基于有限关注的P2P借贷市场监管模式:以百度为例

P2P借贷相对于传统金融中介具有向下整合闲散资金并降低交易成本的优势,在"互联网+"和"大众创业万众创新"的政策背景下能够有效倒逼传统金融中介改革,为创新企业提供资金.但目前行业仍存在严重的监管缺失问题,而银监会等政府部门监管缺乏法律授权,监管行为缺乏积极性.因此,提出了以《互联网信息搜索服务管理规定》为契机,通过监管百度对P2P的推广业务进而规范行业发展的思路,并论证了这种方法的有效性.百度搜索量对P2P用户投资行为的相关性分析表明,监管百度推广业务能有效阻碍问题平台获得用户,进而减少问题平台的产生及影响.     

基于BP神经网络的P2P网贷借款人信用评估

评估借款人信用是P2P网贷公司控制风险的重要步骤,对于网贷公司的正常运行有着极其重要的意义。论文参考商业银行信用指标体系并根据P2P网贷自身特点,建立了P2P网贷借款人的信用评估指标体系。根据建立的指标体系构建相应的BP神经网络模型,并利用一步正切法进行优化。然后选取具有代表性的P2P网贷平台的相关数据,对该模型进行训练和仿真,证明了该模型对P2P网贷平台的风险控制起到一定的作用。     

P2P网络借贷市场利率主导权偏离程度的研究——基于双边随机前沿模型

近年来P2P网络借贷作为一种典型的互联网金融模式获得了跳跃式的发展,由于借贷双方信息不对称,导致我国P2P网贷市场利率普遍偏高。本文利用双边随机前沿分析(SFA)方法对我国P2P网贷市场借贷双方利率主导权力进行测算,并对借贷双方的主导权力对贷款利率的影响效应进行定量分析,同时对借款者个体特征对借贷双方利率主导权力的影响进行比较分析。实证结果表明,出借方拥有明显的主导权力,随着学历、年龄、收入、信用等级的增高,借款人地位将有所改善。     

保险中遏制投保人逆向选择的博弈策略分析

以投保人的风险类型难于鉴别的逆向选择问题为研究对象,建立了投保人与保险公司的双人非零和博弈模型,并求解得出了该博弈的混合策略纳什均衡点,从而得出重罚有利于遏制投保人的逆向选择以及使保险公司的期望利润为零的保险定价公式.     

投保人异质性风险偏好下指数保险市场均衡的动态演化分析

兼具道德风险与逆向选择免疫性和即刻赔付双重优势的指数保险逐渐成为巨灾风险管理的重要工具,但目前多处于试点阶段,市场均衡演化规律仍不明确。本文构建了指数保险市场中保险公司、投保人和政府的三方演化博弈模型,同时,考虑投保人面对损失与收益的不同风险态度,引入异质性风险偏好设计了投保人决策函数,进而分析指数保险市场均衡演化路径及其影响因素。结果表明,指数保险市场均衡随其生命周期的演进而变化,政府在指数保险市场中的职能将从管理者走向退出;政府对保险公司进行补贴更有效,但补贴力度需在适度范围内。影响因素方面,投保人的异质性风险偏好对市场均衡演化有重要影响,其损失敏感性将加快市场向均衡状态的收敛速度;提前赔付优势能够促进市场向均衡状态收敛,但溢出效应会延缓均衡的达成。基于此提出了政府对指数保险市场引导与鼓励的建议。     

P2P网贷平台风险预测研究

随着大数据和机器学习的流行,其在破产预测和风险预测领域逐渐崭露头角。本文运用爬虫技术得到885家网贷平台的16815条数据,通过因子分析及模型验证挖掘出了若干能较好评估P2P平台风险的因子。然后本文通过选取的指标体系建立了Logistics回归、支持向量机、BP神经网络、LightGBM等单模型以及融合模型进行学习训练,所建立的融合模型在测试集中得到最高的准确率,说明本文所建的融合模型能较好地评估网贷平台的风险。本文还选取决策树绘图以及对特征进行重要性排名,选取出了对识别问题平台有重要作用的十项特征。这对投资者选取安全平台进行投资或者监管者选取重点平台进行监管有很好的借鉴意义。     

免赔额保险公平定价的期权博弈分析

传统保险定价实质上是供给方定价,忽视了保险契约是保险人和投保人双方互动决策的结果.另一方面,保单具有或有权益的性质,这使得近年来金融定价方法得以引入到保险定价中,以反映风险和回报之间的长期均衡关系.借助期权博弈框架引入博弈论和期权定价理论,分析了免赔额保险的公平定价问题,给出了基本模型和扩展模型两种情形下博弈均衡结果,即保单的无套利价值,并发现在扩展模型情形下,投保人的最优投保策略和均衡保险合同均发生变化.     

道德风险影响下的保险最优投资研究

在考虑道德风险的情况下,以均值方差准则为目标研究保险人最优投资问题.假设保险盈余过程服从C-L模型,金融市场上存在一种无风险资产和一种风险资产可供投资,其中风险资产的价格过程服从几何布朗运动.在纯道德风险保险契约设计中,借鉴相关研究对努力水平和效用化努力成本的假设,量化道德风险对盈余过程的影响.在均值方差目标下,建立保险人最优投资问题的广义Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman(HJB)方程,给出保险人时间一致的均衡投资策略和价值函数.结果显示累计索赔比例参数越大,公司对最优努力水平越敏感,采取措施降低道德风险有利于公司收益提升;努力成本参数越大,公司会降低努力水平减少支出,避免损失.     

基于熵权灰色关联TOPSIS法的涉农P2P网贷项目优选研究

随着"互联网+农业"的逐步深入,涉农P2P网贷将成为缓解农民借款难的有效途径,建立涉农P2P网贷项目优选模型对保障资金借出者的资金安全和收益具有很好的现实意义.根据ECIRM模型从5个维度建立衡量信用风险及还款能力的涉农P2P网贷项目评价指标体系,在资金借出者根据自己的要求对借款项目初步筛选的基础上,建立网贷项目优选模型,利用熵权灰色关联TOPSIS法对网贷项目进行优选排序,为出资者决策提供参考依据.     

关于P4P问题解数的一些研究

本文研究了计算机视觉中P4P问题的多解问题,运用几何方法,分析了P4P问题的多解现象,获得了P4P问题存在5个解的必要条件.     

The valuation of contingent capital with catastrophe risks

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report (2007) indicates that unanticipated catastrophic events could increase with time because of global warming. Therefore, it seems inadequate to assume that arrival process of catastrophic events follows a pure Poisson process adopted by most previous studies (e.g. [Louberge, H., Kellezi, E., Gilli, M., 1999. Using catastrophe-linked securities to diversify insurance risk: A financial analysis of lCAT bonds. J. Risk Insurance 22, 125–146; Lee, J.-P., Yu, M.-T., 2002. Pricing default-risky CAT bonds with moral hazard and basis risk. J. Risk Insurance 69, 25–44; Cox, H., Fairchild, J., Pedersen, H., 2004. Valuation of structured risk management products. Insurance Math. Econom. 34, 259–272; Jaimungal, S., Wang, T., 2006. Catastrophe options with stochastic interest rates and compound Poisson losses. Insurance Math. Econom., 38, 469–483]. In order to overcome this shortcoming, this paper proposes a doubly stochastic Poisson process to model the arrival process for catastrophic events. Furthermore, we generalize the assumption in the last reference mentioned above to define the general loss function presenting that different specific loss would have different impacts on the drop in stock price. Based on modeling the arrival rates for catastrophe risks, the pricing formulas of contingent capital are derived by the Merton measure. Results of empirical experiments of contingent capital prices as well as sensitivity analyses are presented.     

On the regulator–insurer interaction in a structural model

In this paper, we provide a new insight to the previous work of Briys and de Varenne [E. Briys, F. de Varenne, Life insurance in a contingent claim framework: Pricing and regulatory implications, Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory 19 (1) (1994) 53–72], Grosen and Jørgensen [A. Grosen, P.L. Jørgensen, Life insurance liabilities at market value: An analysis of insolvency risk, bonus policy, and regulatory intervention rules in a barrier option framework, Journal of Risk and Insurance 69 (1) (2002) 63–91] and Chen and Suchanecki [A. Chen, M. Suchanecki, Default risk, bankruptcy procedures and the market value of life insurance liabilities, Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 40 (2007) 231–255]. We show that the particular risk management strategy followed by the insurance company can significantly change the risk exposure of the company, and that it should thus be taken into account by regulators. We first study how the regulator establishes regulation intervention levels in order to control for instance the default probability of the insurance company. This part of the analysis is based on a constant volatility. Given that the insurance company is informed of regulatory rules, we study how results can be significantly different when the insurance company follows a risk management strategy with non-constant volatilities. We thus highlight some limits of the prior literature and believe that the risk management strategy of the company should be taken into account in the estimation of the risk exposure as well as in that of the market value of liabilities.     

Optimal insurance design in the presence of exclusion clauses

The present work studies the design of an optimal insurance policy from the perspective of an insured, where the insurable loss is mutually exclusive from another loss that is denied in the insurance coverage. To reduce ex post moral hazard, we assume that both the insured and the insurer would pay more for a larger realization of the insurable loss. When the insurance premium principle preserves the convex order, we show that any admissible insurance contract is suboptimal to a two-layer insurance policy under the criterion of minimizing the insured’s total risk exposure quantified by value at risk, tail value at risk or an expectile. The form of optimal insurance can be further simplified to be one-layer by imposing an additional weak condition on the premium principle. Finally, we use Wang’s premium principle and the expected value premium principle to illustrate the applicability of our results, and find that optimal insurance solutions are affected not only by the size of the excluded loss but also by the risk measure chosen to quantify the insured’s risk exposure.     

过度自信、违约补偿与众创投资平台三边道德风险规制

基于投资型众创空间运营过程中众创投资平台、风险投资机构和创业企业之间复杂的委托代理关系,构建了一个三边道德风险分析模型,将众创投资平台的过度自信倾向和风险投资机构的违约补偿引入模型设计,探讨了各利益主体的行为选择与道德风险约束。研究发现,众创投资平台过度自信对三边融资结构具有双重影响,既降低了创业企业的道德风险;又助长了投资平台的违约倾向,提高了代理成本和风险投资机构的道德风险。违约补偿可以有效规制三边道德风险,不仅降低了风险投资机构的违约行为,也有助于缓解投资平台和创业企业的道德风险。     

Optimal insurance with belief heterogeneity and incentive compatibility

People may evaluate risk differently in the insurance market. Motivated by this, we examine an optimal insurance problem allowing the insured and the insurer to have heterogeneous beliefs about loss distribution. To reduce ex post moral hazard, we follow Huberman et al. (1983) to assume that alternative insurance contracts satisfy the principle of indemnity and the incentive-compatible constraint. Under the assumption that the insurance premium is calculated by the expected value principle, we establish a necessary and sufficient condition for an optimal insurance solution and provide a practical scheme to improve any suboptimal insurance strategy under an arbitrary form of belief heterogeneity. By virtue of this condition, we explore qualitative properties of optimal solutions, and derive optimal insurance contracts explicitly for some interesting forms of belief heterogeneity. As a byproduct of this investigation, we find that Theorem 3.6 of Young (1999) is not completely true.     

具有私人信息的道德风险的委托—代理人模型的合约分析

本文对存在的不对称信息的环境下的具有私人信息道德风险的委托—代理人模型的合约问题进行了详细的讨论,并得出一些有新意的结论.此讨论问题的方法很值得推荐和推广,特别是在最优激励合同中,比如投资激励,管理机制中的激励,销售激励,保险激励等合同的设计,都可以借鉴此方法来研究和分析.     

在线网络借贷投资决策模型及实证研究

P2P网络借贷作为电子商务在金融领域的延伸与应用,近年来得到广大学者的关注.但是目前的理论研究中,鲜有从投资者信息挖掘的角度进行投资决策分析.本文提出一个新颖的方法,即投资者构成分析方法,通过分析贷款的众多投资者信息遴选出最有价值的投资,辅助投资者进行投资决策.首先从投资者的历史投资收益率、风险偏好以及投资经验三个维度构建投资者档案(investor profile),进而基于投资者档案构建投资者构成分析模型,最后通过美国最大的在线网络借贷网站Prosper的数据,对本文提出的构想及模型进行了实证研究.实验结果表明本文提出的利用投资者构成分析的方法辅助投资者进行投资决策是可行的,文中构建的模型表现出良好的预测能力,能够有效地筛选出有价值的投资.