面向战略型消费者的产品创新与定价策略

考虑垄断制造商面向战略型消费者时的产品创新与定价问题。运用消费者效用理论和博弈论等方法,构建静态和动态定价下制造商和消费者两期决策模型并求解分析。结果表明,消费者是否购买以及何时购买产品取决于升级换代产品的价格阈值。与静态定价相比较,动态定价能使制造商获得更多期望收益,但会降低消费者剩余、弱化制造商的产品创新积极性,并且这种弱化现象在产品价值折扣系数较高的情况下尤为明显。战略消费者购买行为对制造商的产品创新、期望收益和消费者剩余的影响,不仅依赖于制造商选择何种定价策略,还取决于产品价值折扣系数的大小。研究结论为消费者的产品购买和升级换代提供了理论建议,为企业的产品创新和定价提供了决策参考。

Product Innovation and Pricing Strategies in the Presence of Strategic Consumers

This paper investigates the optimal product innovation and pricing strategies of a monopoly manufacturer facing strategic consumers. Methods such as consumer utility theory and game theory are used to develop models over two periods under the dynamic-and static-pricing strategies. The results show that strategic consumers make purchase decisions based on some price thresholds of the upgraded products. Compared to the static-pricing strategy, the dynamic-pricing strategy enables the manufacturer to get more expected profit, but results in less consumer surplus and innovation incentive particularly when the discount factor of product value is high. In addition, the effects of strategic consumers' purchase behavior on product innovation, the manufacturer's expected profit, and consumer surplus depend not only on the pricing strategy but also on the discount factor of product value. Our findings offer consumers theoretical proposals of purchasing and upgrading products, as well as provide firms with decision-making reference about the adoption of the product innovation and pricing strategies.