三方相互体谅讨价还价模型

对于较重要的三方合作利益分配博弈问题,将相互体谅作为基本遵循并基于适应性预期模型,建立三方相互体谅讨价还价模型.运用这个模型,可以把三方相互体谅讨价还价达成均衡,归结为单调有界数列收敛与常系数非齐次线性差分方程组求解的结合运用.三方相互体谅讨价还价属于不完全信息动态合作博弈.对模型求解,一般地揭示三方相互体谅讨价还价达成均衡的过程与结果,阐明讨价还价有满足初始条件的唯一解和充要条件,以及充要条件的经济含义和数学意义.三方相互体谅讨价还价模型是对于两方相互体谅讨价还价模型的拓展,可以为建立更多方相互体谅讨价还价模型提供借鉴.     

The semireactive bargaining set of a cooperative game

The semireactive bargaining set, a solution for cooperative games, is introduced. This solution is in general a subsolution of the bargaining set and a supersolution of the reactive bargaining set. However, on various classes of transferable utility games the semireactive and the reactive bargaining set coincide. The semireactive prebargaining set on TU games can be axiomatized by one-person rationality, the reduced game property, a weak version of the converse reduced game property with respect to subgrand coalitions, and subgrand stability. Furthermore, it is shown that there is a suitable weakening of subgrand stability, which allows to characterize the prebargaining set. Replacing the reduced game by the imputation saving reduced game and employing individual rationality as an additional axiom yields characterizations of both, the bargaining set and the semireactive bargaining set. Received September 2000/Revised version June 2001     

基于合作博弈纳什议价的几种网络定价结构模型比较

本文基于目前的网络资费模式,提炼出三种网络定价结构模型,研究本地网络服务提供商(ISP)及用户之间的利润分配.首先,利用一个简化的网络业务质量(Qos)保证模型构造目标函数,说明合作博弈得到的解比非合作博弈情形下更优,合作博弈时得到纳什议价解与双方的相对议价权力有关.然后,从社会结构理论角度,说明议价权力取决于网络结构类型以及局中人在结构中所处的位置.相对议价权力大,获益较多;相对议价权力小,获益较少.最后,通过实例分析得到三种网络定价结构模型下的纳什议价解.结果表明,本地网络服务提供商的合并、收购、互联有利于提高其相对议价权力,从而获益增加.     

指派问题的多重最优解的择优方法

在某些情况下,经典指派问题的最优解不唯一．不同的最优解对参与人的影响不同,导致每个参与人会争取最有利于自身的最优解．为解决这个问题,通过研究允许合作指派问题的合作对策解的形成,提出允许合作指派问题的讨价还价模型和个体理性激励函数．在此基础上,提出了一个考虑个体理性的指派问题多重最优解的择优方法,从而保证了指派问题最优解的唯一性．     

Stationary perfect equilibria of an n-person noncooperative bargaining game and cooperative solution concepts

This paper characterizes the stationary (subgame) perfect equilibria of an n-person noncooperative bargaining model with characteristic functions, and provides strategic foundations of some cooperative solution concepts such as the core, the bargaining set and the kernel. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we show that a linear programming formulation successfully characterizes the stationary (subgame) perfect equilibria of our bargaining game. We suggest a linear programming formulation as an algorithm for the stationary (subgame) perfect equilibria of a class of n-person noncooperative games. Second, utilizing the linear programming formulation, we show that stationary (subgame) perfect equilibria of n-person noncooperative games provide strategic foundations for the bargaining set and the kernel.     

多目标协商模型的标量化方法

多目标协商问题是协商理论的一个新的研究领域.本文讨论了由Bronisz和Krus提出的多目标协商模型和Bronisz-Krus-协商解概念,构造了由Bronisz-Krus多目标协商模型诱导的单目标协商模型并对其提出了一套公理系统和引入了Raiffa-协商解概念,讨论了诱导结局空间的性质,给出了Bronisz-Krus多目标协商模型与其诱导的单目标协商模型在某种意义下的等价性,即Bronisz-Krus-协商解与Raiffa-协商解可以互相确定,并给出了这种相互确定的关系式.     

医药产学研联盟创新决策、创新危机与利润分配

以我国医药行业产学研合作创新为现实背景,构建两家相互竞争的制药企业与学研机构的双边纳什议价模型,分析企业的创新价值和议价能力对联盟成员绩效的影响,探讨合作创新对药品价格、企业市场份额、经营绩效和社会福利的影响,研究制药企业创新战略的选择决策及创新对企业可能的危险。通过模型分析,得到如下结论:产学研合作创新能够提高社会总福利,但不一定提高制药企业的绩效和药品的价格;议价能力强的制药企业不一定总是获得高利润,企业最终的利润受到企业自身及竞争者的议价能力、创新价值的共同影响;虽然产品创新能够提高消费者的购买意愿,但盲目跟风创新可能会带来双输的结果。本研究对促进医药行业的产学研合作,提高产学研合作的有效性具有现实意义。     

Cooperative games with imcomplete information

A bargaining solution concept which generalizes the Nash bargaining solution and the Shapley NTU value is defined for cooperative games with incomplete information. These bargaining solutions are efficient and equitable when interpersonal comparisons are made in terms of certainvirtual utility scales. A player's virtual utility differs from his real utility by exaggerating the difference from the preferences of false types that jeopardize his true type. In any incentive-efficient mechanism, the players always maximize their total virtual utility ex post. Conditionally-transferable virtual utility is the strongest possible transferability assumption for games with incomplete information.     

Endogenous reference points in bargaining

We allow the reference point in (cooperative) bargaining problems with a reference point to be endogenously determined. Two loss averse agents simultaneously and strategically choose their reference points, taking into consideration that with a certain probability they will not be able to reach an agreement and will receive their disagreement point outcomes, whereas with the remaining probability an arbitrator will distribute the resource by using (an extended) Gupta–Livne bargaining solution (Gupta and Livne in Manag Sci 34:1303–1314, 1988). The model delivers intuitive equilibrium comparative statics on the breakdown probability, the loss aversion coefficients, and the disagreement point outcomes.     

Fuzzy extensions of bargaining sets and their existence in cooperative fuzzy games

Recently, the concept of classical bargaining set given by Aumann and Maschler in 1964 has been extended to fuzzy bargaining set. In this paper, we give a modification to correct some weakness of this extension. We also extend the concept of the Mas-Colell's bargaining set (the other major type of bargaining sets) to its corresponding fuzzy bargaining set. Our main effort is to prove existence theorems for these two types of fuzzy bargaining sets. We will also give necessary and sufficient conditions for these bargaining sets to coincide with the Aubin Core in a continuous superadditive cooperative fuzzy game which has a crisp maximal coalition of maximum excess at each payoff vector. We show that both Aumann-Maschler and Mas-Colell fuzzy bargaining sets of a continuous convex cooperative fuzzy game coincide with its Aubin core.     

A dynamic solution in N-person cooperative game theory

We formulate a cooperative game as an extended form game in which each player in turn proposes payoffs to a coalition over M steps. Payoffs at time t are discounted by a penalty function f(t). If all players in a coalition agree to their payoffs, they receive them. Under a convergence hypothesis verified by computer for three players in many cases, we compute the payoffs resulting from a coalition pattern and give necessary conditions for particular patterns. The resulting solution is related to the Nash bargaining solution and the competitive solution.     

A fuzzy approach to cooperative n-person games

The object of this paper is to provide a systematic treatment of bargaining procedures as a basis for negotiation. An innovative fuzzy logic approach to analyze n-person cooperative games is developed. A couple of indices, the Good Deal Index and the Counterpart Convenience Index are proposed to characterize the heuristic of bargaining and to provide a solution concept. The indices are examined theoretically and experimentally by analyzing three case studies. The results verify the validity of the approach.     

A bargaining game model for measuring performance of two-stage network structures

Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a method for measuring the efficiency of peer decision making units (DMUs), where the internal structures of DMUs are treated as a black-box. Recently DEA has been extended to examine the efficiency of DMUs that have two-stage network structures or processes, where all the outputs from the first stage are intermediate measures that make up the inputs to the second stage. The resulting two-stage DEA model not only provides an overall efficiency score for the entire process, but also yields an efficiency score for each of the individual stages. The current paper develops a Nash bargaining game model to measure the performance of DMUs that have a two-stage structure. Under Nash bargaining theory, the two stages are viewed as players and the DEA efficiency model is a cooperative game model. It is shown that when only one intermediate measure exists between the two stages, our newly developed Nash bargaining game approach yields the same results as applying the standard DEA approach to each stage separately. Two real world data sets are used to demonstrate our bargaining game model.     

Multiobjective management of mining under water hazard by game theory

The management of an aquifer is studied under the assumption that the solution of the multiobjective programming model describing the management problem should satisfy a certain set of axioms. It is shown that a certain class of multiobjective problems may be solved by a game-theoretical concept leading to a single objective quasiconvex programming problem. The method is generalization of Nash's cooperative game theoretical model, and may lean on Zeuther's bargaining process. The methodology is applied to the Transdanubian Karstic region in Hungary where three objectives are present: mining costs, water supply and environmental protection. Results are compared with the solution previously obtained by compromise programming with an l₁-norm. It is found that results obtained by the two methods are comparable.     

Aubin cores and bargaining sets for convex cooperative fuzzy games

In this paper, we deal with Aubin cores and bargaining sets in convex cooperative fuzzy games. We first give a simple and direct proof to the well-known result (proved by Branzei et al. (Fuzzy Sets Syst 139:267–281, 2003)) that for a convex cooperative fuzzy game v, its Aubin core C(v) coincides with its crisp core C ^cr (v). We then introduce the concept of bargaining sets for cooperative fuzzy games and prove that for a continuous convex cooperative fuzzy game v, its bargaining set coincides with its Aubin core, which extends a well-known result by Maschler et al. for classical cooperative games to cooperative fuzzy games. We also show that some results proved by Shapley (Int J Game Theory 1:11–26, 1971) for classical decomposable convex cooperative games can be extended to convex cooperative fuzzy games.     

Structural satisfaction in simple games

A fundamental maxim for any theory of social behavior is that knowledge of the theory should not cause behavior that contradicts the theory's assertions. Although this maxim consistently has been heeded in the theory of noncooperative games, it largely has been ignored in solution theory for cooperative games. Solution theory, the central concern of this paper, seeks to identify a subset of the feasible outcomes of a cooperative game that are ‘stable’ results of competition among participants, each of whom attempts to bring about an outcome he favors, rather than to prescribe ‘fair’ outcomes that accord with a standard of equity. We show that learning by participants about the solution theory can cause the outcomes identified as stable by certain solution concepts to become unstable, and discover that an important distinction in this regard is whether the solution concept requires each element of the solution set to defend itself against alternatives rather than relying on other elements for its defense. Finally, we develop a concept of ‘solid’ solutions which have a special claim for stability.The unifying theme of this paper concerns the sense in which certain outcomes of a cooperative game may be regarded as stable, and the extent to which this stability requires that the players are ignorant of the theory. Although the issues raised here have implications for the theory of cooperative games in general, Section 1 establishes the focus of the analysis on collective decision games. Section 2 develops some general perspectives on solution theory which are used in Sections 3 and 4 to evaluate the Condorcet solution, the core, the robust proposals set, von Neumann- Morgenstern solutions and competitive solutions. Section 5 presents the concept of a solid solution and relates this idea to the solution concepts reviewed earlier. We demonstrate that in general a solution concept has a strong claim to stability only if it is solid. Finally, Section 6 concludes by indicating that the basic argument also can be applied to Aumann and Maschler's bargaining sets and, more generally, to solution theory for any cooperative game.     

Bargaining in cooperative games

This paper introduces a new solution concept for cooperative games without sidepayments, called the aspiration bargaining set, and proves that this set is nonempty for a wide, and economically interesting, class of games.     

NEGOTIATING OVER EXTERNALITIES

We present a simple model in which two perfectly informed, risk neutral agents will not negotiate an efficient agreement to lessen the effects of an externality and for which the outcome of negotiation depends on the legal assignment of property rights. The model permits agents to pre-commit themselves to refuse to negotiate particular agenda issues. The result is obtained because we prove that one player is always made strictly worse off from the addition of side-payments to a bargaining game. Along the way, we devise a supporting hyperplane for the n-person Nash bargaining game solution. We also display a simple game which establishes that our main result holds true—for at least some games—for an array of alternative bargaining game solutions such as that of Raiffa, Kalai, and Smorodinski.     

Compromise values in cooperative game theory

The aim of this paper is to give a survey on several well-known compromise values in cooperative game theory and its applications. Special attention is paid to the τ-value for TU-games, the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for bargaining problems, and the compromise value for NTU-games.     

Compromise values in cooperative game theory

Summary The aim of this paper is to give a survey on several well-known compromise values in cooperative game theory and its applications. Special attention is paid to the τ-value for TU-games, the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for bargaining problems, and the compromise value for NTU-games.