分权竞争、协同意愿与城市群建设:考虑公平偏好的委托代理解释

互惠合作机制缺失和信息不对称影响了地方政府的区域协调投入,不利于城市群建设和经济高质量发展。在委托代理模型中引入公平偏好的基础上,重点讨论协作意愿和信息条件对努力水平的影响。发现公平偏好和信息条件都对代理人的努力水平产生影响,且代理人之间的信息分布更重要。地方政府努力水平依赖于相邻城市的协同意愿,满足公平偏好中的“互惠”行为;且信息对称情形下的努力水平均高于不对称情形。改善信息分布和引导公平偏好,有利于提高地方政府的区域协同投入而改善整体产出水平。城市群建设和区域协调发展需要健全的协调机制,以增强不同区域地方政府的互信水平和互惠机制,降低、消除区域间信息不对称情形,通过互惠性合作和投入提升区域经济效率、促进经济高质量发展。

Decentralized Competition,Willingness to Cooperate and Urban Agglomeration Construction: A Principal-agent Explanation Considering Fairness Preference

The lack of reciprocal cooperation mechanism and information asymmetry affects the regional coordinated investment of local governments, which is not conducive to the construction of urban agglomeration and high-quality economic development. On the basis of introducing fairness preference into the principal-agent model, this paper focuses on the impact of willingness to cooperate and information conditions on the level of effort. It is found that both fairness preference and information conditions affect the effort level of agents, and the information distribution among agents is more important. The effort level of local governments depends on the collaborative willingness of adjacent cities to meet the “reciprocal” behavior in fairness preference; And the effort level in the case of information symmetry is higher than that in the case of asymmetry, which means improving information distribution and guiding fairness preference is conducive to improving the regional collaborative input of local governments and the overall output level. It can be concluded the urban agglomeration construction and regional coordinated development need a sound coordination mechanism to enhance the level of mutual trust and mutual benefit mechanism between local governments, and to reduce and eliminate information asymmetry between regions, which would improve regional economic efficiency and promote high-quality economic development.