共查询到18条相似文献,搜索用时 328 毫秒
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研究了联盟是模糊的合作博弈.利用多维线性扩展的方法定义了模糊联盟最小核心解,并推导出三人模糊联盟合作博弈最小核心的计算公式.研究结果发现,多维线性扩展的模糊联盟合作博弈最小核心解是对清晰联盟合作博弈最小核心解的扩展.最后给出三人模糊联盟合作博弈的一个具体事例,证明了此方法的有效性和适用性. 相似文献
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研究了具有联盟结构的企业联盟模糊情况下各局中人的收益分配问题.首先拓展了Owen联盟值在经典意义下满足的5个公理,利用Choquet积分给出了基于联盟结构的模糊合作博弈的Owen联盟值,即模糊Owen联盟值的具体形式,并证明该联盟值满足新定义的5个公理.最后用实例验证了模糊Owen联盟值方法,并对计算结果进行分析。 相似文献
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考虑花卉市场价格的不确定性,用三角模糊数表示花卉供应链联盟的效用函数。为有效解决模糊环境下花卉供应链联盟的合作收益分配策略问题,在模糊合作博弈理论的基本框架下,基于参与合作的各个局中人的超额贡献,结合最小二乘法基本原理和思想,用局中人的超额贡献替代经典Shapley值中局中人的边际贡献,提出基于局中人超额贡献的三角模糊数改进Shapley值的解概念并给出其解析式。采用三角模糊数描述花卉供应链联盟的效用函数及支付值,克服了花卉市场中由于季节、节假日等因素造成的市场价格的不稳定性,为解决花卉供应链联盟的合作收益分配策略问题提供了新思路,本文所做的理论研究是对经典Shapley值在模糊情境下的有效拓展和深入研究。最后,利用花卉供应链联盟的真实算例,验证文章所建立的模型是科学、合理且行之有效的,可以为花卉供应链联盟的合作收益分配策略问题提供理论依据和实践指导。 相似文献
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文章首先基于联盟盈余合意性(Hu,2019)提出了合作博弈解新的公理,即联盟缺额合意性,并证明了除了不超过2个局中人合作博弈的平凡情形之外,联盟缺额合意性与合作博弈解的有效性互斥.其次,通过对联盟缺额进行平均化引入了平均联盟缺额合意性,进一步结合有效性和可加性实现了均分不可分贡献值的公理化刻画.最后,将相关公理化结果拓展到了权重均分不可分贡献值(Hou等,2019). 相似文献
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The least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. Two values for TU games based on the excess vector 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Luis M. Ruiz Federico Valenciano Jose M. Zarzuelo 《International Journal of Game Theory》1996,25(1):113-134
The nucleolus and the prenucleolus are solution concepts for TU games based on the excess vector that can be associated to any payoff vector. Here we explore some solution concepts resulting from a payoff vector selection based also on the excess vector but by means of an assessment of their relative fairness different from that given by the lexicographical order. We take the departure consisting of choosing the payoff vector which minimizes the variance of the resulting excesses of the coalitions. This procedure yields two interesting solution concepts, both a prenucleolus-like and a nucleolus-like notion, depending on which set is chosen to set up the minimizing problem: the set of efficient payoff vectors or the set of inputations. These solution concepts, which, paralleling the prenucleolus and the nucleolus, we call least square prenucleolus and least square nucleolus, are easy to calculate and exhibit nice properties. Different axiomatic characterizations of the former are established, some of them by means of consistency for a reasonable reduced game concept. 相似文献
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Peter Sudhölter 《International Journal of Game Theory》1997,26(2):147-182
A new solution concept for cooperative transferable utility games is introduced, which is strongly related to the nucleolus and therefore called modified nucleolus. It takes into account both the “power”, i.e. the worth, and the “blocking power” of a coalition, i.e. the amount which the coalition cannot be prevented from by the complement coalition. It can be shown that the modified nucleolus is reasonable, individually rational for weakly superadditive games, coincides with the prenucleolus for constant-sum games, and is contained in the core for convex games. Finally this paper proposes two axiomatizations of this solution concept on the set of games on an infinite universe of players which are similar to Sobolev's characterization of the prenucleolus. 相似文献
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We introduce an efficient and dynamic resource allocation mechanism within the framework of a cooperative game with fuzzy coalitions (cooperative fuzzy game). A fuzzy coalition in a resource allocation problem can be so defined that membership grades of the players in it are proportional to the fractions of their total resources. We call any distribution of the resources possessed by the players, among a prescribed number of coalitions, a fuzzy coalition structure and every membership grade (equivalently fraction of the total resources), a resource investment. It is shown that this resource investment is influenced by the satisfaction of the players in regard to better performance under a cooperative setup. Our model is based on the real life situations, where possibly one or more players compromise on their resource investments in order to help forming coalitions. 相似文献
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合作博弈是处理局中人之间协同行为的数学理论。有诸如核心、稳定集、沙普利值、准核仁和核仁等不同的解概念。在很多情形,除了借助专家经验和主观直觉,没有恰当的方式来确定支付函数,由此产生了具有模糊支付的合作博弈模型。准核仁是一种重要的解概念,在模糊支付合作博弈中如何恰当定义准核仁是个重要的问题。本文在可信性理论的框架下研究了这个问题,定义了两类可信性准核仁概念并证明了它们的存在性和唯一性,同时研究了可信性核心、可信性核仁与它们之间的关系。 相似文献
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首先,将经典合作博弈进行扩展,提出了一类模糊联盟合作博弈的通用形式,涵盖常见三种模糊联盟合作博弈,即多线性扩展博弈、比例模糊博弈与Choquet积分模糊博弈.比例模糊博弈、Choquet积分模糊博弈的Shapley值均可以作为一种特定形式下模糊联盟合作博弈的收益分配策略,但是对于多线性扩展博弈的Shapley值一直关注较少,因此利用经典Shapley值构造出多线性扩展博弈的Shapley值,以此作为一种收益分配策略.最后,通过实例分析了常见三类模糊联盟合作博弈的形式及其对应的分配策略,分析收益最大的模糊联盟合作对策形式及最优分配策略,为不确定情形下的合作问题提供了一定的收益分配依据. 相似文献
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One of the important properties characterizing cooperative game solutions is consistency. This notion establishes connections between the solution vectors of a cooperative game and those of its reduced game. The last one is obtained from the initial game by removing one or more players and by giving them the payoffs according to a specific principle (e.g. a proposed payoff vector). Consistency of a solution means that the restriction of a solution payoff vector of the initial game to any coalition belongs to the solution set of the corresponding reduced game. There are several definitions of the reduced games (cf., e.g., the survey of T. Driessen [2]) based on some intuitively acceptable characteristics. In the paper some natural properties of reduced games are formulated, and general forms of the reduced games possessing some of them are given. The efficient, anonymous, covariant TU cooperative game solutions satisfying the consistency property with respect to any reduced game are described.The research was supported by the NWO grant 047-008-010 which is gratefully acknowledgedReceived: October 2001 相似文献
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A solution on a class of TU games that satisfies the axioms of the pre-nucleolus or -kernel except the equal treatment property and is single valued for two-person games, is a nonsymmetric pre-nucleolus (NSPN) or -kernel (NSPK). We investigate the NSPKs and NSPNs and their relations to the positive prekernel and to the positive core. It turns out that any NSPK is a subsolution of the positive prekernel. Moreover, we show that an arbitrary NSPK, when applied to a TU game, intersects the set of preimputations whose dissatisfactions coincide with the dissatisfactions of an arbitrary element of any other NSPK applied to this game. This result also provides a new proof of sufficiency of the characterizing conditions for NSPKs introduced by Orshan (Non-symmetric prekernels, discussion paper 60. Center for Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1994). Any NSPN belongs to ??its?? NSPK. Several classes of NSPNs are presented, all of them being subsolutions of the positive core. We show that any NSPN is a subsolution of the positive core provided that it satisfies the equal treatment property on an infinite subset of the universe of potential players. Moreover, we prove that, for any game whose prenucleolus is in its anticore, any NSPN coincides with the prenucleolus. 相似文献
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《Operations Research Letters》2019,47(6):478-482
The existence of a Nash-stable coalition structure in cooperative games with the Aumann–Dreze value is investigated. Using the framework of potential functions, it is proved that such a coalition structure exists in any cooperative game. In addition, a similar result is established for some linear values of the game, in particular, the Banzhaf value. For a cooperative game with vector payments, a type of stability based on maximizing the guaranteed payoffs of all players is proposed. 相似文献