基于委托—代理下的模糊报童问题

在委托-代理关系中.代理人的私人信息对委托人的决策会产生重要影响.因此,为了获取代理人的真实信息.设计一个有效的激励机制是委托人的核心问题.本文基于需求依赖于代理人的努力水平和模糊市场条件的假设,利用委托一代理相关理论,探讨了模糊报童问题的激励机制问题.首先讨论了委托人最优产量的确定问题.然后分别给出了可观测和不可观测两种努力水平下的最优激励机制,最后分析了模糊市场条件对委托一代理双方利益的影响.     

信息不对称时基于过度自信代理人的工资契约研究

非对称信息条件下建立了具有过度自信代理人的委托代理模型.基于模型讨论了代理人过度自信行为对其自身努力水平及委托人利润的影响,得出:与对称信息情形相比,信息不对称条件下,代理人的努力程度更低,委托人利润也会减少.代理人的过度自信特征能降低信息不对称对委托人的不利影响,因而后者更愿意选择过度自信程度高的代理人合作.     

应用型大学教师转型的激励理论分析

作为应用型大学的主体,教师的行为受到转型激励机制的影响.大学通过激励机制来规范教师的行为,教师则通过自身的努力获取收益和规避风险.应用型大学只有建设一支具有“双师型”教师队伍,才能满足人才培养需求,因此需要大学教师向双师型转型.在以往研究基础上,我们尝试运用经济学领域的委托代理理论,将大学管理者视为委托人,教师为代理人,分析大学管理者与教师的委托代理关系,建立了多委托人-多代理人的委托代理模型,对大学管理者应该如何更有效地激励教师向双师型转型的问题进行机制设计,以提高转型率.     

基于双边过度自信及风险厌恶的委托-代理问题研究

研究了委托人与代理人双边过度自信倾向及风险厌恶偏好情形下的委托-代理问题.结论表明最优风险分担水平随着委托人风险厌恶程度及代理人过度自信水平的增大而增加,随着代理人风险厌恶程度和委托人过度自信水平的减少而减少.最优努力水平随代理人风险厌恶程度及委托人过度自信水平的增大而提高,随委托人风险厌恶程度和代理人过度自信水平的减少而减少.     

基于双边风险厌恶及存在监督的委托-代理模型研究

研究了委托人与代理人双边风险厌恶及存在监督情形下的委托-代理问题.结论表明非对称信息下最优风险分担系数是委托人风险厌恶程度的递增函数,是代理人风险厌恶程度的递减函数,代理人努力水平是其风险厌恶程度的递减函数.监督措施的存在提高了对代理人的激励强度.     

代理人在职消费对动态多任务激励契约的影响

将代理人的在职消费行为引入到动态多任务委托代理框架中,构造了代理人在职消费行为下的两阶段多任务模型,分析了代理人在职消费行为对动态多任务激励契约的影响.研究结果表明:一是任务为两阶段时,无论代理人有无在职消费行为,代理人的努力程度随着时间均呈上升趋势,这就表明当委托人在设计契约时,如果委托人期望代理人在第一阶段的努力水平不低于第二阶段的努力水平,就需要适当提高第一阶段的业绩薪酬系数;二是代理人在职消费自利行为并不一定会提高自身的努力程度,需要依据在职消费行为对绩效的影响情形来具体分析;三是在两阶段内,代理人存在在职消费时,委托人可适当降低业绩薪酬系数.     

基于公平偏好的三阶段锦标激励模型研究

为解决多代理人激励及委托人道德风险问题,本文基于公平偏好理论,构建了三阶段锦标激励模型,通过数理推导研究委托人最大化目标下公平偏好与工资差距对代理人努力水平和拆台行为的影响,并对不同晋升过程下代理人各阶段的努力水平进行比较。结果表明,代理人的努力水平与拆台行为同升同降,公平偏好降低代理人的努力水平和拆台行为,而工资差距提高代理人的努力水平和拆台行为,且无论晋升过程如何,代理人在第一阶段的努力水平均大于其第三阶段的努力水平。本文拓展了行为经济学视角下基于委托代理框架的锦标赛激励研究。     

产出为Cobb-Dauglas函数的 Holmstrom-Milgrom委托代理模型

Holmstrom-Milgrom模型是在委托代理理论一般化模型的基础上提出的一个简化模型,引入代理人的能力水平,将产出函数从一维的线性函数扩展到二维的非线性Cobb-Dauglas生产函数,分析求解了新的模型.与原模型相比,新的最优解中代理人的努力程度有所提高,风险成本有所降低,委托人的期望收益有所改善.     

阶梯激励合约下代理人行为与合约激励效果

基于委托代理理论研究了阶梯激励合约下的代理人行为,并从委托人角度探讨了最优合约设计的问题。在一般市场需求分布和代理人效用函数下,代理人的效用可能是其努力水平的双峰函数,且存在一个阈值使得当合约绩效奖励超过该阈值时,代理人的努力水平“跳跃式”增加。通过比较阶梯激励合约与其他两类激励合约发现,当代理人是风险厌恶型且代理人的产出完全依赖于其努力水平,委托人总是更偏好阶梯激励合约。     

基金契约中代理问题存在性研究

基金投资与基金经理之间的关系是一种委托一代理关系，这种委托一代理关系集中体现在基金契约中。为了激励基金经理能按照最大化基金投资的效用行动，减少代理问题，人们设计了各种类型的基金契约。本以一个最常用的线性基金契约为例，讨论分析了其中代理问题的存在性。     

基于多任务委托—代理理论的高校教师激励机制研究

对高校教师的激励是高等教育中一个非常重要的环节,对高校教师合理的激励机制设计是提高高等教育水平的制度保证.从教师激励工作中高校管理者作为委托人与高校教师作为代理人二者信息不对称的角度出发,运用博弈论与委托代理理论,将高校教师工作进行教学努力和科研努力的划分,运用多任务委托代理理论对教师激励机制进行研究,建立模型进行分析,并结合西安科技大学现实提出合理化建议,以求达到既提高教学质量又提高科研产出水平的目的.     

Solving nonlinear principal-agent problems using bilevel programming

While significant progress has been made, analytic research on principal-agent problems that seek closed-form solutions faces limitations due to tractability issues that arise because of the mathematical complexity of the problem. The principal must maximize expected utility subject to the agent’s participation and incentive compatibility constraints. Linearity of performance measures is often assumed and the Linear, Exponential, Normal (LEN) model is often used to deal with this complexity. These assumptions may be too restrictive for researchers to explore the variety of relationships between compensation contracts offered by the principal and the effort of the agent. In this paper we show how to numerically solve principal-agent problems with nonlinear contracts. In our procedure, we deal directly with the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint. We illustrate our solution procedure with numerical examples and use optimization methods to make the problem tractable without using the simplifying assumptions of a LEN model. We also show that using linear contracts to approximate nonlinear contracts leads to solutions that are far from the optimal solutions obtained using nonlinear contracts. A principal-agent problem is a special instance of a bilevel nonlinear programming problem. We show how to solve principal-agent problems by solving bilevel programming problems using the ellipsoid algorithm. The approach we present can give researchers new insights into the relationships between nonlinear compensation schemes and employee effort.     

The principal-agent problem with adaptive players

In this study we show predictions made by the standard principal-agent theory may not hold when knowlege assumptions are relaxed. Conventional principal-agent models assume players are completely rational: they know their own and other player's utilities and probabilities of all states of nature. In reality, players must make decisions without such knowledge.We define a simple version of the principal-agent game and examine it using object-oriented computer simulation. Player learning is modeled with a statistical learning model. Our results show that even this simple game combined with standard learning assumptions results in complex behavior. Expectations of both the principal and the agents are crucial in determining the system outcomes. Expectations and lack of prior knowledge make it possible for the principal to converge on suboptimal behavior or not converge on a consistent behavior at all. The same attributes in the agents make it possible for the principal to drive expectations down and thus get higher effort for lower reward.This study contributes a more robust understanding of the principal-agent model and its application to incentive design.     

On coordination of supply chain based on information asymmetry of effort level and fuzzy market environment

The agent’s private information contributes greatly to a person to make principal decision in the supply of a chain coordination. Therefore, it is a great issue for him to design an effective incentive mechanism in order to get the true information from the agent in his principle making. Assuming that the demand depend upon an agent’s effort level and the fuzzy market condition, the author in this paper researches and analyzes the principle-agent problem under fuzzy information asymmetry condition by using the theory of principal-agent as well as incentive mechanism.     

科技投入的博弈分析模型

本文把博弈论应用于科技投入分析,利用博弈论的委托—代理理论构造了一个委托—代理激励模型,研究中央对地方科技投入的激励机制,并针对委托人和代理人的不同风险情况进行了分析,讨论了对地地方政府科技投入激励的必要性。     

COASTAL STATES,DISTANT WATER FISHING NATIONS AND EXTENDED JURISDICTION: A PRINCIPAL–AGENT ANALYSIS

This paper is concerned with the issue of optimal economic arrangements between coastal states and distant water fishing nations under Extended Jurisdiction. It is argued that the issue is appropriately examined within the framework of principal-agent analysis. The coastal state, having property rights to the relevent fishery resources, is seen as the principal; the distant water fishing nation (s) is (are) seen as the agent(s). Circumstances under which it will, and will not, be possible for the coastal state to establish incentive schemes that will allow it to achieve first best situations are analysed.     

The influence of face-to-face communication: a principal-agent experiment

The principal-agent problem is an interesting problem involved in many everyday relationships, such as the one between company owners and their delegates. Our experiment simulates such a relationship, whereby the task of participating pairs is to negotiate labor contracts. Our aim is to find the effects of face-to-face communication and negotiation on contract framing. We argue that including pre-play communication into the principal-agent problem leads to a significant improvement of agent’s effort and results in changes of the compensation scheme. We show that incentives are not the only possibility to induce high effort. We use content analysis of the video-taped negotiations to find some characteristics of the communication process.