A dynamic model for advertising and pricing competition between national and store brands

We study the relationship between the pricing and advertising decisions in a channel where a national brand is competing with a private label. We consider a differential game that incorporates the carryover effects of brand advertising over time for both the manufacturer and the retailer and we account for the complementary and competitive roles of advertising. Analysis of the obtained equilibrium Markov strategies shows that the relationship between advertising and pricing decisions in the channel depends mainly on the nature of the advertising effects. In particular, the manufacturer reacts to higher competitive retailer’s advertising levels by offering price concessions and limiting his advertising expenditures. The retailer’s optimal reaction to competitive advertising effects in the channel depends on two factors: (1) the price competition level between the store and the national brands and (2) the strength of the competitive advertising effects. For example, in case of intense price competition between the two brands combined with a strong manufacturer’s competitive advertising effect, the retailer should lower both the store and the national brands’ prices as a reaction to higher manufacturer’s advertising levels. For the retailer, the main advantage from boosting his competitive advertising investments seems to be driven by increased revenues from the private label. The retailer should however limit his investments in advertising if the latter generates considerable competitive effects on the national brand’s sales.     

Price and lead time decisions in dual-channel supply chains

Manufacturers today are increasingly adopting a dual channel to sell their products, i.e., the traditional retail channel and an online direct channel. Empirical studies have shown that service quality (we focus on the delivery lead time of the direct channel) even goes beyond product price as one of the major factors influencing consumer acceptance of the direct channel. Delivery lead time has significant effects on demand, profit, and pricing strategy. However, there is scant literature addressing the decision on the promised delivery lead time of a direct channel and its impact on the manufacturer’s and retailer’s pricing decisions. To fill this gap, we examine the optimal decisions of delivery lead time and prices in a centralized and a decentralized dual-channel supply chain using the two-stage optimization technique and Stackelberg game, and analyze the impacts of delivery lead time and customer acceptance of a direct channel on the manufacturer’s and retailer’s pricing behaviours. We analytically show that delivery lead time strongly influences the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s pricing strategies and profits. Our numerical studies reveal that the difference between the demand transfer ratios in the two channels with respect to delivery lead time and direct sale price, customer acceptance of the direct channel, and product type have great effects on the lead time and pricing decisions.     

Dynamic pricing with uncertain production cost: An alternating-move approach

This article studies a two-firm dynamic pricing model with random production costs. The firms produce the same perishable products over an infinite time horizon when production (or operation) costs are random. In each period, each firm determines its price and production levels based on its current production cost and its opponent’s previous price level. We use an alternating-move game to model this problem and show that there exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in production and pricing decisions. We provide a closed-form solution for the firm’s pricing policy. Finally, we study the game in the case of incomplete information, when both or one of the firms do not have access to the current prices charged by their opponents.     

Dynamic pricing and warranty policies for products with fixed lifetime

We consider a repairable product with known market entry and departure times. A warranty policy is offered with product purchase, under which a customer can have a failed item repaired free of charge in the warranty period. It is assumed that customers are heterogeneous in their risk attitudes toward uncertain repair costs incurred after the warranty expires. The objective is to determine a joint dynamic pricing and warranty policy for the lifetime of the product, which maximizes the manufacturer’s expected profit. In the first part of the analysis, we consider a linearly decreasing price function and a constant warranty length. We first study customers’ purchase patterns under several different pricing strategies by the manufacturer and then discuss the optimal pricing and warranty strategy. In the second part, we assume that the warranty length can be altered once during the product lifetime in developing a joint pricing and warranty policy. Numerical studies show that a dynamic warranty policy can significantly outperform a fixed-length warranty policy.     

Dynamic pricing of inventory/capacity with infrequent price changes

We consider a problem of dynamically pricing a single product sold by a monopolist over a short time period. If demand characteristics change throughout the period, it becomes attractive for the company to adjust price continuously to respond to such changes (i.e., price-discriminate intertemporally). However, in practice there is typically a limit on the number of times the price can be adjusted due to the high costs associated with frequent price changes. If that is the case, instead of a continuous pricing rule the company might want to establish a piece-wise constant pricing policy in order to limit the number of price adjustments. Such a pricing policy, which involves optimal choice of prices and timing of price changes, is the focus of this paper.We analyze the pricing problem with a limited number of price changes in a dynamic, deterministic environment in which demand depends on the current price and time, and there is a capacity/inventory constraint that may be set optimally ahead of the selling season. The arrival rate can evolve in time arbitrarily, allowing us to model situations in which prices decrease, increase, or neither. We consider several plausible scenarios where pricing and/or timing of price changes are endogenized. Various notions of complementarity (single-crossing property, supermodularity and total positivity) are explored to derive structural results: conditions sufficient for the uniqueness of the solution and the monotonicity of prices throughout the sales period. Furthermore, we characterize the impact of the capacity constraint on the optimal prices and the timing of price changes and provide several other comparative statics results. Additional insights are obtained directly from the solutions of various special cases.     

Double optimal stopping times and dynamic pricing problem: description of the mathematical model

In many industries, managers face the problem of selling a given stock of items by a deadline. We investigate the problem of dynamically pricing such inventories when demand is price sensitive and stochastic and the firm’s objective is to maximize expected revenues. Examples that fit this framework include retailers selling fashion and seasonal goods and the travel and leisure industry, which markets space such as seats on airline flights, cabins on vacation cruises, hotels renting rooms before midnight and theaters selling seats before curtain time that become worthless if not sold by a specific time. Given a fixed number of seats, rooms, or coats, the objective for these industries is to maximize revenues in excess of salvage value. When demand is price sensitive and stochastic, pricing is an effective tool to maximize revenues. In this paper, we address the problem of deciding the optimal timing of a double price changes from a given initial price to given lower or higher prices. Under mild conditions, it is shown that it is optimal to decrease the initial price as soon as the time-to-go falls below a time threshold and increase the price if time-to-go is longer than adequate time threshold. These thresholds depend on the number of yet unsold items.      

The impact of dynamic pricing on the economic order decision

This paper analyzes the impact of dynamic pricing on the single product economic order decision of a monopolist retailer. Items are procured from an external supplier according to the economic order quantity (EOQ) model and are sold to customers on a single market without competition following the simple monopolist pricing problem. Coordinated decision making of optimal pricing and ordering is influenced by operating costs – including ordering and inventory holding costs – and the demand rate obtained from a price response function. The retailer is allowed to vary the selling price, either in a fixed number of discrete points in time or continuously. While constant and continuous pricing have received much attention in the literature, problems with a limited number of price changes are rather rare. This paper illustrates the benefit of dynamically changing prices to achieve operational efficiency in the EOQ model, that is to trigger high demand rates when inventories are high. We provide structural properties of the optimal time instants when the price should be changed. Taking into account costs for changes in price, it provides numerical guidance on number, timing, and size of price changes during an order cycle. Numerical examples show that the benefits of dynamic pricing in an EOQ framework can be achieved with only a few price changes and that products being unprofitable under static pricing may become profitable under dynamic pricing.     

基于预售的生鲜供应链销售模式选择与定价研究

研究预售下由供应商与零售商构成的生鲜供应链的销售模式选择与定价策略,其中包括分散与集中两种销售模式,撇脂与渗透两种定价策略。结果表明,在网络消费者对实体渠道偏好较低时,分散与集中模式均会选择撇脂定价,反之选择渗透定价。撇脂定价下,集中模式中零售商可以通过调节两个渠道的价格占有更大的市场,获取高于分散模式下的利润。而分散模式中,由于两个零售商会存在竞争,因此为了获得竞争优势该模式下的定价会存在低价销售的情形。比较销售模式可知,在网络消费者占比少或占比多但对实体渠道偏好越小时,供应商在分散模式下能获得更高的利润,反之,集中模式对供应商更有利。但是,对零售商而言,分散模式更有利于实体渠道,而集中模式更有利于网络渠道。     

Optimal quoting of delivery time by a third party logistics provider: The impact of shipment consolidation and temporal pricing schemes

Increased competition in business environments requires that firms provide not only quality but also timely service with minimal cost. Offering a delivery-time guarantee may increase the demand for a product or service, or allow the firm to charge a price premium. This paper investigates the effects of different pricing schemes for a Third Party Logistics (3PL) provider. The 3PL tenders a consolidated load to a carrier that line-hauls over a certain origin–destination lane. In a price- and time-sensitive logistics market, we derive the optimal quotations that should be made for price and delivery-time, with the objective of maximizing the profit rate of the 3PL provider. We propose four easy-to-use temporal pricing schemes, and derive the corresponding optimal length of shipment consolidation cycles and the prices. Depending on the logistics market parameters, we show that charging according to an order’s time of arrival is not necessarily the best pricing scheme. Various managerial insights and numerical examples with sensitivity analysis are provided.     

THE LONG‐RUN INEFFICIENCY OF BLOCK‐RATE PRICING

ABSTRACT. In this paper we compare two regulation instruments, flat‐rate and increasing block‐rate pricing. The analysis applies to a competitive industry with free entry. Charge for irrigation water is a concrete example. It is shown that flat‐rate pricing leads to a first‐best social optimum, while with block‐rate pricing where the highest block set at the marginal cost, there is over production, firms are too small, and loss of economic surplus occurs. Moreover, first‐best is not implementable by increasing block‐rate pricing. This is in contrast to the commonly accepted view that block‐rate pricing is superior to flat‐rate pricing by allowing for income redistribution while preserving efficiency. Several second‐best situations are analyzed to show: 1) Block‐rate pricing with the highest block at the social marginal cost is optimal when the regulator must preserve the number of firms. 2) Water pricing alone cannot implement social optimum subject to a constant level of agricultural production. 3) Lobbying and political pressures, which force the regulator to sustain a constant average water price, result in optimal block‐rate pricing with the highest block below the social marginal cost.     

Integration of pricing and capacity allocation for perishable products

For years pricing and capacity allocation decisions in most revenue management models have been carried out independently. This article presents a comprehensive model to integrate these two decisions for perishable products. We assume that the supplier sells the same products to different micro-markets at distinct prices. Throughout the sales season, the supplier faces decisions as to which micro-markets or customer classes should be served and at what prices. We show that (i) at any time, a customer class is active (being served) if and only if the price offered is over a threshold level, but the optimal price may not be the highest one of the supplier’s choice; (ii) when the price decision is made in conjunction with inventory, it is similar to the procedure shown in pure pricing models, i.e., the optimal price comes from a subset of prices that forms a maximum increasing concave envelope; (iii) because of dynamic changes in the optimal prices, the nested-price structure does not necessarily hold in general and needs to be redefined; and (iv) the optimal pricing and capacity control policy is based on a sequence of threshold points that incorporate inventory, price and demand intensity. Numerical examples are provided.     

The effect of market segmentation with demand leakage between market segments on a firm’s price and inventory decisions

In this paper, we address the simultaneous determination of price and inventory replenishment in a newsvendor setting when the firm faces demand from two or more market segments in which the firm can set different prices. We allow for demand leakage from higher-priced segments to lower-priced segments and assume that unsatisfied demand can be backlogged. We examine the case where the demands occur concurrently without priority and are met from a single inventory. We consider customer’s buy-down behavior explicitly by modeling demand leakage as a function of segment price differentiation, and characterize the structure of optimal inventory and pricing policies.     

A competitive dynamic pricing model when demand is interdependent over time

In this study, we contribute to the dynamic pricing literature by developing a finite horizon model for two firms offering substitutable and nonperishable products with different quality levels. Customers can purchase and store the products, even if they do not need them at the time, in order to use them in future. The stockpile of the products generated by customers affects the demand in future periods. Therefore, the demand for each product not only is a function of prices and quality levels, but also of the products’ stockpile levels. In addition, the stockpile levels change the customers’ consumption behavior; more product in a stockpile leads to more consumption. Therefore, we address not only the price and demand relationship but also the stockpiling and consumption relationship in a competitive environment.     

Pricing and hedging in the presence of extraneous risks

Given an underlying complete financial market, we study contingent claims whose payoffs may depend on the occurrence of nonmarket events. We first investigate the almost-sure hedging of such claims. In particular, we obtain new representations of the hedging prices and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a claim to be marketed. The analysis of various examples then leads us to investigate alternative pricing rules. We choose to embed the pricing problem into the agent’s portfolio decision and study reservation prices. We establish the existence and consistency of this pricing rule in a semimartingale model. We characterize the nonlinear dependence of the reservation price with respect to both the agent’s initial capital and the size of her position. The fair price arises as a limiting case.     

Price coordination in distribution channels: A dynamic perspective

In this study, we investigate two important questions related to dynamic pricing in distribution channels: (i) Are coordinated pricing decisions efficient in a context where prices have carry-over effects on demand? (ii) Should firms practice a skimming or a penetration strategy if they choose to coordinate or to decentralize their activities? To answer these questions, we consider a differential game that takes place in a bilateral monopoly where the past retail prices paid by consumers contribute to the building of a reference price. The latter is used by consumers as a benchmark to evaluate the value of the product, and by firms to decide whether to adopt a skimming or a penetration strategy.     

Selling to the “Newsvendor” with a forecast update: Analysis of a dual purchase contract

We consider a supply chain in which a manufacturer sells to a procure-to-stock retailer facing a newsvendor problem with a forecast update. Under a wholesale price contract, the retailer waits as long as she can and optimally places her order after observing the forecast update. We show that the retailer’s wait-and-decide strategy, induced by the wholesale price contract, hinders the manufacturer’s ability to (1) set the wholesale price and maximize his profit, (2) hedge against excess inventory risk, and (3) reduce his profit uncertainty. To mitigate the adverse effect of wholesale price contract, we propose the dual purchase contract, through which the manufacturer provides a discount for orders placed before the forecast update. We characterize how and when a dual purchase contract creates strict Pareto improvement over a wholesale price contract. To do so, we establish the retailer’s optimal ordering policy and the manufacturer’s optimal pricing and production policies. We show how the dual purchase contract reduces profit variability and how it can be used as a risk hedging tool for a risk averse manufacturer. Through a numerical study, we provide additional managerial insights and show, for example, that market uncertainty is a key factor that defines when the dual purchase contract provides strict Pareto improvement over the wholesale price contract.     

Risk-averse order policies with random prices in complete market and retailers’ private information

We consider a retailer who orders products before the price for them becomes known. The price is an outcome of perfect competition in a complete market. Since the demand is price sensitive, the uncertainty in prices induces uncertain profits and associated risks. In this paper we show that if the retailer is risk averse and, as a result, selects a utility function of profit to maximize, then his subjective assessment of future prices is affected by the risk attitude. This, in turn, introduces a bias in retailer’s ordering policies. By considering coordinated pricing and ordering policies we derive a relationship between risk aversion, retailer’s subjective (private) assessment and the market implied, risk neutral forecast. This relationship and the induced bias are then illustrated for two typical operations management strategies which involve either inventory considerations or promotions avoiding accumulation of stocks.     

Random yield supply chain with a yield dependent secondary market

This paper considers a simple supply chain with one supplier and one retailer where the supplier’s production is subject to random yield and the retailer faces uncertain demand. There exists a secondary market for acquiring or disposing products by the supplier. We study both the centralized and decentralized systems. In the decentralized system, a no risk sharing contract and a risk sharing minimum commitment contract are analyzed. The supply chain with the risk sharing contract is further analyzed with a constant secondary market price and a yield dependent secondary market price. We present both the supplier’s and the retailer’s optimal strategies and provide insights for managers when making decisions under random yield risk and demand uncertainty. We find that the secondary market generally has a positive impact on supply chain performance and the actual effect of random yield risk on the supply chain performance depends on cost parameters and supply chain contract settings. Under certain conditions, reducing yield randomness may weaken the double marginalization effect and improve the chain performance. From the numerical study, we also show that there exists an optimal commitment level for the supply chain.     

不同价格模式下考虑需求波动性和差异化服务的网约车平台定价决策

针对单个平台两种品牌网约车的最优定价问题,考虑平台服务质量的差异化和市场需求波动性,分别建立动态价格、差异化价格和静态价格模式下的网约车动态服务模型,运用多元函数和泛函的条件极值求得两种品牌网约车的最优定价策略。研究发现,平台最优动态价格和差异化价格均随需求波动时长单调变化,而最优静态价格并非单调。此外,平台提高差异化服务时,两种品牌网约车的最优价格均提高,但高服务质量的网约车会有更高的提价幅度;固定佣金报酬率增大时,平台最优价格均提高,但边际损失成本较大的网约车会有更高的提价幅度。最后,通过数值仿真对不同价格模式下的平台利润进行比较和灵敏度分析,并发现平台利润在市场需求稳定时差异不大。     

Sensitivity of optimal prices to system parameters in a steady-state service facility

We consider the problem of maximizing the long-run average reward in a service facility with dynamic pricing. We investigate sensitivity of optimal pricing policies to the parameters of the service facility which is modelled as an M/M/s/K$M/M/s/K$ queueing system. Arrival process to the facility is Poisson with arrival rate a decreasing function of the price currently being charged by the facility. We prove structural results on the optimal pricing policies when the parameters in the facility change. Namely, we show that optimal prices decrease when the capacity of the facility or the number of servers in the facility increase. Under a reasonable assumption, we also show that optimal prices increase as the overall demand for the service provided by the facility increases or when the service rate of the facility decreases. We illustrate how these structural results simplify the required computational effort while finding the optimal policy.