Prisoner＇s Dilemma Game with Nonlinear Attractive Effect on Regular Small-World Networks

We investigate a spatial Prisoner＇s Dilemma game with nonlinear attractive effect on regular small-world networks. The players located on the sites of networks can either cooperate with their neighbours or defect. In every generation, each player updates its strategy by firstly choosing one of the neighbours with a probability proportional to .A^α denoting the attractiveness of the neighbour, where .4 is the collected payoff and ^α （-〉0） is a free parameter characterizing the extent of nonlinear effect. Then each player adopts its strategy with a probability dependent on their payoff difference. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we investigate the density pc of cooperators in the stationary state for various values of α and the rewiring probability q of the network. It is shown that the introduction of such attractive effect remarkably promotes the emergence and persistence of cooperation over a wide range of the temptation to defect for the same network structures. We also point out that long-range connections either enhance or inhibit the cooperation, which depends on the value of α and the payoff parameter b.     

Prisoner＇s Dilemma Game with Heterogeneous Influential Effect on Regular Small-World Networks

The effect of heterogeneous influence of different individuals on the maintenance of co-operative behaviour is studied in an evolutionary Prisoner＇s Dilemma game with players located on the sites of regular small-world networks. The players interacting with their neighbours can either co-operate or defect and update their states by choosing one of the neighbours and adopting its strategy with a probability depending on the pay off difference. The selection of the neighbour obeys a preferential rule： the more influential a neighbour, the larger the probability it is picked. It is found that this simple preferential selection rule can promote continuously the co-operation of the whole population with the strengthening of the disorder of the underlying network.     

Local Minority Game with Evolutionary Strategies

We study a model of local minority game in the random Kauffman network with evolutionary strategies and propose three methods to update the strategy of poor agents, with lower points in a given generation： namely to update either the Boolean function of their strategies randomly, or their local information of randomly adjacent m agents, or the number m of randomly chosen adjacent agents. The results of extended numerical simulations show that the behaviour of strategies in the three methods may enhance significantly the entire coordination of agents in the system. It is also found that a poor agent tends to use both small m strategies and correlated strategies, and the strategies of agents will finally self-organize into a steady-state distribution for a long time playing of the game.     

Adaptive generalized matrix projective lag synchronization between two different complex networks with non-identical nodes and different dimensions

<正>The adaptive generalized matrix projective lag synchronization between two different complex networks with non-identical nodes and different dimensions is investigated in this paper.Based on Lyapunov stability theory and Barbalat’s lemma,generalized matrix projective lag synchronization criteria are derived by using the adaptive control method.Furthermore,each network can be undirected or directed,connected or disconnected,and nodes in either network may have identical or different dynamics.The proposed strategy is applicable to almost all kinds of complex networks.In addition,numerical simulation results are presented to illustrate the effectiveness of this method,showing that the synchronization speed is sensitively influenced by the adaptive law strength,the network size,and the network topological structure.     

Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Two Types of Positively Correlated Networks

We study the effects of degree correlations on the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner＇s dilemma game with individuals located on two types of positively correlated networks. It is shown that the positive degree correlation can either promote or inhibit the emergence of cooperation depending on network configurations. Furthermore, we investigate the probability to cooperate as a function of connectivity degree, and find that high-degree individuals generally have a higher tendency to cooperate. Finally, it is found that small-degree individuals usually change their strategy more frequently, and such change is shown to be unfavourable to cooperation for both kinds of networks.     

Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game Based on Pursuing Higher Average Payoff

We investigate the prisoner＇s dilemma game based on a new rule： players will change their current strategies to opposite strategies with some probability if their neighbours＇ average payoffs are higher than theirs. Compared with the cases on regular lattices （RL） and Newman-Watts small world network （NW）, cooperation can be best enhanced on the scale-free Barabasi-Albert network （BA）. It is found that cooperators are dispersive on RL network, which is different from previously reported results that cooperators will form large clusters to resist the invasion of defectors. Cooperative behaviours on the BA network are discussed in detail. It is found that large-degree individuals have lower cooperation level and gain higher average payoffs than that of small-degree individuals. In addition, we find that small-degree individuals more frequently change strategies than do large- degree individuals.     

An effective method to improve the robustness of small-world networks under attack

In this study, the robustness of small-world networks to three types of attack is investigated. Global efficiency is introduced as the network coefficient to measure the robustness of a small-world network. The simulation results prove that an increase in rewiring probability or average degree can enhance the robustness of the small-world network under all three types of attack. The effectiveness of simultaneously increasing both rewiring probability and average degree is also studied, and the combined increase is found to significantly improve the robustness of the small-world network.Furthermore, the combined effect of rewiring probability and average degree on network robustness is shown to be several times greater than that of rewiring probability or average degree individually. This means that small-world networks with a relatively high rewiring probability and average degree have advantages both in network communications and in good robustness to attacks. Therefore, simultaneously increasing rewiring probability and average degree is an effective method of constructing realistic networks. Consequently, the proposed method is useful to construct efficient and robust networks in a realistic scenario.     

Controlling disease spread on networks with feedback mechanism

Many real-world networks have the ability to adapt themselves in response to the state of their nodes. This paper studies controlling disease spread on network with feedback mechanism, where the susceptible nodes are able to avoid contact with the infected ones by cutting their connections with probability when the density of infected nodes reaches a certain value in the network. Such feedback mechanism considers the networks' own adaptivity and the cost of immunization. The dynamical equations about immunization with feedback mechanism are solved and theoretical predictions are in agreement with the results of large scale simulations. It shows that when the lethality $\alpha$ increases, the prevalence decreases more greatly with the same immunization $g$. That is, with the same cost, a better controlling result can be obtained. This approach offers an effective and practical policy to control disease spread, and also may be relevant to other similar networks.     

A preliminary investigation on the topology of Chinese and climate networks

Complex networks have been studied across many fields of science in recent years. In this paper, we give a brief introduction of networks, then follow the original works by Tsonis et al (2004, 2006) starting with data of the surface temperature from 160 Chinese weather observations to investigate the topology of Chinese climate networks. Results show that the Chinese climate network exhibits a characteristic of regular, almost fully connected networks, which means that most nodes in this case have the same number of links, and so-called super nodes with a very large number of links do not exist there. In other words, though former results show that nodes in the extratropical region provide a property of scale-free networks, they still have other different local fine structures inside. We also detect the community of the Chinese climate network by using a Bayesian technique; the effective number of communities of the Chinese climate network is about four in this network. More importantly, this technique approaches results in divisions which have connections with physics and dynamics; the division into communities may highlight the aspects of the dynamics of climate variability.     

Synchronization between Different Networks

Synchronization between two networks with different topology structures and different dynamical behaviours is studied. These two different networks are driving and responding networks, respectively. Under the preconditions that the driving network gets synchronization, we give the conditions for the responding network to be synchronized to the same dynamics as the driving network with the help of the open-plus-closed-loop method. Then a example is given to verify the validity of the theoretical results.     

Network effects of animal conflicts

We simulated animal conflicts on different networks, where five strategies that the animals may take are considered. The result of the evolution of the five strategies on networks shows that whether one strategy dominates or two strategies coexist on the network is determined by the structure of the network. But no matter what structure the network is, the total-war strategy is constrained and never becomes a final winning strategy when it contests with the other four limited-war strategies. This may be the reason that the animals choose the limited-war strategies to fight against other animals of the same species.     

The coevolutionary ultimatum game on different network topologies

In this paper, a model of ultimatum game is discussed from the coevolutionary perspective, where strategy dynamics and structure dynamics coexist. The interplay between structure dynamics and strategy dynamics leads to overwhelmingly interesting evolved topology and fairness behaviors. It is found that fair division emerges for specific ratios of structure updating probability to strategy updating probability. Furthermore, it is shown that the initial structures have no essentially different effect on the coevolutionary results. In particular, the results for strategy are almost similar whenever the initial structure is set to be the nearest-neighbor coupled network, the ER random network or the scale-free network. Besides, the effects of other spatial factors are also investigated, e.g. the population size has a positive influence on the offer, while the average degree has a negative effect. In addition, one extrinsic factor, the background payoff, is also of great importance in promoting fair divisions. Apart from above, we study the properties of the evolved networks, which have the small-world effect and positive assortative behaviors.     

Spatial snowdrift game with myopic agents

We have studied a spatially extended snowdrift game, in which the players are located on the sites of two-dimensional square lattices and repeatedly have to choose one of the two strategies, either cooperation (C) or defection (D). A player interacts with its nearest neighbors only, and aims at playing a strategy which maximizes its instant pay-off, assuming that the neighboring agents retain their strategies. If a player is not content with its current strategy, it will change it to the opposite one with probability p next round. Here we show through simulations and analytical approach that these rules result in cooperation levels, which differ to large extent from those obtained using the replicator dynamics.     

Motion of influential players can support cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma

We study a spatial Prisoner’s dilemma game with two types (A and B) of players located on a square lattice. Players following either cooperator or defector strategies play Prisoner’s Dilemma games with their 24 nearest neighbors. The players are allowed to adopt one of their neighbor’s strategy with a probability dependent on the payoff difference and type of the given neighbor. Players A and B have different efficiency in the transfer of their own strategies; therefore the strategy adoption probability is reduced by a multiplicative factor (w < 1) from the players of type B. We report that the motion of the influential payers (type A) can improve remarkably the maintenance of cooperation even for their low densities.     

Evolutionary ultimatum game on complex networks under incomplete information

This paper studies the evolutionary ultimatum game on networks when agents have incomplete information about the strategies of their neighborhood agents. Our model assumes that agents may initially display low fairness behavior, and therefore, may have to learn and develop their own strategies in this unknown environment. The Genetic Algorithm Learning Classifier System (GALCS) is used in the model as the agent strategy learning rule. Aside from the Watts-Strogatz (WS) small-world network and its variations, the present paper also extends the spatial ultimatum game to the Barabási-Albert (BA) scale-free network. Simulation results show that the fairness level achieved is lower than in situations where agents have complete information about other agents’ strategies. The research results display that fairness behavior will always emerge regardless of the distribution of the initial strategies. If the strategies are randomly distributed on the network, then the long-term agent fairness levels achieved are very close given unchanged learning parameters. Neighborhood size also has little effect on the fairness level attained. The simulation results also imply that WS small-world and BA scale-free networks have different effects on the spatial ultimatum game. In ultimatum game on networks with incomplete information, the WS small-world network and its variations favor the emergence of fairness behavior slightly more than the BA network where agents are heterogeneously structured.     

Evolutionary snowdrift game with disordered environments in mobile societies

We investigate an evolutionary snowdrift game on a square $N=L\times L$ lattice with periodic boundary conditions, where a population of $n_{0}$ ($n_{0}\leq N$) players located on the sites of this lattice can either cooperate with or defect from their nearest neighbours. After each generation, every player moves with a certain probability $p$ to one of the player's nearest empty sites. It is shown that, when $p=0$, the cooperative behaviour can be enhanced in disordered structures. When $p>0$, the effect of mobility on cooperation remarkably depends on the payoff parameter $r$ and the density of individuals $\rho$ ($\rho=n_{0}/N$). Compared with the results of $p=0$, for small $r$, the persistence of cooperation is enhanced at not too small values of $\rho$; whereas for large $r$, the introduction of mobility inhibits the emergence of cooperation at any $\rho<1$; for the intermediate value of $r$, the cooperative behaviour is sometimes enhanced and sometimes inhibited, depending on the values of $p$ and $\rho$. In particular, the cooperator density can reach its maximum when the values of $p$ and $\rho$ reach their respective optimal values. In addition, two absorbing states of all cooperators and all defectors can emerge respectively for small and large $r$ in the case of $p>0$.     

Stability of strategies in payoff-driven evolutionary games on networks

We consider a network of coupled agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which players are allowed to pick a strategy in the interval [0, 1], with 0 corresponding to defection, 1 to cooperation, and intermediate values representing mixed strategies in which each player may act as a cooperator or a defector over a large number of interactions with a certain probability. Our model is payoff-driven, i.e., we assume that the level of accumulated payoff at each node is a relevant parameter in the selection of strategies. Also, we consider that each player chooses his∕her strategy in a context of limited information. We present a deterministic nonlinear model for the evolution of strategies. We show that the final strategies depend on the network structure and on the choice of the parameters of the game. We find that polarized strategies (pure cooperator∕defector states) typically emerge when (i) the network connections are sparse, (ii) the network degree distribution is heterogeneous, (iii) the network is assortative, and surprisingly, (iv) the benefit of cooperation is high.     

Message Passing and Metabolism

Active inference is an increasingly prominent paradigm in theoretical biology. It frames the dynamics of living systems as if they were solving an inference problem. This rests upon their flow towards some (non-equilibrium) steady state—or equivalently, their maximisation of the Bayesian model evidence for an implicit probabilistic model. For many models, these self-evidencing dynamics manifest as messages passed among elements of a system. Such messages resemble synaptic communication at a neuronal network level but could also apply to other network structures. This paper attempts to apply the same formulation to biochemical networks. The chemical computation that occurs in regulation of metabolism relies upon sparse interactions between coupled reactions, where enzymes induce conditional dependencies between reactants. We will see that these reactions may be viewed as the movement of probability mass between alternative categorical states. When framed in this way, the master equations describing such systems can be reformulated in terms of their steady-state distribution. This distribution plays the role of a generative model, affording an inferential interpretation of the underlying biochemistry. Finally, we see that—in analogy with computational neurology and psychiatry—metabolic disorders may be characterized as false inference under aberrant prior beliefs.     

Topology and dynamics of attractor neural networks: The role of loopiness

We derive an exact representation of the topological effect on the dynamics of sequence processing neural networks within signal-to-noise analysis. A new network structure parameter, loopiness coefficient, is introduced to quantitatively study the loop effect on network dynamics. A large loopiness coefficient means a high probability of finding loops in the networks. We develop recursive equations for the overlap parameters of neural networks in terms of their loopiness. It was found that a large loopiness increases the correlation among the network states at different times and eventually reduces the performance of neural networks. The theory is applied to several network topological structures, including fully-connected, densely-connected random, densely-connected regular and densely-connected small-world, where encouraging results are obtained.     

Evolutionary game dynamics of combining the Moran and imitation processes

One of the assumptions of previous research in evolutionary game dynamics is that individuals use only one rule to update their strategy. In reality, an individual's strategy update rules may change with the environment, and it is possible for an individual to use two or more rules to update their strategy. We consider the case where an individual updates strategies based on the Moran and imitation processes, and establish mixed stochastic evolutionary game dynamics by combining both processes. Our aim is to study how individuals change strategies based on two update rules and how this affects evolutionary game dynamics. We obtain an analytic expression and properties of the fixation probability and fixation times(the unconditional fixation time or conditional average fixation time) associated with our proposed process. We find unexpected results. The fixation probability within the proposed model is independent of the probabilities that the individual adopts the imitation rule update strategy. This implies that the fixation probability within the proposed model is equal to that from the Moran and imitation processes. The one-third rule holds in the proposed mixed model. However, under weak selection, the fixation times are different from those of the Moran and imitation processes because it is connected with the probability that individuals adopt an imitation update rule. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the relationships between fixation times and the probability that an individual adopts the imitation update rule, as well as between fixation times and selection intensity. From the simulated analysis, we find that the fixation time for a mixed process is greater than that of the Moran process, but is less than that of the imitation process. Moreover, the fixation times for a cooperator in the proposed process increase as the probability of adopting an imitation update increases; however, the relationship becomes more complex than a linear relationship.