考虑决策者失望规避的供应链协同绿色创新动态优化与协调研究

针对决策者存在失望规避行为且产品绿色水平具有动态变化特征的情形,基于失望理论,运用微分博弈的方法研究了供应链协同绿色创新动态优化与协调问题,探讨了供应链成员失望规避程度对绿色创新决策及供应链绩效的影响,并提出双向成本分担契约对供应链进行协调。结果表明,供应链成员是否选择协同绿色创新及产品的绿色水平均与成员的失望规避程度密切相关;分散式决策下,若制造商选择分担供应商部分绿色创新成本,其分担比例与制造商失望规避程度负相关,与供应商失望规避程度正相关;集中式决策下,产品绿色水平、成员绿色创新水平及效用现值均高于协调前分散系统中的对应值;在一定条件下,双向成本分担契约的设计与实施,能有效提升供应链成员效用现值,实现供应链协调。     

基于微分对策的绿色供应链生态研发策略与协调机制

综合考虑产品绿色度和价格对市场需求的多重影响,构建微分博弈模型,运用最优控制理论,先后考察并比较批发价契约、收益共享契约和集中式决策三种情形下绿色供应链最优生态研发努力和定价策略,进一步采用Rubinstein讨价还价模型设计合理的利润分配契约。研究发现:收益共享契约无法促使绿色供应链实现协调,但在一定条件下,能够有效消除批发价契约的“双重边际效应”;集中式决策下,合理的利润分配契约能够保证供应链成员分得的利润“帕累托最优”,实现供应链协调,且该契约与收益共享比例有关。     

价格和服务双因素影响的供应链协调决策模型研究

以单个制造商和存在竞争的两个零售商组成的供应链结构模型为研究对象,建立价格和服务两个重要因素影响的市场需求函数,研究供应链协调决策模型。以销售价格、服务质量和制造商批发价格作为三个决策变量,分析集中决策和分散决策两种情景的最优策略,研究收益共享、服务成本分担、收益共享成本分担等三种不同契约的供应链协调问题,并使用数值仿真方法,分析了相关参数变化对系统协调的影响。仿真结果表明:收益共享契约和成本分担契约需满足一定条件才能达到供应链协调,但其效果不一定实现帕累托最优;收益共享和成本分担契约可实现供应链协调,但收入共享系数需在合理区间取值;改进的收益共享成本分担契约能够避免共享系数的盲区,更加有效地达到供应链协调,保持供应链良好运行。     

考虑运输时间和消费者偏好的水产品供应链协调研究

本文研究了由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的两级生鲜品供应链协调问题。考虑消费者水产品生鲜偏好、运输时间和保鲜努力水平等影响因素,分别构建了集中决策和分散决策下冷链保鲜存储的零售商和供应商的供应链成员之间Stackelberg博弈模型。通过理论证明和数值仿真的研究表明,在“保鲜成本分担+收益共享”契约,供应链总体利润大于一般保鲜成本共担契约,能获得更高的利润,“保鲜成本分担+收益共享”契约更能提高冷链储存的保鲜努力水平。     

政府补贴下供应链合作减排的微分博弈

借助微分博弈理论,研究政府补贴下由一个供应商和一个制造商组成的供应链长期合作减排的动态协调问题。在产品需求受减排量的影响下,构建了集中式和分散式微分博弈模型,并设计了成本分担契约协调供应链。结合算例对参数进行灵敏度分析,研究发现:政府补贴对企业减排起到有效的激励作用并且有助于供应链实现协调;成本分担契约的引入可提高供应商和制造商的减排努力水平、产品减排量及需求量,并实现了供应链协调;随着供应商、制造商减排成本系数以及减排量自衰减率的增大,引入契约后产品减排量呈下降趋势;相反,随着产品减排量对减排努力水平的敏感性以及消费者低碳意识的增强,产品减排量呈上升趋势。     

共享平台下供应链闲置资源动态优化配置策略

随着共享经济的发展,其领域已从消费环节延伸到供应链层面。供应链上闲置资源如何重新配置,以实现共享,提高资源利用率,是共享供应链企业面临的新问题。本文考虑基于共享平台的供应链闲置资源匹配过程的动态性,利用微分博弈和动态规划原理分别建立集中式决策下、无成本分担和有成本分担契约的分散式决策下共享供应链闲置资源的优化配置模型,并构建对应的哈密顿-雅克比-贝尔曼(HJB)方程,求解和分析三种情形下资源供应方、共享平台和需求方关于供应链共享闲置资源的最优配置策略。结果表明,成本分担契约在一定条件下可提高供应链闲置资源参与方的积极性,并使供应链上各参与方利润增加,实现共享供应链的Pareto改进。     

异质性农产品农超对接供应链策略模型

针对消费者的异质性需求,构建由农户、合作社和超市组成的异质农产品农超对接三级供应链,建立完全信息下合作社主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,通过引入最低绿色度讨论了两种契约模型对供应链成员决策的影响.研究表明:最低绿色度对两种农产品的最优价格水平、绿色农产品的需求量产生影响,但不会影响普通农产品的需求量;在固定采购价的批发价契约下,限定的最低绿色度是确定的.通过加入成本分担契约、收益共享契约进行契约组合设计,指出组合契约能够提高限定的最低绿色度、绩效价格比和供应链成员的利润,使得供应链的运作效率显著提高.最后利用数值算例对模型结论的有效性进行了分析验证.     

政府补贴下供应链合作减排与低碳宣传的动态协调策略

基于微分博弈理论,研究由制造商和零售商构成的低碳供应链长期纵向合作减排、低碳宣传以及政府补贴问题。考虑到需求受减排量和零售商低碳宣传努力的双重影响下,构建了Stackelberg微分博弈模型。当政府对各决策下供应链成员提供相同补贴时,设计的利润共享契约实现了供应链利润的合理分配。设计的减排成本分担契约使得供应链利润得到Pareto改进,比较并分析三种模式下政府补贴率和供应链的均衡策略,并探讨了政府和供应链成员的交互影响。最后,对模型结果进行比较分析和算例分析,验证了结论的合理性。     

企业社会责任下的旅游供应链低碳运营研究

针对由一低碳景区和一旅行社构成的低碳旅游供应链,考虑了供应链成员企业社会责任行为对供应链动态均衡的影响,构建了企业社会责任行为下的低碳旅游供应链微分博弈模型。研究发现:旅游企业应在消费者低碳偏好增加的同时提高低碳决策水平;成本分担合同的制定需满足一定的条件,且只有在一定条件下,供应链企业社会责任的增加会提高成本分担比例,而消费者低碳偏好的增加降低了成本分担比例;成本分担模式下,主导者的企业社会责任直接提升了自身的决策水平,间接提升了跟随者的决策水平,提高了成本分担比例;企业社会责任偏好不会改变成本分担合同的有效性。     

基于微分博弈的生鲜农产品三级供应链温度控制投入研究

针对生鲜农产品三级供应链温度控制投入的最优动态决策与协调问题,考虑供应链供应商、零售商和第三方物流服务商三方温度控制投入对生鲜农产品新鲜度的共同影响,分别构建集中式和批发价分散式决策下微分博弈模型,并比较两种决策情形下最优温度控制投入水平和供应链的各成员及整体利润。利用“互为成本分担-带固定补贴契约”对供应链进行协调,并结合数值算例,对不同决策情形下影响参数进行了敏感性分析和协调机制效果分析。研究表明：协调机制下“互为成本分担-带固定补贴契约”与批发价分散决策相比,协调机制下“互为成本分担-带固定补贴契约”供应链供应商、零售商和第三方物流服务商能够得到帕累托改善。     

基于流程创新的供应链激励合同研究

针对由一个零售商两个制造商组成的竞争供应链,建立了零售商处于领导地位的Stackelberg博弈模型。分析了收益分享合同和成本分担合同下流程创新效率和竞争强度对流程创新水平和供应链成员利润的影响,并探讨了最优激励合同类型。研究发现,流程创新效率的降低会使得制造商流程创新水平和供应链成员利润降低;竞争强度的增大会使得制造商流程创新水平和供应链成员利润增加。此外,在流程创新效率较高和竞争强度较低时零售商提供收益分享合同有利,在流程创新效率较低和竞争强度较高时零售商提供成本分担合同有利。     

Dynamic conformance and design quality in a supply chain: an assessment of contracts’ coordinating power

We consider a two-echelon supply chain involving one manufacturer and one supplier who collaborate on improving both design and conformance quality. Design quality is supposed to increase product desirability, and therefore market demand, while conformance quality should reduce the proportion of defective items, and therefore increase the manufacturer’s sales revenue. We investigate how the supply chain parties allocate effort between design and conformance quality under both cooperative and non-cooperative settings in an intertemporal framework. Furthermore, we evaluate wholesale price contracts and revenue-sharing contracts in terms of their performance and coordination power. We show that although a revenue-sharing contract enables the manufacturer to effectively involve the supplier in quality improvement, neither contract type allows for perfect coordination resulting in the quality that can be achieved by a cooperative supply chain. We thus suggest a reward-based extension to the revenue-sharing contract, to ensure system-wide optimal quality performance. Importantly, we find that the supplier would be better off adopting a reward-based revenue sharing contract and refusing a standard revenue-sharing contract, while the opposite would be true for the manufacturer.     

Manufacturer’s revenue-sharing contract and retail competition

This paper investigates a revenue-sharing contract for coordinating a supply chain comprising one manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader, offers a revenue-sharing contract to two competing retailers who face stochastic demand before the selling season. Under the offered contract terms, the competing retailers are to determine the quantities to be ordered from the manufacturer, prior to the season, and the retail price at which to sell the items during the season. The process of pricing and ordering is expected to result in an equilibrium as in the Bayesian Nash game. On the basis of anticipated responses and actions of the retailers, the manufacturer designs the revenue-sharing contract. Adopting the classic newsvendor problem model framework and using numerical methods, the study finds that the provision of revenue-sharing in the contract can obtain better performance than a price-only contract. However, the benefits earned under the revenue-sharing contract by different supply chain partners differ because of the impact of demand variability and price-sensitivity factors. The paper also analyses the impact of demand variability on decisions about optimal retail price, order quantity and profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailers. Lastly, it investigates how the competition (between retailers) factor influences the decision-making of supply chain members in response to uncertain demand and profit variability.     

考虑延伸售后保证服务的闭环供应链定价与协调

在一个制造商和一个零售商构成的闭环供应链中,研究了延伸售后保证(Extended Warranty EW)不同提供模式下的供应链定价决策,比较了不同EW提供模式供应链的效率,设计了考虑满意度的收益共享契约协调供应链。研究结果表明:在服务成本相同的分散式决策环境下,零售商提供EW时,零售价较低,批发价也较低,同时销售量、回收率、EW价、各节点成员利润和总利润较高;无论是哪种EW提供模式,相较于集中式决策,分散决策零售价较高,而回收率、EW价和总利润较低。为实现供应链的协调,考虑到各成员的满意度,依据绝对偏离方法,设计收益共享契约。利用数值算例检验了理论结果。     

Optimizing product service system by franchise fee contracts under information asymmetry

This paper studies the problem of how to effectively provide product service system (PSS) in a service-oriented manufacturing supply chain under asymmetric private demand information. The PSS in the supply chain is operated heterogeneously and complementarily, in which the manufacturer provides the product while the retailer who possesses private demand information is responsible for adding the necessary value-added service on the basic product. We address the issue of how different contracts affect the decisions and profitability of the supply chain members. Three types of contracts are developed to help supply chain partners to make decisions and enhance the supply chain’s efficiency. The first is the franchise fee (FF) contract, under which the manufacturer provides a two-part tariff contract (wholesale price and franchise fee) to influence the retailer’s decision and to detect her private demand information. The second is the franchise fee with service requirement (FFS) contract, under which the manufacturer specifies the service level required in addition to the two-part tariff contract terms. The third is the franchise fee with centralized service requirement (FFCS) contract, which is similar to the FFS contract but that the service level specified by the manufacturer is the system optimal solution. Our analytical results show that all three contracts enable the manufacturer to detect the retailer’s private demand information, with the FFCS contract achieving the greatest channel profit. Finally, numerical examples are presented, and sensitivity analysis of service level and profit are conducted to compare the performance of the three contracts under different settings. The paper provides managerial guidelines for the manufacturer in contract offering under different conditions.     

Contracting with demand uncertainty under supply chain competition

We examine supply chain contracts for two competing supply chains selling a substitutable product, each consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. Both manufacturers are Stackelberg leaders and the retailers are followers. Manufacturers in two competing supply chains may choose different contracts, either a wholesale price contract in which the retailer??s demand forecasting information is not shared, or a revenue-sharing contract in which the retailer??s demand forecasting information is shared. Under supply chain competition and demand uncertainty, we identify which contract is more advantageous for each supply chain, and under what circumstances.     

Supply chain coordination for newsvendor-type products with two ordering opportunities and demand information update

This paper studies a coordination issue with two ordering opportunities in a two-echelon supply chain, where one manufacturer sells a single newsvendor-type product through one buyer. The manufacturer does not hold inventory and activates production or order with an infinite capacity and a fixed setup cost in response to the buyer’s order. The buyer places two orderings during the selling period of the product: one happens at the beginning of the period and the other at some specified time within the selling period. The whole selling period is divided into two stages or sub-periods by the buyer’s second order. The stochastic demands in the two sub-periods are assumed to be auto-correlated. The excess demand before the second order is partially backordered, whereas the excess demand at the end of the selling season is utterly lost. Under both the centralized and decentralized settings, we develop the models of how the buyer determines his two-ordering policies. We analyse the existence and uniqueness of the optimal solutions to the models and present the corresponding analytical solutions. Furthermore, we propose an improved revenue-sharing contract that can realize the perfect coordination of the supply chain and study how the revenue-sharing policies affect the supply chain members’ decisions. Finally, we show the superiority of the presented two-ordering strategy through numerical examples.     

企业社会责任下碳减排优化策略与协调机制研究

基于企业社会责任(CSR)的视角,本文研究由生产低碳产品的制造商和零售商组成的二级供应链的最优策略及供应链协调问题。通过构造供应链成员具有社会责任感的效用函数,分析了CSR对各成员的利润和环境的影响。研究发现:制造商和零售商都是通过降低碳排放水平来体现社会责任感;无论制造商有社会责任感还是零售商有社会责任感,供应链的利润都增大;在收益共享-成本分摊合同(RC合同)下协调,可以使制造商和零售商实现双赢(帕累托最优);零售商应该承担更多的社会责任,降低碳排放水平。