Rawlsian altruism with perfect discrimination leads to social efficiency

Recent studies draw attention on the highly specialized capacity of human beings in recognizing altruists versus cheaters in social interactions. These results hint at the existence of specialized abilities that support discriminating behavior in strategic interactions. In this paper, we explore the implications of discriminating behavior in the study of the indirect evolutionary selection of selfish versus altruistic motivations in the context of generic 2×2 base games, and in particular for coordination and cooperation scenarios. We find that inequality averse (Rawlsian) altruism can enforce under rather general conditions socially optimal outcomes, including cases where selfishness cannot, such as in prisoner’s dilemmas. Inequality seeking (Nietzschian) altruism in no case improves upon Rawlsian altruism in terms of social optimality of outcomes, and often does worse. In the cooperation scenario in particular, Nietzschean altruism never manages to implement the cooperative outcome. Under perfect discrimination, moreover, inequality averse (Rawlsian) altruism often evolves at the expense of selfishness. These results suggest that the development of sophisticated discrimination abilities may be strongly adaptive in supporting fairness-oriented forms of pro-sociality in humans in the context of social dilemmas and coordination problems.     

Representing risk preferences in expected utility based decision models

Users of expected utility based decision models frequently find it useful or necessary to specify a functional form that represents the risk preferences of a decision maker. Having additional functional forms from which to choose would be helpful. The literature so far has provided several such functional forms for the utility function itself. The discussion presented here indicates that providing a functional form for the marginal utility function is an alternate and equally useful way to represent risk preferences. Furthermore, functional forms for marginal utility are easier to provide, and there exist functional forms for marginal utility that represent simple risk preferences for which there is no associated functional form for the utility function. Several functional forms for marginal utility are suggested, and the class of isoelastic risk preferences is identified and discussed.     

HOW RAPID SHOULD EMISSION REDUCTION BE? A GAME‐THEORETIC APPROACH

Abstract In this paper, we search for multistage realization of international environmental agreements. To analyze countries' incentives and the results of their interactions, we mathematically represent players' strategic preferences and apply a game‐theoretic approach to make predictions about their outcomes. The initial decision on emissions reduction is determined by the Stackelberg equilibrium concept. We generalize Barrett's static “emission” model to a dynamic framework and answer the question “how rapid should the emission reduction be?” It appears that sharper abatement is desirable in the early term, which is similar to the conclusion of the Stern review. Numerical example demonstrates that abatement dynamics of the coalition and the free‐rider differ when discounting of the future payoffs increases. We show that without incentives from external organizations or governments, such pollution reduction path can actually lead to a decline in the agreement's membership size.     

Multiutility representations for incomplete difference preorders

A difference preorder is a (possibly incomplete) preorder on a space of state changes (rather than the states themselves); it encodes information about preference intensity, in addition to ordinal preferences. We find necessary and sufficient conditions for a difference preorder to be representable by a family of cardinal utility functions which take values in linearly ordered abelian groups. We also discuss the sense in which this cardinal utility representation is unique up to affine transformations, and under what conditions it is real-valued. This has applications to interpersonal comparisons, social welfare, and decisions under uncertainty.     

Recursiveness of indifference prices and translation-invariant preferences

We consider an economic agent with dynamic preferences over a set of uncertain monetary payoffs. We assume that preferences are updated in a time-consistent way as more information is becoming available. Our main result is that the agent’s indifference prices are recursive if and only if the preferences are translation-invariant. The proof is based on a characterization of time-consistency of dynamic preferences in terms of indifference sets. As a special case, we obtain that expected utility leads to recursive indifference prices if and only if absolute risk aversion is constant, that is, the Bernoulli utility function is linear or exponential.     

Prevention efforts,insurance demand and price incentives under coherent risk measures

This paper studies an equilibrium model between an insurance buyer and an insurance seller, where both parties’ risk preferences are given by convex risk measures. The interaction is modeled through a Stackelberg type game, where the insurance seller plays first by offering prices, in the form of safety loadings. Then the insurance buyer chooses his optimal proportional insurance share and his optimal prevention effort in order to minimize his risk measure. The loss distribution is given by a family of stochastically ordered probability measures, indexed by the prevention effort. We give special attention to the problems of self-insurance and self-protection, and show that if the buyer’s risk measure decreases faster in effort than his expected loss, optimal effort is non-decreasing in the safety loading with a potential discontinuity when optimal coverage switches from full to zero. On the contrary, if the decrease of the buyer’s risk measure is slower than the expected loss, optimal effort may or may not be non-decreasing in the safety loading. In case of Pareto distributed losses, the seller sets the highest possible price under which the buyer still prefers full insurance over no insurance. We also analyze the case of discrete distributions: on the one hand, for self-protection, under the assumption that the marginal impact of the effort is higher on small losses than it is on catastrophic losses, the optimal effort is non-decreasing in the safety loading. On the other hand, in the case of self-protection, more conditions are needed, in particular, we obtain sufficient conditions for the optimal effort to be non-decreasing or non-monotone in the safety loading.     

Examining risk attitudes

The existence of risky choices makes the study of attitudes toward risk important. In this article we ask the following questions: Do risk‐neutral preferences maximize utility? Are there other measures of social welfare that can explain risk aversion in society? What effect does evolution have on the distribution of risk attitudes and the measures of social welfare? In a static environment risk‐neutral risk attitudes maximize utilitarian measures of social welfare, and risk‐averse attitudes maximize Rawlsian measures. In a dynamic system agents will tend toward risk, preferring greater affinity for risk when they can accumulate wealth. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity 9: 25–30, 2004     

Norms of Cooperation in a Game of Partnership

We study a model of partnership with costly commitment in an evolutionary game-theoretic framework. We introduce various types of cooperative players with different degrees of strategic sophistication. We find that a necessary condition for cooperation at the social equilibrium is that the probability of a high opportunity value falls below a certain critical threshold. Such condition, however, is not sufficient. If players are too naively cooperative, the permanence of cooperation at the equilibrium is put at risk because naive cooperation entails playing inefficient responses to other equilibrium strategies. As a consequence, naive cooperation will be present at the equilibrium selected by the social dynamics only under somewhat special conditions. If cooperators are more flexible, in that they remain in the partnership only if mated to a first stage cooperator and only in lack of favorable outside opportunities, cooperation is almost granted provided that it is Pareto efficient (perverse lock in cases under unfavorable initial conditions are possible). Finally, the selection of Pareto superior cooperation with certainty may be granted by a certain norm-oriented type of strategically sophisticated behavior, that we call Rawlsian altruism.     

Transferring and sharing exchange-rate risk in a risk-averse supply chain of a multinational firm

This paper analyzes risk management contracts used to handle currency risk in a decentralized supply chain that consists of risk-averse divisions in a multinational firm. Particular contracts of interest involve transferring risk to a third party by using risk-transfer contracts such as currency options and re-arranging risk between supply chain members using risk-sharing contracts. Due to decentralization, operational and risk management decisions are made locally; however, a headquarter who is interested in total supply chain profit has some controllability over those activities. We question if each kind of risk management contract can improve the utility of all supply chain members compared to the utility without any of those, and how the conditions to achieve such improvements are different. Further structural differences are investigated via sensitivity analysis with respect to the transfer price, the variability of exchange rates, and the location of the headquarter. We also find that using the two kinds of contracts jointly does not necessarily result in better outcomes.     

Dynamic decision making without expected utility: An operational approach

Non-expected utility theories, such as rank dependent utility (RDU) theory, have been proposed as alternative models to EU theory in decision making under risk. These models do not share the separability property of expected utility theory. This implies that, in a decision tree, if the reduction of compound lotteries assumption is made (so that preferences at each decision node reduce to RDU preferences among lotteries) and that preferences at different decision nodes are identical (same utility function and same weighting function), then the preferences are not dynamically consistent; in particular, the sophisticated strategy, i.e., the strategy generated by a standard rolling back of the decision tree, is likely to be dominated w.r.t. stochastic dominance. Dynamic consistency of choices remains feasible, and the decision maker can avoid dominated choices, by adopting a non-consequentialist behavior, with his choices in a subtree possibly depending on what happens in the rest of the tree. We propose a procedure which: (i) although adopting a non-consequentialist behavior, involves a form of rolling back of the decision tree; (ii) selects a non-dominated strategy that realizes a compromise between the decision maker’s discordant goals at the different decision nodes. Relative to the computations involved in the standard expected utility evaluation of a decision problem, the main computational increase is due to the identification of non-dominated strategies by linear programming. A simulation, using the rank dependent utility criterion, confirms the computational tractability of the model.     

Explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma game under incomplete and complete information

Explaining cooperation in social dilemmas is a central issue in behavioral science, and the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is the most frequently employed model. Theories assuming rationality and selfishness predict no cooperation in PDs of finite duration, but cooperation is frequently observed. We therefore build a model of how individuals in a finitely repeated PD with incomplete information about their partner’s preference for mutual cooperation decide about cooperation. We study cooperation in simultaneous and sequential PDs. Our model explains three behavioral regularities found in the literature: (i) the frequent cooperation in one-shot and finitely repeated N-shot games, (ii) cooperation rates declining over the course of the game, and (iii) cooperation being more frequent in the sequential PD than in the simultaneous PD.     

Risk taking over gains and losses: A study of oil executives

This paper examines the risk propensities of experienced executives in the oil and gas industry faced with a hypothetical risky business decision that involves significant gains and losses. The executives were asked to provide the minimum price their firm should accept before selling their share of a joint exploration venture whose future prospects were systematically varied to include gains only, losses only, and mixed gains and losses. In addition, they were asked to provide a single probability equivalence for a mixed gain/loss situation in lieu of breaking even for sure. The executives were more risk taking than risk averse over pure losses, consistent with the prediction of prospect theory. Over pure gains, however, there was as much risk taking as risk aversion, with more risk taking occurring when the chance of breaking even was higher. The relationship between risk propensity over pure gains and over pure losses was insignificant, indicating very different attitudes in these two domains. Although the reflection effect did occur in some cases, it was not pervasive. There was a tendency for certainty equivalences to show greater risk taking than probability equivalences in mixed gain/loss situations, which was consistent with a reframing effect. Risk propensity over mixed gains and losses was closer to that expressed in the losses only domain than to risk propensity over pure gains. More than half of the executives gave responses that were fully consistent with expected utility, and an additional quarter of executives were consistent within a 10% margin of error in their responses. However, one out of five executives did not satisfy the stochastic dominance relationships among the certainty equivalences. Systematic inconsistencies occurred most frequently in the mixed situations where the certainty equivalences for some subjects were biased toward the outcome that had the predominant chance of occurring.     

Constraints on social dilemmas: An institutional approach

Many contemporary political and economic problems have attributes of social dilemmas. These dilemmas are simply characterized as settings in which individuals have a dominant strategy to not cooperate in collective action. However, this choice results in a Pareto-inferior outcome. Likewise, a dominated strategy exists that results in a Pareto-superior outcome. Where cooperation is absent, this problem has been described as ann-person prisoner's dilemma. This paper discusses the environmental problem of acid rain as such a social dilemma. Relying on a series of laboratory experimental settings, the argument is that many social dilemmas can be resolved through the construction of institutional mechanisms allowing for the coordination of the participant's joint strategies. Policy analysts in particular can profit from focusing on institutional solutions to social dilemmas.Support for the research reported in this paper was obtained from a summer research grant provided by the Dean of the Division of the Social Sciences, Rice University. This paper also benefited from contributions by Robert M. Thrall, Randy Calvert, Alphons van de Kragt and Mark Ishimatsu. All of the above are absolved of errors stemming from good advice that was ignored.     

Separable and additive representations of binary gambles of gains

Two approaches are taken to a new utility representation of binary gambles that is called “ratio rank-dependent utility.” Both are based on known axiomatizations of a ranked-additive representation of consequence pairs (x, y) in binary gambles (x, C; y) of gains with C held fixed and of a separable one of the special gambles (x, C; e), where e denotes the status quo. The axiomatized version imposes the condition of status-quo event commutativity to get a functional equation that leads to the result. The other assumes, but does not axiomatize, a separable representation of the (C; y) portion of the gamble. These assumptions lead to two difficult functional equations that are solved in the mathematical literature, but the former only under the assumption that the function is twice differentiable. Three behavioral conditions are shown to force this new utility representation to reduce to the standard rank-dependent utility one for gains. They are co-monotonic trade-off consistency, ranked bisymmetry, and segregation, the latter requiring the addition of an operation of joint receipt.     

Evolutionary Selection of Socially Sensitive Preferences in Random Matching Environments

In this paper we study the evolutionary selection of socially sensitive preferences in the context of reference interaction settings such as coordination failure and cooperation. We refer to a specific class of socially sensitive preferences in which players weigh additively their own material payoff against the opponent with either a positive or negative coefficient (λ-players). Preference evolution is guided by replicator dynamics in a context of perfect observability of preferences types and stochastic pairwise matching. We take an indirect evolutionary approach, that is, the selection mechanism operates on the actual material payoffs earned by players, so that any instance of socially sensitive preference can be thought of as instrumentally maintained. We find that the evolutionary viability of socially sensitive preferences basically depends on whether or not they cause a substantial improvement in the achievement of socially efficient outcomes with respect to the case where only self-serving or unconditionally focused preference orientations are observed. Our results suggest that moderate pro-social preference orientations are likely to emerge from social selection even in the absence of an intrinsic motivational drive, whereas extremely pro-social orientations as well as competitive and anti-social ones may need a stronger motivational base.     

What is the impact of stock market contagion on an investor’s portfolio choice?

Stocks are exposed to the risk of sudden downward jumps. Additionally, a crash in one stock (or index) can increase the risk of crashes in other stocks (or indices). Our paper explicitly takes this contagion risk into account and studies its impact on the portfolio decision of a CRRA investor both in complete and in incomplete market settings. We find that the investor significantly adjusts his portfolio when contagion is more likely to occur. Capturing the time dimension of contagion, i.e. the time span between jumps in two stocks or stock indices, is thus of first-order importance when analyzing portfolio decisions. Investors ignoring contagion completely or accounting for contagion while ignoring its time dimension suffer large and economically significant utility losses. These losses are larger in complete than in incomplete markets, and the investor might be better off if he does not trade derivatives. Furthermore, we emphasize that the risk of contagion has a crucial impact on investors’ security demands, since it reduces their ability to diversify their portfolios.     

Pairwise disjoint eight‐shaped curves in hybrid planes

We introduce a suitable notion of eight‐shaped curve in the product S × ? of a Suslin line S for the real line ?, and we prove that if S is dense in itself, then every collection of pairwise disjoint eight‐shaped curves in S × ? is countable. This parallels a folklore result which holds for the real plane. (© 2007 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim)     

Arbitrage and the tax code

We provide a detailed characterization of arbitrage-free asset prices in the presence of capital gains and income taxes. The distinguishing feature of our analysis is that we impose on the model two important features of the tax code: the limited use of capital losses and the inability to wash sell. We show that under remarkably mild conditions, the lack of pre-tax arbitrage implies the lack of post-tax arbitrage with the limited use of capital losses. The conditions are that the risk free interest rate be positive and that tax rates on interest income exceed capital gains tax rates. The result also holds when only a wash sale constraint is imposed and no investor holds a portfolio with a large capital loss. We allow investors to face different tax rates and have different bases for the calculation of capital gains taxes. The characterizations we provide have important implications for both asset pricing and portfolio choice. Our results imply that models that use arbitrage-free pre-tax models continue for derivative pricing and hedging are also arbitrage free in a world with taxes. Similarly, portfolio choice models with taxes typically specify pre-tax arbitrage free price processes and then analyze portfolio choice in the presence of taxes. In these models, it is unclear if portfolio recommendations are based on risk-return tradeoffs or on the arbitrage opportunities present in the model. Our results imply that if the above features of the tax code are modeled explicitly, then we can isolate the post-tax risk-return tradeoffs.     

Analyzing Risky Choices: Q‐learning for Deal‐No‐Deal

In this paper, we derive an optimal strategy for the popular Deal or No Deal game show. To do this, we use Q‐learning methods, which quantify the continuation value inherent in sequential decision making in the game. We then analyze two contestants, Frank and Susanne, risky choices from the European version of the game. Given their choices and our optimal strategy, we find what their implied bounds would be on their levels of risk aversion. Previous empirical evidence in risky decision making has suggested that past outcomes affect future choices and that contestants have time‐varying risk aversion. We demonstrate that the strategies of Frank and Susanne are consistent with constant risk aversion levels except for their final risk‐seeking choice. We conclude with directions for future research. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.