| 考虑决策者失望规避的供应链协同绿色创新动态优化与协调研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 关志民,曲优,赵莹.考虑决策者失望规避的供应链协同绿色创新动态优化与协调研究[J].运筹与管理,2020,29(5):96-107. |
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| 作者姓名： | 关志民 曲优 赵莹 |
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| 作者单位： | 东北大学 工商管理学院,辽宁 沈阳 110169 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972100,71372186) |
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| 摘 要： | 针对决策者存在失望规避行为且产品绿色水平具有动态变化特征的情形,基于失望理论,运用微分博弈的方法研究了供应链协同绿色创新动态优化与协调问题,探讨了供应链成员失望规避程度对绿色创新决策及供应链绩效的影响,并提出双向成本分担契约对供应链进行协调。结果表明,供应链成员是否选择协同绿色创新及产品的绿色水平均与成员的失望规避程度密切相关;分散式决策下,若制造商选择分担供应商部分绿色创新成本,其分担比例与制造商失望规避程度负相关,与供应商失望规避程度正相关;集中式决策下,产品绿色水平、成员绿色创新水平及效用现值均高于协调前分散系统中的对应值;在一定条件下,双向成本分担契约的设计与实施,能有效提升供应链成员效用现值,实现供应链协调。
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| 关 键 词： | 绿色供应链 失望规避 微分博弈 成本分担契约 |
| 收稿时间： | 2018-09-14 |
Dynamic Optimization and Coordination on Joint Green Innovation in a Supply Chain ConsideringDisappointment Aversion |
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| GUAN Zhi-min,QU You,ZHAO Ying.Dynamic Optimization and Coordination on Joint Green Innovation in a Supply Chain ConsideringDisappointment Aversion[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2020,29(5):96-107. |
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| Authors: | GUAN Zhi-min QU You ZHAO Ying |
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| Affiliation: | School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110169, China |
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| Abstract: | Green innovation has become an important method for enterprises to obtain advantage against the background of green development. Considering supply chain members who possess disappointment aversion and the green products which are characteristic of dynamic change, based on disappointment theory, a dynamic optimization and coordination model for joint green innovation is established. Using the feedback method, we obtain the optimal equilibrium strategies under different decision-making scenarios, and investigate the impacts of supply chain members' disappointment aversion on product's green level as well as the supply chain's performance. Furthermore, a two-way cost sharing contract is proposed to coordinate the supply chain. The results show that: whether the supply chainmembers conduct green innovation jointly as well as the green degree of product are particularly relevant for the level of supply chain members' disappointment aversion; under the decentralized scenario, the cost sharing proportion decreases with manufacturer's disappointment aversion degree and increases with supplier's disappointment aversion degree in the situation which manufacturer would like to share the green innovation costs of supplier; by comparison, the product's green degree and supply chain's performance under centralized setting have more advantage than that under decentralized setting; besides, under certain conditions, a two-way costs sharing contract adoption can realize supply chain coordination. |
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| Keywords: | green supply chain disappointment aversion differential game cost sharing contract |
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