不确定下广义博弈强Berge均衡的存在性

本文基于不确定下的非合作博弈NS均衡给出了不确定下广义非合作博弈强Berge均衡与广义多目标弱Pareto强Berge均衡的定义,利用Fan-Glicksberg不动点定理证明了不确定下广义非合作博弈强Berge均衡与不确定下广义多目标弱Pareto强Berge均衡存在性定理.     

广义不确定性下非合作博弈中Berge-NS均衡的存在性

在已知不确定参数变化范围的假设下,引入广义不确定性概念,并且基于非合作博弈的Berge均衡及帕雷托均衡的概念,结合NS均衡,定义出广义不确定性下非合作博弈的Berge-NS均衡,并借助极大元定理证明其存在性,并且给出相应的特殊形式.最后利用算例验证其可行性和有效性.     

模糊二人非合作对策的简单Berge均衡

研究模糊二人非合作对策的简单Berge均衡的存在性.基于Zimmermann处理模糊多目标线性规划的观点和Zhukovskii提出的简单Berge均衡概念,定义了模糊二人非合作对策的简单Berge均衡并借助于Ky Fan不等式证明其存在性.     

不完备偏好下广义强Berge均衡的存在性

本文基于不完备偏好集中元素对应的等价类集是一个偏序集,把不完备偏好问题转化为偏序问题,得到了不完备偏好下的不动点定理,提供一种新的方法证明局中人的决策偏好不满足完备性时,n人非合作博弈中广义强Berge均衡的存在性.     

基于α-CIS值的非合作-合作双型博弈的求解

本文研究了非合作-合作双型博弈模型求解的问题.首先利用于α-CIS值,求解非合作-合作双型博弈中的合作博弈阶段,再对非合作博弈阶段求其纯策略纳什均衡,获得了基于α-CIS值的双型博弈的一种新的求解方法.推广了原始双型博弈模型的求解方法并证明其可行性.     

集值伪连续函数及其在非合作与合作博弈中的应用

首先,我们引入一类集值伪连续函数.在此基础上,我们给出集值伪连续函数的性质特征刻画.然后,作为应用,我们在具有集值伪连续支付函数的博弈问题中,分别证明了非合作博弈均衡与合作博弈均衡的存在性.最后给出一个具体算例,验证了其可行性.     

不确定参数下群体博弈均衡的存在性与通有稳定性

本文在已知不确定参数变化范围的假设下,研究了不确定参数下群体博弈均衡的存在性与通有稳定性.首先,基于经典非合作博弈NS均衡概念提出了不确定参数下群体博弈NS均衡的定义;其次,在支付函数连续性与凸性的一定假设下,利用Ky Fan不等式证明了均衡的存在性;最后,给出了不确定参数下群体博弈模型NS均衡集通有稳定性的相关结论,运用Fort引理证明了在Baire分类的意义下,当支付函数发生扰动时,大多数不确定参数下群体博弈的NS均衡点集都是稳定的.     

多主从群体博弈中合作均衡的存在性

基于Scarf,Kajii关于n-人非合作博弈中的合作均衡存在性定理,越来越多的研究表明,对非合作博弈的合作均衡研究是有必要的.本文综合Sandholm的群体博弈模型以及Yang和Ju证明的多主从博弈的合作均衡存在性定理,旨在详细研究多主从群体博弈的合作均衡.首先,在多主从群体博弈中引入合作均衡的概念,并通过Kajii...     

广义不确定下广义多目标博弈弱Pareto-Nash均衡点集的存在性与本质连通区

引入具有不确定参数的n人广义多目标博弈,这里局中人了解不确定性参数的变化区域,而且个人的参数变化与其他局中人的行为密切相关.我们定义广义不确定下广义多目标博弈的弱Pareto-Nash均衡.进一步我们证明广义不确定下广义多目标博弈的弱Pare-Nash均衡点集的存在性与本质连通区的存在性.     

信息集广义多目标博弈弱Pareto-Nash平衡点的存在性和稳定性

首先把信息集的概念引入到多目标博弈, 建立了信息集广义多目标博弈模型, 并指出了信息集广义多目标博弈以广义多目标博弈、广义n人非合作博弈、一般n人非合作博弈为特例, 然后用Fan-Glicksberg不动点定理证明了信息集广义多目标博弈弱Pareto-Nash平衡点的存在性, 最后在本质解和强本质解的意义下, 分别研究了信息集广义多目标博弈弱Pareto-Nash平衡点的通有稳定性和强本质连通区的存在性.     

不确定性下的一主多从博弈及其ε-平衡稳定性分析

本文对主从博弈以及不确定性等问题进行研究,建立了不确定性下的一主多从博弈模型,并利用极大值定理证明了该模型均衡点的存在性。对于不确定性下的一主多从博弈的均衡点问题建立了有限理性模型,进而得到其均衡点的稳定性,即结构稳定以及对ε-平衡是鲁棒的。     

不确定条件下n人非合作博弈均衡点集的通有稳定性

基于经典博弈模型的Nash均衡点集的通有稳定性和具有不确定参数的n人非合作博弈均衡点的概念,探讨了具有不确定参数博弈的均衡点集的通有稳定性.参照Nash均衡点集稳定性的统一模式,构造了不确定博弈的问题空间和解空间,并证明了问题空间是一个完备度量空间,解映射是上半连续的,且解集是紧集（即usco（upper semicontinuous and compact-valued）映射）,得到不确定参数博弈模型的解集通有稳定性的相关结论.     

抽象凸空间中集值映射的不动点定理及其应用

A new fixed point theorem and the selection property for upper semi-continuous set-valued mappings in abstract convexity space are established. As their applications the existence of Nash equilibrium for n-person non-cooperative generalized games is proved.     

Inequalities and Nash equilibria

This paper concentrates on the problem of the existence of equilibrium points for non-cooperative generalized N-person games, N-person games of normal form and their related inequalities. We utilize the K-K-M lemma to obtain a theorem and then use it to obtain a new Fan-type inequality and minimax theorems. Various new equilibrium point theorems are derived, with the necessary and sufficient conditions and with strategy spaces with no fixed point property. Examples are given to demonstrate that these existence theorems cover areas where other existence theorems break down.     

A note on Berge equilibrium

This work is a contribution on the problem of the existence of Berge equilibrium. Abalo and Kostreva give an existence theorem for this equilibrium that appears in the papers [K.Y. Abalo, M.M. Kostreva, Berge equilibrium: Some recent results from fixed-point theorems, Appl. Math. Comput. 169 (2005) 624–638; K.Y. Abalo, M.M. Kostreva, Some existence theorems of Nash and Berge equilibria, Appl. Math. Lett. 17 (2004) 569–573]. We found that the assumptions of these theorems are not sufficient for the existence of Berge equilibrium. Indeed, we construct a game that verifies Abalo and Kostreva’s assumptions, but has no Berge equilibrium. Then we provide a condition that overcomes the problem in these theorems. Our conclusion is also valid for Radjef’s theorem, which is the basic reference for [K.Y. Abalo, M.M. Kostreva, Berge equilibrium: Some recent results from fixed-point theorems, Appl. Math. Comput. 169 (2005) 624–638; K.Y. Abalo, M.M. Kostreva, Some existence theorems of Nash and Berge equilibria, Appl. Math. Lett. 17 (2004) 569–573; K.Y. Abalo, M.M. Kostreva, Fixed points, Nash games and their organizations, Topol. Methods Nonlinear Anal. 8 (1996) 205–215; K.Y. Abalo, M.M. Kostreva, Equi-well-posed games, J. Optim. Theory Appl. 89 (1996) 89–99].     

多目标大博弈中弱Pareto-Berge均衡的存在性

研究了具有任意多个局中人的非合作多目标博弈(多目标大博弈).基于一般非合作博弈中的Berge均衡概念,定义多目标大博弈中的弱Pareto-Berge均衡.进一步推广了截口定理,得到新的截口定理,并且利用这个新的截口定理证明多目标大博弈中弱Pareto-Berge均衡的存在性.多目标大博弈中弱Pareto-Nash均衡的存在性结论可作为弱Pareto-Berge均衡存在性的特例给出.     

有限理性与一类多主从博弈问题的良定性

利用Ky Fan不等式证明了一类多主从博弈平衡点的存在性,并且定义了此类多主从博弈的有限理性函数.在非线性问题的良定性的框架下,使用有限理性证明了此类多主从博弈问题是广义Had-amard良定的和广义Tykhonov良定的.     

EQUILIBIA OF NONCOMPACT GENERALIZED GAMES WITH CORRESPONDENCES WITHOUT OPEN LOWER SECTIONS

1IntroductionOneofthemainresultsofequilibriullltheoryforgelleralizedgalllesistileexistellceofmaximalelementsconcerninganirreflexivepreferencecorrespondellcewitllcollvexvalues,openlowersections,definedonacompactconvexsubsetKofRnalldwithvaluesillZap,seen.Chapter7].Duetotheimportallceofapplications,tileresultwasgelleralizedby1flailyauthors,forexample,see[2,5--7,10,13,15-181.Tilelllostoftheseexistellcetheorellisforlllaxilllalelementsandequilibriulllpointsdealwithpreferencecorrespondenceswhichhav…     

Generalized Browder-type fixed point theorem with strongly geodesic convexity on Hadamard manifolds with applications

In this paper, a generalized Browder-type fixed point theorem on Hadamard manifolds is introduced, which can be regarded as a generalization of the Browder-type fixed point theorem for the set-valued mapping on an Euclidean space to a Hadamard manifold. As applications, a maximal element theorem, a section theorem, a Ky Fan-type Minimax Inequality and an existence theorem of Nash equilibrium for non-cooperative games on Hadamard manifolds are established.     

Population uncertainty and Poisson games

A general class of models is developed for analyzing games with population uncertainty. Within this general class, a special class of Poisson games is defined. It is shown that Poisson games are uniquely characterized by properties of independent actions and environmental equivalence. The general definition of equilibrium for games with population uncertainty is formulated, and it is shown that the equilibria of Poisson games are invariant under payoff-irrelevant type splitting. An example of a large voting game is discussed, to illustrate the advantages of using a Poisson game model for large games. Received December 1995/Revised version July 1997