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EQUILIBIA OF NONCOMPACT GENERALIZED GAMES WITH CORRESPONDENCES WITHOUT OPEN LOWER SECTIONS
作者姓名:丁协平
作者单位:Deparfment of Mathematics,Sichuan Normal University,Chengdu,610066,China
摘    要:1IntroductionOneofthemainresultsofequilibriullltheoryforgelleralizedgalllesistileexistellceofmaximalelementsconcerninganirreflexivepreferencecorrespondellcewitllcollvexvalues,openlowersections,definedonacompactconvexsubsetKofRnalldwithvaluesillZap,seen.Chapter7].Duetotheimportallceofapplications,tileresultwasgelleralizedby1flailyauthors,forexample,see2,5--7,10,13,15-181.Tilelllostoftheseexistellcetheorellisforlllaxilllalelementsandequilibriulllpointsdealwithpreferencecorrespondenceswhichhav…


EQUILIBIA OF NONCOMPACT GENERALIZED GAMES WITH CORRESPONDENCES WITHOUT OPEN LOWER SECTIONS
Ding Xieping.EQUILIBIA OF NONCOMPACT GENERALIZED GAMES WITH CORRESPONDENCES WITHOUT OPEN LOWER SECTIONS[J].Acta Mathematica Scientia,1998(1).
Authors:Ding Xieping
Abstract:The new classes of Fc-correspondences and Fc -majorised correspondenceswithout open lower sections is introduced. Some existence theorems of madximal elements ofthe Fc -correspondences and the Fc-majorized correspondences defined on noncompactset in topological vector spaces are obtained. As applications, some existence theoremsof equilibrium points for one-person games, qualitative games and generalized games withthe Fc -majorized correspondences devined on noncompact strategy sets in topologicalvector spaces are also given. These theorems improve and generalize several known resultsin recent literature.
Keywords:Generalized games Fc-majorized correspondence  transfer compactly openvalued  equilibrium
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