Advertising strategies in a franchise system

The main question of this research is: Who should undertake promotional and brand-image advertising if the franchisor and franchisees act so as to maximize their respective profits? To address this question, we study a two-stage advertising game between a franchisor and two adjacent franchisees. In the first stage of the game, the franchisor chooses between three advertising models – centralizing or delegating the two types of advertising to the franchisees or delegating only promotional advertising. In the second stage, given the franchisor’s choice of an advertising model, the two franchisees decide whether or not to cooperate. Our main findings are that (1) the franchisees should cooperate if the franchisor delegates either both brand-image and promotional advertising or promotional advertising, although cooperation between franchisees does not necessary improve the franchisor’s profits. (2) The choice of an advertising arrangement critically depends on the margins as well as the costs of performing both promotional and brand-image advertising. We also discuss the conditions under which the three advertising models should be implemented.     

随机需求下物流服务供应链订购策略研究

针对由单个物流服务提供商和集成商组成的物流服务供应链,基于集中化模式、纳什博弈模式和Stackelberg博弈模式三种典型模式,考虑市场需求随机且受服务质量缺陷承诺水平的影响,探讨物流服务供应链的订购与质量缺陷承诺策略问题。通过分析发现:物流服务质量缺陷承诺水平随着市场需求弹性系数的增加而递减,但其受物流服务集成商观测水平的影响却因合作模式不同而变化不一致;集中化模式下的物流服务订购量随着物流服务集成商观测水平或市场需求弹性系数的增大而递减,但在其他两种合作模式下物流服务订购量随着物流服务集成商观测水平或市场需求弹性系数的增加而增加;在三种模式下,物流服务供应链的整体利润随着市场需求弹性系数的增加而递减,但其受物流服务集成商观测水平的影响却因合作模式不同而变化不一致。     

Duopoly competition in networks

This paper presents a new approach to modeling competition between firms in network-based industries, i.e. industries where the firms' technology decisions correspond to choices of networks. Industries having this structure include transportation, telecommunications, and some service industries. Competition is studied between two firms who make both network design decisions and price decisions for services. This situation is modeled as a game, an equilibrium solution corresponding to a Nash equilibrium is defined, and properties of the solution are characterized. Necessary and sufficient conditions are shown for equilibrium solutions and existence of equilibrium solutions is demonstrated. Among the results is that each firm will maximize its own profit by minimizing total industry cost of providing services. An example demonstrating results is presented.     

基于演化博弈视角下的加盟式快递合作稳定性分析

针对我国加盟式快递企业逐渐暴露出的加盟商服务质量低下、各自为政、总部管理薄弱等引发的双方合作不稳定问题, 本研究以演化博弈模型为主要理论工具, 开发了不完全信息下快递公司总部和加盟商的行为交互演化博弈系统。通过雅克比矩阵求解, 揭示了博弈初始条件改变以及决策参数取值变动对演化稳定结果的影响;然后以申通公司为例, 采用MATLAB软件进行了数值仿真分析。研究表明, 当加盟商积极合作所增加的收益、快递公司总部的罚金、信息不对称程度和监督成本位于不同阈值区间时, 系统分别呈现出三种演化稳定结果和一种周期性的随机状态, 同时发现快递单价对促进博弈双方的合作稳定性具有积极作用。最后, ①降低快递加盟商服务成本, 提高服务质量;②建立适度的违约惩罚制度, 完善利润分配机制;③加强平台信息共享, 促进信息透明化;④营造良好的竞争氛围, 避免无谓的价格战, 有助于引导系统向理想状态演化。     

价格竞争下风险规避对闭环供应链决策的影响研究

基于零售商销售价格与回收价格竞争情形,构建了一个可持续的闭环供应链.考虑决策者风险规避行为,研究了闭环供应链成员的定价决策问题.利用博弈论,在风险中性与风险规避特性下分别探讨了批发价格,零售价格和回收价格的最优决策,并建立了它们的表达式.研究结论表明,仅当零售商具有风险规避时,制造商决策不受零售商的影响,而仅当制造商具有风险规避时,零售商决策会受制造商的影响.同时,当二者都具有风险规避特性时,他们之间的决策会相互影响.     

An analysis of p-median location problem: Effects of backup service level and demand assignment policy

Any solution to facility location problems will consider determining the best suitable locations with respect to certain criteria. Among different types of location problems, involving emergency service system (ESSs) are one of the most widely studied in the literature, and solutions to these problems will mostly aim to minimize the mean response time to demands. In practice, however, a demand may not be served from its nearest facility if that facility is engaged in serving other demands. This makes it a requirement to assign backup services so as to improve response time and service quality. The level of backup service is a key, strategic-level planning factor, and must be taken into consideration carefully. Moreover, in emergency service operations conducted in congested demand regions, demand assignment policy is another important factor that affects the system performance. Models failing to adopt sufficient levels of backup service and realistic demand assignment policies may significantly deteriorate the system performance.Considering the classic p-median problem (pMP) location model, this paper investigates the effects of backup service level, demand assignment policy, demand density, and number of facilities and their locations on the solution performance in terms of multiple metrics. For this purpose, we adopt a combined optimization and simulation approach. We will first modify the classic pMP to account for distances to backup services. Next, we employ a discrete event simulation to evaluate the performance of location schemes obtained from the deterministic mathematical model. Our results provide insights for decision-makers while planning ESS operations.     

A Multiobjective Approach to Design Franchise Outlet Networks

The economic goals and the resulting locational objectives of a franchisor and its individual franchisees are frequently in conflict. For example, one goal of the franchisor is to maximize system-wide market coverage, while the corresponding goal of the franchisee is to maximize his or her individual market share. Consequently, the optimal facility siting scheme from one perspective may be suboptimal from the other. That is, the facility siting scheme which maximizes system-wide coverage will not necessarily maximize the market shares of the individual franchises which make up the system. In this paper we introduce a multiobjective integer programming model to design franchise networks. The model selects franchise locations and identifies individual franchise market areas. Constraints in the formulation guarantee that all franchise locations are assigned at least a minimal threshold market area with sufficient demand to ensure economic survival. An underlying assumption of the model is that a rationing mechanism exists to assign demand to various franchise locations. Consequently, the model is most appropriate for service delivery franchises in which the franchisor can define and enforce exclusive franchise territories for the various franchise outlets. The purpose of this model is to generate alternative siting configurations which demonstrate the inherent trade-offs between the objectives of the franchisor and the individual franchisees. Given these various location alternatives, it is expected that the franchisor will then evaluate them in terms of other criteria such as the likelihood of the individual franchisee's success, pricing strategies for the various sites, total costs, total profit, and the effects of the response of competitors. Consequently, the proposed model should be viewed as an aid for one aspect of the decision process, i.e. the generation of alternative courses of action.     

A Mathematical Programming Model of Decentralized Multi-Level Systems

In decentralized systems, the objectives at the different levels often differ. Each level controls only a subset of the decision variables but is affected by the decisions made at the other levels. Recent methods in bi-level linear programming solve such systems better than decomposition methods. Here, the bi-level LP is extended to a bi-level system with many decision-makers at the lower level, and a tri-level system with one decision-maker at each level. In both of these cases, the higher level acts as the leader and the lower level as the follower in the Stackelberg game. The resulting techniques are illustrated with simple numerical examples.     

Deployment of rural health facilities in a developing country

This study describes the problem of finding suitable sites for additional health facilities in a rural area in Bangladesh. The objective is to improve the accessibility of people to the health care system given the existing set of facilities. As is frequently the case in developing countries, activities designed to develop and improve differing sectors of the infrastructure are poorly integrated and ill-coordinated. As a result, decision-makers may make independent and individual decisions about locating new service facilities. Often, as has been the case in Bangladesh, these decisions are taken at a relatively low level, by officers of local government or by elected leaders in a region, or by a combination of these. In the absence of any formal analysis and generation of alternatives, the final decision may be made on political or pragmatic considerations. As a result the decisions are often far from optimal. Ultimately, better health care will enhance many sectors of a regional economy, and so the decision about where to invest in new or better resources is important for reasons over and above that of providing health care for the population. In this paper, the role of location-allocation modelling in developing countries is considered, and the specific Bangladeshi problem is considered as a maximal covering location problem which is solved by an efficient heuristic method.     

Optimising a general repair kit problem with a service constraint

Field services are a particular type of after-sales service performed at the customer’s location where technicians repair malfunctioning machines. The inventory decisions about which spare part types to take to the repair site and in what quantities is called the repair kit problem. This problem is characterized by an order-based performance measure since a customer is only satisfied when all required spare parts are available to fix the machine. As a result, the service level in the decision making process is defined as a job fill rate. In this paper we derive a closed-form expression for the expected service level and total costs for the repair kit problem in a general setting, where multiple units of each part type can be used in a multi-period problem. Such an all-or-nothing strategy is a new characteristic to investigate, but commonly used in practice. Namely, items are only taken from the inventory when all items to perform the repair are available in the right quantity. We develop a new algorithm to determine the contents of the repair kit both for a service and cost model while incorporating this new expression for the job fill rate. We show that the algorithm finds solutions which differ on average 0.2% from optimal costs. We perform a case study to test the performance of the algorithm in practice. Our approach results in service level improvements of more than 30% against similar holding costs.     

Service capacity procurement of logistics service supply chain with demand updating and loss-averse preference

This paper studies the impacts of loss-averse preference on the service capacity procurement decisions with demand updating in a logistics service supply chain, which consists of one logistics service integrator and one functional logistics service provider. It starts from a basic two-stage Stackelberg game model, then, extends to three scenarios where either the integrator or the provider or neither of them has loss-averse preference. The impact of loss-averse preference on the decisions of supply chain members is discussed by comparing the four models. Our results reveal, first, the loss-averse preferences do not always affect the decisions of supply chain members. If certain conditions are satisfied, the logistics service integrator can benefit from its loss-averse preference. Second, the increased service level can affect the logistics service integrator's procurement strategy and the functional logistics service provider's pricing strategy. This effect is only related to the loss-averse preference of the functional logistics service provider. Last, under certain conditions, the total service capacity decreases with the increased service level, regardless of whether or not the supply chain members have loss-averse preferences.     

基于政府补贴的养老服务市场供给研究

随着我国老龄化速度加快,养老服务的有效供给问题是政府和学者关注的焦点。考虑政府财政补贴下,引入民办与公办养老服务的替代因子,构建民办养老机构与公办养老机构的服务动态供给模型,分析不同补贴方式和补贴力度对服务均衡供给量的影响,并进一步通过补贴乘数分析政府补贴对养老服务机构最优供给决策的影响程度。结果表明:政府对民办养老机构的财政补贴可以增加养老服务市场供给量,相较于运营补贴,政府建设补贴的政策效应更加明显;财政补贴降低了民办养老机构的建设成本和投资风险,刺激社会资本投入的积极性,民办养老服务供给增加幅度大于公办养老服务供给减少幅度,养老服务市场有效供给增加。在财政预算约束下,选择恰当的财政补贴方式,可以提高财政资源的配置效率,增加养老服务市场的有效供给,缓解养老服务财政压力。     

The capacitated maximal covering location problem with backup service

The maximal covering location problem has been shown to be a useful tool in siting emergency services. In this paper we expand the model along two dimensions — workload capacities on facilities and the allocation of multiple levels of backup or prioritized service for all demand points. In emergency service facility location decisions such as ambulance sitting, when all of a facility's resources are needed to meet each call for service and the demand cannot be queued, the need for a backup unit may be required. This need is especially significant in areas of high demand. These areas also will often result in excessive workload for some facilities. Effective siting decisions, therefore, must address both the need for a backup response facility for each demand point and a reasonable limit on each facility's workload. In this paper, we develop a model which captures these concerns as well as present an efficient solution procedure using Lagrangian relaxation. Results of extensive computational experiments are presented to demonstrate the viability of the approach.     

双渠道供应链中的价格决策与服务决策研究

在集中式和分散式决策条件下,应用两阶段优化技术和Stackelberg博弈的理论与方法,对一个制造商与一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链,重点考虑了制造商在网络渠道的服务决策,建立了利润最大化模型,得到了最优的价格策略和服务策略,研究表明,网络渠道的服务水平对制造商和零售商的价格决策有着重要影响,而且消费者对网络直销渠道的偏好对制造商和零售商价格决策和服务决策会产生很大影响．     

前景理论视角下专利代理服务模式优化研究

专利代理服务是知识产权服务体系中的重要组成,利用预期收益分配契约激励专利代理服务参与者,引导双方采取共赢的行为策略,是提高合作效率、提升专利代理服务效果的重要方向。在考虑决策者有限理性的基础上,提出一种专利代理服务预期收益分配方案,引入前景理论衡量心理因素对专利代理服务参与主体的影响,建立收益感知矩阵,构建演化博弈模型,刻画更贴近现实的认知决策过程,进而探讨技术发明人与专利代理机构之间的博弈关系和稳定策略,最后通过数值仿真揭示影响稳定策略的关键变量。结果表明:这种预期收益分配方案具有可行性,区别设置预期收益分配模式的违约处罚水平以及减小预期收益分成比重是避免违约、维持长期稳定合作的最佳途径。     

考虑供应商服务与零售商退货的定价博弈分析

研究由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的二级供应链,由供应商提供产品服务,零售商制定产品零售价,在一个销售周期结束后存在零售商向供应商的退货,退货产生的物流成本由零售商与供应商通过博弈的方式共同分担.基于博弈理论,建立了供应商和零售商以各自利润最大化为目标,以服务水平、零售价和退货为主要影响因素的Nash和Stackelberg博弈.采用数值方法,对这两个博弈进行了求解.得到供应商为零售商分担退货物流成本最优比例、供应商最优服务水平和零售商最优定价策略.研究表明,Nash博弈时的解是唯一的,此时供应商不会分担退货物流成本;Stackelberg博弈时,供应商分担退货物流成本比例依据批发价大小而定.     

A Cournot–Nash–Bertrand game theory model of a service-oriented Internet with price and quality competition among network transport providers

This paper develops a game theory model of a service-oriented Internet in which profit-maximizing service providers provide substitutable (but not identical) services and compete with the quantities of services in a Cournot–Nash manner, whereas the network transport providers, which transport the services to the users at the demand markets, and are also profit-maximizers, compete with prices in Bertrand fashion and on quality. The consumers respond to the composition of service and network provision through the demand price functions, which are both quantity and quality dependent. We derive the governing equilibrium conditions of the integrated game and show that it satisfies a variational inequality problem. We then describe the underlying dynamics, and provide some qualitative properties, including stability analysis. The proposed algorithmic scheme tracks, in discrete-time, the dynamic evolution of the service volumes, quality levels, and the prices until an approximation of a stationary point (within the desired convergence tolerance) is achieved. Numerical examples demonstrate the modeling and computational framework.     

Strategic interactions in traditional franchise systems: Are franchisors always better off?

The effects of price competition and advertising spillover on franchisees’ decision to cooperate and on franchisor’s contractual preferences are investigated. We show that the franchisees’ decision to cooperate or not depends on the type of franchise contracts. Under exclusive territory contracts, any mode of play between franchisees give the same profits to the franchisees and franchisor. Contracts that allow price competition and well targeted local advertising offer a good ground for horizontal cooperation, which may or may not benefit the franchisor depending on whether the prices are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. Contracts in which price competition is allowed and the burden of advertising decisions is totally transferred to the franchisor lead to cooperation between franchisees at the expense of the franchisor. Franchisees do not cooperate to the benefit of the franchisor if local advertising is predatory and price competition is not allowed in the contract, but franchisees are given the responsibility to undertake local advertising. Also, the franchisor endorses cooperation between franchisees when local advertising has a public good nature, but such a cooperation may never occur when the impact of local advertising on demand is significant. We finally show that while some contracts always dominate others, the choice of a franchise contract may also depend on local competition and/or the franchise goodwill.     

A two-player competitive discrete location model with simultaneous decisions

In this paper we will describe and study a competitive discrete location problem in which two decision-makers (players) will have to decide where to locate their own facilities, and customers will be assigned to the closest open facilities. We will consider the situation in which the players must decide simultaneously, unsure about the decisions of one another, and we will present the problem in a franchising environment. Most problems described in the literature consider sequential rather than simultaneous decisions. In a competitive environment, most problems consider that there is a set of known and already located facilities, and new facilities will have to be located, competing with the existing ones. In the presence of more than one decision-maker, most problems found in the literature belong to the class of Stackelberg location problems, where one decision-maker, the leader, locates first and then the other decision-maker, the follower, locates second, knowing the decisions made by the first. These types of problems are sequential and differ significantly from the problem tackled in this paper, where we explicitly consider simultaneous, non-cooperative discrete location decisions. We describe the problem and its context, propose some mathematical formulations and present an algorithmic approach that was developed to find Nash equilibria. Some computational tests were performed that allowed us to better understand some of the features of the problem and the associated Nash equilibria. Among other results, we conclude that worsening the situation of a player tends to benefit the other player, and that the inefficiency of Nash equilibria tends to increase with the level of competition.     

Optimal configuration of telephone answering sites in a service industry

The location of facilities, plants, warehouses, distribution centers and the like has always been an important managerial problem. This paper is concerned with the optimal location of telephone answering sites for a non-competitive service organization within the public sector. The answering site network must service the entire United States. The methodological approach taken to addressing the telephone site location problem was integer programming. While the paper to be described herein presents the problem in a conceptual fashion, the approach adopted was in fact the basis of an actual model within a particular national service organization. For reasons of confidentially, the subject organization has requested to remain anonymous.This model and paper presents a conceptual treatment of a portion of a larger study to encompass all aspects of the telephone site location question; that portion directly related to site location and telecommunications. Non-telecommunications aspects such as staffing, space and property considerations, plus other operating cost and non-cost considerations, the latter including organizational and managerial aspects, were also a part of a larger study of which treatment herein will be excluded. The model discussed and developed provided the principal focus and basis for decision making pertaining to this project, primarily due to the large proportion of total costs involved.The study project is national in scope in that callers from all parts of the country have need for various kinds of technical and non-technical information at all times of the year. The location aspect of the telecommunications portion of the telephone model is itself but one aspect of the total problem. Additional aspects include the optimal number of telephone answering sites as well as the appropriate domain (geography served) of each site and the telecommunications (circuitry) configuration at each site.While results of the modelling effort have not been made officially public by the organization under study, it can be stated that the modelling effort resulted in several organization changes including opening and closing of individual offices, domain realignments of new or existing offices, and significant cost savings primarily due to telecommunication cost reductions and increased utilization of telephone answering manpower.