两参数Ornstein－Uhlenbeck过程的自相交局部时与k重时的维数

本文研究两参数ｄ维Ｏｒｎｓｔｅｉｎ－Ｕｈｌｅｎｂｅｃｋ过程的相交局部时的联合连续性，ｋ重点的存在性．当４ｋ＞（ｋ－１）ｄ时，得到了ＯＵＰ２．ｄ的ｋ重时集的Ｈａｕｓｄｏｒｆｆ维数与ｐａｃｋｉｎｇ维数．     

d维平稳高斯过程多重点的Hausdorff维数及Packing维数

设Ｘ＾ｄ（ｔ）（ｔ∈Ｒ＋）是ｄ维可分平稳高斯过程，在一定条件下，本文得到了Ｘ＾ｄ（ｔ）的ｋ重点集的Ｈａｕｓｄｏｒｆｆ维数及Ｐａｃｋｉｎｇ维数。Ｐｏｌｙａ过程为其特例。     

稳定分量过程象集的一致测试和一致维数

令Ｘ（ｔ）＝Ｘ１（ｔ），…，ＸＮ（ｔ）为－ｄ维过程，其中Ｘｉ（ｔ）为ａｉ－阶ｄｉ－维稳定过程，设０＜ａｎ＜…＜ａ１≤２，ｄ＝ｄ１＋…＿ｄＮ。本文中，我们获得了当ａ１≤ｄ１时稳定分量过程Ｘ（ｔ）关于Ｂｏｒｅｌ集Ｅ的象Ｘ（Ｅ）的Ｈａｕｓｄｏｒｆｆ测度和Ｐａｃｋｉｎｇ测度的致上界和一致下界，当ａ１＞ｄ１时得到了相应测度的一个一致上界。同时我们给出了一致维数结果。     

G－半局部环及其同调维数

本文中讨论了一类比半局部环更广的环类，即Ｇ－半局部我们通过模去环的左Ｓｏｃｌｅ及Ｊａｃｏｂｓｏｎ根，研究了环的同调维数，并得到Ｇｄ（Ｒ／Ｓ）＝Ｇｄ（Ｒ／Ｓ∩Ｊ），式中的Ｇｄ表示环Ｒ的左整体维数或右整体维数，Ｓ＝Ｓｏｃ（_ＲＲ）以及Ｊ是环Ｒ的Ｊａｃｏｂｓｏｎ根。当Ｒ还是半本原环时，即得Ｇｄ（Ｒ／Ｓ）＝Ｇｄ（Ｒ）。     

G—半局部环及其同调维数

本文中讨论了一类比半局部环更广的环类，即Ｇ－半局部环，对Ｇ－半局部我们通过模去环的左Ｓｏｃｈｅ及Ｊａｃｏｂｓｏｎ根，研究了环的同调维数，并得到Ｇｄ（Ｒ／Ｓ）＝Ｇｄ（Ｒ／Ｓ∩Ｊ），式中的Ｇｄ表示环Ｒ的左整体维数或右整体维数，Ｓ＝Ｓｏｃ（Ｒ＾Ｒ）以及Ｊ是环Ｒ的Ｊａｃｏｂｓｏｎ根，当Ｒ还时半本原环时，即得Ｇｄ（Ｒ／Ｓ）＝Ｇｄ（Ｒ）。     

一类多指标随机过程样本轨道的Hausdorff维数

设｛Ｘ（ｔ，ｗ）；ｔ∈［０，１］Ｎ｝是Ｒｄ值轨道连续的随机过程，在条件：存在常数０＜α＜１，Ｍ＞０，β≥ｄ使　下，我们得到了Ｘ关于紧集的象和图以及水平集的Ｈａｕｓｄｏｒｆｆ维数的最佳上界，同时在条件：存在常数ａ．α，ｄ＇＞０使　下，我们获得了Ｘ关于紧集的象和图的Ｈａｕｓｄｏｒｆｆ维数的最佳下界以及存在平方可积的局部时．     

稳定随机游动二重时集的离散Hausdorff维数

设（Ｘ）ｎ≥０是ｄ维格子点上相应于正则变差函数ｂ（ｎ）＝ｎ＾１／βＳ（ｎ）的稳定随机游动，称为（Ｘｎ）ｎ≥０的二重时集，时文讨论了Ａ＾ｄβ的离散Ｈａｕｓｄｏｆｒｒ维数，并且在较弱的条件下证明了：ｄｉｍＨ（Ａ＾ｄβ）（１当ｄ＞β时，２－ｄ／β当ｄ≤β时     

多型随机递归集关于统计自相似测度的Multifractal分解

本文构造了一类多型随机递归集Ｋ,并利用 Ｆａｌｃｏｎｅｒ的方法［１］获得了Ｋ的重分形分解集Ｋａ（ａ＞０）的Ｈａｕｓｄｏｒｆｆ维数和Ｐａｃｋｉｎｇ维数．     

N指标d维广义Wiener过程象集代数和性质

令Ｗ↑￣（ｔ）：Ｒ＋＾Ｎ→Ｒ＾ｄ是Ｎ指标ｄ维广义Ｗｉｅｎｅｒ过程，对任意紧集Ｅ，Ｆ∩→Ｒ＋＾Ｎ／｛０｝，本文研究了代数和Ｗ↑￣（Ｅ）－Ｗ↑￣（Ｆ）的Ｈａｕｓｄｏｒｆｆ维数及内点存在性，此结果包含并推广了Ｂｒｏｗｎｉａｎ Ｓｈｅｅｔ的结果。     

也谈实二次域类数的可除性

设ｄ无平方因子，ｈ（ｄ）是二次域Ｑ（ｄ）的类数，本文证明了：若１＋４ｋ２ｎ＝ｄａ２，ａ，ｋ＞１，ｎ＞２为正整数，且ａ＜０．９ｋ３５ｎ或ｎ的奇素因子ｐ和ｋ的素因子ｑ均适合（ｐ，ｑ－１）＝１，则除（ａ，ｄ，ｋ，ｎ）＝（５，４１，２，４）以外，ｈ（ｄ）≡０（ｍｏｄｎ）．同时，我们猜测：上述结果中的条件（ｐ，ｑ－１）＝１是不必要的．     

On the Estimation of the Parameters of Multivariate Stable Distributions

In the paper, the asymptotic normality for a new estimator for the spectral measure of a multivariate stable distribution is proved. Also an estimator for the density of a multivariate stable distribution is proposed, its properties are investigated. The dependence of a stable density on exponent and the spectral measure is investigated.     

A maximum stable matching for the roommates problem

The stable roommates problem is that of matchingn people inton/2 disjoint pairs so that no two persons, who are not paired together, both prefer each other to their respective mates under the matching. Such a matching is called a complete stable matching. It is known that a complete stable matching may not exist. Irving proposed anO(n ²) algorithm that would find one complete stable matching if there is one, or would report that none exists. Since there may not exist any complete stable matching, it is natural to consider the problem of finding a maximum stable matching, i.e., a maximum number of disjoint pairs of persons such that these pairs are stable among themselves. In this paper, we present anO(n ²) algorithm, which is a modified version of Irving's algorithm, that finds a maximum stable matching.This research was supported by National Science Council of Republic of China under grant NSC 79-0408-E009-04.     

Egalitarian solutions in the core

In this paper we define the Lorenz stable set, a subset of the core consisting of the allocations that are not Lorenz dominated by any other allocation of the core. We introduce the leximin stable allocation, which is derived from the application of the Rawlsian criterion on the core. We also define and axiomatize the egalitarian core, a set of core allocations for which no transfer from a rich player to a poor player is possible without violating the core restrictions. We find an inclusive relation of the leximin stable allocation and of the Lorenz stable set into the egalitarian core. Received: October 1999/Final version: July 2001     

On the invariance of male optimal stable matching

The stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that no two unmatched agents prefer each other to their actual partners under the matching. In this paper, we present a set of sufficient conditions on the preference lists of any given stable matching instance, under which the optimality of the original male optimal stable matching is still preserved.     

On the dimension of the subspace of Liouvillian solutions of a Fuchsian system

The effect of small constantly acting random perturbations of white noise type on a dynamical system with locally stable fixed point is studied. The perturbed system is considered in the form of Itô stochastic differential equations, and it is assumed that the perturbation does not vanish at a fixed point. In this case, the trajectories of the stochastic system issuing from points near the stable fixed point exit from the neighborhood of equilibrium with probability 1. Classes of perturbations such that the equilibrium of a deterministic system is stable in probability on an asymptotically large time interval are described.     

The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems

We study the dynamics of stable marriage and stable roommates markets. Our main tool is the incremental algorithm of Roth and Vande Vate and its generalization by Tan and Hsueh. Beyond proposing alternative proofs for known results, we also generalize some of them to the nonbipartite case. In particular, we show that the lastcomer gets his best stable partner in both incremental algorithms. Consequently, we confirm that it is better to arrive later than earlier to a stable roommates market. We also prove that when the equilibrium is restored after the arrival of a new agent, some agents will be better off under any stable solution for the new market than at any stable solution for the original market. We also propose a procedure to find these agents.     

The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game

The Multiple Partners assignment game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game (Shapley and Shubik, 1972) to the case where the participants can form more than one partnership.  In Sotomayor (1992) the existence of stable outcomes was proved. For the sake of completeness the proof is reproduced in Appendix I. In this paper we show that, as in the Assignment Game, stable payoffs form a complete lattice and hence there exists a unique optimal stable payoff for each side of the market. We also observe a polarization of interests between the two sides of the matching, within the whole set of stable payoffs. Our proofs differ technically from the Shapley and Shubik's proofs since they depend on a central result (Theorem 1) which has no parallel in the Assignment model. Received: June 1996/Revised version: February 1999     

Strong stability and the incompleteness of stable models for λ-calculus

We prove that the class of stable models is incomplete with respect to pure λ-calculus. More precisely, we show that no stable model has the same theory as the strongly stable version of Park's model. This incompleteness proof can be adapted to the continuous case, giving an incompleteness proof for this case which is much simpler than the original proof by Honsell and Ronchi della Rocca. Moreover, we isolate a very simple finite set, , of equations and inequations, which has neither a stable nor a continuous model, and which is included in and in , the contextual theory induced by the set of essentially λI-closed terms. Finally, using an approximation theorem suitable for a large class of models (in particular stable and strongly stable non-sensible models like and ), we prove that and are included in , giving an operational meaning to the equality in these models.     

On the dimension of partially ordered sets

A generalization of the concept of dimension of a poset, the stable dimension, is introduced, and it is shown that there is a simple procedure for determining its value. No such procedure is known for the dimension itself. The main theorem shows that the stable dimension is equal to the maximum number of elements in a pair of antichains of the set, one lying above the other. The stable dimension can be used to find bounds for the dimension, including one which is an improvement on a bound given by W. T. Trotter, Jr., [Irreducible posets with large height exist,     

The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules

A stable matching rule is used as the outcome function for the Admission game where colleges behave straightforwardly and the students’ strategies are given by their preferences over the colleges. We show that the college-optimal stable matching rule implements the set of stable matchings via the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. For any other stable matching rule the strategic behavior of the students may lead to outcomes that are not stable under the true preferences. We then introduce uncertainty about the matching selected and prove that the natural solution concept is that of NE in the strong sense. A general result shows that the random stable matching rule, as well as any stable matching rule, implements the set of stable matchings via NE in the strong sense. Precise answers are given to the strategic questions raised.