactive bargaining set, a solution for cooperative games, is introduced. This solution is in general a subsolution of the bargaining set and a supersolution of the reactive bargaining set. However, on various classes of transferable utility games the semireactive and the reactive bargaining set coincide. The semireactive prebargaining set on TU games can be axiomatized by one-person rationality, the reduced game property, a weak version of the converse reduced game property with respect to subgrand coalitions, and subgrand stability. Furthermore, it is shown that there is a suitable weakening of subgrand stability, which allows to characterize the prebargaining set. Replacing the reduced game by the imputation saving reduced game and employing individual rationality as an additional axiom yields characterizations of both, the bargaining set and the semireactive bargaining set. Received September 2000/Revised version June 2001     

运输问题的合作对策求解方法

产地间或销地间往往存在竞争,在这种情况下,使用运输问题最优化方法是不合理的。因此,从个体理性的视角提出运输问题的合作对策求解方法,方法将运输问题看作是一个博弈问题,各个产地或销地是博弈的局中人,求解其纳什均衡与纳什讨价还价解。在此基础上,说明了运输问题的非合作形式是一个指派问题,并证明指派问题的最优解是一个纳什均衡点。接着,通过实验验证运输问题的最优解是一个纳什讨价还价解,满足产地或销地的自身利益。在此基础上,针对纳什讨价还价解不唯一的问题,从决策者的视角给出最大可能激励成本的计算方法。最后,为弥补纳什讨价还价解不唯一及纳什讨价还价解不允许出现子联盟的缺陷,给出运输收益分配或成本分摊的Shapely值计算方法。