需求波动及预测信息量对企业定价的影响研究

为了让双寡头企业在市场需求及预测信息不确定情况下更好地作出科学定价决策,建立了两阶段双寡头企业需求-价格模型,通过动态规划方法以及博弈均衡解的运算,得到了在双寡头企业对耐用品市场需求总量的预测结果与市场需求期望值不对称状况下,双寡头企业两阶段最优定价的差异性变化等结论.     

基于吸收能力的企业合作研发的动态模型

竞争还是合作,是企业研发投资时所面临的选择,本文应用最优控制论建立了一个考虑吸收能力的企业合作研发的动态模型,分析了双寡头垄断企业在竞争和合作两种情况下的均衡研发投资,并与D＇aspremont ＆ J＇aquemin的静态模型的结果进行了比较.     

基于推测弹性的双寡头研发AJ模型最优成本缩减决策

文章通过将推测弹性引入AJ模型,首先考察一致性推测弹性对双寡头企业研发策略的影响,从而得出有推测的双寡头市场结构下的研发均衡结果,然后将零一致性推测弹性的均衡成本缩减量与AJ模型的结果进行对比,最后给出一致性推测弹性和溢出系数之间的关系对研发绩效的影响效果.     

有限理性双寡头博弈模型的复杂性分析

以Bowley博弈模型为核心,将寡头的调整速度作为企业的竞争策略,并对该模型Nash均衡点的稳定域进行分析;通过数值仿真把双寡头的策略区域分为均衡区、周期区和混沌区。研究发现双寡头博弈市场中,寡头为了获得更大的利润而不断改变自身产量策略,这是市场出现周期波动、甚至陷入混沌的根本内因.     

双寡头动态R&D竞合模型的构建与分析

放松了经典Cournot模型中市场容量不变的假设,构建了双寡头企业R&D动态竞争的Cournot模型,研究了双寡头在R&D投入和产量决策两个阶段完全竞争与完全合作情形下的均衡结果.结果表明增加新增市场容量可以提高企业的最佳R&D投入水平和均衡利润,并且可以维持更长久的博弈周期.结果还表明动态R&D竞争模型是对传统模型的进一步拓展,能适用于更广泛、更实际的竞争情形.     

在消费者偏好不确定下双寡头定位定价博弈

本文通过建立在企业对消费者偏好信息不确定情形下,双寡头企业动态定位、定价博弈模型,研究企业的定位策略、定价策略以及产品差异化问题。证明了该动态博弈存在唯一的子博弈精炼均衡。均衡结果表明,偏好不确定性是一种差异化力量,与消费者偏好信息确定情形相比,企业的不确定性能够提高均衡价格、增加均衡利润。最后,分析了偏好不确定性对社会最优定位和社会最优差异化的影响。     

产品多方面差异下双寡头定位定价模型

建立在同类产品存在多方面差异条件下双寡头企业两阶段动态定位定价博弈模型,在市场中存在不同类型消费者时,求出了使企业利润最大化的子博弈精炼纳什均衡,并深入分析了消费者对两家企业平均偏好效用差(ΔU)和企业的运输成本率(t)对企业定位定价策略的影响.     

基于内生创新溢出的企业低成本产品定位与定价博弈分析

通过引入一类企业的有效创新贡献水平函数,应用三阶段博弈模型分析了创新溢出内生时双寡头企业的产品定位和定价决策问题.研究发现,双寡头企业产品的均衡定位是功能非替代率的增函数;企业间的产品差异随功能非替代率的增大而增加,内生溢出却随之增大而减小;如果从两企业均衡定位处稍微减小它们之间的差异程度,则产业利润将减少,而社会福利是否减小与单位产品的功能非替代率的取值有关.     

考虑广告投放的不对称竞争企业定价策略研究

针对非对称双寡头竞争企业中广告投放以及定价策略等问题,本文首先依据市场细分构建了统一定价和差异化定价模型;其次,以定价模型为基础,针对转化者市场是否存在偏好,构建了不同情境下的效益模型,并利用博弈论确定不同阶段的均衡结果,通过对均衡结果的分析,得出广告成本以及竞争市场的差异化程度对均衡结果的影响,最后利用数值分析验证结果的有效性。     

存在空箱调运的非对称运输市场定价策略研究

考虑空箱调运成本,本文对垄断和双寡头市场分别研究运输企业在两条相向路径上的定价问题。对于垄断市场,建立了运输企业最优定价策略,并刻画出无空箱调运的潜在需求不平衡区间。对于双寡头市场,考虑同一路径上不同企业潜在运输需求不等的现实情境,求解了非对称企业的伯川德纳什均衡,给出最优定价策略。研究发现,无空箱调运并不意味着较高利润,运输企业没有必要刻意消除空箱调运现象。另外,增加单位载货运输成本和竞争强度会降低企业利润,而提升单位空箱重置成本、价格敏感度和市场不对称程度都会增大企业利润。     

A nonlinear Cournot duopoly with advertising

This paper aims at studying local and global dynamics in a nonlinear duopoly with quantity-setting firms and non-cooperative advertising investments that affect the degree of (horizontally) differentiated products. It concentrates on persuasive advertising in a model where each firm has limited information and uses a behavioural rule to set the quantity for the subsequent period. By using some mathematical techniques and numerical simulations, our results show the existence of weak (à la Milnor) attractors, multistability and chaotic dynamics. In the long term, firms may continuously shift from states in which they invest in advertising to states in which advertising investment is absent.     

Co-op advertising models in manufacturer–retailer supply chains: A game theory approach

In the literature of cooperative (co-op) advertising, the focus of research is on a relationship in which a manufacturer is the leader and retailers are followers. This relationship implies the dominance of the manufacturer over retailers. Recent market structure reviews have shown a shift of retailing power from manufacturers to retailers. Retailers have equal or even greater power than a manufacturer when it comes to retailing. Based on this new market phenomenon, we intend to explore the role of vertical co-op advertising efficiency with respect to transactions between a manufacturer and a retailer through brand name investments, local advertising expenditures, and sharing rules of advertising expenses. Three co-op advertising models are discussed which are based on two noncooperative games and one cooperative game. In a leader–follower noncooperative game, the manufacturer is assumed to be a leader who first specifies the brand name investment and the co-op subsidization policy. The retailer, as a follower, then decides on the local advertising level. In a noncooperative simultaneous move game, the manufacturer and the retailer are assumed to act simultaneously and independently. In a cooperative game, the system profit is maximized for every Pareto efficient co-op advertising scheme, but not for any other schemes. All Pareto efficient co-op advertising schemes are associated with a single local advertising level and a single brand name investment level, but with variable sharing policies of advertising expenses. The best Pareto efficient advertising scheme is obtained taking members' risk attitudes into account. Utilizing the Nash bargaining model, we discuss two situations that (a) both members are risk averse, and (b) both members are risk neutral. Our results are consistent with the bargaining literature.     

An empirical study on the Lanchester model of combat for competitive advertising decisions

This paper presents an empirical study on the Lanchester model of combat for competitive advertising decisions. Three issues are evaluated: (i) the specification of the market share response model; (ii) the effect of inflation on the estimation of the response model; and (iii) the performance of competitive strategies. It is shown that (a) the square root function that is used in previous studies is often inappropriate to characterize the market share response model; (b) market share variations are more responsive to current advertising expenditures; (c) closed-loop Nash equilibrium strategies are better competitive advertising strategies for firms to maximize profits than open-loop Nash equilibrium strategies; and (d), finally, general perfect equilibria Nash equilibrium strategies developed by Case are usually not good competitive advertising strategies for firms to maximize profits.     

Cooperative advertising models in supply chain management: A review

This paper reviews articles on cooperative advertising, a topic which has gained substantial interest in the recent years. Thereby, we first briefly distinguish five different definitions of cooperative advertising which can be found in operations research literature. After that, we concentrate on vertical cooperative advertising, which is the most common object of investigation and is understood as a financial agreement where a manufacturer offers to pay a certain share of his retailer’s advertising expenditures. In total, we identified 58 scientific papers considering mathematical modeling of vertical cooperative advertising. These articles are then analyzed with regard to their general model setting (e.g., the underlying supply chain structure and design of the cooperative advertising program). After that, we explain the different demand and cost functions that are employed, whereupon we distinguish between static and dynamic models. The last dimension of our review is dedicated to the game-theoretic concepts which are mostly used to reflect different forms of distribution of power within the channel.     

Optimal advertising strategies with age-structured goodwill

The problem of a firm willing to optimally promote and sell a single product on the market is here undertaken. The awareness of such product is modeled by means of a Nerlove–Arrow goodwill as a state variable, differentiated jointly by means of time and of age of the segments in which the consumers are clustered. The problem falls into the class of infinite horizon optimal control problems of PDEs with age structure that have been studied in various papers either in cases when explicit solutions can be found or using Maximum Principle techniques. Here, assuming an infinite time horizon, we use some dynamic programming techniques in infinite dimension to characterize both the optimal advertising effort and the optimal goodwill path in the long run. An interesting feature of the optimal advertising effort is an anticipation effect with respect to the segments considered in the target market, due to time evolution of the segmentation. We analyze this effect in two different scenarios: in the first, the decision-maker can choose the advertising flow directed to different age segments at different times, while in the second she/he can only decide the activation level of an advertising medium with a given age-spectrum.     

Modelling Cooperative Advertising Decisions in Franchising

Advertising fee decisions in franchise systems are a frequent source of conflict between franchisors and franchisees. Such disagreements persist because the win-win potential of vertical cooperative advertising is not well appreciated. Our paper introduces a formal normative approach for analyzing, understanding and subsequently making these vertical cooperative advertising decisions within a franchising context in a manner that results in optimal system-wide returns. The model demonstrates that cooperative determination of franchisor's and franchisee's advertising contributions may yield superior payoffs for both exchange partners than the total payoff if the franchisor and franchisee seek to optimize their individual objective functions. Three types of models are developed and evaluated (i.e. deterministic, stochastic and under conditions of differing perceptions of the sales response functions to advertising). Conclusions hold under all three model variants. Industry implications are also presented.     

Coordinating advertising and pricing in a manufacturer–retailer channel

Cooperative advertising is a practice that a manufacturer pays retailers a portion of the local advertising cost in order to induce sales. Cooperative advertising plays a significant role in marketing programs of channel members. Nevertheless, most studies to date on cooperative advertising have assumed that the market demand is only influenced by advertising expenditures but not by retail price. This paper addresses channel coordination by seeking optimal cooperative advertising strategies and equilibrium pricing in a two-member distribution channel. We establish and compare two models: a non-cooperative, leader–follower game and a cooperative game. We develop propositions and insights from the comparison of these models. The cooperative model achieves better coordination by generating higher channel-wide profits than the non-cooperative model with these features: (a) the retailer price is lower to consumers; and (b) the advertising efforts are higher for all channel members. We identify the feasible solutions to a bargaining problem where the channel members can determine how to divide the extra profits.     

New product advertising in dynamic oligopolies

The success of the introduction of a new product in a market is very sensitive to the marketing decision variables adopted by the firm. In the present paper we are concerned with the question of new product advertising in a heterogeneous oligopoly market consisting of N firms. A dynamic game is formulated to model strategic as well as sales interactions in such a market. Optimal advertising strategies are identified as open-loop Nash solutions.The comments of two anonymous referees are appreciated. The first author wishes to acknowledge support from NSERC (Grant No. OGP0037342).     

制造商广告激励策略对灰色市场的影响研究

在灰色市场的背景下,构建了由一个制造商和两个独立市场的零售商构成的两阶段供应链模型。依据产品估值将市场分为高端和低端市场,基于价格差异,低端市场的零售商为了实现投机套利会在高端市场中销售原本属于低端市场的产品。研究了灰色市场与制造商广告激励策略对供应链的影响问题。研究表明:若低端市场消费者对产品评价较低,灰色市场可增加制造商的利润;而低端市场消费者对产品估值较高时,灰色市场会减少制造商利润。进一步引入了制造商广告激励策略,得出广告激励不仅可以抑制灰色市场,而且可以在不降低高端市场零售商利润的情况下,让制造商和低端市场零售商的收益增加。     

广告媒介下互补产品市场扩散扰动模型研究

创新产品通过广告媒介来传递信息以提高市场需求,对产品的扩散起着一定的作用.将创新产品的互补性分为三类互补类型,即两种产品均有独立的市场,两个产品均无独立市场,只有一个产品有独立市场.分别建立广告媒介下具有互补关系的创新产品扩散动态模型,分析具有不同竞争力的创新产品具有互补关系时市场的稳定状态,解释了产品互补型的企业纵向兼并及合用的原因,为模拟和预测动态市场结构演变及管理决策提供了理论依据.