信息披露扭曲下企业债券违约风险量化研究

信息披露的真实性会直接影响到投资者对企业债券违约风险自々判断。利用信息噪声的偏倚性捕获财务报告信息中对资产价值的故意扭曲,推导了信息偏误下资产价值的条件分布、违约概率和信用价差的解析表达式.数值分析表明当资产价值遭到不同方向的扭曲时,信息噪声与违约概率会表现出不同的变动关系。实证检验表明该模型可以较为准确的刻画财务信息扭曲造成的债券违约风险和信用价差的变化规律。该模型为理解债券违约风险和财务报告信息扭曲之间的关系提供了新的启发,可以帮助债券投资者在信息披露问题比较严重的市场环境中评估违约风险。     

信息披露质量影响公司风险承担:治理效应抑或声誉效应？

基于信息披露理论和公司治理理论,本文实证检验了信息披露质量对公司风险承担的影响。实证结果发现:较高的信息披露质量有助于提高公司风险承担水平,从而验证了信息披露的“治理效应”。进一步发现,管理层持股激励能够影响上市公司的信息披露行为,并提高公司风险承担水平,说明管理层持股能够加强信息披露质量与公司风险承担之间的正向关系,且这种影响关系在高管理层持股组中更显著。研究结论不仅丰富和拓展了信息披露和公司风险承担的相关研究,而且对管理层激励契约的设计和公司风险认知具有重要的启示作用和现实意义。     

机构投资者参与公司治理监督的非合作对策

本文研究了 n个机构投资者在参与公司治理 ,对公司实施监督的过程中非合作博弈情况 .在 n个机构投资者不卖出股份等相关假设下 ,其非合作博弈结果是 ,持有股份最大机构投资者才会对公司进行监督 ,其他股东采取搭便车策略 .     

投资者调研对不实传闻市场反应的影响研究

本文基于投资者信息获取视角, 采用2013~2017年深圳交易所上市公司样本, 实证检验了投资者调研能否降低不实传闻引发的市场反应, 并通过投资者交易行为在其间发挥的中介作用探讨其作用机理。研究发现:投资者调研通过使市场交易行为更为理性, 显著降低了不实传闻引发的市场反应, 并且这一作用在当期业绩发生大幅变化的公司中更为明显。以上结果在进行了一系列稳健性检验后依然成立, 说明投资者调研能够提高资本市场对不实传闻的分辨能力, 从而提高市场定价效率。进一步检验发现, 参与调研活动或分析披露的调研信息均有助于提高投资者理性决策水平, 并且投资者调研显著提升了公司发布传闻澄清公告的及时性。     

动态

美SEC将针对大银行财务粉饰提出新规 美国联邦监管机构近期表示,将针对财务粉饰问题推出新的披露规则。 对18家大银行金融数据进行的分析显示．作为一个整体,这些银行在过去六个季度中每个季度末都会降低债务水平,由季度峰值平均降低了42％。该做法暗示这些银行比显现给投资者或消费者的状况承担了更多的风险。投资者只能从公司的季度资产负债表中看到债务水平。     

机构调研行为的示范效应研究——基于深证“互动易”平台的实验证据

基于深交所“互动易”平台的机构调研信息和投资者问答数据,以投资者关注为聚焦点,通过剖析机构调研行为-投资者关注-股票流动性的传导路径,检验中国股票市场机构调研行为的示范效应。结论表明,机构调研行为具有强烈的示范效应,能够通过引起其他投资者的关注,促进中短期股票流动性的提高,且机构调研行为越集中,这种示范效应越强。此外,对于信息披露质量较低和机构持股比例较低的公司,机构调研行为更容易引起投资者的关注,示范效应更强。研究结论验证了机构投资者的信息优势性和行为影响力,支持了投资者的信息解读能力,为机构投资者的市场引导作用提供解释依据。     

具有违约观察期公司债券的定价

借助于美国破产保护法第十一章,违约公司获得-个额外的违约观察期过程,通过纳什均衡原理对股东和债权人的利益进行重新分配,利用巴黎型期权的定价思想来刻画具有这种违约观察期过程的股票与公司债券的定价模型,并从股东权益最大化,把股票的定价模型归结为-个自由边界问题,进而通过偏微分方程方法(PDE)推出股票与公司偾券价格的闭合表达式和最佳违约边界解的显式表达式;同时文章还对公司的最优杠杆,清算概率和信用利差进行讨论.     

ST公司基于财务数据的动态分析

国内上市公司发生ST可以看作违约,现有的研究基本基于静态的判别分析。本文提出了基于Cox模型的动态违约预报模型,考虑了多阶段财务状态变量对违约强度的影响。选取1998年以前国内A股市场上市的公司作为样本,发现流动比率、其它应收款/总资产和资产周转率等财务指标对公司是否发生ST有显著影响,且其它应收款占比影响较大,投资者应当提高警惕。同时还发现,我国的证券市场还处于初期的不断调试完善阶段,模型存在微小的结构性变化。本文还针对训练样本外的测试样本做了预报检验,并以Logit模型作为对比,发现二者均可以进行违约预报,且基于Cox的动态模型优于传统的Logit模型。     

动态

中国公司治理内控矛盾依然突出近日,甫瀚咨询联合中国社会科学院共同发布其连续第七年的合作成果一《2011年中国上市公司100强公司治理评价》报告。该报告主要参考经济合作与发展组织《公司治理原则》,并结合中国的相关法律、法规,从“股东权利”、“平等对待股东”、“利益相关者作用”、“信息披露和透明度”、“董事会职责”和“监事会职责”等六大评价板块着手.     

信息披露中四方主体双边合谋的博弈分析

为了解决信息披露过程中的多个主体合谋损害投资者利益的问题,根据信息披露的过程,采用多人非合作博弈的方法构建了上市公司、媒体、会计事务所和监管机构参与双边合谋的博弈模型,均衡分析发现:每个局中人最优策略选择都取决于实现各自预期效用最大化的临界值.最后根据每个主体决策的临界值提出了治理合谋的政策建议.     

A new equilibrium in the one-sided asymmetric information market with pairwise meetings

We reconsider the model used by Serrano and Yosha (1993) who were interested in information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings. We prove that there exists an additional equilibrium not detected in the original paper and show that this equilibrium is characterized by incomplete revelation of information which was not the case of the other already identified equilibria of the model.     

Switching tax structure and payouts in endogenous bankruptcy models

In the spirit of Leland (H.E. Leland, Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenant, and Optimal Capital Structure, J. Finance 49 (1994), pp. 1213–1252), we consider a structural credit risk model with tax provisions under the assumption of a positive payout rate. By defining a more general tax structure than in (Leland, 1994), we introduce a general switching corporate tax rate function and analytically derive the value of the tax benefits claim, the whole capital structure and the smooth pasting condition. In this set-up, the endogenous failure level is derived and both the singular and joint effect of the two introduced risk factors (payouts and tax asymmetry) on optimal managerial financing decisions are studied. Results show a quantitatively significant impact on optimal debt issuance and leverage ratios, bringing them to values more in line with historical norms and providing a way to explain differences in observed leverage across firms.     

A model of interim information sharing under incomplete information

We propose a two-person game-theoretical model to study information sharing decisions at an interim stage when information is incomplete. The two agents have pieces of private information about the state of nature, and that information is improved by combining the pieces. Agents are both senders and receivers of information. There is an institutional arrangement that fixes a transfer of wealth from an agent who lies about her private information. In our model, we show that (1) there is a positive relation between information revelation and the amount of the transfers, and (2) information revelation has a collective action structure, in particular, the incentives of an agent to reveal decrease with respect to the amount of information disclosed by the other.     

Consumer returns reduction and information revelation mechanism for a supply chain

In this paper, we develop two revelation mechanism models of a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer under asymmetric information, where the retailer provides store assistance (SA) to reduce consumer returns rate and increase demand. Under full information, we find that a higher returns rate or returns handling cost increases the SA level if the market scale is sufficiently high. In the demand information asymmetry model, we find that: (i) the low-type retailer (facing a low demand) has no incentive to distort demand information while the high-type retailer may report wrong information; (ii) the manufacturer would like to design a menu of wholesale price-order quantity contract to induce truthful demand information and the manufacturer pays an information rent to the high-type retailer if the returns rate or returns handling cost for the retailer is sufficiently low; (iii) asymmetry of information does not change the monotonicity of the unit wholesale price in the retailer’s type, and information asymmetry decreases the retail price but increases the SA level. Unlike the demand information asymmetry model, a higher retailer’s returns handling cost expands the effects of information asymmetry on the retail price and the SA level, and using revelation mechanism decreases the channel profit if the retailer’s returns handling cost is sufficiently high under the returns rate information asymmetry model.     

The Cutting Stock Problem for the Stockholder of Steel Reinforcement Bars

Journal of the Operational Research Society - The stockholder of steel reinforcement bars supplies cut lengths to its customers to be used principally in prestressed concrete. The bars which the...     

基于股吧情感本体与传播的股市短线预测

为研究股吧文本中蕴含的股民情感对股市短线走势的影响,使用情感倾向点互信息算法构建面向股市的情感词典,分别考虑情感本体与情感来源传播建立面向股市的加权情感倾向得分模型,并进一步建立ARMA-GARCHX模型以分析股民情感与股市短线走势之间的关系.研究显示：面向股市的情感词典相比于传统情感词典具有更强的适应性,使用加权情感倾向得分模型建立的预测模型对股市走向的预测相比于传统方法具有更优良的预测效果.     

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This paper establish a first passage time model based on the Merton's structural model by using the method of geometric Brownian motion. In this paper, we consider the accounting noise and historical default record and then introduce a new incomplete information hypothesis. Besides, we introduce the stock's liquidity value into the model, and apply its method measurement which based on Merton's structural model to the first passage time model to obtain the endogenous default boundary. Based on the incomplete information, the conditional default probability is derived by using the default boundary. And at the last of this passage, we analysis the effect of the correlation between stock's price and company assets on the default probability.     

The communication complexity of private value single-item auctions

This paper is concerned with information revelation in single-item auctions. We compute how much data needs to be transmitted in three strategically equivalent auctions—the Vickrey auction, the English auction and the recently proposed bisection auction—and show that in the truth-telling equilibrium the bisection auction is the best performer.     

具有一般跳幅度分布的跳扩散模型下永久公司债券的定价

在公司资产价值演化服从具有一般跳幅度分布的跳扩散模型下,采用结构化方法研究具有无限到期日公司债券的定价问题,通过微分方程的方法和无套利原理获得了公司债券,股东权益和公司总价值的定价表达式以及最佳违约边界的表达式.     

多因素干扰下的供应链最优定价与订货决策

在信息不对称条件下,市场需求、价格和风险厌恶等因素同时干扰时,构建数量折扣契约的供应链博弈模型,寻找其实现供应链协调的内在约束条件。根据显示原理,构建信息不对称条件下多因素干扰的CVaR模型并求解,然后用算例仿真,结果表明:供应商隐瞒生产成本信息会带来额外收益,但给零售商造成额外损失。价格随机与零售商厌恶风险的耦合作用是导致供应链上各决策变量发生分岔现象的内因,与信息是否对称无关。但信息不对称会损害供应链系统的稳定性。在分岔突变区域内供应链失调,在区域之外供应链协调。零售商风险中性的态度和提高信息透明度有利于提高整个供应链的绩效。