考虑线下渠道时销售商在团购网站上的最优销售策略研究

基于团购网站和销售商的典型合作模式,考虑了团购网站和线下市场的相互影响,用非线性优化理论为基础以销售商制定团购上限和团购项目定价为决策变量,考虑团购价格和最低团购数量的约束条件,建立模型优化,求解出销售商推出团购项目的最优策略。考虑到团购网站下限和团购网站销售成本以及网上销售的广告效用,分析了销售商是否应该制定团购上限,如何结合团购项目定价制定团购上限。探讨了在线低价限量销售的优势,以及顾客转移购买率和团购下限对销售商策略选择的影响。通过和单一线下渠道的最优销售策略相比较,得出销售商推出团购项目的前提条件。同时为团购网站运营商如何引导销售商推出低价团购项目提供了管理启示。     

Dynamic Network-Based Discriminatory Pricing

We study the dynamic pricing decisions for competitive network service providers. We assume that each competing firm follows a three-part pricing scheme, which consists of an ongoing membership fee, a usage fee for communications within the networks, and another usage fee for communications across the networks. The difference between the two usage fees is the network-based price discount that allows price discrimination. We study the firms problems as a differential game and establish the optimal pricing policy as a Nash equilibrium feedback strategy depending on only the network sizes (i.e., the number of subscribers). We compare the dynamic network-based discount with the static discount. In the special case of a uniform calling pattern, we find that the firm network-based dynamic discount is always lower than the static discount; we find also that the firm that has a larger network can offer a bigger discount. These results are useful particularly for managers. To get further insights into the dynamic pricing policies, we explore the case of symmetric competition using numerical simulation.Communicated by G. Leitmann     

Integrated inventory model with quantity discount and price-sensitive demand

Quantity discount has been a subject of study for a long time; however, little is known about its effect on integrated inventory models when price-sensitive demand is placed. The objective of this study is to find the optimal pricing and ordering strategies for an integrated inventory system when a quantity discount policy is applied. The pricing strategy discussed here is one in which the vendor offers a quantity discount to the buyer. Then, the buyer will adjust his retail price based on the purchasing cost, which will influence the customer demand as a result. Consequently, an integrated inventory model is established to find the optimal solutions for order quantity, retail price, and the number of shipments from vendor to buyer in one production run, so that the joint total profit incurred has the maximum value. Also, numerical examples and a sensitivity analysis are given to illustrate the results of the model.     

双寡头垄断下全渠道竞争优化策略

引入包含线上购买线下取货(buy online and pick up in store, BOPS)的全渠道策略,在随机和确定性需求下分别构建双寡头Nash均衡博弈模型,得出在线下-线上和BOPS-线上等不同渠道下双寡头企业的最优库存策略。通过分析不同的渠道,进一步探讨了双寡头企业产品定价的差异对最优线下库存的影响。结果表明,BOPS作为一种新的零售模式,通过提供库存的可用性信息,显著降低了顾客承担的缺货风险,既可以增加顾客的访问量,还可以增加交叉收益;同时,零售商是否提供BOPS,将显著影响顾客的渠道选择。     

一种电子商务环境下耐用品的动态定价模型与策略

针对电子商务环境下消费者对价格歧视的抗拒问题,以及耐用品生命周期长、产品需求依赖于时间、价格等特点,提出了一种动态定价模型与策略。该模型通过构造转移概率矩阵,推导出在线消费者浏览到耐用品的不同价格状态下的概率,接着根据消费者多阶段效用函数分析消费者的购买决策行为,进而给出零售商利润达到最大化时的最优定价策略集合。为了验证模型与策略的有效性,通过数值模拟实验,分析模型主要参数变化对最优定价策略的影响。研究发现当效用折扣因子越高,零售商应该降低促销频率和高价格并且提高低价格,从而诱导高端消费者在高价格购买产品。折扣效用因子大小还决定了网上零售商是否要隐藏自己的促销概率。     

考虑专利保护和渠道偏好的再制造双渠道闭环供应链决策与协调

本文在电子商务环境下考虑消费者对零售渠道和直销渠道具有不同的渠道偏好,研究了专利许可零售商实施再制造的双渠道闭环供应链定价决策和协调问题。运用博弈论方法求得了集中决策和分散决策情形下的最优定价策略,并分析了消费者渠道偏好系数对节点企业最优定价策略及利润的影响。针对分散决策存在效率损失的问题,以集中决策的最优解为基准,通过联合运用一个由批发价格、直销价格和专利许可费构成的定价机制和一个利润分享机制,实现了双渠道闭环供应链的完美协调。     

考虑预付定金和退货的SMPEs产品定价与优化策略

借鉴中小制造型企业(SMPEs)在线渠道预售模式,考虑市场中存在预付订金和不预付订金的顾客,并将其退货情况引入到生产商利润表达式中,构建确定性和随机性市场需求下的SMPEs产品销售利润最大化模型,推导生产商产品最优定价的解析解;对比两种销售模式的利润,得到了生产商选择不同销售策略的条件。进一步考虑预付定金的产品数量、预交定金比例、退货数量是关于价格折扣敏感的情况,采用拉格朗日乘子法对生产商产品定价及优化问题进行研究,分析求得生产商销售策略(产品定价和价格折扣)的近似最优解。最后,通过数值算例对研究结论进行了验证并给出经济学解释。     

基于在线评论的新产品定向市场播种最优策略研究

定向市场播种,即选择特定的消费群体对其免费发放新产品,由此获得的在线评论对其他潜在消费者的购买决策有较大的影响作用,但还没有 相关研究。以在线销售的新产品为研究对象,基于Hoteling模型,加入在线评论对消费者预期值的影响作用来构建企业最优收益模型,研究垄断厂商最优的定向播种策略。研究结果揭示了(1)最优播种目标与消费者对产品的初始预期值相关:预期值较高时,可不播种;预期值处于中等水平,可选择均匀播种;预期值较低时,应选择高匹配用户播种;(2)三种播种方式下各自的最优播种比例及其定价策略;(3)当消费者初始预期值与产品不匹配成本发生变化时,三种播种策略下最优的播种比例和定价策略的调整方案。研究结果为探究在线评论对播种策略的影响提供了新的研究方向和理论依据。     

Volume discount pricing strategy in the VMI supply chain with price sensitive demand

This paper develops a volume discount scheme to coordinate Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) supply chains with multiple heterogeneous retailers, in which the supply chain is modelled as a Stackelberg game with price sensitive demand. The paper proposes a method to construct a volume discount price scheme and shows that, any volume discount can be represented as a piecewise constant function of demand. We provide the game formulations of VMI supply chains and develop algorithms to solve this type of game problems, including finding the optimal volume discount scheme. Through a numerical study comparing the results of applying a volume discount strategy with the profits from a single wholesale price strategy, we show that the volume discount pricing strategies can be used to improve profits for all participants in the VMI supply chain in comparison with single price strategies.     

Managing a dual-channel supply chain under price and delivery-time dependent stochastic demand

Several leading manufacturers recently combined the traditional retail channel with a direct online channel to reach a wider range of customers. We examine such a dual-channel supply chain under price and delivery-time dependent stochastic customer demand. We consider five decision variables, the price and order quantity for both the retail and the online channels and the delivery time for the online channel. Uncertainty frequently arises in both retail and online channels and so additional inventory management is required to control shortage or overstock and that has an effect on the optimal order quantity, price, and lead time. We developed mathematical models with the profit maximization motive. We analyze both centralized and decentralized systems for unknown distribution function of the random variables through a distribution-free approach and also for known distribution function. We examine the effect of delivery lead time and customers’ channel preference on the optimal operation. For supply chain coordination a hybrid all-unit quantity discount along a franchise fee contract is used. Moreover, we use the generalized asymmetric Nash bargaining for surplus profit distribution. A numerical example illustrates the findings of the model and the managerial insights are summarized for centralized, decentralized, and coordinated scenarios.     

基于分类服务机制的可预约排队系统设计和服务定价研究

采取合理有效的服务机制和服务定价是确保服务型企业持续有效运行的重要方式,服务提供商设计合理的服务策略可以使得服务收益达到最优。本文以服务可预约的排队系统为研究背景,对服务提供商分类服务机制选择和服务定价策略进行研究。通过考虑由两种服务策略下顾客之间的平均等待时间的对比和顾客等待厌恶心理参数形成的全新顾客服务效用模型,给出服务提供商在不同服务机制下的最优服务策略以及顾客市场规模对其服务策略选择的影响。研究表明,当预约顾客的市场规模相对较小时,服务提供商可以采取分类服务机制,即同时服务预约顾客和未预约顾客以增加服务收益,反之亦然。此外,预约顾客等待厌恶程度能够显著增大服务提供商的服务定价。     

供应商歧视定价下网络零售商店内推介策略研究

研究了供应商歧视定价时网络零售商店内推介策略。首先,以供应商统一定价模型为基准,通过逆推归纳法求解不同推介策略组合下零售商和供应商的均衡利润,研究发现:仅当消费者对两家零售商认知差异较小时四种推介策略组合才能同时成立,且随着推介费用的增大两零售商均衡推介策略依次为:都不推介、仅强势零售商1推介和双向推介。其次,构建供应商歧视定价模型,发现歧视定价有利于弱势零售商2获得市场空间,随着消费者对两家零售商感知差异和推介费用的变化呈现出多样化的均衡推介策略。最后,探讨了两种定价模型下供应商的最优利润,发现受推介策略的影响歧视定价未必能够为供应商带来更多利润。     

网络团购的定价与收益协调策略研究

如何实现团购网站和团购参与商家之间的双赢是我国网络团购目前面临的一大挑战性问题。结合我国网络团购的特点,构建团购网站和商家之间定价与收益分配的博弈模型,针对博弈结果运用纳什谈判模型给出协调策略。最后,通过数值算例分析主要参数的变化对价格与收益的影响。结果表明,敏感市场的规模和团购网站的广告效应越大、商品的单位成本越小、开展网络团购对商家和团购网站越有利。     

价格数量折扣下多阶段报童问题的在线策略

价格数量折扣可以提高订购量, 是库存决策中的一个重要因素. 特别地, 当订购量达到一定水平时, 价格折扣才会发生. 应用理论计算机科学兴起的弱集成算法, 研究具有这种价格数量折扣的多阶段报童问题的在线策略. 弱集成算法是一种在线序列决策算法, 其主要特点是不对未来输入做任何统计假设, 克服了报童问题研究中需要对需求做概率假设的困难. 主要将弱集成算法应用到固定订购量的专家策略, 给出了价格数量折扣下多阶段报童问题的具体在线策略;得到了该在线策略相对于最优专家策略的理论保证. 进一步将回收价值和缺货损失费引入, 给出了推广的在线策略及其理论结果. 最后应用数值算例说明了给出的在线策略具有较好的竞争性能.     

电商平台主导的E-闭环供应链定价、服务决策与回收模式

E-闭环供应链(E-CLSC)管理须有科学的定价与服务决策支撑。针对集中和分散回收模式,构建电商平台主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究E-CLSC定价与平台服务决策。通过对产品销售价格、平台服务水平等均衡策略分析,揭示回收主体投资有效性、回收转移价格等对E-CLSC均衡策略影响。研究表明:集中回收模式优于分散回收模式;在分散回收模式下,若回收主体投资有效性相同,制造商、平台均偏好制造商回收模式;平台回收与第三方回收模式相比,产品销售价格、平台服务水平相同,前者回收渠道效率较高;平台回收模式下,单位佣金与回收转移价格负相关,产品销售价格、平台服务水平、废旧产品回收率均与回收转移价格无关;若回收主体投资有效性差异程度较大,制造商回收模式并非总是最优的,回收主体投资有效性差异显著影响产品销售价格、回收渠道效率、平台服务水平和E-CLSC各成员利润。上述结论通过数值仿真进行了验证。     

Revenue management for a supply chain with two streams of customers

In this paper, we consider revenue management for a service supply chain with one supplier and one retailer. The supplier has a limited capacity of a perishable product and both the supplier and the retailer face customers. Each customer may choose to buy a product from either the supplier or the retailer by considering prices and the cost associated with switching. For the centralized model, the supplier determines the selling prices for both herself and the retailer, and the retailer simply collects a commission fee for each product sold. We derive monotone properties for the revenue functions and pricing strategies. Further, we show that the commission fee increases the retailer’s price while decreasing the supplier’s and leads to efficiency loss of the chain. For the decentralized decision-making model, the supplier and the retailer compete in price over time. Two models are considered. In the first, the retailer buys products from the supplier before the selling season and in the second the retailer shares products with the supplier in retailing. For both models, we discuss the existence of the equilibrium and characterize the optimal decisions. Numerical results are presented to illustrate properties of the models and to compare the supply chain performance between the centralized and the decentralized models.     

基于策略型消费者的电商平台折扣销售期定价策略研究

电商平台折扣销售期的双重折扣现象激发了巨大的消费需求,本文构建了具有折扣销售期的电商平台和商家的斯坦伯格博弈模型,研究了在电商平台不提供消费者返利和提供消费者返利的情况下商家和电商平台的最优定价策略。从消费者效用出发,结合最优化方法和博弈论,力图为商家和电商平台的决策提供参考。研究结果表明:(1)在电商平台不提供返利时,消费者的策略性越高,正常销售期的价格越高,折扣率越低。(2)当电商平台给消费者提供返利时,正常销售期的价格会升高,而折扣销售期的价格会降低,差异化定价现象愈加明显。(3)当消费者的麻烦成本高于某一阈值时,电商平台提供顾客返利时的收益相比不提供顾客返利时更高且最优利润随着消费者的麻烦成本的增加而增加。(4)拓展部分考虑了过高麻烦成本造成的消费者流失,发现适当的提高消费者的麻烦成本能增加平台和商家的收益,但是当超过一定的范围,会引起用户流失,反而损害双方的利润。     

考虑跟随企业搭便车行为的创新企业定价策略研究

文章通过构建博弈模型探讨了存在跟随企业搭便车行为时创新企业的定价策略及定价模式(稳定定价或动态定价),并分析了忠实消费者规模及需求溢出效应等特征对创新企业定价决策与利润的影响.结果表明,无论创新企业采用稳定定价或动态定价模式,跟随企业搭便车行为均会降低创新企业利润,需求溢出效应的增强总能使创新企业和跟随企业均获得更高的利润.动态定价模式下,当需求溢出效应较大时,创新企业会采用渗透定价策略;反之会采用撇脂定价策略.无论垄断或竞争市场情形下,均存在消费者规模阈值效应,即创新企业的利润随着忠实消费者规模的增大而先增大后减小.垄断市场下,动态定价模式能让创新企业获得更高利润;竞争市场下,当跟随企业质量处于较中间水平时,稳定定价模式能让创新企业获得更多优势.     

面向战略型消费者的产品创新与定价策略

考虑垄断制造商面向战略型消费者时的产品创新与定价问题。运用消费者效用理论和博弈论等方法,构建静态和动态定价下制造商和消费者两期决策模型并求解分析。结果表明,消费者是否购买以及何时购买产品取决于升级换代产品的价格阈值。与静态定价相比较,动态定价能使制造商获得更多期望收益,但会降低消费者剩余、弱化制造商的产品创新积极性,并且这种弱化现象在产品价值折扣系数较高的情况下尤为明显。战略消费者购买行为对制造商的产品创新、期望收益和消费者剩余的影响,不仅依赖于制造商选择何种定价策略,还取决于产品价值折扣系数的大小。研究结论为消费者的产品购买和升级换代提供了理论建议,为企业的产品创新和定价提供了决策参考。     

线上零售商全渠道门店布局密度策略研究

全渠道零售通过整合线上线下发挥协同效应,为零售商和消费者带来价值。但实施全渠道需要更多的成本投入,而合适的线下门店布局是成功的关键。本文基于消费者效用和优化理论,通过零售商和消费者的利益平衡分析,探讨零售商实施全渠道策略下的定价决策、最优门店密度以及相关的全渠道实施的条件。结果表明:全渠道模式的定价与线下不便成本等因素有显著关系;合适的线下门店密度是BOPS策略成功的关键,而最优的密度与与全渠道运营成本系数以及线下门店距离成本难度系数有关,BOPS门店密度大于BOPS+SFS;全渠道策略并不一定有利可图,当线下距离成本效应较低时,BOPS模式优于单一线上销售模式;而BOPS实施成本强度较大或线下距离难度效应较高时,BOPS+SFS则更为可行。