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研究具有模糊参与度和模糊收益的模糊合作博弈各局中人的Owen联盟值问题。首先,重新定义了模糊Owen联盟值的具体形式,并证明其满足新定义的5条公理。利用模糊结构元理论和限定运算理论去计算求解,最后用一个实例验证了模糊Owen联盟值方法,并对结果进行分析。 相似文献
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在具有联盟结构的合作对策中,针对局中人以某种程度参与到合作中的情况,研究了模糊联盟结构的合作对策的收益分配问题。首先,定义了具有模糊联盟结构的合作对策及相关概念。其次,定义了Choquet积分形式的模糊联盟核心,提出了该核心与联盟核心之间的关系,对于强凸联盟对策,证明Choquet积分形式的模糊Owen值属于其所对应的模糊联盟核心。最后通过算例,对该分配模型的可行性进行分析。 相似文献
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本文给出了基于个人超出值的无限模糊联盟合作博弈最小二乘预核仁的求解模型,得到该模型的显式解析解,并研究该解的若干重要性质。证明了:本文给出的无限模糊联盟合作博弈的最小二乘预核仁与基于个人超出值的相等解(The equalizer solution),基于个人超出值的字典序解三者相等。进一步证明了:基于Owen线性多维扩展的无限模糊联盟合作博弈的最小二乘预核仁与基于个人超出值的经典合作博弈最小二乘预核仁相等。最后,通过数值实例说明本文提出的无限模糊联盟合作博弈求解模型的实用性与有效性。 相似文献
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王利明 《数学的实践与认识》2019,(11)
考虑局中人结成优先联盟参与合作,并且优先联盟之间具有权限结构限制的合作对策,利用Owen值的两阶段分配思路并考虑到优先联盟之间权限结构对合作的限制,定义这类合作对策一个解,证明了解的公理化结论,并验证了公理化条件的独立性.最后给出了算例分析,说明解在合作收益分配问题的应用. 相似文献
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运用模糊延拓等方法将核心理论扩展到模糊联盟结构合作博弈中,提供一种兼顾局中人的模糊参与度与联盟偏好的稳定分配方法,并且给出模糊联盟结构合作博弈的模糊Owen值稳定的充分条件.基于供应链协同创新中的不确定因素较多,将此跨供应链协作问题抽象为模糊联盟结构合作博弈模型,计算模糊信息下合作利益分配策略,在两个层次上分配额外收益:产业集群,供应链.模糊联盟结构合作博弈理论以及求解方法的研究,理论上拓展了经典合作博弈的应用范围,实证上又为供应链协同创新问题提供了一定分析思路,降低了由于收益分配不均导致的跨区域供应链破裂的概率. 相似文献
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Banzhaf值是经典可转移效用合作对策中一个著名的分配规则,可以用来评估参与者在对策中的不同作用。本文将Banzhaf值推广到具有联盟结构和图结构的TU-对策中,首先提出并定义了具有联盟结构和图结构的Banzhaf值(简称PL-Banzhaf值),证明了PL-Banzhaf值满足公平性、平衡贡献性和分割分支总贡献性,并给出了该值的两种公理性刻画。其次,讨论了PL-Banzhaf值在跨国天然气管道案例中的应用,并和其他分配规则进行了比较分析。 相似文献
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In the framework of games with coalition structure, we introduce probabilistic Owen value which is an extension of the Owen value and probabilistic Shapley value by considering the situation that not all priori unions are able to cooperate with others. Then we use five axioms of probabilistic efficiency, symmetric within coalitions, symmetric across coalitions applying to unanimity games, strong monotone property and linearity to axiomatize the value. 相似文献
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Anna B. Khmelnitskaya Elena B. Yanovskaya 《Mathematical Methods of Operations Research》2007,66(2):255-261
We show that the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure can be characterized without the additivity axiom similarly
as it was done by Young for the Shapley value for general TU games. Our axiomatization via four axioms of efficiency, marginality,
symmetry across coalitions, and symmetry within coalitions is obtained from the original Owen’s one by the replacement of
additivity and null-player via marginality. We show that the alike axiomatization for the generalization of the Owen value
suggested by Winter for games with level structure is valid as well.
The research was supported by NWO (The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research) grant NL-RF 047.017.017. 相似文献
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In this paper, the fuzzy core of games with fuzzy coalition is proposed, which can be regarded as the generalization of crisp core. The fuzzy core is based on the assumption that the total worth of a fuzzy coalition will be allocated to the players whose participation rate is larger than zero. The nonempty condition of the fuzzy core is given based on the fuzzy convexity. Three kinds of special fuzzy cores in games with fuzzy coalition are studied, and the explicit fuzzy core represented by the crisp core is also given. Because the fuzzy Shapley value had been proposed as a kind of solution for the fuzzy games, the relationship between fuzzy core and the fuzzy Shapley function is also shown. Surprisingly, the relationship between fuzzy core and the fuzzy Shapley value does coincide, as in the classical case. 相似文献
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Gérard Hamiache 《International Journal of Game Theory》2001,29(4):517-532
This paper presents two new axiomatizations of the Owen value for games with coalition structures. Two associated games are
defined and a consistency axiom is required. The construction of the associated games presupposes that coalitions behave in
an aggressive manner towards players who are not members of the same unions and in a friendly manner towards players that
do belong to their unions. The consistency axiom necessitates the definition of only one associated game which is not a reduced
game.
Received: February 1999/Revised version: January 2000 相似文献
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讨论一类具有限制联盟结构的合作对策,其中局中人通过优先联盟整体参与大联盟的合作,同时优先联盟内部有合取权限结构限制,利用两阶段Shapley值的分配思想并考虑到权限结构对优先联盟内合作的限制,给出了此类合作对策的解。 该解可看做具有联盟结构的合作对策的两阶段Shapley值的推广。 证明了该解满足的公理化条件,并验证了这些条件的独立性。 相似文献
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首先,将经典合作博弈进行扩展,提出了一类模糊联盟合作博弈的通用形式,涵盖常见三种模糊联盟合作博弈,即多线性扩展博弈、比例模糊博弈与Choquet积分模糊博弈.比例模糊博弈、Choquet积分模糊博弈的Shapley值均可以作为一种特定形式下模糊联盟合作博弈的收益分配策略,但是对于多线性扩展博弈的Shapley值一直关注较少,因此利用经典Shapley值构造出多线性扩展博弈的Shapley值,以此作为一种收益分配策略.最后,通过实例分析了常见三类模糊联盟合作博弈的形式及其对应的分配策略,分析收益最大的模糊联盟合作对策形式及最优分配策略,为不确定情形下的合作问题提供了一定的收益分配依据. 相似文献
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We introduce and compare several coalition values for multichoice games. Albizuri defined coalition structures and an extension of the Owen coalition value for multichoice games using the average marginal contribution of a player over a set of orderings of the player’s representatives. Following an approach used for cooperative games, we introduce a set of nested or two-step coalition values on multichoice games which measure the value of each coalition and then divide this among the players in the coalition using either a Shapley or Banzhaf value at each step. We show that when a Shapley value is used in both steps, the resulting coalition value coincides with that of Albizuri. We axiomatize the three new coalition values and show that each set of axioms, including that of Albizuri, is independent. Further we show how the multilinear extension can be used to compute the coalition values. We conclude with a brief discussion about the applicability of the different values. 相似文献