基于公平信念均衡的废旧金属回收体系激励合约设计

针对废旧金属回收体系中的道德风险问题,以现金流量模型作为衡量主体收益的标准,在废旧金属回收体系激励合约设计中考虑博弈实验中证明的公平偏好因素,通过比较静态和算例分析证明了废旧金属回收中的公平偏好具有挤进效应和挤出效应——对代理商的努力水平存在挤出效应;对激励合约设计中的资质分配水平和分享系数存在挤进效应。公平偏好改变了废旧金属回收体系中代理商的最优努力水平和回收公司的最优资质分配水平以及最优分享系数,表明公平偏好可以作为废旧金属回收激励合约正式制度设计的补充。     

分权竞争、协同意愿与城市群建设:考虑公平偏好的委托代理解释

互惠合作机制缺失和信息不对称影响了地方政府的区域协调投入,不利于城市群建设和经济高质量发展。在委托代理模型中引入公平偏好的基础上,重点讨论协作意愿和信息条件对努力水平的影响。发现公平偏好和信息条件都对代理人的努力水平产生影响,且代理人之间的信息分布更重要。地方政府努力水平依赖于相邻城市的协同意愿,满足公平偏好中的“互惠”行为;且信息对称情形下的努力水平均高于不对称情形。改善信息分布和引导公平偏好,有利于提高地方政府的区域协同投入而改善整体产出水平。城市群建设和区域协调发展需要健全的协调机制,以增强不同区域地方政府的互信水平和互惠机制,降低、消除区域间信息不对称情形,通过互惠性合作和投入提升区域经济效率、促进经济高质量发展。     

公平偏好下考虑互补效应的项目投资收益分配研究

决策者的公平偏好对项目投资合作的形成和推进有重要影响。本文从创业企业和风险投资家的双重道德风险出发,选取Nash谈判解为公平偏好参照点,构建创业企业具有公平偏好的项目投资委托代理模型,研究委托方和代理方的能力存在互补效应的情形下,公平偏好对项目收益分配及双方努力水平的影响。结果表明:项目收益的最优分配比例和双方的最高努力水平均与创业企业的公平偏好程度相关。在互补效应存在时,双方的努力水平不会随收益分配比例的变化呈现单调变化趋势。如果双方的能力互补程度较小,具有公平偏好的创业企业会以Nash谈判解为自己的收益下限,风险投资家需要向其让渡更多的项目收益才能实现有效激励;如果双方的能力互补程度较大,创业企业会将Nash谈判解作为自己的收益上限,风险投资家即使不给予其大于Nash谈判解的收益也可实现有效激励。     

阶梯激励合约下代理人行为与合约激励效果

基于委托代理理论研究了阶梯激励合约下的代理人行为,并从委托人角度探讨了最优合约设计的问题。在一般市场需求分布和代理人效用函数下,代理人的效用可能是其努力水平的双峰函数,且存在一个阈值使得当合约绩效奖励超过该阈值时,代理人的努力水平“跳跃式”增加。通过比较阶梯激励合约与其他两类激励合约发现,当代理人是风险厌恶型且代理人的产出完全依赖于其努力水平,委托人总是更偏好阶梯激励合约。     

“高水位”法下私募基金经理的激励与风险选择

私募基金契约本质上是一种复杂的委托—代理关系。本文基于现行私募基金行业标准的“2-20”合同,在委托代理框架下,结合前景理论,讨论了“高水位”法对基金经理的激励效应及其导致的冒险行为。研究发现,在高水位激励下产生“承诺升级”现象,当基金经理在评估期对基金业绩超过“高水位”持乐观信念时,经理倾向采用保守型投资策略;反之其倾向激进的投资策略。由此提出“2-20”合同改进：业绩激励乘数随着基金经理的差异信念而时变,同时纳入对基金风险范围的约束,以防范代理投资过程中的过度冒险问题。     

基于公平偏好的三阶段锦标激励模型研究

为解决多代理人激励及委托人道德风险问题,本文基于公平偏好理论,构建了三阶段锦标激励模型,通过数理推导研究委托人最大化目标下公平偏好与工资差距对代理人努力水平和拆台行为的影响,并对不同晋升过程下代理人各阶段的努力水平进行比较。结果表明,代理人的努力水平与拆台行为同升同降,公平偏好降低代理人的努力水平和拆台行为,而工资差距提高代理人的努力水平和拆台行为,且无论晋升过程如何,代理人在第一阶段的努力水平均大于其第三阶段的努力水平。本文拓展了行为经济学视角下基于委托代理框架的锦标赛激励研究。     

考虑互惠公平的创新顾客激励契约研究

基于公平偏好理论的互惠公平,从创新顾客的互惠偏好程度、激励契约类型与激励效果的关系入手,构建创新顾客参与企业创新活动的激励模型。通过模型求解和分析,探讨激励契约的外部性和互惠关系对于激励效果的影响;此外,进一步分析如何联合经济激励和心理激励,降低企业获得创新顾客高努力投入的成本;最后,通过仿真实验,验证模型分析结果。研究发现:当创新顾客之间出现互惠关系时,最优激励契约取决于创新顾客心理偏好与风险态度之间的相互作用:当创新顾客的风险规避程度较低时,最优激励契约为相对绩效契约;当创新顾客的风险规避程度较高时,最优激励契约为团队报酬契约。     

博弈论在企业管理中的应用

本文把博弈论应用于企业管理 ,利用博弈论的委托 -代理理论构造了一个委托 -代理激励模型 ,针对信息对称与信息不对称情况进行了分析。在设计企业的委托代理机制时 ,若考虑了对经理的激励 ,则委托人的风险成本、代理成本都比没有考虑对经理的激励时要小。从理论上证明了对企业经理激励的必要性。     

非对称信息下供应链的商业信用激励

本文主要研究了非对称信息下商业信用对两级供应链的激励作用。首先设计了成本信息非对称情形下供应商的商业信用激励菜单,基于委托代理框架构建商业信用激励模型,采用拉格朗日方法和最优化算法求解模型;并分析了非对称信息下供应商的信用决策和零售商的订购决策;比较了信息对称和非对称两种情形下商业信用对供应链决策和利润的影响。研究结果表明通过设计合理的商业信用激励契约,可激励零售商披露其真实的成本,防止逆向选择的发生,增加供应链的利润。     

基于联合体双方异质性特征的EPC项目控制权配置模型研究

为确保联合体双方各自利益不受损的同时,实现项目效益最大化,EPC(Engineering-Procurement-Construction)项目控制权的合理配置成为关键。在考虑联合体双方异质性特征的基础上,构建EPC项目特定控制权与剩余控制权的配置模型,并对模型进行理论推导与假设检验。研究发现：联合体牵头者的身份能够有效抑制自利性投入行为;较高的决策偏好度会诱发自利性投入行为;特定控制权与剩余控制权配置区间的增加均会激发联合体双方的项目性投入;提高风险承受度而降低风险偏好度有利于减少设计方的自利性投入。研究成果为具有异质性特征的联合体成员间控制权的合理配置提供对策。     

Bid calculation for construction projects: Regulations and incentive effects of unit price contracts

The Austrian contract awarding system for construction projects is characterized by the unit price contract being an important contract type. The bid price is a decisive criterion for the selection of the construction company that performs a project, and the bid price is calculated from the unit prices and the specified production volumes of the project activities. Since the actual production volumes can differ from the specified volumes, the actual payment can differ from the bid price according to these deviations. In practice there can be asymmetric information on the production volumes. This leads to an incentive for the bidders to “skew” the bid calculation by asymmetric allocation of overhead costs to project activities.In this paper we analyze this agency-theoretical situation and develop a model that decides on the allocation of overhead costs to project activities in order to maximize the actual payment for a predetermined bid price. We also present a case study and comment on the implications of the model for the contract awarding system in the construction industry.     

具有私人信息的道德风险的委托—代理人模型的合约分析

本文对存在的不对称信息的环境下的具有私人信息道德风险的委托—代理人模型的合约问题进行了详细的讨论,并得出一些有新意的结论.此讨论问题的方法很值得推荐和推广,特别是在最优激励合同中,比如投资激励,管理机制中的激励,销售激励,保险激励等合同的设计,都可以借鉴此方法来研究和分析.     

信息披露质量影响公司风险承担:治理效应抑或声誉效应？

基于信息披露理论和公司治理理论,本文实证检验了信息披露质量对公司风险承担的影响。实证结果发现:较高的信息披露质量有助于提高公司风险承担水平,从而验证了信息披露的“治理效应”。进一步发现,管理层持股激励能够影响上市公司的信息披露行为,并提高公司风险承担水平,说明管理层持股能够加强信息披露质量与公司风险承担之间的正向关系,且这种影响关系在高管理层持股组中更显著。研究结论不仅丰富和拓展了信息披露和公司风险承担的相关研究,而且对管理层激励契约的设计和公司风险认知具有重要的启示作用和现实意义。     

Allocation of risk capital on an internal market

We propose an allocation process for economic risk capital using an internal sequential auction in which investment allowances are based on marginal risk contributions. Division managers have incentive to give truthful bids because of bonus payments, which are linear in the division’s profit and linked to the auction bids. With our model, the auction process reaches an equilibrium identical to the optimal allocation if division managers have no diverging interests. When division managers do have diverging preferences in terms of empire building, headquarters faces a trade-off between incurring opportunity costs for achieving a suboptimal allocation and bonus costs paid to division managers to overcome their diverging interests. However, bonus costs are partially offset by proceeds from the auction. Depending on the model parameters, total agency costs can become negative. We show that for large values of new risk capital to be allocated, headquarters can always choose a level of bonus payments so that total costs are negative.     

Contracting over multiple parameters: Capacity allocation in semiconductor manufacturing

This paper is a generalization of Mallik and Harker [Mallik, S., Harker, P.T., 2004. Coordinating supply chains with competition: Capacity allocation in semiconductor manufacturing. European Journal of Operational Research 159, 330–347] that presented an integrated model of incentive problems arising in forecasting and capacity allocation. In that model, multiple product managers and multiple manufacturing managers forecast the means of their respective demand and capacity distributions, and a central coordinator allocates capacities based on these forecasts. A mechanism that elicits truthful information from the managers was the main contribution of that paper. The objective of this paper is to generalize our previous results to multiple statistics reporting. This work assumes that the central coordinator can ask the managers to report multiple statistics (mean and variance, for example) about their respective distributions. We propose a game theoretic model and design a mechanism (a bonus scheme and an allocation rule) that elicits truthful reporting of all statistics by all managers. It turns out that the structure of the optimal bonus schemes are rather simple with easily calculable parameters. We also show that a large class of allocation rules are manipulable. A bonus is often required for elicitation of truthful information. We compare our results of multiple statistics reporting with those from Mallik and Harker (2004). We also characterize under what conditions the reporting of the extra information is of limited use.     

研发外包中考虑服务商道德风险与资金限制的支付契约

针对研发外包中服务商道德风险防范与激励问题,在考虑服务商自有资金限制下,设计了研发外包支付契约,分析了契约的特性。研究表明,服务商自有资金的多少会影响支付契约的激励效果。当服务商自有资金很少时,支付契约对道德风险的防范与激励效果较差。当服务商自有资金达到一定量时,随着自有资金的增多,支付契约的激励效果越来越强,特别的当服务商自有资金超过很大一个量时,支付契约能激励服务商实现系统最优的工作努力程度。     

逆向信息和道德风险下的供应链线性激励契约研究

本文我们利用委托代理理论，研究了供应商和零售商之间的利益博弈．考察了两类不对称信息——逆向信息和道德风险并存下的供应链线性契约．通过把问题归结为一个二层规划问题，求解得到了相关结论：与道德风险下的线性契约[12]相比，两类不对称信息的存在，使得对零售商的激励变得更加复杂．通过数值试验，比较了线性甄别契约和线性混同契约，发现对于作为委托人的供应商而言，甄别契约比汇同契约更有效率．     

Reducing incremental costs associated with the delegation of incentive contracting decisions: An analysis of planning and control decisions in a manufacturing setting in the presence of moral hazard

We compare and contrast two specific regimes involving the centralization and delegation of the incentive contracting decision in manufacturing organizations. In the centralization regime, a single individual simultaneously makes the allocation of demand to production facilities and determines the incentive compensation scheme for the managers at the facilities. Under the delegation regime, the demand allocation is decided upon initially by a superior and the incentive contracting decision is subsequently made by a subordinate, who is neither of the two managers in charge of the production facilities. Using the principal–agent paradigm, which assumes that the managerial efforts are unobservable, we demonstrate that the centralization regime performs no worse than the delegation regime. For situations where strategic or other requirements necessitate firms to opt for the delegation of the incentive contracting decision, we propose a heuristic that significantly increases the likelihood of mimicking the allocation and contracting decisions made under the centralized regime.