Contracting with demand uncertainty under supply chain competition |
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| Authors: | Xingzheng Ai Jing Chen Jianhua Ma |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Economics and Management, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, 610054, China
2. Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Winnipeg, Winnipeg, MB, R3B 2E9, Canada
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| Abstract: | We examine supply chain contracts for two competing supply chains selling a substitutable product, each consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. Both manufacturers are Stackelberg leaders and the retailers are followers. Manufacturers in two competing supply chains may choose different contracts, either a wholesale price contract in which the retailer??s demand forecasting information is not shared, or a revenue-sharing contract in which the retailer??s demand forecasting information is shared. Under supply chain competition and demand uncertainty, we identify which contract is more advantageous for each supply chain, and under what circumstances. |
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