Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game Based on Pursuing Higher Average Payoff |
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| Authors: | LI Yu-Jian WANG Bing-Hong YANG Han-Xin LING Xiang CHEN Xiao-Jie JIANG Rui |
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| Affiliation: | [1]Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026 [2]Shanghai Academy of System Science and University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093 [3]Faculty of Science, Zhefiang Normal University, Jinhua 321004 [4]School of Engineering Science, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026 [5]Intelligent Control Laboratory, Center for Systems and Control, Department of Mechanics and Space Technologies College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871 |
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| Abstract: | We investigate the prisoner's dilemma game based on a new rule: players will change their current strategies to opposite strategies with some probability if their neighbours' average payoffs are higher than theirs. Compared with the cases on regular lattices (RL) and Newman-Watts small world network (NW), cooperation can be best enhanced on the scale-free Barabási-Albert network (BA). It is found that cooperators are dispersive on RL network, which is different from previously reported results that cooperators will form large clusters to resist the invasion of defectors. Cooperative behaviours on the BA network are discussed in detail. It is found that large-degree individuals have lower cooperation level and gain higher average payoffs than that of small-degree individuals. In addition, we find that small-degree individuals more frequently change strategies than do large-degree individuals. |
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| Keywords: | 87 23 Kg 02 50 Le 87 23 Ge 89 75 Fb |
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