基于不对称需求信息的数量折扣设计

通过建立数量折扣设计优化模型,利用委托代理理论分别分析了完全和不完全需求信息条件下,商品供应商如何为一群异质的零售商制定价格政策,实现其中望利润的最大化.在完全需求信息条件下,单一价格就能使供应商实现利润最大化;而在需求信息为不对称条件下,逆向选择使单一价格失效,此时,数量折扣是一种能够有效增加零售商订货量的激励方式.     

一种电子商务环境下耐用品的动态定价模型与策略

针对电子商务环境下消费者对价格歧视的抗拒问题,以及耐用品生命周期长、产品需求依赖于时间、价格等特点,提出了一种动态定价模型与策略。该模型通过构造转移概率矩阵,推导出在线消费者浏览到耐用品的不同价格状态下的概率,接着根据消费者多阶段效用函数分析消费者的购买决策行为,进而给出零售商利润达到最大化时的最优定价策略集合。为了验证模型与策略的有效性,通过数值模拟实验,分析模型主要参数变化对最优定价策略的影响。研究发现当效用折扣因子越高,零售商应该降低促销频率和高价格并且提高低价格,从而诱导高端消费者在高价格购买产品。折扣效用因子大小还决定了网上零售商是否要隐藏自己的促销概率。     

不同情形下供应链优化决策模型的比较分析

本文提出三种不同情形（制造商与零售商追求各自利润最大化，并且没有价格折扣策略；制造商与零售商共同追求总利润最大化，不实施价格折扣策略；制造商与零售商共同追求总利润最大化，并实施价格折扣策略）下供应链价格和库存补充策略的优化决策模型，并通过具体数例进行比较分析，结果表明，供应链合作并实施价格折扣策略时的供应链总利润最高，而供应链双方利润分配系数的变化对基于供应链总利润最大化的供应链优化决策没有影响．     

需求随价格变化的具有折扣的易变质物品的库存模型

本文研究了在需求随价格变化及物品易变质的条件下，当供应商给予数量折扣时的库存问题。证明了当供应商给予数量折扣时，零售商的需求量是增大的，并给出了供应商给予数量折扣时零售商的订货量和订货周期的计算方法。对物品变质率和需求价格敏感系数对零售商的订货量、订货周期、出售价格和单位时间利润的影响进行了数值分析，并给出了数值算例。     

供应链中供需协调及价格折扣订货模型研究

本文研究由单一供方和单一需方组成的供应链协调问题。通过制定一个合理的价格折扣范围,提出一种改进的订货策略—n阶段订货策略,使供应链整体利润最大化,同时使供需双方达到双赢。     

模糊随机需求报童问题的Stackelberg-Nash均衡策略

针对模糊随机需求下的分布控制型报童问题,建立了无数量折扣和有数量折扣情况下的利润最大化两层规划模型,并结合模糊随机模拟技术和遗传算法设计了模型求解的混合智能算法.解决了上层制造商制定包括折扣区间和折扣价格的最优数量折扣策略,以及下层多零售商确定各自的最优订货量的Stackelberg-Nash均衡策略问题.     

考虑预付定金和退货的SMPEs产品定价与优化策略

借鉴中小制造型企业(SMPEs)在线渠道预售模式,考虑市场中存在预付订金和不预付订金的顾客,并将其退货情况引入到生产商利润表达式中,构建确定性和随机性市场需求下的SMPEs产品销售利润最大化模型,推导生产商产品最优定价的解析解;对比两种销售模式的利润,得到了生产商选择不同销售策略的条件。进一步考虑预付定金的产品数量、预交定金比例、退货数量是关于价格折扣敏感的情况,采用拉格朗日乘子法对生产商产品定价及优化问题进行研究,分析求得生产商销售策略(产品定价和价格折扣)的近似最优解。最后,通过数值算例对研究结论进行了验证并给出经济学解释。     

需求弹性与垄断企业的价格歧视

本给出了垄断企业实行价格歧视的价格比较模型．在垄断企业获取最大利润的前提下，利用需求弹性分析了垄断企业价格歧视的成因，探讨了它们的数量特征，并进一步利用该模型描述了市场需求对垄断企业实行价格歧视的影响。     

广告分担、价格折扣与供应链的纵向合作广告

研究了生产商和零售商的纵向合作广告问题。分别在广告分担和价格折扣策略下，探讨了双方的均衡结果和利润。当生产商的边际利润较小时，生产商的最优决策是不采取任何一种策略。当生产商的边际利润达到一定范围时，广告分担策略是双方共同的最优选择。而无论在什么样的条件内，价格折扣策略都不会使双方同时满意。为了增加双方的收益，供应链成员应该在广告上集成决策。最后给出了系统集成的可行最优解的范围和Nash讨价还价解。     

资金约束下订单农业供应链内外部融资策略研究

考虑一个农户和一个公司组成的二级订单农业供应链,农户面临资金约束及农产品产出随机性,分别研究了银行贷款融资和带有价格折扣的预付款两种融资模式下,农户的生产决策和公司的收购价格决策,进而探讨了供应链内外部融资方式的比较与选择。研究结果表明,农产品产出随机性风险导致农户减少种植规模,公司降低农产品的收购价格,不利于农户增加收入,对公司利润产生不利影响;由于农户的弱势地位,相比银行贷款融资模式,预付款融资无法实现农户与公司双方的帕累托改进。     

寡头垄断市场三度价格歧视动态博弈分析

对两寡头厂商2元市场用完全信息动态博弈的方法分析了实施三度价格歧视情形和统一定价情形的均衡产量,均衡价格和均衡总收益,并研究了这两种情形三个指标之间的关系.结果显示,在两个子市场的需求函数为线性需求的条件下,统一定价的市场均衡产量等于歧视定价的市场均衡产量;统一定价的均衡价格是歧视定价时两个子市场均衡价格的加权平均;统一定价的市场均衡总收益小于歧视定价的市场均衡总收益.     

Pricing and advertisement in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain

We use a game theoretical approach to study pricing and advertisement decisions in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain when price discounts are offered by both the manufacturer and retailer. When the manufacturer is the leader of the game, we obtained Stackelberg equilibrium with manufacturer’s local allowance, national brand name investment, manufacturer’s preferred price discount, retailer’s price discount, and local advertising expense. For the special case of two-stage equilibrium when the manufacturer’s price discount is exogenous, we found that the retailer is willing to increase local advertising expense if the manufacturer increases local advertising allowance and provides deeper price discount, or if the manufacturer decreases its brand name investment. When both the manufacturer and retailer have power, Nash equilibrium in a competition game is obtained. The comparison between the Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium shows that the manufacturer always prefers Stackelberg equilibrium, but there is no definitive conclusion for the retailer. The bargaining power can be used to determine the profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer. Once the profit sharing is determined, we suggest a simple contract to help the manufacturer and retailer obtain their desired profit sharing.     

Pricing and lot-sizing for a deteriorating item in a periodic review inventory system with shortages

We consider a single product that is, subject to continuous decay, a multivariate demand function of price and time, shortages allowed and completely backlogged in a periodic review inventory system in which the selling price is allowed to adjust upward or downward periodically. The objective of this paper is to determine the periodic selling price and lot-size over multiperiod planning horizon so that the total discount profit is maximized. The proposed model can be used as an add-in optimizer like an advanced planning system in an enterprise resource planning system that coordinates distinct functions within a firm. Particular attention is placed on investigating the effect of periodic pricing jointly with shortages on the total discount profit. The problem is formulated as a bivariate optimization model solved by dynamic programming techniques coupled with an iterative search process. An intensive numerical study shows that the periodic pricing is superior to the fixed pricing in profit maximization. It also clarifies that shortages strategy can be an effective cost control mechanism for managing deterioration inventory.     

基于双边市场理论的金融超市竞争定价策略研究

基于双边市场理论,重点分析金融超市在双寡头垄断情形下的竞争定价策略。即在在一般定价模型的基础上,构建起加入金融超市双边用户交易次数为歧视标准的价格歧视竞争模型。并且围绕金融超市追求长期利益和短期利益两种不同动机,对采取该策略均衡时最终用户的均衡进入价格、金融超市利润和市场份额进行比较分析。最后,给出金融超市实施价格歧视策略的对策和建议。     

Dynamic Network-Based Discriminatory Pricing

We study the dynamic pricing decisions for competitive network service providers. We assume that each competing firm follows a three-part pricing scheme, which consists of an ongoing membership fee, a usage fee for communications within the networks, and another usage fee for communications across the networks. The difference between the two usage fees is the network-based price discount that allows price discrimination. We study the firms problems as a differential game and establish the optimal pricing policy as a Nash equilibrium feedback strategy depending on only the network sizes (i.e., the number of subscribers). We compare the dynamic network-based discount with the static discount. In the special case of a uniform calling pattern, we find that the firm network-based dynamic discount is always lower than the static discount; we find also that the firm that has a larger network can offer a bigger discount. These results are useful particularly for managers. To get further insights into the dynamic pricing policies, we explore the case of symmetric competition using numerical simulation.Communicated by G. Leitmann     

不确定需求与产出供应链回购契约决策

针对市场需求的不确定性和供应商产出产品合格率的不确定性,提出供应商产出量小于销售商订购量时需再生产满足销售商的订购,以及供应商生产过量和回购的产品通过折扣市场出售,建立以供应链期望利润为目标函数,以回购单价为决策变量的供应链回购契约决策模型.通过模型的分析,证明了模型存在最优的期望利润,给出了最优回购单价满足的方程;同时,也证明了最优订购量,最优生产量和销售商最优期望利润是回购单价的增函数.最后,通过算例验证了模型的有效性.     

基于区间效率的贷款定价研究

以存款利息支出率、费用支出率、预期违约损失率、目标利润率等4个定价指标作为输入,以贷款利率作为输出,采用支持向量机回归算法建立基于区间效率的贷款定价模型.创新与特色一是通过区间数形式来反映预期违约损失率、目标利润率、费用支出率等,改变了现有研究将目标利润、贷款费用、违约损失等变量看作确定性数值来定价的现状.使贷款利率更具有竞争性.二是通过比较不同核函数、核参数下的训练样本的贷款效率区间与合理的贷款效率区间的匹配程度,确定贷款定价模型最优的核函数和核参数,进而建立了贷款定价模型.间接解决了在考虑贷款价格能否被银行、客户接受情况下贷款利率确定的问题.     

面向战略型消费者的产品创新与定价策略

考虑垄断制造商面向战略型消费者时的产品创新与定价问题。运用消费者效用理论和博弈论等方法,构建静态和动态定价下制造商和消费者两期决策模型并求解分析。结果表明,消费者是否购买以及何时购买产品取决于升级换代产品的价格阈值。与静态定价相比较,动态定价能使制造商获得更多期望收益,但会降低消费者剩余、弱化制造商的产品创新积极性,并且这种弱化现象在产品价值折扣系数较高的情况下尤为明显。战略消费者购买行为对制造商的产品创新、期望收益和消费者剩余的影响,不仅依赖于制造商选择何种定价策略,还取决于产品价值折扣系数的大小。研究结论为消费者的产品购买和升级换代提供了理论建议,为企业的产品创新和定价提供了决策参考。     

Periodic pricing and replenishment policy for continuously decaying inventory with multivariate demand

This paper deals with the joint decisions on pricing and replenishment schedule for a periodic review inventory system in which a replenishment order may be placed at the beginning of some or all of the periods. We consider a single product which is subject to continuous decay and a demand which is a function of price and time, without backlogging over a finite planning horizon. The proposed scheme may adjust periodically the selling price upward or downward that makes the pricing policy more responsive to structure changes in supply or demand. The problem is formulated as a dynamic programming model and solved by numerical search techniques. An extensive numerical study is conducted to attend qualitative insights into the structures of the proposed policy and its sensitivity with respect to major parameters. The numerical result shows that the solution generated by the periodic policy outperforms that by the fixed pricing policy in maximizing discount profit.