ARMA（1,1）需求下的信息延迟对供应链最优决策的影响

在假定顾客需求满足ARMA（1,1）过程的前提下,考虑了由一个零售商和一个供应商所组成的两级供应链系统最优订购决策问题.分别建立了需求信息不延迟与延迟这两种情形下零售商和供应商的最优订购决策模型,通过比较得出：当需求呈正相关时,需求信息延迟不仅可以减小牛鞭效应,而且可以降低供应链系统的平均总成本.     

随机需求下有产能约束的技术创新策略研究

在随机需求和技术变革的环境下,基于有产能约束的单供应商-单零售商的供应链结构,研究供应商分销价格决策和技术创新策略以及零售商订货决策。建立了三阶段Stackelberg博弈模型,通过逆推方法求得了供应商最优分销价格和技术创新策略以及零售商最优订货量,深入探讨了供应商产能、新技术出现概率以及市场需求期望与波动分别对供应商、零售商和供应链整体利润的影响。结果表明当供应商产能不足时进行技术创新会提高供应商和供应链的利润,但零售商因间接承担供应商技术创新的投资成本而利润下降;当供应商产能过剩时进行技术创新则会降低供应商及供应链的利润,而零售商的利润增加。新技术出现概率增加会提高供应链各成员的利润;提高市场需求期望并减小市场波动对供应商及供应链有利,但可能会降低零售商的利润。     

低碳双渠道供应链的需求信息共享策略研究

在需求不确定环境下,研究考虑消费者低碳意识的双渠道供应链的需求信息共享策略。论文考虑由单个零售商和单个进行碳减排的制造商构成的两级双渠道供应链,构建三种情形的模型:信息不共享、信息共享和只有零售商作预测。通过三种情形下供应链中成员最优决策和利润的比较,得到需求信息共享策略对供应链的影响;并进一步研究消费者低碳意识等参数对供应链运营的影响。研究发现,需求信息共享未必使得供应链成员利润均提高,当制造商预测准确度优于零售商时,零售商会选择信息共享,制造商选择信息不共享情形;当零售商比制造商预测准确时,零售商会选择信息不共享的情形,而制造商会选择仅有零售商预测,此时制造商应采取一定的激励措施以获得零售商的预测信息;消费者低碳意识对批发价、零售价、单位产品减排量、供应链成员利润均产生正向影响。     

低碳双渠道供应链的需求信息共享策略研究

在需求不确定环境下,研究考虑消费者低碳意识的双渠道供应链的需求信息共享策略。论文考虑由单个零售商和单个进行碳减排的制造商构成的两级双渠道供应链,构建三种情形的模型:信息不共享、信息共享和只有零售商作预测。通过三种情形下供应链中成员最优决策和利润的比较,得到需求信息共享策略对供应链的影响;并进一步研究消费者低碳意识等参数对供应链运营的影响。研究发现,需求信息共享未必使得供应链成员利润均提高,当制造商预测准确度优于零售商时,零售商会选择信息共享,制造商选择信息不共享情形;当零售商比制造商预测准确时,零售商会选择信息不共享的情形,而制造商会选择仅有零售商预测,此时制造商应采取一定的激励措施以获得零售商的预测信息;消费者低碳意识对批发价、零售价、单位产品减排量、供应链成员利润均产生正向影响。     

基于提前订货折扣和延期支付契约的双渠道供应链运作策略研究

在随机需求环境下, 构建了四种不同情形下零售商和双渠道制造商利用契约机制进行竞争的供应链决策模型, 并给出了各情形下供应链成员最优决策和利润。研究发现, 相对于供应链无任何契约情形, 双渠道供应链中各主体均提供契约来增加自身需求和利润的策略并非始终是有效的, 一定条件下供应链各主体利润均受损。当供应链中仅零售商为下游顾客提供提前订货折扣契约, 而制造商不提供任何契约时, 供应链各主体利润均达到最大。因而, 对双渠道制造商来说, 当零售商采用一定契约策略增大其渠道需求并降低制造商网络渠道需求时, 制造商最优的策略并非是采用“敌对”的契约策略来进一步增加自身网络渠道需求, 而是采用“搭便车”策略, 不为下游顾客提供任何契约优惠, 而从零售商渠道获得更多批发收益, 并最终实现自身总收益的最大化。     

需求信息不对称下供应链中流程与产品创新模式选择研究

在制造商进行流程创新和产品创新的供应链中,当需求预测信息不对称时,研究了零售商的需求信息分享策略以及制造商最优创新模式。利用精炼贝叶斯理论和Stackelberg博弈模型,首先求得了每一种创新模式下信息分享价值、促进需求信息分享的激励机制以及供应链均衡的信息分享策略,其次对两种创新模式下利润进行对比分析。研究发现,在两种创新供应链模型中,当创新效率较高和较低时,零售商自愿分享和不分享需求信息分别是均衡策略;当创新效率处于中间水平时,通过设计一个讨价还价机制可以使零售商分享需求信息成为一个均衡。此外,当消费者对质量(价格)更敏感时,制造商选择产品创新(流程创新)模式可以使供应链成员都获益。     

JIT环境下三级供应链供需协调模型研究

模型以整个供应链成本最低为目标,在JIT环境下通过对原材料供应商、制造商和零售商等各阶段库存模型以及其他相关成本的研究,得到供应链的最优物料补充策略,制造商的最优生产策略以及产成品运输策略。供应链结构包括一个制造商,多个原材料供应商和零售商。研究表明,通过有效的加强整条供应链的协作,能够有效降低供应链的总成本。     

考虑捆绑销售的多产品供应链定价策略

以一个制造商向一个零售商同时销售两种互补产品的二级供应链为研究对象,研究了制造商、零售商分别采用不同捆绑策略下的供应链定价博弈问题,并对四种定价模型(分开—分开,分开—捆绑,捆绑—分开,捆绑—捆绑)进行比较分析,探讨了产品互补程度、边际利润水平与供应链利润、最优捆绑策略的关系。研究结果表明,对领导者制造商而言,采取分开定价是占优决策;对于追随者零售商而言,是否采取捆绑定价取决于产品互补程度与产品边际利润水平比值,当产品互补程度变大或者边际利润比值降低时,零售商的最优策略由捆绑策略向分开定价策略转变。     

碳交易规制下信息不对称供应链的减排和低碳推广博弈研究

论文在碳交易规制下,研究单一制造商和双零售商组成的供应链减排与低碳推广决策以及零售商对制造商的成本信息分享问题,分析了零售商对制造商分享成本信息的条件,及不同情形下的制造商减排和零售商低碳推广策略。研究发现:零售商的最优低碳推广水平只与自身相关参数有关,零售商只有在自身低碳推广效率足够高时才会与制造商分享信息;制造商最优减排量随消费者低碳意识、碳交易价格、零售商低碳推广效率及其不确定性增大而提高,随零售商之间竞争程度提高而降低;无论零售商是否对制造商分享成本信息,供应链成员的最优利润随零售商之间竞争程度提高而增加,随消费者低碳意识、碳交易价格提高而提高;零售商低碳推广效率的不确定性越大则制造商的最优利润越低,零售商的最优利润越高;仅一家零售商分享成本信息时,制造商无法通过转移支付使另一家零售商与其分享信息。     

基于商业信用和回购契约的供应链最优化策略研究

本文考虑由单一供应商和零售商组成的供应链系统,当供应商为零售商提供回购契约,同时零售商又为下游顾客提供商业信用契约时,供应商如何设计回购契约来有效协调整个供应链,以及零售商又如何借助回购和商业信用契约来做出自身最优订货策略问题,并建立了相应的决策模型。通过模型分析,给出了供应商和零售商在四种情形下的最优契约设计参数,以及零售商的最优订货决策。研究发现,当满足一定的参数范围时,供应链中两主体同时采用协调契约能够更加有效地增加整个供应链中的订货量和利润,为各主体创造更多新的价值。最后,本文结合数值例子,分析了模型参数变化对最优订货策略和各主体利润的影响。     

Ordering and pricing decisions in a two-echelon supply chain with asymmetric demand information

This article examines coordinated decisions in a decentralized supply chain that consists of one supplier and one retailer, and faces random demand of a single product with a short life cycle. We consider a setting where the retailer has accurate demand information while the supplier does not. Such a problem with asymmetric demand information can be viewed as an extension of the newsboy problem in which both the supplier and the retailer possess the same demand information. Combining the mechanism of sharing demand information and that of quantity discount and return policy enables us to develop three coordinated models in contrast with the basic and uncoordinated model. We are able to show the ordinal relationship among the retailer’s optimal order quantities in these four models under a general form of random demand, and compare the supply chain profits and conduct sensitivity analysis analytically in four models under uniform random demand. We also provide numerical results under normal random demand that bear a resemblance to those under uniform random demand.     

Coordinating order quantity decisions in the supply chain contract under random demand

In this paper, we are concerned with the coordinating quantity decision problem in a supply chain contract. The supply chain contract is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer to meet the random demand of a single product with a short lifecycle. Our analysis show that the retailer expects to obtain higher profit under proper ordering policies, which can also maximize the expected profit of the supply chain. The manufacturer may induce the retailer to order the coordinated quantity by adjusting the unit return price. As a result, the supply chain is expected to achieve the optimal expected profit.     

Analysis and design of returns policies from a supplier's perspective

This paper considers the problem of designing a returns policy in a supply chain from a supplier's perspective. The supply chain considered here is assumed to have one supplier and one retailer who serves a random demand of a product with a short life cycle. The retailer can return all the unsold products to the supplier with a partial refund. We found that if the retailer behaviour is rational, that is, ordering the optimal quantity to maximize its expected profit, then both retailer and supplier could benefit from the returns policy. Furthermore, we established that the optimal buyback price is independent of the mean of the random demand, but the variance of the demand has a significant impact on setting the optimal buyback price. The higher the variance the higher the optimal buyback price and the larger the profit gain of both parties. Numerical studies are employed to help understand the benefits of returns policies for the supplier, the retailer, and the whole supply chain.     

产出不确定性的三级供应链风险分担组合契约设计

研究了供应商和制造商产出随机且零售商面临随机需求的三级供应链协调模型,决策变量为供应商的原材料投入量、制造商的订购量和零售商的订购量。分析了集中决策下供应链协调基准的唯一性,论证了回购契约及其与产出风险分担组合契约的协调性。研究结果表明,对于产出和需求不确定的三级供应链,仅考虑在制造商和零售商之间采用回购契约可改善供应链绩效,但并不能实现供应链的全局最优化,而从风险分担的角度设计的回购和产出风险分担组合契约不仅能有效的协调供应链,且在一定条件下,各供应链成员的利润还能获得帕累托改进。通过算例验证了以上结论的正确性,并分析了回购价格对订购量、原材料投入量和利润的影响,以及各供应链成员对契约的偏好。     

A game theoretic approach to coordinate pricing and vertical co-op advertising in manufacturer-retailer supply chains

Vertical cooperative (co-op) advertising is a marketing strategy in which the retailer runs local advertising and the manufacturer pays for a portion of its entire costs. This paper considers vertical co-op advertising along with pricing decisions in a supply chain; this consists of one manufacturer and one retailer where demand is influenced by both price and advertisement. Four game-theoretic models are established in order to study the effect of supply chain power balance on the optimal decisions of supply chain members. Comparisons and insights are developed. These embrace three non-cooperative games including Nash, Stackelberg-manufacturer and Stackelberg-retailer, and one cooperative game. In the latter case, both the manufacturer and the retailer reach the highest profit level; subsequently, the feasibility of bargaining game is discussed in a bid to determine a scheme to share the extra joint profit.     

Channel Coordination with Cooperative Advertising Considering Effect of Advertising on Willingness to Pay

In this paper, cooperative advertising in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain is studied. Advertising can enhance willingness to pay (WTP) of customers. This trade-off between the benefits of increasing WTP of customers and the advertising expenditure is a key to understanding the retailers optimal advertising decision. On the other hand, it is interesting to understand in which condition supporting the retailer for his advertising expenditure is beneficial for the manufacturer. In this study, in order to capture pricing and advertising strategies of the channel member, three non-cooperative games including Nash, Stackelberg retailer and Stackelberg manufacturer game-theoretic models are established. In spite of the related studies which restrict price in order to prevent negative demand, the proposed model allows channel members to increase their prices by enhancing WTP of customers. In this study, contrary to similar additive form demand functions applied in the co-op ad literature which limits their studies for cases that profit function is concave with respect to variables, optimal prices and advertising strategies are obtained for all the solution space. Surprisingly for the very high values of the advertising effect coefficient, a finite optimal advertising expenditure is achieved.     

Coordination mechanism for the supply chain with leadtime consideration and price-dependent demand

We study a coordination contract for a supplier–retailer channel producing and selling a fashionable product exhibiting a stochastic price-dependent demand. The product’s selling season is short, and the supply chain faces great demand uncertainty. We consider a scenario where the supplier reserves production capacity for the retailer in advance, and permits the retailer to place an order not exceeding the reserved capacity after a demand information update during a leadtime. We formulate a two-stage optimization problem in which the supplier decides the amount of capacity reservation in the first stage, and the retailer determines the order quantity and the retail price after observing the demand information in the second stage. We propose a three-parameter risk and profit sharing contract that coordinates the supply chain. The proposed contract permits any agreed-upon division of the supply-chain profit between the channel members.     

需求不确定性对闭环供应链系统决策的影响分析

在由一个制造商与一个销售商组成的闭环供应链系统中,构建了市场需求不确定环境下废旧产品回收率为外生变量和零售商决策变量两种情形的闭环供应链系统决策模型,并通过数值仿真得到了各模型供应链成员的最优定价和订货策略以及最终利润,进一步分析了两种情形下市场需求不确定性对零售商、制造商决策行为及利润的影响,最后对两种情形进行了对比分析.     

需求不确定下制造商为核心的三级供应链协调

在需求不确定的情境下,研究由单一供应商、制造商和销售商组成的三级供应链系统的协调问题。设计了制造商—销售商采用期权契约,制造商—供应商采用回购契约的联合契约协调机制,分析了集中控制、分散控制和协调机制下供应链系统的最优决策。最后,通过数值算例说明了机制设计的有效性,并对分析结果进行验证。研究结果表明,通过制定合理的契约参数可以使供应链各成员的期望利润相比分散决策时有帕累托改进,从而实现三级供应链系统的协调。