Price coordination in distribution channels: A dynamic perspective |
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Authors: | Guiomar Martín-Herrán Sihem Taboubi |
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Institution: | 1. IMUVA, Universidad de Valladolid, Spain;2. GERAD, Montréal, Canada;3. Marketing Department, HEC Montréal, Canada |
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Abstract: | In this study, we investigate two important questions related to dynamic pricing in distribution channels: (i) Are coordinated pricing decisions efficient in a context where prices have carry-over effects on demand? (ii) Should firms practice a skimming or a penetration strategy if they choose to coordinate or to decentralize their activities? To answer these questions, we consider a differential game that takes place in a bilateral monopoly where the past retail prices paid by consumers contribute to the building of a reference price. The latter is used by consumers as a benchmark to evaluate the value of the product, and by firms to decide whether to adopt a skimming or a penetration strategy. |
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Keywords: | Marketing channels Dynamic pricing Channel coordination Differential games |
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