| 供应链企业社会责任治理决策研究——基于SD-演化博弈分析法 |
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| 引用本文： | 程慧锦,丁浩.供应链企业社会责任治理决策研究——基于SD-演化博弈分析法[J].运筹与管理,2022,31(5):14-22. |
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| 作者姓名： | 程慧锦 丁浩 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.青岛理工大学 管理工程学院,山东 青鸟;2.中国石油大学(华东) 经济管理学院,山东 青岛 |
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| 基金项目： | 山东省教育科学“十四五”规划课题(2021YB019);山东省社会科学规划研究项目(19CJJJ32);山东省高等学校人文社会科学研究计划项目(J18RB056);中央高校基本科研业务费专项基金资助项目(19CX04013B) |
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| 摘 要： | 采用演化博弈模型和系统动力学相结合的方法探讨不同治理措施情景下的供应链企业社会责任决策问题,并进行了仿真分析。结果表明,供应链各环节企业决策之间存在着相互影响作用;当制造商和零售商有一方具有较高的履行企业社会责任意识,另一方具有较低的履行意识时,具有较高意识的一方无论有无激励措施,最终都会趋于履行企业社会责任,而较低一方选择不履行决策,除非有力度较大的激励措施出现;当二者以中性态度对企业社会责任的履行进行决策时,激励措施的实施对制造商更有效;制造商相对于零售商履行企业社会责任,对消费者偏好所带来的市场效应更加依赖;政府补贴在短期内是较为有效的激励方式;惩罚力度越强,激励作用越好,持续时间越久;若两种激励措施搭配使用,可以更好地发挥激励作用。
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| 关 键 词： | 供应链企业社会责任 演化博弈 系统动力学 政府补贴 惩罚机制 |
| 收稿时间： | 2019-10-23 |
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility in Supply Chain Based on System Dynamics |
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| CHENG Hui-jin,DING Hao.Evolutionary Game Analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility in Supply Chain Based on System Dynamics[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2022,31(5):14-22. |
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| Authors: | CHENG Hui-jin DING Hao |
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| Affiliation: | School of Management Engineering, Qingdao University of Technology;School of Economics and Management, China University of Petroleum |
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| Abstract: | In this paper, evolutionary game model and system dynamics are combined to explore the decision-making of corporate social responsibility in supply chain under different governance measures. The simulation results show that there is an interaction between the decision-making of enterprises in each link of the supply chain. When one party has a high sense of fulfilling corporate social responsibility the other has a low one. The higher conscious party will eventually tend to fulfill corporate social responsibility regardless of whether there are incentives or not, while the lower one will choose not to fulfill the decision, unless there is a strong incentive. The implementation of incentive measures is more effective for manufacturers when they make decisions on the performance of corporate social responsibility with a neutral attitude. Compared with retailers, manufacturers are more dependent on the market effect brought by consumers' preferences when they fulfill their corporate social responsibilities. Government subsidies are more effective in the short term. The stronger the punishment, the better the incentive effect and the longer the duration. If the two incentive measures are used together, the incentive effect can be better played. |
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| Keywords: | supply chain corporate social responsibility evolutionary game government subsidies system dynamics penalty mechanism |
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