西部开发中能源配置模型的研究

开发西部丰富的能源资源,解决东部地区能源紧缺的矛盾,是东西部经济合作、优势互补、东西联动双赢战略研究的一项重要课题.在国家投资主体和市场经济条件下,以能源消费效益最大为目标,建立了基于边际效益均衡的能源空间配置优化模型;兼顾经济效益与环境效益的能源部门配置优化模型.结果显示,各地区、部门要获得更多的能源,就必须提高能源的使用效率,提高能源消费的边际效益,降低污染排放水平.     

基于学习的互利协调与互制均衡及其矢量分析

纳什均衡代表了博弈参与人如何博弈的一致性预测.但是,有限理性的博弈者一般不会在一次博弈中取得一致性预期,他们总是通过不断的重复学习,使得预期逐渐向均衡方向演化.对互利协调与互制均衡进行分析,并探讨协调和均衡的动态形成机理.互制均衡强调自我实现,倾向个体利益最优.互利协调在强调自我实现的基础上,注重双赢,引导合作.现代博弈学习理论正是从有限理性的实际出发,通过学习和进化,最终实现博弈的均衡或协调.这对于如何走出传统博弈的困境具有重要意义.     

李建华：银企双调整

如果企业能在平时就与银行等金融机构保持良好的合作与沟通,那么在经济不景气时期必然受益。在区域性的企业与银行之间,这种互利关系表现得更为明显。2011年9月8日,在新理财杂志社主办的第四届中国CFO年会期间,记者与宁夏银行行长李建华的对话,便突出体现了这一点。     

移动支付协作模式的影响因素分类探讨及仿真研究

针对移动支付产业链,基于演化博弈的理论和方法,研究有限理性的移动运营商和金融机构之间的合作机制.首先分析了影响移动运营商和金融机构长期合作的因素,然后利用数值模拟进行仿真研究。理论研究和数值模拟的结果表明,移动运营商和金融机构合作是未来发展的趋势,而且,双方进行合作的概率与合作成功所获得的超额收益、单独研发收益、知识学习能力系数正相关、与背叛收益负相关;合理的资源共享和收益分配机制将有利于保证合作双方有利可图,并实现双赢的局面;合理的惩罚有利于减少背叛行为.     

基于演化博弈的海上丝绸之路合作稳定性分析

中国倡导共建21世纪海上丝绸之路面临诸多外部不确定因素。为了判别海上丝绸之路合作的演化方向及其实现条件,构建三元策略博弈支付矩阵,以改进复制动态方程模拟有限理性条件下合作的博弈过程,分析博弈均衡点稳定性及其参数条件。模型数值仿真验证了动态方程分析结果,根据仿真图直观给出中方策略建议:大力推进合作示范项目,突破初始不合作均衡;短期内补贴吸引合作,以达成长期公平互利局面;不追求局部利益最大化,容许对方项目收益高于已方;根据博弈地位相对优势,选择有利合作对象与领域;寻找彼此战略利益交汇点,确保长期协同合作绩效;关注国际环境扰动,抓住机遇引导有利演化方向。     

高校高等数学教与学的博弈

在信息不完全的情况下,利用博弈论的方法分析高等数学教学中师生合作的可能,提出相应的教学策略达到师生双赢.     

我国东西部高等教育布局结构研究

关于我国东西部高等教育布局均衡性问题,目前国内的研究观点和结论大相径庭,研究方法各不相同.一种观点认为,东西部高等教育无论从规模还是从质量上都有相当大的差距;另一种观点认为,在某种意义下,高等教育并不存在东西部分布的不均衡.本文针对我国高等学校地理(空间)布局的不平衡问题及目前研究方法的缺陷,采用国际上通用的衡量分布不平衡的G IN I模型,对基本衡量指标作相对化处理,分析了东西部高等教育的差异及变化趋势;提出西部高等教育发展的对策及建议.     

风险投资估值调整协议的实物期权价值及其应用

为了分析风险投资估值调整协议的合理应用对于风险投资活动的重要意义.本文以蒙牛与大摩等投资机构签订的估值调整协议为现实背景,凝练出了估值调整协议的特点:规避风险、达到双赢是估值调整协议的目标;不确定性是估值调整协议的基础;绩效考核是约束手段、股权是激励筹码;合理估值是实现双赢的必备条件.基于上述特点,本文构建了估值调整协议的实物期权模型,证明给出估值调整协议的实物期权价值及双赢后风险投资主体退出的最佳时机解析解,并通过算例进行了验证,最后得出了风险投资估值调整协议是以双赢和规避风险作为其目标,并当项目价值大于约定临界值后,风险投资主体并不会长时间的等待而是及时选择合适时机退出的结论.     

竞争环境下供应链的BOPS合作策略及其对交通拥堵改善的影响

针对由一个拥有线上直销渠道的制造商以及一个线下零售商组成的供应链,考虑消费者对不同渠道的偏好构建了供应链博弈模型,研究了竞争环境下制造商与零售商的最优BOPS合作策略,并分析了BOPS合作在改善交通拥堵方面的作用。研究表明,BOPS合作在缓解供应链双重边际效应的同时会加剧渠道之间的价格竞争,所以并不总是对供应链有利;仅当消费者线上渠道偏好程度比较低且线下麻烦成本比较大时,制造商和零售商才会都从BOPS合作中受益从而自愿达成合作,其他情形下制造商可根据供应链利润变化设计转移支付契约促成与线下零售商的BOPS合作并实现双赢;此外,一定条件下BOPS合作能够通过调整渠道需求结构,在保证供应链成员利润的同时对交通拥堵改善也带来正向作用。     

东西部能源经济系统可持续发展博弈分析

引入经济可持续发展能源可承受度概念,建立中央和东西部地区兼顾经济增长及能源可持续发展的博弈模型,分析西部大开发战略中中央、东部和西部能源开发的战略选择,得到能源作为稀缺资源在地区及全国范围内最优配置的相关结论.     

Erratum: Betweenness Centralization for Bipartite Graphs

We address two related issues. First, we analyze the effects of risk preferences on cooperation in social dilemmas. Second, we compare social dilemmas in which outcomes represent gains with dilemmas where outcomes represent losses. We show that predictions on gain‐loss asymmetries with respect to conditions for cooperation crucially depend on assumptions concerning risk preferences. Under the assumption of risk aversion for gains as well as losses together with an assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion, conditions for cooperation are less restrictive if outcomes represent losses than if outcomes represent gains. Conversely ‐ and counterintuitively ‐ under the assumption of S‐shaped utility, conditions for cooperation are more restrictive if outcomes represent losses than if outcomes represent gains. We provide an experimental test of such predictions. Only a minority of subjects behaves consistent with the assumption of S‐shaped utility. Furthermore, we find no empirical evidence for a general difference between cooperation in social dilemmas in which outcomes represent gains and dilemmas where outcomes represent losses. We do find evidence that risk preferences affect cooperation rates.     

Can remembering history from predecessor promote cooperation in the next generation?

People usually think that helping the next generation to remember history can promote cooperation in dilemma games. We show that is not always the case when agents have memory. Agents play with each neighbor by game history and strategies (such as TFT and WSLS), and the next generation inherits good strategies from the predecessor. We analyze the system’s cooperation ratio by comparing the 2 sources of history at the beginning of each generation: (a) inherited from the predecessor; (b) randomly initialized with different cooperation ratio. We find that with unconditional imitation update rule, agents who remember history get lower cooperation ratio than those who randomly initialize the history; while with replicator rule, higher initial cooperation ratio promotes higher final cooperation. We also do additional experiments to investigate the R, ST, P reciprocity and strategies distribution of the systems.     

Norms of Cooperation in a Game of Partnership

We study a model of partnership with costly commitment in an evolutionary game-theoretic framework. We introduce various types of cooperative players with different degrees of strategic sophistication. We find that a necessary condition for cooperation at the social equilibrium is that the probability of a high opportunity value falls below a certain critical threshold. Such condition, however, is not sufficient. If players are too naively cooperative, the permanence of cooperation at the equilibrium is put at risk because naive cooperation entails playing inefficient responses to other equilibrium strategies. As a consequence, naive cooperation will be present at the equilibrium selected by the social dynamics only under somewhat special conditions. If cooperators are more flexible, in that they remain in the partnership only if mated to a first stage cooperator and only in lack of favorable outside opportunities, cooperation is almost granted provided that it is Pareto efficient (perverse lock in cases under unfavorable initial conditions are possible). Finally, the selection of Pareto superior cooperation with certainty may be granted by a certain norm-oriented type of strategically sophisticated behavior, that we call Rawlsian altruism.     

Structural heterogeneity mediates the effect of community structure on cooperation

Emergence of cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game strongly depends on the topology of underlying interaction network. We explore this dependence using community networks with different levels of structural heterogeneity, which are generated by a tunable upper‐bound on the total number of links that any vertex can have. We study the effect of community structure on cooperation by analyzing a finite population analogue of the evolutionary replicator dynamics. We find that structural heterogeneity mediates the effect of community structure on cooperation. In the community networks with low level of structural heterogeneity, community structure has negative effect on cooperation. However, the positive effect of community structure on cooperation appears and enhances with increasing structural heterogeneity. Our work may be helpful for understanding the complexity of cooperative behaviors in social networks. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity, 2012     

The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment

Cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma games can usually be sustained only if the game has an infinite horizon. We analyze to what extent the theoretically crucial distinction of finite versus infinite-horizon games is reflected in the outcomes of a prisoner’s dilemma experiment. We compare three different experimental termination rules in four treatments: a known finite end, an unknown end, and two variants with a random termination rule (with a high and with a low continuation probability, where cooperation can occur in a subgame-perfect equilibrium only with the high probability). We find that the termination rules do not significantly affect average cooperation rates. Specifically, employing a random termination rule does not cause significantly more cooperation compared to a known finite horizon, and the continuation probability does not significantly affect average cooperation rates either. However, the termination rules may influence cooperation over time and end-game behavior. Further, the (expected) length of the game significantly increases cooperation rates. The results suggest that subjects may need at least some learning opportunities (like repetitions of the supergame) before significant backward induction arguments in finitely repeated game have force.     

Strategy changing penalty promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

Many classical studies suggest that punishment is a useful way to promote cooperation in the well-mixed public goods game, whereas relative evidence in the research of spatial prisoner’s dilemma game is absent. To address this issue, we introduce a mechanism of strategy changing penalty, combining memory and penalty during the update process, into spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. We find that increasing penalty rate or memory length is able to promote the evolution of cooperation monotonously. Compared with traditional version, recorded penalty could facilitate cooperation better. Moreover, through examining the process of evolution, we provide an interpretation for this promotion phenomenon, namely, the effect of promotion can be warranted by an evolution resonance of standard deviation of fitness coefficient. Finally, we validate our results by studying the impact of uncertainty within strategy adoptions on the evolution of cooperation. We hope that our work may shed light on the understanding of the cooperative behavior in the society.     

Prisoner's dilemma game on adaptive networks under limited foresight

We study the emergence of cooperation in an environment where players in prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) not only update their strategies but also change their interaction relations. Different from previous studies in which players update their strategies according to the imitation rule, in this article, the strategies are updated with limited foresight. We find that two absorbing states—full cooperation and full defection—can be reached, assuming that players can delete interaction relations unilaterally, but new relations can only be created with the mutual consent of both partners. Simulation experiments show that high levels of cooperation in large populations can be achieved when the temptation to defect in PDG is low. Moreover, we explore the factors which influence the level of cooperation. These results provide new insights into the cooperation in social dilemma and into corresponding control strategies. © 2012Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity, 2012     

Robust cycles in Kolmogorov–Lotka–Volterra class of models with intraspecific co-operation

Using the Andronov–Hopf bifurcation theorem and the Poincaré–Bendixson Theorem, we explore robust cyclical possibilities in Kolmogorov–Lotka–Volterra class of models with positive intraspecific cooperation (in the form of social networks) in the prey population. We find that this additional feedback effect of intraspecific cooperation introduces nonlinearities which modify the cyclical outcomes of the model. We show that the cyclical outcomes are more robust than in the existing literature in this area due to introduction of such non-linearities. We also demonstrate the possibilities of multiple limit cycles under certain situations.     

Cooperation in an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game with probabilistic strategies

In this work, we investigate an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game in structured populations with probabilistic strategies instead of the pure strategies of cooperation and defection. We explore the model in details by considering different strategy update rules and different population structures. We find that the distribution of probabilistic strategies patterns is dependent on both the interaction structures and the updating rules. We also find that, when an individual updates her strategy by increasing or decreasing her probabilistic strategy a certain amount towards that of her opponent, there exists an optimal increment of the probabilistic strategy at which the cooperator frequency reaches its maximum.     

成本不确定时企业技术创新联盟中的策略承诺分析

技术创新日益受到重视,特别是跨产业合作已成为企业突破自身资源困境的有效途径之一。为了避免可能的投机行为,成员企业往往做出事前承诺。然而如何承诺才能有效避免伙伴投机,进而提高合作绩效？本文将据此考察上游成本和联合创新水平不确定时的策略承诺,并分析承诺对合作创新行动的影响。本文提出状态依赖承诺的概念,并通过研究发现策略承诺能够降低不确定性所带来不利影响,刺激创新投入,并提高合作绩效——特别是对上游的激励作用更强。本文从理论上指出策略承诺在合作创新中的积极作用,特别是对供应商参与新产品研发的重要激励作用。