| 奖惩机制下零售商信息分享对闭环供应链的影响研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 王文宾,丁军飞.奖惩机制下零售商信息分享对闭环供应链的影响研究[J].运筹与管理,2020,29(7):89-98. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王文宾 丁军飞 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.中国矿业大学 经济管理学院,江苏 徐州 221116;2.东南大学 经济管理学院,江苏 南京 211189 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71971210,71971058,71571042);能源矿业经济智库(2018WHCC01);四川循环经济研究中心重点项目(XHJJ-1902);四川省电子商务与现代物流研究中心重点项目(DSWL19-5);中国矿业大学创新团队(2020QN004) |
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| 摘 要： | 研究奖惩机制下零售商的信息分享策略以及对闭环供应链的影响,建立了由制造商和零售商以及消费者组成的闭环供应链,其中制造商负责回收废旧产品并进行再制造。分别研究了集中式决策的情形和分散式决策下零售商信息分享和不分享的情形。研究发现,若政府在社会总福利目标中不考虑奖惩成本且回收难度较小时,零售商信息分享使社会总福利提高,反之,导致社会总福利降低;零售商信息分享总会使消费者剩余的期望值降低,但能够提高废旧产品的回收率。最后,针对零售商信息分享引起社会福利提高的情况设计了回收责任分担契约激励零售商分享信息。关键词:信息分享;奖惩机制;闭环供应链;社会福利;消费者剩余
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| 关 键 词： | 信息分享 奖惩机制 闭环供应链 社会福利 消费者剩余 |
| 收稿时间： | 2019-01-08 |
Impact of Information Sharing on Closed-loop Supply Chain under Reward-Penalty Mechanism |
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| WANG Wen-bin,DING Jun-fei.Impact of Information Sharing on Closed-loop Supply Chain under Reward-Penalty Mechanism[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2020,29(7):89-98. |
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| Authors: | WANG Wen-bin DING Jun-fei |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Economics and Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China;2. School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China |
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| Abstract: | This paper studies the retailer' strategy of information sharing and its impact on the closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)under reward-penalty mechanism(RPM). We develop a CLSC model which consists of one manufacturer, one retailer and consumers, in which the manufacturer collects waste products and then conducts remanufacturing. In this model, the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader and the retailer is the follower. We use game theory to solve this dynamic decision problem. Furthermore, we investigate the centralized case and decentralized cases, which includes the cases that the retailer shares information and does not share information. The results show that, if the target of the social welfare includes the reward-penalty cost and the degree of collection difficulty is low relatively, information sharing increases the social welfare, otherwise, it decreases the total social welfare; the information sharing strategy always reduces the expected consumer surplus, while it can enhance the collection rate. Finally, we design a collection responsibility sharing contract to encourage the retailer to share information under the setting where the information sharing strategy strengthens the social welfare. |
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| Keywords: | information sharing reward-penalty mechanism closed-loop supply chain social welfare consumer surplus |
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