Ordering and pricing decisions in a two-echelon supply chain with asymmetric demand information

This article examines coordinated decisions in a decentralized supply chain that consists of one supplier and one retailer, and faces random demand of a single product with a short life cycle. We consider a setting where the retailer has accurate demand information while the supplier does not. Such a problem with asymmetric demand information can be viewed as an extension of the newsboy problem in which both the supplier and the retailer possess the same demand information. Combining the mechanism of sharing demand information and that of quantity discount and return policy enables us to develop three coordinated models in contrast with the basic and uncoordinated model. We are able to show the ordinal relationship among the retailer’s optimal order quantities in these four models under a general form of random demand, and compare the supply chain profits and conduct sensitivity analysis analytically in four models under uniform random demand. We also provide numerical results under normal random demand that bear a resemblance to those under uniform random demand.     

零售商主导的模糊供应链博弈——考虑销售努力的情形

以包含一个制造商与一个零售商的两级供应链为研究对象,考虑零售商居于主导地位并付出销售努力时供应链各成员的决策。结合经济环境的不确定性,将市场需求函数和制造商的制造成本、零售商的经营成本视为模糊变量;运用斯塔克尔伯格模型刻画零售商和制造商之间的博弈过程,并引入期望值模型、机会约束模型来解决最优决策问题;通过一个数值算例证明了供应链博弈模型的有效性。研究表明,在均衡结果中,考虑到零售商所承担的销售努力成本,其总体期望值利润相比于制造商而言偏低,但单位产品边际利润较高。原因在于,零售商的主导地位使其不仅通过销售努力提高产品销量,提高了供应链的整体利润,同时也能够采用压低批发价格的方式,使自身在供应链中获取更多收益。     

Launching new products through exclusive sales channels

When launching a new product, a manufacturer usually sells it through competing retailers under non-exclusive arrangements. Recently, many new products (cellphones, electronics, toys, etc.) are sold through a single sales channel via an exclusive arrangement. In this paper we present two separate models that examine these two arrangements. Each model is based on a Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer acts as the leader by setting the wholesale price and the retailers act as the followers by choosing their retail prices. For each model, we solve the Stackelberg game by determining the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price and each retailer’s optimal retail price in equilibrium. Then we examine the conditions under which the manufacturer should sell the new product through an exclusive retailer. In addition, we examine the impact of postponing the wholesale price decision and the impact of demand uncertainty on the manufacturer’s optimal profit under both arrangements.     

Call,put and bidirectional option contracts in agricultural supply chains with sales effort

This paper develops option contracts in a supplier-retailer agricultural supply chain where the market demand depends on sales effort. First, we examine a benchmark case of integrated supply chain with the loss rate. Second, we introduce three coordinating option contracts led by the supplier to reduce the retailer's risk, where the call option contract can reduce the shortage risk, the put option contract can reduce the inventory risk and the bidirectional option contract can reduce the bilateral risk. We find that both the optimal initial order quantity and the optimal option quantity increase with the sales effort and the option price will balance the influence of the loss rate on supply chain coordination. Furthermore, the bidirectional option price is the highest while its option quantity is the least, and the put option initial order quantity is the highest. Third, we also consider an option contract led by the retailer to reduce the supplier's wholesale risk. Among the above four option contracts, we find that the option quantity led by the retailer is the highest. Finally, the numerical examples present the impact of the parameters on the optimal decisions, and provide practical managerial insights to reduce the different risk in the agricultural supply chain.     

Estimating demand by using sales information: inaccuracies encountered

Demand data is integral to a company’s overall information requirement. This is particularly true for manufacturers and retailers with regard to capacity, production, and inventory planning. Notwithstanding the implicit inaccuracies encountered, companies are predisposed to employ sales data as a primary source of information for estimating future demand.In this paper, by adopting a two-product setting, we measure inventory cost inaccuracies that arise from using sales data in estimating demand. By analyzing these costs, we also explore the conditions under which the resulting inaccuracies are either “lessened” or become “acute.” In this context, the determining rule of an induced substitution structure between the two products during stockout occasions is explicitly analyzed.We use a newsboy framework, in a two product environment, wherein one product may be taken as a direct substitute for the other. We provide necessary and sufficient optimality conditions and an extensive computational study to illustrate and support our findings and to provide additional insights on the conditions characterizing optimal stocking policies.     

基于提前订货折扣和延期支付契约的双渠道供应链运作策略研究

在随机需求环境下, 构建了四种不同情形下零售商和双渠道制造商利用契约机制进行竞争的供应链决策模型, 并给出了各情形下供应链成员最优决策和利润。研究发现, 相对于供应链无任何契约情形, 双渠道供应链中各主体均提供契约来增加自身需求和利润的策略并非始终是有效的, 一定条件下供应链各主体利润均受损。当供应链中仅零售商为下游顾客提供提前订货折扣契约, 而制造商不提供任何契约时, 供应链各主体利润均达到最大。因而, 对双渠道制造商来说, 当零售商采用一定契约策略增大其渠道需求并降低制造商网络渠道需求时, 制造商最优的策略并非是采用“敌对”的契约策略来进一步增加自身网络渠道需求, 而是采用“搭便车”策略, 不为下游顾客提供任何契约优惠, 而从零售商渠道获得更多批发收益, 并最终实现自身总收益的最大化。     

Analysis and design of returns policies from a supplier's perspective

This paper considers the problem of designing a returns policy in a supply chain from a supplier's perspective. The supply chain considered here is assumed to have one supplier and one retailer who serves a random demand of a product with a short life cycle. The retailer can return all the unsold products to the supplier with a partial refund. We found that if the retailer behaviour is rational, that is, ordering the optimal quantity to maximize its expected profit, then both retailer and supplier could benefit from the returns policy. Furthermore, we established that the optimal buyback price is independent of the mean of the random demand, but the variance of the demand has a significant impact on setting the optimal buyback price. The higher the variance the higher the optimal buyback price and the larger the profit gain of both parties. Numerical studies are employed to help understand the benefits of returns policies for the supplier, the retailer, and the whole supply chain.     

需求依赖努力水平的农产品供应链期权契约优化

针对供应商和零售商组成的农产品供应链,研究市场需求受到努力水平影响的农产品供应链协调问题.由于双重边际效应,分散式供应链中的最优生产数量低于集中式供应链的情况,零售商努力水平也相对较低.引入期权契约时,在零售商主导期权契约的供应链中,研究得到零售商的最优初始订货量和最优期权价格,以及供应商的最优生产数量,实现供应链协调.数值分析证实了期权契约有助于提高零售商的努力水平以及整个供应链的利润.     

Coordinated stocking,clearance sales,and return policies for a supply chain

The results of a study of inter-organizational coordination effect in inventory control, return, and clearance sales policies for a distribution channel consisting of a supplier, a retailer, and a Discount Sales Outlet (DSO) are reported here. We first study the retailer–DSO coordination issues. The products are initially sold in a retail outlet. After the selling season, the leftovers are moved to a DSO for a permanent clearance sale. When the retailer and the DSO coordinate, they share information on the demand forecast and jointly decide the stocking, markdown sales, and return policies to maximize mutual profit. In the absence of coordination, the demand information is not shared by the two parties, and the decisions are decentralized to optimize the individual party’s objective function. For the supplier–retailer–DSO cooperation issue, two models are considered: namely, the Joint Optimal Model (JOM) and the Individual Optimal Model (IOM), respectively. In the IOM, the stocking, markdown sales, and return policies are individually designed by the retailer–DSO, while the supplier independently sets the terms of the return policy. We compare this approach with the JOM, in which the supplier–retailer–DSO jointly designs a mutually beneficial plan so as to maximize the supply chain joint profit. Optimal coordination policies are analyzed, and the factors that make coordination an effective approach are studied.     

考虑零售商保鲜和消费者效用的生鲜农产品供应链协调

针对消费者对生鲜农产品新鲜度要求更高但零售商单独保鲜能力有限的问题,从提高消费效用角度出发,构建了受生鲜农产品新鲜度和价格影响的消费者时变效用函数,建立了由零售商和供应商组成的两级生鲜农产品供应链利润模型,采用Stackberg博弈方法分析了分散式决策下供应商的最优保鲜努力和零售商的最优定价,并同集中式决策下供应链系统的最优决策进行比较。由于分散式决策下零售商的保鲜努力较小,因此给出了能够实现生鲜农产品供应链协调的“保鲜成本分担+收益共享”契约。在此基础上,以同时实现供应链协调和提高消费者整体效用为目标,进一步确定了协调契约所在的区间范围。最后通过算例证明了协调契约的有效性。     

Optimal policies for inventory systems with discretionary sales, random yield and lost sales

We determine replenishment and sales decisions jointly for an inventory system with random demand, lost sales and random yield. Demands in consecutive periods are independent random variables and their distributions are known. We incorporate discretionary sales, when inventory may be set aside to satisfy future demand even if some present demand may be lost. Our objective is to minimize the total discounted cost over the problem horizon by choosing an optimal replenishment and discretionary sales policy. We obtain the structure of the optimal replenishment and discretionary sales policy and show that the optimal policy for finite horizon problem converges to that of the infinite horizon problem. Moreover, we compare the optimal policy under random yield with that under certain yield, and show that the optimal order quantity （sales quantity） under random yield is more （less） than that under certain yield.     

Assortment and inventory decisions with multiple quality levels

We consider the assortment and inventory decisions of a retailer under a locational consumer choice model where products can be differentiated both horizontally (e.g., color of a product) and vertically (e.g., quality of a product). The assortment and quantity decisions affect customer choice and, hence, the demand and sales for each product. In this paper, we investigate two different environments where product availability and assortment affect consumer choice and demand in different ways: make-to-order (MTO) and make-to-stock (MTS). In the MTO environment, customers order and purchase their most preferred product; that is, stockouts do not occur. In the MTS model, customers buy their most preferred product if it is in stock or do not buy if it is out of stock. In both environments we find conditions under which it is optimal to carry assortments of only a single quality level. In the MTS case, we show that an assortment of mixed quality levels can be optimal only within a narrow range of parameters.     

促销努力成本信息不对称下供应链回购契约

在由一个供应商和一个销售商构成的二级供应链,假设市场需求受到销售商的促销努力水平的影响,销售季节到来之前,销售商根据促销成本和收益决定最优促销努力水平和订货量。在促销成本不可观测时,利用委托代理理论研究信息不对称时如何通过回购契约揭示真实的促销努力成本。研究结果表明销售商有动机将努力促销成本报高,为了吸引销售商显示真实的促销努力成本,供应商必须付出额外的信息租金,随促销成本增大,销售商通过虚报高成本获得的利润减小,故需要揭示真实成本信息所付出的信息租金随之减小。由于信息租金的付出,导致了非效率现象的产生,使得销售商的最优订货量和促销努力水平均小于完全信息下系统的最优水平,只能得到帕累托改进的次优结果。     

考虑零售商风险规避及努力因素的供应链协调与优化模型

引入零售商风险规避偏好,在努力水平影响需求的两种模式下,分别建立了销售回馈与惩罚契约模型。随后,探讨了单纯的销售回馈与惩罚契约能否实现供应链协调,以及协调时各契约参数满足的条件。最后,通过数值分析对契约的协调性进行进一步分析。     

A critical comparison of the various plausible inter-echelon gaming processes in supply chain models

An increasing number of supply-chain models are related to the following structure: (i) a manufacturer supplies a product to a retailer—who fixes a retail price and then retails the product to the consumers; (ii) the effect of the retail price on sales volume is dictated by a deterministic demand curve known to both parties. Results from these models depend very much on the ‘gaming process’ that is assumed to govern how the manufacturer and the retailer interact with each other. This paper reviews and compares some basic characteristics of seven seemingly plausible gaming processes; including the two most common ones: the manufacturer-Stackelberg and the fixed-markup-retailer processes. Our results show that: (i) each of the seven processes appear to be no less plausible than the other six; (ii) all seven processes possess some implausible characteristics; (iii) the relationships among the processes are confusing and do not appear to be intuitively logical; (iv) the relationships among these processes are further complicated by the way they are affected by the form of the assumed demand curve. Our results show that in supply-chain modelling more attention should be given to: (i) the proper selection of an appropriate gaming process assumption; (ii) how the model's results change under different gaming processes; (iii) the incorporation of information asymmetry that will allow these gaming-process assumptions to become more realistic.     

Defending and improving the ‘slotting fee’: how it can benefit all the stakeholders dealing with a newsvendor product with price and effort-dependent demand

‘Slotting fee’ (hereafter ‘SF’) is an upfront fee a ‘supplier’ is required to pay a retailer in order to have his product sold on the retailer's shelves. It is becoming increasingly common, but also widely reviled. This paper considers a newsvendor product whose expected demand is dependent on retail price and sales effort. The question we pose is: given that the Stackelberg-dominant retailer has to choose a pricing contract with which she transacts with the supplier, how would the supply-chain stakeholders fare when the retailer implements SF instead of another practical pricing contract? We show that, contradicting its negative public image, SF empowers the dominant retailer to specify contract terms that will benefit all the stakeholder-groups. That is, the supplier's and the retailer's profits are higher, the production workers are asked to produce more, and the consumers pay a lower retail price. We also propose a new ‘composite’ contract format that incorporates both the SF and ‘buyback’ features. This composite format empowers the retailer to provide even greater benefits to the supply-chain's stakeholders.

     

三层供应链上需求信息不对称下Newsboy型协作问题

本文主要研究单产品在单周期内由供应商、制造商、零售商组成的三层供应链上的协作订购问题,即在随机需求下供应商、制造商、零售商以利润最大化为目的的最优协作订购问题。在需求信息不对称下,零售商充分了解需求信息。在协作订购时面临四种策略,给出了在这四种策略下的四种利润模型及零售商在这四种策略下的最优订购量并比较它们的大小,最后通过需求服从正态分布的实例验证了供应商一制造商一零售商在采用数量折扣和返回措施三者完全合作时供应链上的利润最大。     

Dynamic Slotting and Pricing Decisions in a Durable Product Supply Chain

We consider a supply chain in which a manufacturer sells an innovative durable product to an independent retailer over its life cycle. We assume that the product demand follows a Bass-type diffusion process and that it is determined by the market influences, retail price of the product, and shelf space allocated to it. We consider the following retailer profit optimization strategies: (i) the myopic strategy of maximizing the current-period profit and (ii) the far-sighted strategy of maximizing the life-cycle profit. We characterize the optimal dynamic shelf-space allocation and retail pricing policies for the retailer and wholesale pricing policies for the manufacturer. We compute also these policies numerically. Surprisingly, we find that the manufacturer, and sometimes even the retailer, is better off with a myopic retailer strategy in some cases.     

需求可变性降低对均值CVaR约束销售努力决策库存系统的影响

本文运用Levy提出的变换研究需求可变性降低对风险偏好零售商的库存决策、销售努力决策和期望效用的影响,用均值CVaR刻画零售商的风险偏好特性,它包括风险厌恶、风险追求,也具有损失规避的特性。首先,运用该变换定量刻画需求可变性的降低,证明该变换蕴含经典随机占优中的割准则序和二阶随机占优等。其次,给出系统的最优订货量、最优期望效用和最优销售努力水平,得到它们关于风险偏好系数的单调性,并给出降低需求可变性对期望效用的影响。第三,针对风险中性、风险厌恶(最大化CVaR)和风险追求(最小化CVaR)这三种特殊情况得到相应的结果,并给出企业在库存决策和促销决策的管理启示。最后,通过数值例子验证了得到的研究结果并给出相应的管理启示。     

突发事件下不对称信息供应链协调机制研究

针对一个由供应商和一个零售商构成的供应链,在零售商成本为私有信息条件下,假设产品的市场需求为零售价格的指数函数,研究如何协调供应链应对突发事件。首先,给出了对称信息下供应链协调模型;然后,研究了不对称信息下集权式与分权式供应链的协调机制;再次,在突发事件引起零售商成本分布函数扰动情况下,通过引入供应商由于可能需要调整生产计划而产生的偏差成本,研究了供应链的最优应对策略。 研究表明,供应链的最优生产计划、最优批发价格和最优零售价格均具有一定的鲁棒性,当突发事件造成零售商期望成本在一定范围内发生扰动时,三者可以保持不变,当零售商期望成本扰动超过一定范围内时,则需要对之加以调整,才能有效应对突发事件。最后,通过数值仿真验证了相关结论。