产品多方面差异下双寡头定位定价模型

建立在同类产品存在多方面差异条件下双寡头企业两阶段动态定位定价博弈模型,在市场中存在不同类型消费者时,求出了使企业利润最大化的子博弈精炼纳什均衡,并深入分析了消费者对两家企业平均偏好效用差(ΔU)和企业的运输成本率(t)对企业定位定价策略的影响.     

消费者偏好驱动的制销供应链利润分配策略

从企业社会责任对消费者偏好的影响入手,运用博弈论的基本思想,对制销供应链中,制造商与分销商一次性博弈的定价和利润分配策略进行了研究,并在此基础上对不同情况下制销双方重复性博弈的均衡结果进行了讨论.结果表明:在两类制销供应链中,联盟定价都是制销双方一次性博弈的唯一纳什均衡结果,且在制销双方商定的利润分配因子的取值范围内双方联盟后所得的利润高于联盟之前;在两类制销供应链中,制造商与分销商坚持联盟定价对双方的长期利润都是最优的.     

企业相互持股下的Hotelling拓展模型及其均衡分析

制定合理的产品定位与定价策略在企业营销管理中具有重要意义。本文基于经典 Hotelling模型,在线性市场上二次运输成本条件下,讨论了企业在相互持股情形下如何进行产品的定位以及产品的定价,建立了企业间先同时选址,再同时定价的Hotelling拓展模型,并对模型进行了博弈均衡与参数分析。理论分析结果表明:随着企业间相互持股比例的增大,企业会生产更具差异化的产品以获得更大的利润,且企业追求产品差异化的速度是越来越快的;随着企业间相互持股比例的增大,产品价格会逐渐上升,并且增长幅度越来越快。本文的研究结论将进一步丰富Hotelling模型的现有理论成果,可为企业间确定持股比例、进行合理有效的产品定位与定价提供决策参考。     

考虑广告投放的不对称竞争企业定价策略研究

针对非对称双寡头竞争企业中广告投放以及定价策略等问题,本文首先依据市场细分构建了统一定价和差异化定价模型;其次,以定价模型为基础,针对转化者市场是否存在偏好,构建了不同情境下的效益模型,并利用博弈论确定不同阶段的均衡结果,通过对均衡结果的分析,得出广告成本以及竞争市场的差异化程度对均衡结果的影响,最后利用数值分析验证结果的有效性。     

考虑专利保护和渠道偏好的再制造双渠道闭环供应链决策与协调

本文在电子商务环境下考虑消费者对零售渠道和直销渠道具有不同的渠道偏好,研究了专利许可零售商实施再制造的双渠道闭环供应链定价决策和协调问题。运用博弈论方法求得了集中决策和分散决策情形下的最优定价策略,并分析了消费者渠道偏好系数对节点企业最优定价策略及利润的影响。针对分散决策存在效率损失的问题,以集中决策的最优解为基准,通过联合运用一个由批发价格、直销价格和专利许可费构成的定价机制和一个利润分享机制,实现了双渠道闭环供应链的完美协调。     

消费者非均匀偏好条件下高校项目开发策略

为了探究教育项目消费者随机需求条件下的不同层次高校的竞优策略, 运用Stackelberg博弈方法, 构建了消费者偏好服从非均匀分布的不同层次高校开发同类教育项目的定位设计模型, 分析了消费者偏好行为对教育项目收益的影响规律以及双方的竞优策略。结果显示, H型高校(声誉较高)不受消费者偏好等市场因素影响, 始终选择最大差异化策略。L型高校(声誉较低)在消费者无差异偏好偏向自己一方时也不受市场因素影响采取最大差异化策略; 而在消费者无差异偏好偏向它方时, 若市场需求概率小于0.5则选择最大差异化策略, 否则其决策将受到自身初始位值、市场概率等因素的综合影响, 并适时选择最大差异化、有限差异化或有限趋同化策略。     

基于差异化战略的跨境电商竞争策略研究

随着国际贸易和信息技术的不断推进,跨境电子商务在全球范围内呈爆发式地增长。因为跨境电商产品经常需要进行长距离的运输,适合其销售的种类是有限的,因此如何制定差异化战略从而在日益激烈的竞争中胜出,是许多跨境电商企业急需解决的问题。本文考虑一个包含海外供应商、平台型电商和自营型电商的双渠道跨境供应链,运用博弈模型分析了消费者偏好对商家制定差异化竞争策略的影响,并得到集中决策和分散决策下的最优产品定价和最优服务水平。分析得出,商家间的服务差异化程度与跨境电商总利润以及消费者的渠道偏好的关系受综合因素影响,单纯提高服务差异化程度并不一定能提高自身的竞争力和跨境供应链的效益;实施集中策略且服务差异度高的跨境供应链可以获得更多的利润。     

制造商公平偏好下双渠道闭环供应链定价与协调

将制造商公平偏好行为特征引入双渠道闭环供应链,针对非合作独立决策、完全合作联合决策两种不同情形分别建立相应的定价决策模型.运用博弈理论求得两种不同情形下的最优定价策略,并分析了公平偏好系数对供应链各成员最优定价策略及利润的影响.研究发现:制造商公平偏好行为特征能增强其讨价还价能力,但不利于提升供应链经济效益和社会绿色环保效益;非合作独立决策下的系统利润低于完全合作联合决策下的系统利润.为此,通过联合运用一个由批发价格、直销价格和回收转移价格组成的定价机制和一个两部定价补充协议对双渠道闭环供应链进行协调,可以实现双方的Pareto改进.     

博弈参与人的偏好对最优反应的影响分析

在现实社会中，每个人都有自己的偏好，因此在博弈过程中，参与人的不同偏好在其选择策略时起着不同的作用。本文运用多目标决策方法研究了总需求不确定情况下具有风险偏好的企业决策者关于一种产品价格博弈模型和均衡，并进一步讨论了参与人具有相同偏好和不同偏好情况下风险厌恶程度、价格对需求影响程度等参数对参与人最优反应的影响。     

考虑投资人过度自信偏好的占线股票投资策略研究

当股票价格及收益的统计信息不足或无法构建精确概率分布时,股票占线投资问题获得广泛关注,即投资人能够运用在线算法和竞争分析设计出更好的占线投资策略以应对股价的不确定性。本文将投资人过度自信偏好这种认知偏差,引入到股票占线投资问题中,构建了离线对手与股票占线投资人的博弈模型,分别给出一般情形和存在动量效应情形下的最优混合策略和混合策略纳什均衡。结果发现,两种情形下的最优混合策略不仅克服了传统股票投资策略对股价或股票收益概率分布假设的过度依赖,并且更好地抽象了股票占线投资人过度自信、追涨杀跌等特征,对现有行为金融与金融占线交易问题的研究提供了有益补充。     

Robust non-zero-sum stochastic differential reinsurance game

This paper considers the non-zero-sum stochastic differential game problem between two ambiguity-averse insurers (AAIs) who encounter model uncertainty and seek the optimal reinsurance decision under relative performance concerns. Each AAI manages her own risks by purchasing reinsurance with the objective of maximizing the expected utility of her relative terminal surplus with respect to that of her counterparty. The two AAIs’ decisions influence each other through the insurers’ relative performance concerns and the correlation between their surplus processes. We establish a general framework of Nash equilibrium for the associated non-zero-sum game with model uncertainty. For the representative case of exponential utilities, we solve the equilibrium strategies explicitly. Numerical studies are conducted to draw economic interpretations.     

A note on the dynamics of incentive contracts

Laffont and Tirole (Econometrica 56:1153–1175) show that when uncertainty about an agent’s ability is small, the equilibrium must involve a large amount of pooling, but, whether the continuation equilibrium induced by an optimal first-period menu of contracts is partitional or not, remains unclear. They construct a non-partitional continuation equilibrium for a given first-period menu of contracts and conjecture that this continuation equilibrium need not be suboptimal for the whole game under small uncertainty. We show that, irrespective of the amount of uncertainty, this non-partitional continuation equilibrium generates a strictly smaller payoff for the principal than a different menu of contracts with a partitional continuation equilibrium. In this sense, Laffont and Tirole’s menu of contracts, giving rise to a non-partitional continuation equilibrium, is not optimal.     

Robust game theory

We present a distribution-free model of incomplete-information games, both with and without private information, in which the players use a robust optimization approach to contend with payoff uncertainty. Our ``robust game' model relaxes the assumptions of Harsanyi's Bayesian game model, and provides an alternative distribution-free equilibrium concept, which we call ``robust-optimization equilibrium,' to that of the ex post equilibrium. We prove that the robust-optimization equilibria of an incomplete-information game subsume the ex post equilibria of the game and are, unlike the latter, guaranteed to exist when the game is finite and has bounded payoff uncertainty set. For arbitrary robust finite games with bounded polyhedral payoff uncertainty sets, we show that we can compute a robust-optimization equilibrium by methods analogous to those for identifying a Nash equilibrium of a finite game with complete information. In addition, we present computational results. The research of the author was partially supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship and by the Singapore-MIT Alliance. The research of the author was partially supported by the Singapore-MIT Alliance.     

Necessary and Sufficient Optimality Conditions for Regular–Singular Stochastic Differential Games with Asymmetric Information

We consider a class of regular–singular stochastic differential games arising in the optimal investment and dividend problem of an insurer under model uncertainty. The information available to the two players is asymmetric partial information and the control variable of each player consists of two components: regular control and singular control. We establish the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for the saddle point of the zero-sum game. Then, as an application, these conditions are applied to an optimal investment and dividend problem of an insurer under model uncertainty. Furthermore, we generalize our results to the nonzero-sum regular–singular game with asymmetric information, and then the Nash equilibrium point is characterized.     

Distributionally robust chance-constrained games: existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium

We consider an n-player finite strategic game. The payoff vector of each player is a random vector whose distribution is not completely known. We assume that the distribution of a random payoff vector of each player belongs to a distributional uncertainty set. We define a distributionally robust chance-constrained game using worst-case chance constraint. We consider two types of distributional uncertainty sets. We show the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of a distributionally robust chance-constrained game corresponding to both types of distributional uncertainty sets. For each case, we show a one-to-one correspondence between a Nash equilibrium of a game and a global maximum of a certain mathematical program.     

Launching new products through exclusive sales channels

When launching a new product, a manufacturer usually sells it through competing retailers under non-exclusive arrangements. Recently, many new products (cellphones, electronics, toys, etc.) are sold through a single sales channel via an exclusive arrangement. In this paper we present two separate models that examine these two arrangements. Each model is based on a Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer acts as the leader by setting the wholesale price and the retailers act as the followers by choosing their retail prices. For each model, we solve the Stackelberg game by determining the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price and each retailer’s optimal retail price in equilibrium. Then we examine the conditions under which the manufacturer should sell the new product through an exclusive retailer. In addition, we examine the impact of postponing the wholesale price decision and the impact of demand uncertainty on the manufacturer’s optimal profit under both arrangements.     

不确定性下的一主多从博弈及其ε-平衡稳定性分析

本文对主从博弈以及不确定性等问题进行研究,建立了不确定性下的一主多从博弈模型,并利用极大值定理证明了该模型均衡点的存在性。对于不确定性下的一主多从博弈的均衡点问题建立了有限理性模型,进而得到其均衡点的稳定性,即结构稳定以及对ε-平衡是鲁棒的。     

Singular mean-field control games

This article studies singular mean field control problems and singular mean field two-players stochastic differential games. Both sufficient and necessary conditions for the optimal controls and for the Nash equilibrium are obtained. Under some assumptions the optimality conditions for singular mean-field control are reduced to a reflected Skorohod problem, whose solution is proved to exist uniquely. Motivations are given as optimal harvesting of stochastic mean-field systems, optimal irreversible investments under uncertainty and mean-field singular investment games. In particular, a simple singular mean-field investment game is studied, where the Nash equilibrium exists but is not unique.     

On discounted stochastic games with incomplete information on payoffs and a security application

This paper presents a robust optimization model for n$n$-person finite state/action stochastic games with incomplete information on payoffs. For polytopic uncertainty sets, we propose an explicit mathematical programming formulation for an equilibrium calculation. It turns out that a global optimal of this mathematical program yields an equilibrium point and epsilon-equilibria can be calculated based on this result. We briefly describe an incomplete information version of a security application that can benefit from robust game theory.     

竞争条件下公司最优投资策略纳什均衡分析

大多数实物期权文献都只是研究一个公司在没有竞争条件下的最优决策,然而实际上竞争者的行为经常影响到公司的投资机会.通过建立投资概率是临界值的函数模型,根据期权博弈理论研究了在不确定条件和不同信息结构下,一个或多个公司的最优投资策略纳什均衡解,并用MATLAB语言对案例进行了仿真分析,画图说明了参数变化对投资策略的影响.