考虑互惠公平的创新顾客激励契约研究

基于公平偏好理论的互惠公平,从创新顾客的互惠偏好程度、激励契约类型与激励效果的关系入手,构建创新顾客参与企业创新活动的激励模型。通过模型求解和分析,探讨激励契约的外部性和互惠关系对于激励效果的影响;此外,进一步分析如何联合经济激励和心理激励,降低企业获得创新顾客高努力投入的成本;最后,通过仿真实验,验证模型分析结果。研究发现:当创新顾客之间出现互惠关系时,最优激励契约取决于创新顾客心理偏好与风险态度之间的相互作用:当创新顾客的风险规避程度较低时,最优激励契约为相对绩效契约;当创新顾客的风险规避程度较高时,最优激励契约为团队报酬契约。

Research into Incentive Contracts of Innovative Customers Based on Reciprocal Equity

The incentive model of innovative customers is built based on the reciprocity equity of equity preference theory, exploring the relationship among the degree of reciprocal equity of innovative customers, the type of incentive contracts and the effect of incentive mechanism. First, this paper explores the impact of the externality of incentive contract and reciprocal relationships on the effect of incentive mechanism by model solving and analysis. Second, it is discussed how to combine economic incentives and psychological incentives to reduce the cost to obtain innovative customers' high effort input. Finally, the results of model analysis are verified according to simulation experiments. It is found that when there is a reciprocal relationship between innovative customers, the optimal incentive contract depends on the interaction between psychological preference and risk attitude of innovative customers. When the risk aversion of innovative customers is relatively low, the optimal incentive contract is a relative incentive one. When the risk aversion of innovative customers is relatively high, the optimal incentive contract is a team incentive one.