考虑消费者社会影响下的企业返利策略研究

研究了存在社会影响下的企业返利策略。以返利的持续性为依据, 建立了前期返利、后期返利、始终返利以及始终不返利四种返利模型。分别分析了垄断和竞争两种情形, 通过研究发现:在垄断情况下, 较小的返利促使企业选择在前期返利而后期不返利, 然而较大的返利迫使企业放弃返利策略;在存在竞争情形下, 会出现四种可能的均衡返利策略, 如果企业间竞争较强且返利较大, 均衡结果是两企业会做出差异化的返利策略选择;如果竞争较弱或返利较小, 则均衡结果是两企业会选择相同的返利策略。虽然两个企业均选择后期返利总不是均衡策略, 但是在某些情形下与其它返利策略相比, 两个企业会陷入囚徒困境, 致使两企业利润的减少。     

奖惩机制下零售商信息分享对闭环供应链的影响研究

研究奖惩机制下零售商的信息分享策略以及对闭环供应链的影响,建立了由制造商和零售商以及消费者组成的闭环供应链,其中制造商负责回收废旧产品并进行再制造。分别研究了集中式决策的情形和分散式决策下零售商信息分享和不分享的情形。研究发现,若政府在社会总福利目标中不考虑奖惩成本且回收难度较小时,零售商信息分享使社会总福利提高,反之,导致社会总福利降低;零售商信息分享总会使消费者剩余的期望值降低,但能够提高废旧产品的回收率。最后,针对零售商信息分享引起社会福利提高的情况设计了回收责任分担契约激励零售商分享信息。关键词:信息分享;奖惩机制;闭环供应链;社会福利;消费者剩余     

The survival of inefficient and efficient norms: Equilibria with and without meta-norms in a repeated norm enforcing game

ABSTRACT

Although meta-norms have been considered as the key to sustaining cooperation norms, this study argues that the meta-norms also facilitate the survival of inefficient norms. The opportunistic norm violation strategy is proposed as an alternative mechanism to motivate costly punishments. A repeated norm enforcing game, in which the externality of the normative action can be negative or positive, is analyzed. This game is equivalent to a social dilemma if the externality is large enough. The ranges of externalities that support tit-for-tat, meta-norm, and opportunism equilibria are compared. The meta-norm equilibrium has the highest stability; however, it can persist in negative externalities. Finally, the opportunism equilibrium is more stable than the tit-for-tat equilibrium, but it breaks down when the externality is small.     

Cyber Swarm Algorithms – Improving particle swarm optimization using adaptive memory strategies

Particle swarm optimization (PSO) has emerged as an acclaimed approach for solving complex optimization problems. The nature metaphors of flocking birds or schooling fish that originally motivated PSO have made the algorithm easy to describe but have also occluded the view of valuable strategies based on other foundations. From a complementary perspective, scatter search (SS) and path relinking (PR) provide an optimization framework based on the assumption that useful information about the global solution is typically contained in solutions that lie on paths from good solutions to other good solutions. Shared and contrasting principles underlying the PSO and the SS/PR methods provide a fertile basis for combining them. Drawing especially on the adaptive memory and responsive strategy elements of SS and PR, we create a combination to produce a Cyber Swarm Algorithm that proves more effective than the Standard PSO 2007 recently established as a leading form of PSO. Applied to the challenge of finding global minima for continuous nonlinear functions, the Cyber Swarm Algorithm not only is able to obtain better solutions to a well known set of benchmark functions, but also proves more robust under a wide range of experimental conditions.     

社会互动,投资者情绪传染与资产泡沫——基于股票论坛发帖的实证研究

在资本市场中,投资者并不是相互独立的个体,而是相互学习、相互交流的。随着互联网的迅猛发展,这种社会互动变得更为频繁和普遍,因此社会互动对资产价格的影响也不容小觑。本文先通过理论建模提出理论假设:社会互动存在条件下,投资者互动会加剧市场情绪的传染,进而增加资产泡沫;当投资者情绪高涨时,投资者互动强度显著正向影响泡沫;当投资者情绪低落时,投资者互动强度显著负向影响泡沫;受社会互动影响,投资者活跃的交易会加剧市场情绪的传染,进而增加资产泡沫。之后本文基于股票论坛发帖构建社会互动、投资者情绪指标,验证了中国股票市场中本文理论假设的正确性。     

供应链企业社会责任治理决策研究——基于SD-演化博弈分析法

采用演化博弈模型和系统动力学相结合的方法探讨不同治理措施情景下的供应链企业社会责任决策问题,并进行了仿真分析。结果表明,供应链各环节企业决策之间存在着相互影响作用;当制造商和零售商有一方具有较高的履行企业社会责任意识,另一方具有较低的履行意识时,具有较高意识的一方无论有无激励措施,最终都会趋于履行企业社会责任,而较低一方选择不履行决策,除非有力度较大的激励措施出现;当二者以中性态度对企业社会责任的履行进行决策时,激励措施的实施对制造商更有效;制造商相对于零售商履行企业社会责任,对消费者偏好所带来的市场效应更加依赖;政府补贴在短期内是较为有效的激励方式;惩罚力度越强,激励作用越好,持续时间越久;若两种激励措施搭配使用,可以更好地发挥激励作用。     

服务台不可靠的重试排队系统均衡分析

本文研究服务台不可靠的M/M/1常数率重试排队系统中顾客的均衡进队策略, 其中服务台在正常工作和空闲状态下以不同的速率发生故障。在该系统中, 服务台前没有等待空间, 如果到达的顾客发现服务台处于空闲状态, 该顾客可占用服务台开始服务。否则, 如果服务台处于忙碌状态, 顾客可以选择留下信息, 使得服务台在空闲时可以按顺序在重试空间中寻找之前留下信息的顾客进行服务。当服务台发生故障时, 正在被服务的顾客会发生丢失, 且系统拒绝新的顾客进入系统。根据系统提供给顾客的不同程度的信息, 研究队长可见和不可见两种信息情形下系统的稳态指标, 以及顾客基于收入-支出函数的均衡进队策略, 并建立单位时间内服务商的收益和社会福利函数。比较发现, 披露队长信息不一定能提高服务商收益和社会福利。     

A Bayesian Model of Panic in Belief

One common principle in the study of belief is what has been called the “consensual validation of reality”: the idea that persons in highly inbred social networks alter their beliefs regarding the external world by repeated interaction with each other rather than by direct observation. This notion accounts for phenomena such as panics, in which a substantial number of actors in a given population suddenly converge to (typically unsubstantiated) beliefs. In this paper, a Bayesian conditional probability model will be used to explore the conditions necessary for such outcomes, and alternative results will be likewise documented. Finally, suggestions for operationalization of the Bayesian model in experimental research will be given, along with some implications of the theory for common phenomena such as the propagation of ideas by media sources, organizational rumors, and polarization of group opinion.     

Matching relations and the dimensional structure of social choices

The concept of a matching relation M generalizes that of an equivalence, in a case in which the domain and range of M are not necessarily identical and may be disjoint. This paper analyzes the representation of any relation R by a union of matching relations. The interpretation of such representation is that a R d — the choice of some individual or object d by some individual a requires the coincidence of at least one value of the chosen and the chooser on some relevant factor. A general discussion of matching relations is given, and various results concerning the representation are presented.