过度自信、违约补偿与众创投资平台三边道德风险规制

基于投资型众创空间运营过程中众创投资平台、风险投资机构和创业企业之间复杂的委托代理关系,构建了一个三边道德风险分析模型,将众创投资平台的过度自信倾向和风险投资机构的违约补偿引入模型设计,探讨了各利益主体的行为选择与道德风险约束。研究发现,众创投资平台过度自信对三边融资结构具有双重影响,既降低了创业企业的道德风险;又助长了投资平台的违约倾向,提高了代理成本和风险投资机构的道德风险。违约补偿可以有效规制三边道德风险,不仅降低了风险投资机构的违约行为,也有助于缓解投资平台和创业企业的道德风险。

Regulation of Trilateral Moral Hazard of Crowd Innovation Platform Basedon Overconfidence and Default Compensation

Based on complex principal-agent relation among crowd innovation platforms, venture investment organization and venture company in the operation of investment-oriented maker space, a trilateral moral hazard analysis model is constructed. By introducing the overconfidence tendency of crowd innovation platform and default compensation mechanism of venture investment organizations into model design, the behavioral selection of moral risk regulation of all interest subjects are explored. The results show that overconfidence tendency has a dual influence on trilateral financing structure, not only reducing the moral risk of venture companies, but also favoring the default tendency of investment platform and increasing agent cost and moral risk of venture investment organizations. Default compensation mechanism can effectively regulate trilateral moral hazard, not only reducing noncompliance of venture investment organizations, but also mitigating the moral risks of investment platform and venture companies.